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The central aim of this thesis is to provide an exposition of the decay of the
categories of political economy first made famous by classical political
economy, but subjected to rigorous critique by Marx. An explanation of the
following form the theoretical core of the thesis: the decay of the categories -
abstract labour, value and capital (in it's fixed, circulating and variable forms);
how the decay of these categories lead to the collective formation of the working
class; and how, combined, they provide the key to understanding the full
ramifications of the weakening of commodityfetishism and decline of capitalism.
Marx, in the latter chapters of Capital volume one, explained and described in
some detail the primitive accumulation of capital. In those passages one has the
developmental creation of the categories of capitalism, aided and abetted by the
force of the State. As the categories of capitalism developed their hold over
society, so did commodity fetishism, as markets swamped the supply and use of
the power of labour (who were being discarded from the land in droves,
especially after the mid decades of the eighteenth century- the process of
primitive accumulation). Marx describes the process vividly, " Thus were the
agricultural people, first forcibly removed from the soil, driven from their homes,
turned into vagabonds, and then whipped, branded, tortured by laws grotesquely
terrible, into the discipline necessary for the wage system....The advance of
capitalist production develops a working class, which by education, tradition,
habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident laws
of Nature. The organisation of the capitalist process of production, once fully
developed, breaks down all resistance. The constant generation of a relative
surplus-population keeps the law of supply and demand of labour, and therefore,
2keeps wages, in a rut that corresponds with the wants of capitaL The dull
compulsion of economic relations completes the subjection of the labourer to
capital" .1
The above passages, and many of a similar nature in Capital, are prime examples
of the Marxist method: historical without being reduced to mere 'history of
appearance'; genetical without being reduced to idealist generic abstraction.
What Marx offers in these passages on primitive accumulation, is nothing short
of the historical development and eventual ascendancy of the dialectically related
social categories ofcapitalism. This thesis, attempts to at least follow the logic
of this method, by providing a similar historical dialectics of the very same
categories of capitalism - in their period of decline. The task will be to reveal
the decline of 'the dull compulsion of capital over labour' in Britain. In this
sense, the thesis does not claim to provide a 'history' of capitalist decline in
Britain, this has been done ad nauseum. Rather, the thesis attempts to adopt
Marx's historical dialectical method, in order to provide a theory of the decline
ofthe capitalist social system - the theory will guide the use of empirical history.
More specifically, the thesis is concerned with establishing an alternative
Marxist theory of the decline of capitalist social relations of production in
Britain. The thesis moves through three distinct phases to complete the task
comprehensively. Firstly, a critique of the existing literature concerning decline
is undertaken, with specific reference to Britain. Secondly, an alternative
Marxist theory of decline is put forward. Thirdly, the full implications of the
theory is then expounded by way of a case study of British capitalism. Of course
capitalist social relations of production are universal, in the sense that they are
global relations of exchange and exploitation, as well as being specific to
individual nations. Therefore, inevitably, the exposition of the concept of
lKarl Marx (1978), The Genesis ofCapital, p32, Progress Publishers (originally taken from Capital vol one).
3capitalist decline will extend, on occasions, beyond my chosen case study -
Britain. Nevertheless the main concern is with British capitalism and its specific
path to decline.
The thesis will reveal that fundamental to a Marxist theory of decline is the
decline of abstract labour. The major signifier of this event, it will be argued,
was the systematic drift away from the gold standard of the major capitalist
currencies during the 1930s. The decline of the capitalist system; the drift away
from the gold standard; and the decline of abstract labour are the phenomenal
forms, giving expression to the underlying social relations of class struggle
between capital and labour.
In so far as the phenomenal forms of expression of capitalist decline are
concerned, the thesis details an account of how, why and in what manner, for
Marxists, gold acts as the material embodiment of social abstract labour. It will
be explained, in some detail, why abstract labour is the substantive ground for the
commodity (which is a use and exchange value), and how the drift from gold
facilitated the social rupture of use and exchange value immanent in the
commodity form of production. Once this social rupture had occurred,
production for exchange value and profit lost its hold over production for use and
need fulfilment. Something fundamental had occurred: commodity fetishism -
the social mechanism of control over labour - had weakened its objective and
ideological hold over labour considerably, which in tum had allowed capitalist
decline to move decisively from underlying potential to actuality. The thesis
will provide a clear exposition of the ramifications of this for the capitalist
system in Britain.
In so far as the underlying social relations of class struggle are concerned, the
thesis will reveal how, the interrelated processes of a deepening social and
4political integration of labour, on the one hand, and the political consolidation of
the power of fmance capital to manage the declining economy, on the other,
underlay the movement away from the gold standard, the decline of abstract
labour formation and the decline of commodity fetishism. The decline of
abstract labour and with it its material embodiment - gold, allowed the increasing
opposition within commodity production relations, (between use value and
exchange value) more room for expression within the capitalist system. This had
two effects, which this thesis explores in detail. On the one hand, it provided the
basis for the working class to achieve vital reforms within the capitalist system;
achievements which consolidated their social integration and political
consciousness. On the other hand, because exchange value had weakened its
hold over use value and needs, capital (in the form of finance capital) had of
necessity to forge a political economy of control over use value (if working class
revolution was to be avoided). The thesis will argue that this new political
economy of fmance capital took the form of Labourism. Hence, another vital
component of a Marxist theory of decline, which this thesis aims to provide, will
be an explanation of the political economy of the rise and eventual fall of
Labourism.
It will be argued in detail that Labourism was the systematic attempt, by a
declining capitalism, to administer control over use value production and
distribution, in an effort to prevent the working class from taking full control
over the defmition of their own needs. Labourism, as bureaucratic
administration, was, more fundamentally, a form of political atomisation which
prevented the working class from becoming a class in itself. The thesis will
detail the social forces involved in Labourism's ascendancy, and the role it
played in the bureaucratic regulation of an ailing commodity form of social
production and political atomisation of labour. More specifically, a vital part of
the thesis will attempt to explains the key roles of the Social Democratic left and
5that of Stalinism in creating social conditions conducive for fmance capital to
feel confident enough to take on the working class and adopt systemic
Labourism.
Finally, the thesis explores the contradictions of the Labourist system once
established in Britain after the Second World War. The main objective will be
to reveal the impossibility of any lasting compromise between labour and capital.
Specific conditions external and inherent to Labourism, had provided a 'window
of opportunity' for concessions to be made to use value and need based
production, whilst still maintaining buoyant profit rates. The thesis will explain
why this 'window of opportunity' could provide no long lasting solution for
capitalism in decline.
To this end, the fmal chapter of the thesis explores external factors, such as,
world trade conditions, the sterling area and rising US imperialism; alongside
inherent factors to Labourism, such as, social welfare, the decommodification of
labour supply and the decommodification of money capital. It is argued that, for
a brief period at least, the external conditions provided a profitable basis for
fmance capital, which made them conducive to allowing the processes of
decommodification and social welfare reforms, at the heart of the Labourist
system. It will be explained how and why this compromise between capital and
labour, was in fact a stalemate between the two classes; and how the result of
this stalemate produced the infamous 'short-termism', so much spoken about
within social democratic Left circles, but so little understood. It will further be
argued that two factors - the decline of the sterling area and growing
politicisation of the labour movement - eventually brought the compromise to an
end and signalled the advance of what has come to be termed 'Thatcherism'.
Following the logic of the thesis, Thatcherism, it is argued, constitutes an attempt
by British capitalism to recommodify labour. However, as explained, the
6recommodification ultimately has no substance, as the substantive ground for
commodification - abstract labour based on gold - no longer exists. Thus
'Thatcherism' merely accelerates the process of decline, as expressed by rapid
de-industrialisation and increasing levels of fmancial speculation.
7INTRODUCTION
The phrase 'social relation' has come to mean different things to different
Marxists. At this point I would like to make clear what I take to be of essence to
the social relations of capitalism. Emphasis will be placed on the Classical
Marxist tradition' This tradition maintains that the essence of the capital relation
is the twofold nature of the production process. On the one hand, it serves for
the material production of use values, and on the other hand, it is a sphere where
individuals produce and reproduce exchange value, surplus value. The latter
dominates the former and is often referred to as 'the valorisation process'. The
process substantiates or objectively grounds the subjective manifestations of
commodity fetishism', which, in brief, allures to the process whereby the
working class accept their exploitation as natural and society in general
fetishises the cult of the atomised individual, as opposed to recognising the
irreducible social nature of being. The law of value is central to the social
relations of capitalism. A fuller exposition of the law of value must be reserved
for the next chapter. However, to contextualise the critique of existing theories
of decline soon to be taken up in chapter one, the essential processes of the
theory require immediate explication.
The fact that labour is wage labour is evidence that labour has two forms: an
exchange value form and a use or need fulfilling form. These are two different
qualities which must equate to allow production and exchange to occur.
General commodities produced have the same two forms and as in the case of
labour they are of two different qualities - exchange and use which must equate.
2 By classical Marxism I refer to Marx and Engels. An example, of their classical statement concerning
the ontology of production relations can be found in: 'The German Ideology' (1846); and also in their 'A
Contribution To A Critique Of Political Economy' (1859).
3 This expresses the fact in capitalism whereby individuals reproduce their social relations via the
circulation of material things (commodities). The development of money capital is the universal equivalent
expression of this fetishism of commodities.
8The fact that labour and other commodities exchange and that capitalist society
has grown on the basis that labour valorises (creates more exchange value from
the act of labour), means that the equation takes place every day. Thus the
capitalist social relation creates its own peculiar equaliser.
The exchange value form is money and price. Money is universal in that it is a
form with one quality: exchangeability. The use value form is always particular
and concrete; all the useful things produced by labour are qualitatively different.
Thus the equaliser (money) has to have an unusual capacity: it must be universal
and particular simultaneously. Money/value expressed in gold has just this
characteristic. Marx unearthed the process. Competitive accumulation between
capitalists over the extraction of surplus value from wage labour, produced the
need for a universal expression of the value of particular labour powers exerted
for capital. The social relation drives towards the ever more adequate
representation of abstract socially necessary labour. Eventually the capitalist
social relation is able to express this in the most attainable bodily/material form
possible: gold (after many near misses with silver). Hence gold becomes the
universal equivalent of the expression, within particular labour and particular
commodities, of value and its substance abstract labour.
When capitalist social relations are at a peak they allow gold to ground the
opposition between use and exchange value, thus keeping it intact. As a result
prices, the form through which capitalists extract surplus value, roughly indicate
the socially necessary worth of labour power and allows accumulation to
advance. In conjunction with this the grounding of exchange and use value by
gold, consolidates commodity fetishism both objectively and subjectively. It is
because of this that the working class is more likely to remain a class in itself
and not a class for itself. The working class are also more likely to accept the
logic of the market over the outcome of wage negotiation, as well as the logic of
9labour process controls and conditions as being rightful and necessary to
profitability.
It is necessary to make these preliminary remarks because this type of exposition
of the law of value has become undermined by what is often referred to as the
'capital logic school' of Marxism. This approach is critiqued in more detail later.
What one can say here is that in this school, the law of value suffers reification
due to the fact that it centres on the quantitative aspects of the law. On this
point, Rubin" refers to a decisive distinction within Marx's value theory. Rubin
emphasised that for Marx, there were two theoretically distinct aspects to value :
the qualitative and the quantitative. Rubin maintained that Marx never made
these distinctions sufficiently clear in the theoretically demanding opening
sections of Capital Vol 1; nevertheless the distinctions are most important. On
the one hand, Rubin points out, one has the quantitative aspect of value, the,
transmission belt which transfers the movement
of working processes from one part of society to another
making that society a functioning whole.
With this quantitative aspect to the fore, one is able to analyse capitalism's 'laws
of accumulation' and the major impulse which drives it, ie, the need to pump out
surplus value profitably. For a Marxist political economy this is of course a quite
proper and essential aspect. However, there is another more fundamental aspect
of the value relation, which, if ignored, reduces the ontological status of the 'laws
of accumulation' and the forms of value deriving from them to ideal concepts
similar to the Kantian tradition. This aspect is the essential substance of value :
the contradiction between concrete and abstract labour. This most essential
aspect of Marx's original discovery over and above classical political economy,
4 See Rubin, (Black Rose edt 1979).
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is usually given short shrift by modem Marxist political economists en route to
what they see as the main ingredient: value as the ultimate technical distributor
of capital and labour about the economy ('ultimate' given the reality of
monopolies. In the 'long run' it is argued the 'law' of value can always be relied
upon to reasserts itself. See, eg, Mandel 1972). Rubin, following Marx,' was at
pains to emphasis the essential importance of this qualitative aspect over and
above the quantitative. As he explained,
The specific character of Marx's labour theory of value
lies in the fact that Marx does not base his theory on
the properties of value, ie, on the acts of equalisation
and evaluation ofthings, but on the properties ofLabour
in the commodity economy, ie, on the analysis of the
working structure andproduction relations of labour.
When it is emphasised that 'our starting point is not value, but labour',6
then the central question for modem day Marxists on the subject of value is not
whether 'prices are determined by value in the long run, despite monopoly'; or
even the more essential: 'why labour has of necessity to take the form of value',"
but, rather, it is how an increasingly sociallabour process leads necessarily to
the negation of value (a process explained in the following chapter).
Contemporary Marxist political economy rarely takes heed of Rubin's distinction.
Thus for the overwhelming majority 'value is the starting point', whilst the
substantive contradiction within labour, if not ignored, as is usual, is merely
glossed over.8 That such a reversal should have taken place is evidence of a
5 The reader is refered to Marx's 'Notes on Wagner' (see T. Carvel's 'Marx's Method').
6 All the above quotes aretaken from Rubin, op-cit, p8I.
7 Rubin, chapter one p6-8, ibid.
8 Sweezy gives it brief consideration, yet treats it inessentially, ie, physiologically, as the general
expenditure of human sweat, nerve and tissue. The problem with this is that when one comes to consider the
reduction of labour with qualitatively different skills, it is all done in the head, via calculation of unskilled
'man hours etc. To put it bluntly, this view sees it as no more than a concept; a Kantian abstraction, or,
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move away from a dialectical and essentialist grasp of the categories of political
economy and towards formal logical approach underwritten by an atomistic
ontology.
I will expound on this critique shortly, what is important to stress here is that
capitalist decline is about the decline of some essential categories mentioned
above. The decline of abstract labour in the form of gold; the decline of the
importance and dominance of exchange value; valorisation; the decline of
objective and subjective commodity fetishism. A theory of declining capitalism
should also be about the growing importance of use value, need and collectivity
above individualism and profit. The thesis will explicate a theory of the
dialectics of this process and reveal, through case study, how capital decline has
become manifest in Britain. Because decline is not linear, but dialectical, in the
sense that the categories not only oppose and attract each other and establish
new forms of the contradictory social relation, but also realign in terms of which
dominates - use or exchange (as class struggle, or lack of it, determines), then the
thesis must also reveal how capitalist society continually attempts to draw back
from decline. It must also reveal the ramifications for wage labour, in the sense
of revealing the increasingly complex array of means of political atomisation
wage labour endures. Once the main form of control over wage labour -
objective commodity fetishism - falter, as they must do in decline, then political
atomisation, which can take many forms, becomes necessary to the systems
survival. Again it is the task of this thesis to outline such forms of atomisation.
Weberian 'ideal type'. The same wrongly conceibed notion of value and abstract labour causes problems for
Mandel (particularly his theory of unequal exchange as the basis of dependency between third world
economies and imperialist economies), n this see P. Mattick (1981 p183-99). Arguably to say, as Mandel does,
that there are different socially necessary labour times per nation, is to deny gold its substantive social form
as a particular concrete universal abstraction of labour. To ignore this aspect of gold its due consideration, is
the result of a misconception of the ontological status of value (an ontology which will be explained in chapter
three).
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As mentioned, these issues will be taken up in full in later chapters. The first
task is a critique of the existing literature on decline. The critique will extend
into chapters one and two and will embrace contributions from right to left of the
political spectrum. I have categorised them into three broad groups for purposes
of clarity and exposition: the pro-capitalist right (PCR); the non-Marxist left
(NML) and Marxists. It is of course realised that within each group there are
important variations of theory, some of which will find expression in the thesis,
although much will not. There are important reasons for classifying them as a
group and these will be explained enroute. Chapter one opens with a critique of
PCR, before moving on to a critique of the NML and Marxist group. Chapter
two extends the critique of Marxism by considering the roots of the remcation of
the law of value in Classical Marxism (defmed in the text). Chapter three deals
with the constructive phase of the thesis, in as much as, following on from the
critique, it outlines an alternative approach to a Marxist theory of decline. The
remaining chapters four, five, six and seven operationalise the theory via a case
study of the development of capitalist social relations of production in Britain.
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CHAPTER ONE
A CRITIQUE OF NON MARXIST THEORIES OF DECLINE
1.1 The de-Industrialisation Thesis
In assuming the naturalness of markets and so of course the value form, the pro
capitalist right (PCR) and non-Marxist left (NML) seek out other less essential
phenomenon to explain the reason for British capitalist decline. However, as
will be argued, by assuming away the very essence of decline, their respective
theories suffer insurmountable ambiguities, not least of which is the conflation
of decline with 'de-industrialisation'; a necessary result of the tendency to equate
capital, not with the value form, but with 'industrialisation'. It is as well at this
point to offer a working definition of what the (PCR) and non-Marxist Left mean
by 'de-industrialisation'. In this respect Caslin's definition is as representative as
any other and has the benefit of bringing into relief the ambiguities which haunt
the concept of de-industrialisation (T. Caslin and H. Vane. 1987 p240).
De-industrialisation is a word with several shades
of meaning, but in its most straightforward sense
it has come to mean the dismantling of a country's
manufacturing base, a base which in the U.K's case
has supported it for 200 years. The most obvious
manifestation of the process are lengthening lists
of factory closures, bankruptcy of industrial firms
and heavy job losses in manufacturing. Many indicators
show that since 1975 the country has moved from
a state of relative industrial decline into a state of
14
absolute industrial decline.
Although both the NML and the PCR are in agreement that de-industrialisation is
a fundamental issue they differ over which is the most essential variables in the
process. For the NML the decline in domestic manufacturing and national
economic disequilibrium (vis-a-vis competitor economies) are the important
variable; for the PCR the decline in private ownership and markets are the key
variables. PCR recognise the NML case, but feel this can be remedied by the
revival of the market economy. The NML by contrast see the revival of markets
and privatisation as a negative force, exacerbating the decline of manufacturing
and national economic disequilibrium. From a Marxist perspective, it follows
that what divides the NML from the PCR is essentially this : the former believe
class compromise holds the key to manufacturing revival (and so a revival of the
balance of payments); the latter believe class compromise and its manifestation -
the 'interventionist State' - has in fact been the cause of market decline and as a
result manufacturing decline. Implicit, therefore, to the PCR case is the need to
end class compromise and increase the power of the ruling capitalist class to
increase the alienation and exploitation of the working class (in all its
heterogeneity). Of course on most occasions the discourse of the NML and PCR
is conducted in terms of 'entrepreneurs', 'managers' and 'the labour force';
'efficiency', 'flexibility' and 'harmony of interests'. Nevertheless, the substantive
meaning underlying both is found in the attempt to redefine and realign class
structure.
As will be argued, the formal discourse within which both PCR and NML argue
their respective case, ultimately binds and limits their understanding of the
decline of capitalism as manifest in Britain. In their overt denial of the essential
relation of classes, they commit themselves, of necessity, to an ontology of
atomism: they wish to see the social world in terms of atomised individuals,
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institutions. Whether it is the individual, institution or indeed 'class', they are all
invariably con±lated as abstract economic variables to be manipulated in the
interest of the 'balance of payments' or the prosperity/survival of another
abstraction 'the national economy'. The obscurantism's which emanate from
atomism and its abstractions of course have their own political purpose: they act
as a shield for the suppression of the working class by capitalist forces.
Relatedly, they also allow one faction of capital to secure hegemony over other
divided factions. It is imperative that this underlying discourse is born in mind as
we now move on to consider firstly the explanation proffered by the PCR and
secondly the explanation proffered by the NML as to the causes of decline.
1.2 The rc« Explanation
Throughout the so called 'consensus years' (1940-76), characterised above all by
state intervention to guarantee full employment, the PCR campaigned vigorously
about the, largely mythical, virtues of the 'free market'. For example, for Hayek
the decline of markets and the encroachment of the regulative State, enshrined in
the post war settlement, cemented the infrastructure, not of progress through co-
operation, but of a Road To Serfdom for humanity, initially established by the
Soviet Union. The Mont Pelerin Society (1947); Institute of Economic Affairs
(1956); Centre For Policy Studies (1974), provided the intellectual forums for the
persistent if not consistent reaction against the decline of market capitalism.
Practically and financially these were backed up by various right wing
organisations which included Conservative politicians and industrialists.
Organisations such as 'The Progress Trust; the National League of Freedom'; the
Society of Individualists'; the 'Aims of Industry'; the 'Salisbury Goup' and the
'Seldon Group'.
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It is this community of capitalist interests, which provided theoretical and
practical support to the more overt class confrontations surrounding currency
manipulation, and speculation, State constraints on spending, defming the
accepted limits of trade union involvement in the affairs of capital accumulation
and the State. Although each group was established to represent particular
interests within particular time periods of class struggle, they have the same
underlying rationale: to promote and regenerate market capitalism and to resist
the trend towards greater State involvement. Ultimately the two rationale's relate
around the one objective: suppressing the threat of labour and prolonging
capitalist rule. Thus, in the language of Von Mises (1944), 'The main issue in
present day social and political conflicts is whether or not man should give away
freedom, private initiative, and individual responsibility and surrender to the
guardianship of a gigantic apparatus of compulsion and coercion, the socialist
State" Thirty years later Keith Joseph, leader of the PCR faction within the
Conservative Party, had more or less the same epochal message. Campaigning
against the post war settlement and State interference in the class confrontation
between capital and labour, which increasingly favoured labour, he argued,
'There is no time to be mealy-mouthed. Since the end of the Second World War
we have had altogether too much Socialism'. As a result, Joseph argues, '..we
have the lowest pay and the lowest production per head. We have the highest
taxes and the lowest investment'. Joseph conveniently associated socialism with
the Labour Party and the bureaucratic State and then personified it in 'Bennism'.
The 'path to Benn, he then argued, is paved with thirty years of interventions;
thirty years of good intentions; thirty years of disappointments'. 10
9L. Von Mises, Bureaucracy, (1944).
l°Quote taken from Joseph's 1974 speech at Upminster, cited in R. Cockett, Thinking The Unthinkable, 1995,
Fontana Press.
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Simon Webley one of the founding members of the right wing Centre for Policy
Studies (CPS) echoes the sentiments of all of the PCR regarding the path
required to be taken; '..wealth must be created by the efficient use of scarce
resources. This can only be achieved by a vigorous, efficient and well motivated
private sector, producing a surplus(profit), a proportion of which goes to sustain
and develop 'welfare' services in their widest sense'. Putting this in class terms:
increased capital expansion is predicated on diminishing the State's regulation of
markets and allowing capital to deal with labour on more directly favourable
terms. Hence the inverted commas surrounding 'welfare' denotes a welfare
which does not debilitate the recommodification of labour ( as 'high' social
benefits do), and which does not assist the extensive decommodification of
goods and services (nationalisation).
The capitalist system in the 1970s came under increased strain world wide:
experiencing falling rates of profit and shrinking markets. Capitalism in Britain
experienced this as chronic inflation, speculative runs on Sterling and property,
merger mania and of course class militancy. Organised labour was beginning to
mobilise itself politically around the issue of defending the welfare state and
State intervention in general. The anti-State theory of the PCR began to gain
ground as the explanation of the current predicament of capitalism. Indeed so
much so that the Labour Party went so far as to assist the removal of their own
political and economic foundations, when introducing monetarism during the
period of intense class antagonisms of 1974-76. First, Labour bound themselves
to a cut back on State intervention imposed by international capital, in the form
of the IMF loan fund. Secondly, monetarism became a central plank of Party
policy when the then Labour Prime Minister Callaghan, gave his annual Mansion
House speech to the effect that Keynsianism is dead and the welfare State was
no longer affordable. Such circumstances propelled the PCR to centre stage. A
number of theories of 'the problem of the State' began to surface and to be acted
18
upon. In many ways the work of Bacon and Eltis (1976) encapsulate the reified
theory and practice of the ascending forces of the PCR. Closer examination of
this work brings into relief the inconsistencies of the PCR's understanding of
their own systems decline.
Bacon and Eltis, following Liberal philosophy in general, start from the initial
assumption that the market economy is both natural and inevitable: the outcome
of basic innate passions (mainly pleasure and pain) and the unbounded
maximising rational of individuals. Because the market is natural and universal
in character in so far as it is a manifestation of 'human nature', it cannot be in
decline in and of itself. Reasons for market decline can only ever exist outside
of the market. Hence Bacon and Eltis assert at the beginning of their most
famous work" that neither the labour market, the capital market (with regard
investments), nor industrial productivity are the cause of 'Britain's economic
problem'. Their claim is that there has always been adequate investment in the
latest technology; the labour movement was never particularly troublesome; and
industrial production had always steadily increased.
Nevertheless Bacon and Eltis square up to the fact that there is a problem of
decline, 'Britain - like many underdeveloped countries - has an economy with
serious structural problems'." Indeed as they accept, by the mid 1970s the
structural problems had achieved the heady mix of zero growth, rapid inflation,
substantial unemployment and an ever widening imbalance of payments.
Apparently this 'structural problem' was so embedded that as far as Bacon and
Eltis were concerned, 'tinkerers'" attempting to alleviate the problem of decline
simply made matters worse. Thus devaluation, incomes policies, tax breaks,
demand management etc.. were all to no avail and in reality positively harmful.




The structural problem in the economy was caused wholly by the State. Quite
simply the State crowds out the essentially healthy forces of the market and
private property
For Bacon and Eltis the central problem of decline is one of 'Too Few
Producers' (market based capital and labour)" relative to a growing army of
non-producers (State based use of capital and labour). 'Producers' are all those
engaged in private capital accumulation. Non-producers, by defmition, are all
those who create goods and services with little direct relevance to capital
accumulation (for example, most of the States economic and social activities).
The market sector (value producing sector) has consistently overseen healthy
increases in productivity, leading to the normal reductions in manpower within
the productive sectors effected. However, the problem: labour forces thus
shedded have not been re diverted to up and coming new productive sectors
(sites of valorisation). Instead they have been diverted towards unproductive
activity (State employment). Therefore, according to Bacon and Eltis, despite the
rise in productivity (evidence of basic market healthiness), industrial production
(capital accumulation) has increased at less than half the rate than it should
otherwise have done during the post war decades, particularly the 60s and 70s.
All this is no fault of the market itself. Effectively the state, it is argued, has
'crowded out' an otherwise healthy and vibrant market (productive) sector.
Specifically it does this by encroaching upon the supply of labour, the supply of
capital and supply of resources, which, paradoxically, are made available
because of the efficiencies of the market economy. State intervention also sets
in train other profound ramifications. For example, state economic intervention
causes balance of payment crises that beset Britain and causes inflationary
pressures. Both occur, it is claimed, as a result of too many non producers
14 This is the rather apt title of Bacon and ELtis's book1978 book refered to above.
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chasing too few marketable products. The occurrence of too few marketable
products is in turn viewed as the result of falling investments in response to the
'squeeze on profits' suffered by the market sector. To complete the circle, the
squeeze on profits are seen as a result of high taxation and full employment
conditions creating the context of wage militancy, both of which are ultimately
caused by State intervention.
Bacon and Eltis in explanation point to the 'facts': since the 1960s the non-market
sector has 'crowded out' the market sector. For example, the fact that
employment in manufacturing fell 13% between 1961-74; whilst, in the same
period, the non-market public sector experienced great expansion - local
government 54%, education 76% - 'proves' that the State has crowded out the
market':". (Bacon and Eltis are not short of graphs and figures) only one
conclusion can follow from the welter of empirical 'proof that they produce:
Given that the market sector is crucial because it is the heart of the productive
sector both in investment and consumer Goods, and for home consumption and
export - State intervention is against the 'national interest.'
PCR theory taken as a whole claims to provide the 'theoretical' justification for
rolling back the state and deploying labour back into the market sector, to be
subsumed once more by capital: both are said to serve the 'national interest' and
the interests of individual freedom and as such will necessarily reverse the
decline in the economy. From Samuel Brittan to M. Friedman one encounters
differing shades of the same theme. PCR claims have been challenged from a
number of angles: empirically, theoretically and practically.
IS Figures from T. Caslin and H. Vane, (1987), p248.
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Empirically this thesis has been successfully challenged by Hadjimatheou and
Skouras 16 . They reveal, firstly, that the Tax burden in the UK over the period in
question relative to other industrialised nations could hardly be described as
excessive. Secondly, 80% of the supposed tax burden did not fall on profits but
rather upon consumers; hence a profit squeeze, at least from this direction, was
not a causal factor in decline. In fact if anything corporate taxation fell during
the post war period.17
With respect to the claim that labour shortages in the private sector was a key
factor in decline, as Hodgson has pointed out, 75% of workers entering the
expanding public sector in the 1970s were women. This means any growth in the
so called 'non-market sector' was overwhelmingly accounted for by the greater
participation of women in the labour market and not due to the redistribution of
men from 'productive' activity, a consideration which would discount the Bacon
and Eltis claim of a labour market 'squeeze'." From another direction, Kohl has
argued that evidence from economies such as Germany, France, Austria,
Netherlands..etc, suggests the greater the public investment, taxation and use of
labour, the greater the growth in the rate of productivity and output enjoyed."
Thus far from crowding out the market sector, State interventionism has provided
it with renewed sources of accumulation. Empirically this is true of Britain too,
for without State subsidisation (direct and indirect) of key industries (specifically
the military sector), then accumulation rates would have been far worse than they
in fact were/are.
16 T. Caslin and H. Vane p249-52, ibid (1987).
17This claim is made in PA Hall, The State and Economic Decline, in Elabaum and Lazonick (edt),(1986).
18 The reader is refered to Eltis's article, Overviews ofDecline in, D. Coates and J. Hillard (edt) (1986),
r~}~Oh1, Trends and Problems in Public Expenditure Development in Western Europe and North America,
in, P Flora and A Heidenheimer, (edt) (1981).
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Judged historically the PCR theory that the State is the major culprit in the
decline of capitalism in Britain, becomes patently ludicrous. During the latter
part of the nineteenth century, before State intervention was minimal compared
to the present, capitalism in Britain was racked by the so called Great
Depression. No matter from what angle one looks at it, the Great Depression
signifies a prolonged period of years (decades) when the laws of supply and
demand did not function and capital disinvested in fixed capital and labour
According to Robbin, for example, 20 roughly between the years 1870-96 there
occurred a sustained fall in growth rates, a downward trend in the rate of profit
and low pnces. All of which occurred for prolonged periods within the
designated (or disputed) zone years of depression. All of which, to reiterate,
occurred when State intervention was minimal. One thing that was not minimal
however was working class collective strength to resist exploitation. Many
historians agree that the employed working class experienced gains in their
standard of living. In the face of declining prices, the growing collective
resistance of workers ensured real wages rose throughout the period. This is a
decisive factor, which indicates a more fundamental problem of the era for
capitalism. A problem with renewed applicability today; a problem discussed in
more detail later.
In Practical terms, what have cuts in public spending produced? According to
the theory of the PCR, the problem was too much state interference. Cutting
back on this interference would presumably unravel the inherently dynamic
market sector. The truth is that, in practice, the opposite has occurred: the
market sector has declined even further, suggesting State intervention was in fact
its major prop rather than a major source of weakness. For example, the public
sector cuts wielded by the labour Government between 1976-79, under the
direction of the LM.F, met little positive response, in the way of expansion of the
20 Keith Robbins (1983), p5I.
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market sector, which clearly should have happened given the PCR's assurances
of its essentially vibrant underlying state. In fact the public sector cuts proved the
opposite of Bacon and Eltis's claim that the market was essentially healthy and
merely 'crowded out' by the 'alien' State sector. The 'market' had failed to take up
the extra labour brought into being with the cuts in public spending. According
to the OECD yearly economy survey's, Government consumption measured by
year-on-year percentages of GDP, fell from 3.2% (1976) to .5% (1977), .5%
(1978). In response domestic private sector gross fixed investment remained
negative; -3.4% (1976), -13.5% (1977), before picking up slightly, 1.9 (1978).
By 1980 Government consumption had to be increased once more in an attempt
to alleviate some of the effects of a dramatic gross fixed disinvestment by the
market sector (-13.4%).
By the time the Thatcher Government had chipped away at the 'non-market'
sector for a further five years to 1984 there was still no sign of market
resurgence and unemployment simply rocketed to over 4 million: capital, far
from embracing the surplus of labour, continued to avoid it. In between a share
capital and consumer spending lead economic mini-boom, has eventually given
way to a second recession (1990-93) which has overseen further attacks on
labour and further reticence on the part of capital to invest in anything other than
the short term quick fix style of old. Meanwhile as the Government can promise
only 'slump economics'" as a means of future control over labour, State spending
has continued to rise inexorably. In point of fact it became practically evident
that market capitalism was racked with internal contradictions, not so much
contradictions and restrictions externally imposed by the State.
21 1refer here to Kenneth Clarke, Chancellor of the Exchequer's annual Manson House Speach to
industrialists and the City in 1994.
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A major source of this contradiction was the division within capital between
those who embraced the end of Keynesian regulation and freedom of financial
posturing in the City and other international markets it brought; and those who
suffered badly from the sudden withdrawal of State subsidy. The main division,
however, was with labour. Pulling back from moves towards Labourism meant
reneging on important concessions to the working class: full employment and the
provision of social welfare enshrined in the social contract. The pull back
unleashed a militant response from labour which stretched from 1976 to 1986,
which was eventually defeated in the watershed struggles of 1984-5
(mineworkers) and 1986 (Wapping).
By cutting back the State sector and redefining its role on more market based
terms, the PCR revealed the shallow ideological nature of their theory
surrounding State interventionism. It did more than this however. Capital's
redefinition of the States role, forced it and its PCR defenders to explicitly
recognise the real source of market decline: the advance of labour. Sir Keith
Joseph's prognosis that the problem lay in Trade Union power epitomised the
concern of the PCR.22 More specifically the problem was that trade unions and
the TUC had proven to be, not too strong, but rather too weak to control the
labour movement. Subsequent Conservative industrial relations law was
designed to break the trade union officialdoms grip on the State so that capital
could deal with the real enemy - the labour movement - more directly.
When the PCR's case is falsified both empirically and practically, it leaves their
theory bereft of a cause - the state non market sector. This being the case the
burden of proof that decline has nothing to do with the market sector falls
squarely in their lap. However it is always an unmanageable burden for the Right
because they start with the axiomatic assumptions that the market is both natural
22 See his article, Britains Trade Union Problem in, D. Coates and Hillard (1987).
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and inevitable. Because of these initial axioms the Right fail to theorise any
fault internal to the market. Nevertheless, reality never tires of revealing the
markets internal substantive failings to the Right, making their theory gross and
ideological.
Essentially their theory is debilitating because it fails to take note (somewhat
conveniently) of the social form" of production and deals exclusively and
selectively with the technical content of the economy. PCR theory is entrapped
within an atomistic approach to society. Society is deemed to be no more
substantial than the aggregate of individuals of which it is comprised. This leaves
the academic associated with the PCR no option but to claim that individuals
have pre-social, universal, unalterable attributes?". In accordance with the logic
of marginalist economics, these attributes unfold along the lines that individuals
are deemed to be instinctive rational maximisers of a rather narrowly defmed
utility, ie, 'more' is 'good, 'less' is 'bad'; 'pleasure' is 'good', 'pain' is 'bad'." From
this fixed, innate identity of the human condition, the market is seen simply as a
technical manifestation which allows the free interaction of individuals, who, via
the matrix of prices and a given income constraint (profits, wages or rent),
maximise their utilities. Given this foundation it is little wonder evidence for
market decline is sought in what are deemed to be 'alien' bodies such as the 'non-
market' sectors. Yet on closer inspection we fmd the only thing which could be
classed as 'alien' in this whole outlook is a phenomena central to the market:
prices. The bourgeois theory of markets simply cannot explain their origin.26 In
23 By social form I refer to historically specific social production relations, see chapter three.
24 Their pre-social nature remains largely unexplained by economists who apparently remain content with
axiomatic assertion, which claim that individuals have a rather narrow psychological motives for action,
princpal1y those surrounding the apparant need to 'rationally maximise ones subjective utilities.
2 It should be noted that the, claimed, founding father of bourgeois political economy - Adam Smith -
refuted this narrow view of human nature in perhaps his most central theoretical enquiry into human action -
Theog: OfMoral Sentiments (1759)
2 Some would no doubt wish to point out that the Marshalian supply and demand 'scissor theory', with
its emphasis on 'objective' production costs, cannot simply be reduced to the subjective value theory of Jevons
and others in the marginalist school of economics. The argument here is that it can, if, that is, one considers
that production costs are explained by past prices offactors ofproduction (in the case of the factor labour, is
26
theoretical terms this means that the PCR have no grounds for declaring there to
be state induced 'price' disruptions in the labour and capital markets, for
example, that labour is over 'priced' due to taxation pushing up wages. Having
no objective criteria to value labour and so no criteria to judge its relative over or
under valuation how can they possibly prove it is wrongly priced?
Commencing from the assumption that society IS fundamentally an
aggregate of atomistic individuals, leaves the economist in an even stickier mess
when it comes to 'proving'the cause of decline. In a world where no essential
productions relations are deemed to exist, then there is no ground for necessary
causation, every act hinges on chance and probability. Therefore, using the
PCR's own ontological assumptions, one can easily argue the reverse case: State
involvement was due to prior market failure. Unless causes are not to drop to
the level of subjectivity, where they could just as well become another mans
effects (or in our case, the reverse argument to the Right, ie, the failure of the
market caused a rise in non-market state sectors), then one must have a criteria
by which one can hierarchies what are causes and what are merely effects. To
attain this, one must have a more substantial theory of markets and not merely a
theory that explains the accidental relation of subjective exchange. Theory must
also explain the necessary relation ofobjective exchange.
Of course to do this one must give up ones atomistic assumptions, something
bourgeois economists and the PCR are singularly unwilling to do. It would mean
overturningmarginal economics and coming to terms with two painful facts : the
real origin of profits having their source in the exploitation of labour and the
transitory nature of capitalism as a social formation. Because of this the Right
explained by the derived demand for past commodities) which are determined subjectively by past prices)!
Hegel's observation about empiricists, is apt for the marginalist school too; on first appearance, their
explanation seems to have depth, however on closer inspection, 'just like peeling the skin of an onion', one is
left with only a multitude of discrete skins!
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and its central political economy remain trapped by a tautological vice of their
own making. A vice which strangles any spark of originality in the quest to
locate the real source of decline. They may say labour's value is its Marginal
revenue product, but this is no answer because it is based upon past and present
already formed prices and so remains an unexplained price conundrum." E.
Harris a Hegelian scholar makes an incisive point about the atomists predicament
in general whatever the field of social enquiry, however it is particularly relevant
in the case of the bourgeois economist. He alludes :
The missing bond is the principle of wholeness
which empiricism cannot admit. It recognises only
collections and fortuitous ones at that, for it can
discover no necessary connections between
sensible particulars, the sole source of its knowledge.
It finds at most constant conjunctions which can
never justify universal judgements, for no
universal conclusions follow validly from particular
premises. In its logic, therefore, necessity is reduced to
tautology and all deduction is purely analytic."
In summary the peR view the relation between the 'market' sector and state 'non-
market' sector as at most a constant conjuncture. Theoretically this is due to their
predisposition towards social atomism. This ontology leaves no substantive
ground for claiming any particular direction of causation. Hence the claim that
the state 'caused market crowding out', could just as well be reversed to argue
market failure caused state intervention. In fact this is what the non-Marxist left
27 There has been much written on this debilitating problem for bourgeois theory, but see especially J.
Schwartz, (edt) (1982) for a series of concise articles which highlight the ideological nature of marginalist
economicsfrom a number of different vantage points.
28 E, Harris, (1983 ), p62.
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(NML) claim in their de-industrialisation thesis. Such is the simple adaptability
of theory tied to an ontology which views the capitalist world atomistically.
1.3 The NML Explanation.
The NML is not so concerned about the decline of the market sector per-se. For
the NML the market is merely one of a number of related technical devises for
producing, distributing and exchanging goods and services, alongside the public
sector. The decline which specifically concerns the NML is two-fold: the
decline from the attainment of national equilibrium of imports vis-a-vis exports;
the decline in manufacturing vis-a-vis services. The primary source is
manufacturing decline (de-industrialisation), which exacerbates the balance of
payments problem and short circuits national economic prosperity by calling
premature halts to any economic expansion domestically.
Decline always has to be relative to some other perceived state. For the NML it
is an abstraction: an ideal economic equilibrium point for the British economy
vis-a-vis the rest of the capitalist world. Anything below the ideal equilibrium
corresponds to a certain degree of economic national decline. The NML 'ideal
equilibrium' point of departure for British capitalism can be summed up as
follows: a manufacturing sector which is able to satisfy home demand, whilst
simultaneously exporting a sufficient amount of goods to pay for foreign imports
at levels as close to full employment and output as possible. Britain is said to be
in decline because systematically, throughout this century it has failed to achieve
this ideal equilibrium. Manufacturing employment as a percentage of all
employment reached a peak of 35% by 1965 from which time it has been in
inexorable decline. By 1990 it accounted for only 20% of an expanded total
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work force." For the NML this has been an unnaturally sharp fall and leaves the
British economy languishing in 'disequilibrium'. According to the NML although
Government policy can and does exacerbate the decline (for example the
Conservative Governments deflationary, high interest and high exchange rate
policy post 1979), its real cause is much deeper within the social structure (an
issue that resurfaces later, below).
The problem of decline, argue the Interventionists, appears initially as a
structural maladjustment in the elasticity's of demand for manufactured goods
between nations (Blackerby, 1979). British commodities, for example, have
apparently become increasingly demand inelastic relative to foreign
commodities. The effects are numerous and interrelated: a persistent and chronic
balance of payments problem, which threatens the value of sterling, resulting in
recurrent sterling crisis (eg the runs on sterling of 1967 and 1976); the setting of
limits to domestic economic expansion, which underwrites the continual cycles
of 'stop-go' demand management; the generation of investment uncertainty;
premature disruptions to the social contract between capital and labour, resulting
in short termism on the part of capital and militant wage economism from the
work force. It even lead to the emergence of'Thatcherism'!
For the NML, (in particular followers of the 'Cambridge view') 30 the growth in
the service sector (particularly fmancial trading in money markets, secondary
shares and insurance which currently balance British trade via invisible earnings)
can be no long term solution. As the NML correctly stress, there is no point at
which real long term equilibrium can be reached in a scenario of a declining
manufacturing and rising service sectors, whether in employment or balance of
29SIr Alexander Cairncross (1994), Economic Policy and Performance: 1964-90, in R Floud and D
McCloskey.
30 For an example of Singh's argument see his, U'K. Industry and the world economy: a case ofde-
industrialisation? in, D. Coates and J. Hillard (edt) (1986).
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payments terms. The decline in manufactured exports declines is not absorbed at
a constant rate by the rising export of commercial services. The fact is, the
manufacturing sector has the capacity to earn foreign currency at almost twice
the rate of services. The implication is that services would have to grow
dramatically to absorb unemployment and continue in the long term to 'balance
the national books'.
That this could never occur as far as unemployment absorption is concerned is
clear enough. In its most expansionary phase throughout the 1960s - 70s and 80s
the service sector continually lagged behind the employment 'fall out' from the
decline in manufacturing. For example, between 1966 - 84 the decline in
manufacturing employment was estimated to be roughly 3 million, whilst take up
in the service sector amounted to roughly 2.25 million.
The usual claim of the PCR that eventually service sector employment will
balance the economy can be seen to be a sham. As the NML (and Marxists too)
are quick to point out, it is very likely that the City's share of world markets in
finance has receded during the 1980s and 90s under pressure from Tokyo,
Frankfurt and New York, and will continue to do so into the next century.31
Invariably the highest productivity gains and Research and Development projects
are concentrated in the manufacturing sector. Therefore its decline leads to a
cumulative spiral of decline in the ability to increase relative surplus value
extraction. A point brought home by the fact that currently the top twelve
manufacturing companies in Britain account for roughly half of Research and
Development spending. Logically, any relative decline they may suffer will have
debilitating effects on long term technological advancement and profitability.
31 As The Financial Times (3-2-92) pointed out, the financial service sector is increasingly under
challenge from within Europe as well as on the more international plain; a fact clearly revealed by the current
(up hill) battle waged by the City of London against other euro finance Centres, to become the newentrope
for ECD dealings.
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On the basis of the above argument, the NML note with concern the trend away
from their 'ideal equilibrium' which has grown from a trickle to a torrent over the
past century. Empirically the decline in British export shares has been extensive
in recent decades : 1950 = 25% of the world market, which by 1973 had fallen to
9.3%32. The balance of payments, reflecting the loss of share of world trade,
has also witnessed an unparalleled deterioration. More importantly however are
the effects these imbalances generate in the capital markets. For example, the
decline of exports relative to imports on a number of occasions in the 1960s, 70s
and 80s, produced current account deficits of one magnitude, which set off an
even larger magnitude of capital flight. This magnifies the balance of payments
problems facing Governments. Governments have both to allow foreign
reserves to become depleted and ultimately raise the bank rate to offset the fall in
sterlings value and so check the speculative arbritage. In other words a fierce
and dramatic halt in domestic capital accumulation inevitably at some stage has
to be engineered. During the 1980s this was complicated even further by the
consumer spending boom and boom in share values. The massive collapse in
share values during October 1987, threatened to bring economic boom to a
premature end, forcing the Government, for a time, to do the opposite in a case
of rising balance of payment deficits: lower interest rates. This however merely
bought time and made the inevitable recession (1990-93) even more depressing
and rapid.
So much for the appearances of decline caused by manufacturing decline.
However, just what, for the NML, are the causes of manufacturing decline?
Presumably if one locates this one has the secret to a successful regeneration of
the British economy, to which the NML are committed. In truth the NML have
some difficulty locating and hierarchising causes. Primarily this is due to the fact
32 Figures taken from T. Caslin and H. Vane (1987).
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that they abstract 'manufacturing', 'the national economy' and 'the market' from
the binding social form within which production, distribution and exchange take
place: the value form. Ignoring the social form converts the relationship between
the economic categories from intemal to extemal and so accidental relations.
As will become clear the result is they are methodologically hamstrung in their
quest to locate the cause of manufacturing decline.
According to the NML the cause of decline is not so much due to lack of price
competitiveness, for since the mid 1960s Britain has enjoyed a relative price
advantage over most competitors". Rather, they argue, it has more to do with
some mysterious supply side 'deficiencies'. These 'deficiencies' result in poor
quality, poorly designed British commodities, relative to competitor economies.
Furthermore, the 'deficiency' is not simply explained by the fact that investment
is low, for the claim is that any investment that is made has been systematically
under utilised. 'Supply-side deficiencies', according to the NML, had by 1973
caused British multinationals to take flight and produce twice as much abroad as
they exported from home. 34
So what are these 'deficiencies? A. Singh, one of the most distinguished ofNML
theorists can offer little in the way of a clear answer. However, Singh does point
vaguely to a problem of sorts;
'..there is conflicting statistical evidence on the relative
efficiency of the utilisation of investment in the U.K, as
compared with other countries. However, casual
observation suggests that, owing to the nature of worker
management relations in this country, the U.K's relative
33 See A. Singh on this point p21 in D. Coates and J. Hillard (1986), op-cit.
34 ibid p24.
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performance ..may well be poor'."
According to Singh the problem has something to do with 'worker management
relations', although exactly what this 'something' is he does not, or cannot, say.
Singh is not alone in his vagueness and ambiguity, it pervades the entire breadth
of NML analysis, which is always evasive and invariably runs aground on the
problem of 'supply-side deficiencies'. The 'supply side deficiency', for example,
that between workers and managers, remains an exogenous inheritance from the
past; a functional caveat to the explanation of present day appearances, never to
be thoroughly explained in itself The supply side problem is simply portrayed
by the NML as that 'factor' which derailed Britain from the world trade
equilibrium it once enjoyed. For example, as far as Singh is concerned,
'Once the economy is in long run disequilibrium,
for whatever reason, continued participation in
international economic relations on the same terms
as before may produce a vicious circle of causation'.36
But surely lack of an understanding of the reason that the economy is in
long run disequilibrium, that is to say the reason for the 'deficient supply-side';
must cut one off from any adequate policy solution (even that prescribed by the
NML; namely, equilibrium balance of payments with close to full employment
conditions)? It would therefore seem imperative that reformers such as the
NML locate the specific source of disequilibrium. As Bernard Stafford notes,
with not a little exasperation,
..the issue at stake is not how differences in growth
35 ibid p24
36 ibid p25. (emphasis mine)
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persist and widen, nor, even, how any trading economy
may suffer a progressive decline. What we want to know
is why the U.K economy suffered such a decline...
To do this interventionists :
..must also say something about the original cause
of the failure of the U.K to hold world markets."
Yet, as Stafford explains, the problem is that their theory is tautological;
..circular and cumulative causation..(means that)
..any outcome is explained only in terms of its
consequences nothing can be said about what initiates
the process of cumulative decline."
The inability to grasp the social form of the labour process as productive
primarily of exchange value and secondarily of use values, limits the NML's
ability to locate the real nature of 'supply-side deficiencies' and so the source of
decline. Ignoring the historically specific social form of production relation
leaves only technological determinism bolstered by institutionally induced
psychological maladies as motives for a 'deficient supply-side'. Yet such
accounts have been of embarrassingly little explanatory use to non-Marxist
political economy. The empiricist underpinnings of NML theory, provide it with
no real basis for policy changes except, perhaps, an inessential change in the
terms of trade.
Indeed the theory drives reactionary policy. Given the increasingly international
division of labour and drive toward European integration, the NML for many
37 See B. Stafford, Theories ofDecline, in, D.Coates and 1. Hillard, p337, ibid (1986).
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years continued to advocate the hoisting of tariff controls and abandonment of
free trade and convertibility. Their theory and policy are ultimately unlikely and
futile abstractions. For example, just supposing it was a policy option for the
capitalist economy of Britain to isolate itself, how could one hope to transform
the internal economy back on to the 'equilibrium path', given the fact that the
NML has consistently failed to locate the root of the problem? Policy decisions
would have to be based on clear evidence and decisive action. As one can be
relatively certain that dominant faction of capital controlling the City of London
and major productive capital's presumably would not take kindly to export
controls on capital and no profitable outlet internally, then a clear and decisive
break with the causes of past inefficiencies would be vital in securing their
compliance. Meanwhile the NML could only continue to ponder about whether
the weak competitive position caused the balance of payments crises; or, was it
vis-versa? Or, did the balance of payments cause the government to operate at a
lower level of demand management; or, rather, were the initial causes after all
merely the effects of government failure to carry through effective demand
policy? Or, further still, did a fall off in investment cause the whole of the
above; or, did some or all of the above cause a fall off in investment? Clearly
without adequate explanation of the mysterious 'supply side deficiencies' the
interventionist is left in quite a theoretical and practical muddle.
The PCR, although never managing the job of adequately theorising decline, as
has been argued above, nevertheless instinctively drive to the heart of the matter:
falling profits, declining ownership and escalating Public intervention into the
labour process. As a consequence throughout the period of 'Thatcherism' the
Right, in attacking organised labour, acted in the only way left open to them with
decisive if pragmatic strokes. In this respect as T.Caslin points out, however
wrong one may consider it to be,
36
The Bacon and Eltis thesis does at least provide an
unambiguous diagnosis with clear cut policy implications
of the need to cut back the size of the non-market sector..
Whereas:
..when we turn to the main thrust of the Cambridge
definition, that is the supply side and non price
competitiveness just what does supply side limitations
mean ? Authors tend to cite everything but the kitchen
sink : from restrictive business and trade union practices,
through to managerial incompetence and government
interference, to socially exclusive selection process's
and an anti-industry culture."
It is little wonder that a multitude of constant conjunctural categories, facts
and events pile up with structural relations remaining only partly explained. The
British non-Marxist political economist has had to work with much analytical
cunning to bring an apparently complex accidentalist world which has no
ground for necessary causation to heel, albeit under the rubric of that mystical
category: 'supply side deficiencies'.
As stated above, at the heart of the NML muddle is their reification of the
capitalist production process, which leaves them largely incapable of seeing
beyond 'employer, 'manager' and 'employee' tripartite institutional relation. This
limits ones conceptualisation of production, distrubution and exchange process to
that of use-values creation, and more specifically how one is to promote their
expansion in the manufacturing sector. Low productivity, investment and output,
coupled with a low elasticity of demand when sold for export, can only be due,
in this reified view, to inessential institutional (ultimately irrational) differences
39 T. Caslin and H. Vane p28 op-cit.
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between manager and worker which cause structural constraints in the 'supply
side'. On the face of it these restrictions can ultimately be only pure bloody
mindedness, for what could any rational group have against producing more use
values of better quality and increased flexibility? The search for class
compromise, the real motive force for Interventionism, effectively becomes in
their eyes, the epitome of rational intelligent policy making activity.
The apparent bloody-mindedness initiating those 'supply-side' constraints
is of course toned down in NML theory, where it becomes transformed into a
problem of 'bounded rationality'. Lorenz 40, for example, argues that
'institutional rigidities' in the labour process 'binds' the rational actions of, on the
one hand the entrepreneur/manager and on the other hand, the labour movement.
The bounded rationality of each group generates uncertainty about the future,
leading to short term planning decisions, and a lack of trust. All of which
hinders the adoption of new technique and flexible work practices. The general
outcome of a sustained bounded rationality is the chronic decline of British
manufacturing relative to Germany, Sweden, Holland etc, who apparently do not
suffer so intensively from this production induced paranoia.
Lorenz's study was concerned with British Shipbuilding decline from 1890-1970,
but he clearly wishes to generalise the - 'institutional rigidities' producing
'bounded rationality' - across the economy as a whole. One of the main culprits
of irrational action appears to be British labour which has stuck doggedly to its
craft based organisation, both at the point of production and in its political
struggles over wage structures and demarcation lines. Unlike foreign
competitors, so the argument runs, British workers had steadfastly rejected
reforms over apprenticeship training, closed shops etc. In a world which, since
the 1930s, has fetishised the production of standardised commodities (in Lorenz's
40 See Lorenz, Journal ofEconomic History, (1992).
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case Ships ) in an effort to achieve economies of scale (and so boost relative
surplus value extraction), the inflexible heterogeneous craft based labour of the
British worker becomes anathema to productive efficiency and so long term fixed
capital investment.
The statistics of this decline in shipbuilding (as good a proxy for the economy as
any other) are quite compelling reading, as Lorenz explains,
..in the 1950s, the proportion of ships built in Britain
was cut from 40 - 15%. During the 1960s, while world
trade expanded at an unprecedented rate, British
industry sustained an absolute decline....by the end of
the 1960s, Britain accounted for only about 5% of
world output.41
Regardless of the false abstraction - 'British Industry' in a world division of
labour and capital - one has here a dramatic rate of decline the essence of which,
in the reified language of economics, resolved to the fact that,
...total factor productivity was significantly
below the competitive standards by the 1960s.42
Compelling evidence to be sure, but its more fundamental meaning escapes the
NML. two important outcomes result for the NML from viewing the labour
process as primarily determined by the production of use values: one theoretical
the other political. Theoretically, the causal mechanism one seeks for total factor




conundrums. For example, as regard explanation, Lorenz's otherwise rigorous
empirical survey comes to this - 'bounded rationality' caused institutional
rigidities, which caused loss of productivity and flexibility, which caused
institutional rigidities, which increase 'bounded rationality'! One must
conclude that the tautology lies in the fact that analysis is blinded by
technological determinism, a characteristic which haunts the whole of the NML
from Institutionalists to Neo- Ricardians. Anybody studying the Interventionists
theoretical output in the hope of an explanation of decline will fmd only
psychological theories as to why decline occurs. These consist of 'lack of trust'
and a sense of 'uncertainty' which emanates from ones 'bounded rational view of
the world'.
This leads to the second important outcome: reactionary politics. Theory and
practice intertwine as the NML are driven to a convenient political solution.
Bounded rationality implies that within the present system there is common
ground for both capital and labour to meet and compromise, to the benefit of
both. The common ground is the State, both local and central. Thus bureaucratic
planning by state administrators becomes the 'feasible' outcome. Local and
central State are one removed from the immediate labour process, hence they
have the good fortune of unbounded rationality. therefore the State must regulate
the labour movement and markets and set the framework for long term planning.
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Perhaps, in an effort to escape this narrow psychological/institutional approach
which leads immutably down the path towards Statism, other theorists on the
NML have introduced class struggle into the study of the labour process, its
'supply-side problems' and the phenomena of British economic decline. One such
43 Lorenz is explicit as to the virtues of bureaucratic planning and its ability to overcome 'bounded
rationality' .
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detailed study has been that by Kilpatrick and Lawson44. Their approach
attempts to ground 'supply side deficiencies' in class struggle between labour and
management. For them any bounded 'rationality' has a class foundation. They
point out that the introduction of new technology and reorganisation of manning
levels, are undertaken as a process of class struggle. Management's poor
administration of the latest technology and introduction of changes in work
practice, is explained as the interrelated outcome of a process of resistance by
the working class and concessions provided by management. The
institutionalised forms of class struggle in production (decentralised craft
bargaining, strict application of demarcation lines and the promise of full
employment) favoured the working class, argue Kilpatrick and Lawson. The
result has been chronically poor rates of productivity. The response has been a
partial evacuation of the production process by British capitalists which
ultimately means that both the working class and management have suffered,
throughjob insecurity.
Empirically there is a lot to be said for their analysis, although why it should be
the prime causal factor of the process of 'decline' in preference to the negative
influence of the 'City' and fmance capital, is left unexplained? They ignore the
latter and merely assert the former. It is clear enough that the class struggle
between capital and labour manifests itself as the struggle over wages and
profits; that is a struggle in value terms which must draw the major site of
control of value produced into the equation: the City. The Omission implies that
their empirical overview of labour management relations are governed by
abstract and inessential concept. In fact they suffer from the same theoretical
defect of their NML co-theorists: the inability to internally relate the different
institutions of capitalism. In the case of Kilpatrick and Lawson and others like
44 See Kilpatrick and Lawson's, The Strength ofthe Working Class. in. D. Coates and J. Hillard (1986)
op-cit.
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them it is because they deal in the conceptual currency of concrete labour, and
use value, whilst ignoring value production" and abstract labour.
Theories of class struggle which recognise only a world of use values, have
partially lost the ground for any developmental notion of classes. Which is to
say their concepts no longer adequately express the ontological conditions under
which classes exist. In this view classes fight over a share of the use values
which takes the form of a fight over wages and profits..etc. Likewise classes are
deemed to man the stage of society at all times fully formed and acting as
classes . Yet this is palpably wrong. The labour movement for the most part
remain a collection of individuals and only in latent form are they a class. In
specific times in history of course classes do begin to act as classes for
themselves. However, the point is this dialectical movement from potential to
actuality of class struggle can only be predicated on the basis of the value
relations in and through which capital and labour struggle. The health of the
value relation (whether it is in peak condition or decline) will determine to what
degree classes are either latent or actual in their manifestation.
Kilpatrick and Lawson's conception of the social world of capitalism obliterates
this distinction, by fetishising the world of use value and simply accepting that
prices happen to be attached to commodities and labour always acts as a class
struggling for their share of commodities. Inevitably the same sharp questions
must be asked of those NML who do hold to a class analysis as one would ask
of the non-class based NML theory. 'Productivity' for what? 'Competition' in the
interests of whom? 'De industrialisation' against who's interests? Given their
methodological shortcomings, it is little wonder that the deep roots of the 'British
problem' remain unexplored.
45 Seechapterthree for a moredeveloped explanation of value and abstract labour.
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Underlying the conceptual fixation on the world of use value is the main
theoretical culprit: an inadequate ontological standpoint: atomistic materialism.
This materialism denies knowledge of the social form of production and as such
the source of decline. According to a growing number of Marxists it has invaded
much Marxist analysis of class" Nevertheless, it must be said that Kilpatrick
and Lawson develop an important aspect of Britain's historical decline from the
vantage point ofproduction relations; the problem is that it is all content without
social form, all atomism and no dialectical essentialism, all technical material
with no social substance. One could have said class struggle was the dependent
variable, so to speak. Dependent on the social form of accumulation and
exploitation. That is, dependent on the value form. The latter is the essential
factor which gives rise to class conflict from an initial underlying position of the
atomisation they suffer as commodities, or functions of capital expansion. One
cannot, therefore, have an analysis of classes under capitalism without engaging
with analysis of the value form of production. Yet this is precisely the mistake
Kilpatrick and Lawson, and of course many more on the NML make.
The essential points to be gleaned from the above critique are firstly that class
based NML, centred on the use-value aspect of production, which effectively
denies them an understanding of the essential source of British capitalism's
decline. Secondly, shorn of a value analysis, their theory necessarily gravitates
towards policy prescription endorsed by the non-class based NML - usually
under the guiding concept of the 'national interest'. Yet the 'national interest' is
simply double speak for the interests of a weak domestic capital and the growing
undemocratic administration of State production and services. The NML of all
varieties, therefore, effectively underwrite in theory the practical need to
continue the exploitation of the working class. This is so even when it is not the
46 See S. Meikle, Essentialism in the Thought ofKarl Marx, (1985), for a systematic presentation of the
inadequacies of atomism and some of its modem manifestations in Marxist literature.
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stated intention of individual theorists, of what is admittedly a varied school of
economic thought. For example, in Kilpatrick and Lawson analysis, despite the
caveats that 'collective bargaining is essentially a defensive strength';" and that
the TUC was never against the introduction of technology as such; one is given
the strong impression that the real fault is that British managers and workers
have 'failed' to evolve at some 'natural rate' existent in other developed western
capitalist economies. Offering no explicit awareness of the social form of
production, Kilpatrick and Lawson become swept away by the undercurrent of
class compromise that pervades the theory and policy of the non-Marxist Left.
47 Kilpatrick and Lawson, in Coates and Hillard (1986), op-cit, p257.
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1.4 Marxist Theory and British Capitalist Decline
One would think from what has been said that Marxists would be acutely aware
of, and sensitive to, the implications of capitalism's social form of production,
and on the basis of this would have located the source of its decline.
Unfortunately this has not been the case. Of course there has been no shortage
of theory which places emphasis on the 'law of value', cyclical crisis and the
'tendency for the rate of profit to fall. However, as will be argued, they are used
as formal logic in an epistemic game, rather than ontological categories of social
life with a history of growth and decline. Similarly there has been no shortage of
Marxist theory placing class struggle at centre stage of enquiry into decline. The
problem is that most of it is intra capitalist class struggle. In this view classes
are tom from their base in the law of value. For some, the law of value merely
provides the explanatory backdrop to the unfolding of class struggle. For others
class struggle becomes everything and value relations are simply ignored.
The abuse the law of value has taken has inevitably meant that many Marxists'
have recoiled from using it in order to comprehend British capitalisms decline
and have plumped for an intra capitalist class theory of British capitalist decline.
To this end, a surplus of theory depicting the intra class rivalry between fmance
capital and industrial capital, has surfaced in recent decades. Some (eg, Coakley
and Harris, 1983) are concerned to reveal the institutional intricacies of the 'City',
and the conflict of interest which emerges between this financial network and
industry over the allocation of money capital (see also G. Ingham 1984, for the
more intricate analysis of commercial capital). Others (Anderson 1964, 1987;
Overbeek 1990) have sought to emphasis the political conflict within factions of
capital. Their stress is on 'hegemonic blocks' which one faction (finance) has
held over the British economy. (This will be explained shortly).
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Regardless of which particular route has been taken by Marxists, they are all in
basic agreement that decline has been the product of an intra capitalist class
struggle and has had nothing essentially to do with the struggle between capital
and its bitterest enemy the working class. This in itself is evidence of something
fundamental: Marxists have moved away from an analysis of decline which links
the split between productive capital and finance capital with the class struggle
being waged with labour. That is to say they turn their backs on a theory of
decline which can situate it within the historically specific and transient social
form of production.
The different brands of Marxism have chosen to ignore the social form of labour
under capitalism - abstract labour - and the potential for this form to be
terminated. Mainly because the reified law of value ejects the category of
abstract labour from its central position within the law. Dislodged from a
starting point in labour, analysis fetishises the agency of capital in bringing about
its own malfunctions determined, such as cyclical crisis, which is understood
merely as the result of competition between capital's. This type of Marxism
treats the working class as some sort of inanimate stage army: useful in providing
'profit squeezes', or making up the numbers in the rising organic composition of
capital. But having no real agency in the process of decline process.
This patronising attitude to labour is inexcusable in itself. More seriously
however, is the fact that by choosing not to analyse the changes in the social
form of labour at the point of production, Marxists too, like their bourgeois
counterparts in political economy, have barred themselves from an adequate
analysis of what is in decline. I wish to show later that this also bars them from
an essential understanding of the role of finance capital and the transition epoch
we live in. The immediate task is to consider briefly current Marxist theory
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which specifically addresses Britain's decline and to point out their
contradictions and ambiguities. Following on from this an attempt will be made
to locate these fault lines in modern Marxism back to classical Marxism,
specifically Hilferding and Lenin, who initially developed a benchmark theory of
decline based on the rise of finance capital.
Andrew Gamble in a concise and useful overview of the bulk of Marxist decline
theses outlines four of the main perspectives" : Firstly, there is the thesis which
suggests decline was caused by sections of British capital (namely :
Aristocratic/Finance) who were able to gain imperial preference and so
protection for their commodities. This alleviated the need to engage in open
competition with imperial rivals; which could have spurred on the production of
new technique and with it potential long term profitability. At the same time, it is
argued, the financial hegemony over what was to be defined 'the British interest'
blocked the development of domestic industrial capital.
According to the second perspective, decline was caused by a failure to address
certain supply side constraints such as 'outmoded' worker management relations.
The economy, it is argued, failed to become sufficiently 'Fordist'." So, in spite of
the fact that all government policy emphasis had shifted to boosting demand and
attempting to manage the results in such a manner as to keep the rule of capital
intact, the weakness in the 'Fordist economy' still led to a stalemate between
capital and labour. The result was poor rates of investment, circulation and
hence profitability. Thirdly, decline was said to be caused by ad-hoc political
interference of the state which some Marxists claim favours either mercantile
interests or some other pre-capitalist grouping such as a landed Aristocracy (see
48 See A. Gamble, Britain in Decline, (third edition) (1990).
49 See H. Overbeek (1990). Also see A. G1yn, R. Armstrong and 1.Harris (1990), The British Economy
Since 1945 (second edt) , were it is used to a lesser degree. However, See B. Jessop's (1988) Regulation
Theory Post Fordism and the State, Capital and Class, No 34 p147-68, for an example of a Marxist who
believes it to be the most valid means of analysis.
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P. Anderson 1964). The result is the same: a retarded economy. Fourthly,
decline is a cultural problem. Specifically, decline is caused by a dilution of the
entrepreneurial spirit, which, it is argued, had become emasculated by the
trappings of aristocratic life and culture. The argument is that this all placed a
low psychological priority on production and competition.
Behind each of these thesis lie detailed arguments, every one of which seemingly
quite convincing in their terms of reference. Indeed it must be stressed that there
is an element of truth to each; British capital does have cultural idiosyncrasies
related to its feudal past; the State has vacillated in its determination to intervene
in the economy; labour process control by management has been pragmatic and
short term; and imperial preference was essential in maintaining the production
of over priced commodities produced by second rate fixed capital. Taken
together, they offer a credible history of British capitalist intra class struggle and
the actions undertaken to offset decline, but they do not explain what is in
decline regarding the capital social relation. Taken alone as explanations of
decline, they do not stand much scrutiny before their credibility is threatened.
For example, Anderson (1964, 1987) argues the source of decline has nothing to
do with factors internal to the capitalist social relation. His basic argument is as
follows. Despite the fact that 'the present crisis is a malady of the whole society',
it has had nothing to do with the working class or production relations. This class
has 'achieved no victories, but its defeats were astonishing', claims Anderson.
Outmanoeuvred in the 1832 reform movement by industrial capital; its political
economy of 'Owenism' defeated by 1836; its Chartist alliance crushed by 1848;
politically decapitated by Fabianism and patronised by a labourist elite; the
working class had, according to Anderson, become acquiescent and conservative
and remains that way to this day.
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The problem of decline, then, for Anderson, has nothing to do with labour. In
fact it has nothing essentially to do with the capitalist class. The problem, we are
told, is outside the internal relations of capitalism, it is in fact pre-capitalist in
nature. Apparently a landed Aristocratic elite never relinquished power and
blocked the road to capitalist development proper by stifling the entrepreneurial
spirit with its traditional aristocratic values of immediate gratification and
abhorrence of thrift.50 What one forgets here is that the supposed 'Aristocratic
elite' relinquished enough power to enable British capital to achieve the status of
'workshop of the world' for at least three decades in the nineteenth century.
Evidence of an accumulation zeal and 'entrepreneurial thrift par excellence one
would think. In addition, one fmds it hard to detect evidence of a feudal fetish
against accumulation when considering British capital's plunder of living labour
power abroad. Indeed today when abroad within other western capitalist
economies, British capital employs the best labour saving devises and managerial
techniques on a par with the indigenous bourgeoisie. Again the 'Aristocratic
elite' bar on accumulation and its 'scientific management' seems only to stretch as
far as the shores of Britain and possibly its ex dominions. Thus Anderson's
decline thesis refers to a causal factor which is outwith the capital labour relation
and is limited to British capital's domestic accumulation strategies (or lack of
strategies?) only.
Another instructive study of British decline is that by G. Ingham (Capitalism
Divided, 1984), which can be loosely related to theses one and three above.
Ingham's stated task was to go beyond Anderson's anti-industrial capitalist
Aristocratic hegemony thesis. Ingham goes beyond Anderson's thesis not so
much to reject it, on the basis that it seeks to explain capitalism's decline via
social groups outwith the capital-labour relation, but to provide it with more
50 Quotes and claims are to be found in Anderson's New Left Review (1964), Origins ofthe Present
Crisis' N023 Jan-Feb (1964) p49-53.
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theoretical depth. Ingham achieves this, so he claims, by breaking down the
distinct features and functions of money capital and its dominance over
productive capital. Ingham, explicitly rejects the explanatory power of the
labour theory of value, where Anderson does so implicitly. This means that his
conception of money is divorced from abstract labour and material processes in
production relations. Having done this he takes the next logical step of rejecting
Marxist historical materialism's applicability to an analysis of British capitalism,
on the basis that commercial money capital has always dominated the more
materialist productive capital and this directly refuted Marx'x claim about the
course of capitalist development.
The result is that for Ingham too, decline is perceived as the product of
something extemal to the capital-labour production relation. The extemal factor
being the hegemonic stranglehold that commercial money capital had apparently
held since at least as far back as the restitution of the Monarchy in 1688. In this
period commercial capital bailed out the State; constituted the Bank of England
in its own interests; and, through the nexus of City-Treasury links, systematically
sacrificed the interests of capitalism proper (productive capital) to the more
lucrative commercial laundering of money via the matrix of 'Bills of Exchange'
on the world market. As Ingham explains in a quite detailed exposition,
commercial capital ruled in this way throughout the 18th and 19th century and
continues to do so in the 20th century through the sterling area and later the euro-
money markets established post world war two.
The important point here is that Ingham ignores the more substantial source of
decline in the social form of production. In doing so he ignores the valorisation
process and production becomes a material technical arena for the production of
use-values. In turn the essential relation between capital and Labour become
displaced as a class struggle over the finished product. With this type of outlook
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it is little wonder Ingham VIews historical materialism as being econormc
determinism. He can then proceed to glean, from a historical enquiry of British
capitalism, that financial concerns appear to be consistently at the expense of
productive capitalism; and from this that 'Capitalism Divided' is the source of
decline and not the capital-Labour value relation.
Ingham, when forced to account for why commercial money capital has remained
dominant for so long, despite concerted efforts by productive capital to over tum
such dominance, he reverts to neo-classical economic theory of rational
economic man. The State officials and specifically the treasury, it is suggested,
have a rationalising mind set when it comes to balancing the publics finances; to
such a degree that productive capital cannot shake it and commercial money
capital can easily manipulate it to their own ends of money laundering in the City
of London. This explanation is also used by Ingham to explain a further
infamous triad relation between the Bank of England - City- Treasury. In effect
Ingham resorts to a kind of symbolic interactionist explanation of capitalist
decline which is ultimately idealist. It ignores completely the reality of class
struggle between labour and capital and the role this ongoing process has in the
decline and in the decisions of those forces of capitalism who galvanise their
political rule through the triad of the Bank of England - City - Treasury. As
Longstreth (1979) has pointed out, if the sterling lobby (which commercial
money capital is sometimes called) or the Treasury view prevailed, it was
because there was no serious opposition to the policies they put forward and not
because the triad of the Bank of England - City - Treasury forced their interests
upon the policy makers. As Longstreth suggests, the picture of banking capital
forcing through policy 'measures in the teeth of strident opposition is indeed a
false one'. Indeed there has been no serious opposition of interest between the
CBI and the Conservative Government these past sixteen years. The CBI may
have grumbled about specific issues, such as interests rates, but has remained
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muted whilst the de valorisation of the British economy deepened throughout the
1980s and 90s. In point of fact, dominant sections of capital have interests in
both productive and financial spheres of the economy (Scott, 1989). The
essential questions which remain largely unanswered are, what is the nature of
this interest? Why did it manifest itself as it did in Britain? How has it/will it
develop?
A number of other studies take a similar route and end up in a similar muddle.
For example, for Overbeek (1990) the divide-equals-decline syndrome becomes
one between 'concepts of control'; namely, the 'money concept' of capital versus
the 'productive concept' of capital. Each concept embraces a class faction within
capital who periodically strive for and achieve control of the state. Having done
so they then determine the nations economic course of development. For
Overbeek, the outcome of this struggle has been detrimental to British economic
growth, because productive capital, although reigning in certain decades (1930s-
70s), has mostly remained in the shadows of money capital.
On the surface of it their cogent enough points, but points that do not go far
enough. The study offers a useful empirical and historical overview of British
capital's development and decline as propelled by the struggle between money
capital and productive capital. However, conceptually Overbeek's work does not
penetrate far enough into the capitalist social relation. Money capital and
productive capital are simply not grounded on living labour power. This is very
important because it is from living labour power and the struggle to convert it
into value and surplus value that these forms of capital arise and decline (a point
developed here in a later chapter). Necessarily, therefore, the study falls short
and embraces only the conceptualisation of the intra capitalist divide, as the
source of decline.
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Given that the above mentioned are Marxist theories of British decline, it is
rather surprising that they should be so quick to ignore the importance of the
main class struggle between labour and capital over the issue of surplus value
extraction and its control. In Marx's own opinion unearthing this process is what
distinguished him from bourgeois political economy and philosophy. It will be
clarified below that Marx's value theory of labour was the cornerstone of his
belief that capitalism was transient in nature and in decline in his own day. Of
course modem day Marxists, unlike their non-Marxist counterparts in, political
economy, do stress the fact that capitalism is, in one way or another, the
problem. What they fail to do however, is address what exactly it is about
capitalism that is in terminal decline. Instead, they jump immediately to
phenomena which lie outside capitalist production; for example, within the
circulation of capital (see G. Ingham 1984), or, in the so called 'superstructure' of
State and civil society (see P. Anderson 1964, 1987).
Marxist theories of capitalist decline invariably become engrossed in the
measurement of a phenomena they have singularly failed to get to the heart of.
In this respect analysis, unable to penetrate deeper into the social form of
production, becomes preoccupied with comparative studies of decline between
Britain and other western capitalist nations. The four causes mentioned earlier -
imperial preference; supply-side constraints; State intervensionism; the decline of
the culture of capitalist accumulation - are then introduced as the basis of policy
designed to curb Britain's 'de-industrialisation' and place it back on the rails of an
'ideal-typical capitalism' such as Germany. This all has a great debilitating affect
on Marxism. The slip into superficial comparative analysis, it must be stressed
again, stems from the denial of value theory as being in any way useful.
Arguably, one of the main reasons for this denial is that over recent decades the
tendency to reify the law of value has gained momentum. That is, a tendency has
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gained ground within Marxism which treats value as a technical distributor of
capital and labour and subjects it to analytical logic, rather than treats it as an
ontological social condition of capitalism subject to dialectical discourse. This
has made it all the more easier (or inevitable) for other Marxists to move away
from the labour theory of value per-se. Yet an understanding of decline has to
be predicated on the value form which labour is first subsumed under and then
begins to cast aside, albeit at frrst in limited ways.
To enable a substantial theory of decline one must 'soften up' the reification of
the law of value, rejuvenate its powers of explanation and so provide the welter
of comparative studies of British capitalist decline with some substantive
foundation (Chapter three of this thesis attempts to put forward such a basis).
However, in setting the foundations of a non reified law of value analysis, it is
important to locate the source of the confusion modern Marxism fmds itself in
via a critique of classical Marxism. Classical Marxism here refers to the
Marxism's which unfolded between Marx's death and the rise of 'western
Marxism' in the 1920's. As the issue here is the decline of capitalism, attention
concentrates on those Marxists who have produced influential analyses in this
respect. Also, as the era is thought by most to be characterised by the split
between 'second international Marxist evolutionism' and 'third international
Marxist revolutionism', it would seem appropriate to choose from both sides, if
only to show that reification has taken place on both 'sides'. Given the
constraints of the chapter, critique is limited to two Marxists of the era:
Hilferding and Lenin. As they are by far the most influential any critique will do
more than enough to link the errors of the past with those of today. Hilferding
and Lenin's respective theories of fmance capital and capitalist decline are often
taken by Marxism today as the fmal word on the subject, the rest being just
history and politics. Nonetheless, as penetrating as Hilferding and certainly
Lenin conceptualisation of decline were, both deal inadequately with the most
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central of categories: labour. The error is the source of Marxist modem day
analytical malaise. Chapter two details these errors and links them to the growth
of the modem day 'capital logic school of Marxism, wherein the reification of the
law of value reaches its highest expression.
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CHAPTER TWO
A CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL MARXIST POLITICAL ECONOMY
2.1 Classical Marxism and the Reijication ofthe Law ofValue
Marx was clear enough about the link between an emerging socialised labour
and socialised capital on the one hand, and the extension and deepening of
fictitious capital on the other; Capital volume 3 and the Grundrisse are replete
with examples of this. Hilferding and Lenin sought to develop this into a theory
of 'finance capital'. For Hilferding the theory of finance capital was the
necessary follow on to Capital, bringing Marx's work up to date for the modem
era. Both Hilferding and Lenin were aware of an epochal shift taking place
within capitalism, which could not be mistaken for a mere quantitative
development of capitalist accumulation." One would have expected that
Marxists, perceiving such an epochal shift in capitalism, and perceiving, in the
case of Hilferding, that their analysis was the continuation of Marx's work in
Capital, would have subjected the social relations of production to intense
scrutiny; possibly looking at the extent to which objective commodity fetishism
was breaking down and, more importantly, in what way the capitalist classes
were responding to this. However, despite some mention of the changing
industrial relations scene (Hilferding), and a growing 'Aristocracy of Labour'
(Lenin), they appear to have developed only one side of the link: the money
form and its institutional manifestations within industry and banking, whilst
neglecting the contradiction within labour. Further, because they did not develop
a theory of the socialised labour aspect and as such the breakdown of
commodity fetishism, then even their development of the money form in the
51 As far as Lenin (1975) was concerned capitalism had entered a qualitatively different and 'higher
stage', one characterised by imperialism, or the domination offinance capital. Likewise, Hilferding's (1981)
analysis of finance capitalism was subtitled the latest phase ofcapitalist development when, '..finance capital
changes fundementally the economic, and hence political, structure of society' (P337).
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epoch of finance capital only amounted to a historical trajectory of capitalist
developmental forms. Hilferding and Lenin, in many respects, have acted as a
theoretical and practical benchmark for modem Marxists political economy of all
persuasions. Indeed Lenin's prognosis that the imperialist epoch was at heart the
epoch of fmance capital and that this epoch was simultaneously capital's highest
and most parasitic form" , has profound implications that I wish to make use of
and develop. However, any development must proceed on the basis of a critical
review of the category of fmance capital as it now stands. The mistakes and
limitations of their analysis of capitalist decline have been extrapolated into
modem Marxist political economy. Indeed it is the claim here that the reification
of the law of value and basis of the functionalist capital logic approach have their
home in classical Marxists, perhaps more in Hilferdings work than that of
Lenin's. It is important, therefore, to subject Hilferding's and Lenin's theory of
decline to detailed scrutiny. On the basis of this one can contextualise the
modem problems of the capital logic school of Marxism and the class struggle
school, its negative opposite.
2.2 Hiljerding, Lenin and Capitalist Decline: The Concept ofFinance Capital
The concept of an 'epoch of finance capital' is wholly derived from the Marxist
tradition and its most influential exponents have been Hilferding (1910) and
Lenin (1916). For both Marxists the emergence of fmance capital was an
epochal shift in the development of capitalism. Also, for both, the epoch was in
52 Hillel Ticktin (1986) Critique, N017 makes an important point when highlighting the fact that Lenin's
comments about parasitic tendencies in the epoch of finance capital lay undeveloped by Lenin, because he
failed to develop a theory of finance capital. Ticktin argues pursuasively that Lenin provides an institutional
explanation, when what he should have given was a theory based upon the development ofthe social
categories peculiar to capitalism. The fresh insights offinance capital, provided by Ticktin in his critique of
Hilferding and Lenin, will be outlined and built upon in the course of the next chapter.
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substance the simultaneous development and decline of capitalism. Yet both
viewed the decline very differently. For Hilferding the emergence of the epoch
of finance capital heralds the evolutionary transition from capitalism to
socialism. The transition for Hilferding is based, not on revolution, but on
reform, primarily due to the fact that Hilferding bases socialism on the planned
regulation of production and banking. In effect 'planning', it is claimed,
eventually nullifies and then eliminates atomistic/anarchic capitalism.
Capitalists, one can only assume, will comply to the evolution by digging a
socialist future, before moving aside for worker self-management. For Lenin the
future does not hold out the same forces of harmony. The epoch of fmance
capital intensifies the contradiction within capitalism. It must be emphasised,
however, that for Lenin, the essential contradiction was between capital's and not
within labour. The rivalry amongst capitalists escalates: the power to mute
competition and extract super profits, leads to monopoly and retardation of
productive forces at 'home' and intensifies as a rivalry amongst imperialist states
abroad.
The similarities and differences between Hilferding and Lenin are clear. Of
interest is the way modem Marxists have passed judgement. The predominant
view is that Hilferding has the superior analysis. However this is only true in
the technical sense: Hilferding providing a tight logical exposition of the
development and role played by fmancial institutions as capitalism concentrates
and centralises under the impulse to move from its competitive mode to its
monopoly mode. Lenin's theory is less technical, but is the more dialectical.
His theory is able to comprehend that fmance capital is not simply a development
of capital, it is also, above all, a signifier of its decay. For Lenin it has a dual
identity, it develops capital by fusing circulation capital ever more closely with
productive capital (pace Hilferding); however it retards capital, in as much as
there is also a tendency for money capital to pull away from surplus value
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extraction and degenerate the productive base of capitalism. Because of this
Lenin's theory is more historically specific. Arguably the basis for claims that
Hilferding's theory was superior to Lenin's is political. Put bluntly, Marxists with
an overwhelming desire to reform capitalism push Hilferding's explanation to the
fore. However if, finance capital is considered not as a developmental force, but
as a force for decay, as Marxists should, then we can only come to the
conclusion, given the clear role of financial markets today, that Lenin's theory is
more sophisticated. This requires more substantiation. Let us first consider
Hilferding's theory of finance capital.
2.3 Hilferding's Theory ofFinance Capital
Hilferding's theory of finance capital never ignores the law of value. His work is
replete with passages on fundamental Marxist categories such as, value,
exchange value, money capital - even abstract labour gets a mention. Equally,
Hilferding cannot be accused of neglecting to mention the growing collectivity of
labour. What, one may ask, is wrong with Hilferding's theory? The problem is
primarily methodological, which in turn (as these things tend to) leads to a
different substantive outcome. The problem stated simply is that he fails to treat
the categories inherent to capitalist social relations dialectically: there is little
interpenetration and opposition evident in his work. For example, he treats the
two issues (value relations and labour collectivity) discretely: value theory at the
beginning of his book, labour collectivity at the end. This in itself means little.
However this distinction has methodological signifIcance. Implicit in Hilferding's
theory is the view that 'in the beginning' one has the abstract model of value
theory; whilst at the end one has the concrete analysis of the changing
institutional forms of labour collectivity. In other words, value relations are
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analysed as abstract deductions of some pure capitalism and labour collectivity
is added on only historically and not treated dialectically.
Employing terminology from Hegel, one could say that Hilferding's theory of
finance capital is universal, but it is an abstract universal not a concrete
universal. This means that when Hilferding deals with the value world, he
creates a world of abstractions, into which concrete reality is forced regardless of
the 'fit'. The value world however, is a real abstraction embedded in the
concrete. The task is to reveal this process methodologically. Some relevant
examples from Hilferding's work will clarify this and in the process provide
insight into the failings of Hilferding's theory of fmance capital, which have been
carried over into modem Marxism.
Hilferding's confusion on the relationship between price, value and labour is an
apt starting point. Time and time again Hilferding disregards Marx's dialectical
method just at those points where it is most needed. In these moments
Hilferding slips into an atomistic mode of thought more at home in functionalist
sociology than Marxism. It is this persistent methodological slippage which
weakens his theory of fmance capital. For example, Hilferding, in his more
dialectical moments, points to the essence of the money form :
The necessity of money...arises from the nature of commodity
producing society, which derives its laws form the exchange
of commodities as products of socially necessary labour time."
In this manner,
....the social relations of the producers is expressed as the
53 Rudolph Hilferding (1981), p227.
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price of their products, the law of price is the regulative
principle of this society.54
What Hilferding points to here is something essential to capitalism, ie, that the
substance of 'prices' and so 'necessity of money' is socially necessary labour. In
other passages he informs us also that atomistic competition between and within
capital and labour is the prerequisite for abstract socially necessary labour
formation and the basis upon which 'capitalism derives its laws'. All very
fundamental, but what happens to abstract socially necessary labour formation,
and capitalist laws derived from its value relation, when the system enters its
epoch of finance capital? A world dominated by monopoly cartels, holding
companies, trusts, banking and industrial syndicates, where spontaneously
generated prices and profits have become squeezed out in favour of conscious
manipulation.
Hilferding's reply clearly reveals that his grasp of 'law' is rather different to
Marx's. Hilferding's 'law' is the 'law' of his own deductive logic and not a law of
a developing real contradiction which theory must follow. This becomes clear
when he poses and answers the following question,
Ifmonopoly combinations abolish competition, they eliminate at
the same time the only means through which an objective law of
price can actually prevail. Price ceases to be an objectively
determined magnitude and becomes an accounting exercise
for those who decide what it shall be by fiat, a pre-
supposition instead of a result.55
54 Hilferding, ibid, p227.
55 Hilferding, ibid, p228
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Hilferding brings the issue to our attention succinctly enough: the objective basis
upon which 'price' is forged becomes 'eliminated' in the epoch of finance capital.
Yet Hilferding never once discusses the real implications of this dialectical
negation. From a dialectical point of view the law of the elimination of the
objective basis of prices must trace its way back to the decay of the social
relations producing abstract socially necessary labour, and so the decay of the
value form, and, in turn, the decay of the contradiction within labour.
Hilferding's laws of logical deduction cannot penetrate so far, he can only meekly
observe, half in answer, half in question, that:
It seems that the monopolistic combine, while it confmns
Marx's theory of concentration, at the same time tends to
undermine his theory of value.56
Surely value is an ontological social condition, not a theory to be undermined?
Hilferding is astute enough to bring out the theoretical implications of monopoly
conditions, but can take the implication no further. The fact that Hilferding takes
his observation no further, serves to underscore earlier evidence that he treats the
law of value as if it were some abstract category of logic. Hilferding as a
consequence must resign himself to a largely institutionalist-cum-functionalist
analysis of finance capital and its essential categories: the socialisation of capital
and labour.
There are two distinct parts to Hilferding's Finance Capital; the first and
primary one concerns the socialisation of capital; the second concerns the
growing collectivity of labour. However, gone are the dialectical
interpenetration and negation of the social categories which characterise these
56 Hilferding, ibid, p228
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opponents; in their place we are proffered an institutional analysis and empirical
survey of a specifically German mode of finance capital.
As far as the socialisation of capital is concerned a number of major themes
surface. Of these, the growing concentration of industrial and banking capital
assume priority. Of importance is the particular fusion between the two which
developed in such a way as to enable banking capital (circulating capital) to
emerge as dominant partner in terms of investment strategy within the growing
corporate structures of capitalism. Hilferding points out how this concentration
of capital takes two forms. On the one hand, larger companies with a high degree
of fixed capital extend the productive forces in the process of earning economies
of scale in the pumping out of surplus value from labour. On the other hand, the
same companies begin to form cartels, which retard the forces of production and
divide the entire economy up between core monopoly capital's and a periphery of
small/medium competitive capital's. The smaller capital's become totally
governed by the core which regulates prices and profits in its own interests. In
this way, the core forming themselves into cartels, dictate the pace, scope and
nature of exploitation of labour throughout the economy.
Hilferding identifies the 'finance capitalists' as that section of the class who, on
the basis of the above conditions, extract their portion of surplus value in the
form of 'promoters profit'." Finance capitalists, under the impulse to extend
their form of income, become the driving force behind the socialisation of capital
via the further development of stock and money markets. As a distinct faction
within the capitalist class, they gradually squeeze out the old usury class and
progressively dominate the industrial bourgeoisie. Their power base IS
57 Promoters profit refers to earnings derived by managing and distributing credit facilities and share
issues to industry. The emergence of joint stock companies in both banking and industry and so the potential
for dealing in ficticious capital (capital without a base in abstract labour) strengthened the grip of this
particular strata of capital over the direction of capitalist development as a whole.
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facilitated by the stock market in primary and secondary shares, which allow
industrial and banking capital to be fused. By controlling the shares of banking
capital, finance capitalists control the shares of industrial capital. Thus the
finance capitalist controls the whole economy and dictates the flow of
accumulation therein. In essence a new finance capitalist strata had, through its
strategic holding of shares and massive profits from promotion and dealings in
fictitious capital, been to dominate the capitalist system.58
For Hilferding this was evidence of a logical and evolutionary progression for
capitalism. Hilferding's description of events in the German economy and class
structure cannot be faulted. What can be questioned is his universalisation of
this same trend to other economies, notably the USA and Britain (a point we
come back to shortly).
As for the emerging socialisation of labour, Hilferding provides what can only
be described as a functionalist account of three different stages of the changes in
labour contract and the structure of its bargaining with capitalists. The first
stage is the negotiation between capital and labour based on individual worker
contracts, which forces labour to collectivise. This provides the basis of the
development to stage two: negotiations based on a collective worker confronting
a weakened atomistic capitalism. The third and final stage Hilferding describes
is the finance capital era, where a strengthened socialised capital can now
confront the collective worker and the wage conflict becomes subsumed within
the state form. At this stage the State become embroiled in the regulation of
wages and regulation of accumulation. In modem parlance, Hilferding provides
one of the better accounts of industrial relations theory.
58 Hilferding p225, op-cit.
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In the modem era this aspect of Hilferding's work holds little value, in itself.
Important here is Hilferclings inability to go beyond the institutional changes and
link the socialisation of labour to the value form of labour. If he had, Hilferding
could then have established the link between the socialisation of labour, the
negation of its abstract value form and the emergence of finance capital, as
evidence of a rupture between use and exchange value and so the decline of
capitalism.
What is required to make both his theory of the socialisation of capital and the
socialisation of labour (and so his theory of finance capital), historically specific,
is an analysis based on the decay of the value form, the very element from which
finance capital emerges. If Hilfercling had developed theory on the basis of a
consistent Marxist method he might also have come to the following conclusion:
the point of finance capital domination is not primarily to unit bank and industrial
capital, but to estrange itself from direct productive ties in a hostile climate
where it is increasingly confronted by a socialised labour organising against its
exploited position.
Taken as a whole Hilfercling's work provides a detailed analysis of the
institutional forms essential to one particular trend within finance capital : its
corporatist form. For Hilferding it is finance capital's only form. If
circumstances happened to be contrary in different nation states, such as Britain,
then, according to Hilfercling, they would eventually develop the same
institutional arrangements over time. Those who adhere to Hilferding's theory of
finance capital are still waiting in vain for its British appearance! Britain has
remained obstinately resistant to Hilferding's evolutionary logic, complying
instead to the real contradictions within capitalism and developing the highest
and most decadent form of finance capital. A finance capital reduced to
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circulating within itself as a result of its partial failure to combat the most
resistant expressions of socialised labour.
To develop a category of finance capital as an epochal form of capitalism, one
would have had to reveal it as predicated upon a decaying value form and so
recognise capitalism as, ultimately, beyond reform. Something Hilferding and
his modem day followers would be prepared to concede. Lenin was aware of
finance capital as the highest form of capitalism coining the phrase 'parasitic
capital' to describe the fact that this 'highest form' also lives off existing surplus
value and, therefore, as having the potential to advance the productive forces and
retard the extraction of surplus value. For Lenin, the latter tendency eventually
overcomes the former. However, with Lenin this remained no more than an
insight; a dialectical intuition, not so much because he did not centre his analysis
on Britain, (which revealed the highest forms of parasitism) but more
fundamentally that he too, explicitly at any rate, did not develop his theory of an
epochal shift into finance capital on the basis ofthe contradict within labour and
its process ofnegation.
In turning to Lenin, we note two tendencies within finance capital : the fusing of
banking and industrial capital and a separation of parasitic capital. With
Hilferding of course one only gets the former. It is argued here however that
these tendencies lie undeveloped within Lenin's theory and that the full
explication of the real dialectical tension within the tendency towards fusion and
parasitism on the part of finance capital requires that they be placed within a
theory that commences from the contradiction within labour's commodity form
and its potential negation.
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2.4 Lenin's Theory ofFinance Capital
For Lenin, the concept of finance capital and of imperialism were inseparable;
the epoch of fmance capital was also the epoch of imperialist rivalry. Running
parallel through the epoch were elements of capitalism's highest stage of
development (imperialism) and also elements of its decay (fmancial parasitism).
The latter becoming rapidly more pronounced. According to Lenin, Capitalism
is at its high point in this epoch in so far as massive concentrations of capital
had developed the forces of production, and produced a highly developed world
division of labour. As Lenin puts it, the characteristic of the epoch is that:
Competition becomes transformed into monopoly. The result is
immense progress in the socialisation of production. In particular
the process of technical invention and improvement becomes
socialised.59
The forms through which this transformation were carried out, however, also
precipitated an era of inevitable capitalist decay, or, to use Lenin's terminology,
'a state of parasitic decaying capitalism'. 60 These forms were identified by
Lenin as follows :
1] Increasing concentration of capital flowing from the laws of accumulation,
leads to the monopoly regulation of industry,
2] the merging of monopolised industry with monopoly banking and the
development of cartels and fmancial trusts. These eventually lead to a domestic
surplus of capital.
59 V I Lenin (1975), p649.
60Lenin, ibid, p710.
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3] the export of capital seeking profitable returns in foreign government stock
and industries etc.
4] the resultant cartelisation and trustification of the world economy,
5] imperialist expansion undertaken by leading capitalist states at the behest of
the hegemonic rentier classes within each nation, the object being to carve up the
rest of the non industrialised world amongst them on a 'winner takes most' basis.
For Lenin, 1 and 4 on the one hand lead to economies of scale efficiencies and
on the other hand lead also directly, to a stagnation of productive forces, as
monopoly industries increase profit through higher prices and not higher
productivity.61 Categories 2 and 3 lead directly to systematic parasitic
tendencies, in the sense that an emerging finance capitalist ('rentier') faction had
increasingly distanced themselves from production via strategic ownership of
trusts. The trusts in turn are used as vehicles to siphon off profits from
production, through asset stripping and rationalisation, rather than by increasing
capital investment and so valorisation. The mass of profits 'created' in this
manner produced a surplus of capital for the fmance capitalist (relative to
domestic investment), who then turned it to parasitic use abroad buying up
foreign government bonds, railroad stock and so on. Finally, category 5 leads
inevitably to world war and so a destruction of humanity and productive forces.
Lenin was able to point out this contradictory nature of the epoch - at once a high
point of capital and point of parasitic decay - because, unlike Hilferding, he
never lost sight of the fact that capitalism, through all its many transitions was
still compelled to competitively accumulate and so would always remain racked
by antagonistic forces. The resulting two-fold practical difference being that for
Lenin in the era of monopoly was characterised by a situation where, firstly,
competition took an international and increasingly military form and secondly,
61Lenin, ibid, p708.
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finance capital could shield itself from domestic competition in some measure by
controlling the flow of profits in their interests via monopoly pricing and or
(increasingly)money market dealings.
The problem with Lenin's concept of finance capital is that it is submerged within
his analysis of imperialism and, therefore, lies undeveloped. There are two
reasons why this has occurred, the first is substantive, the second theoretical.
From a substantive point of view, Lenin was wholly concerned to link the
economic' aspects of capitalist accumulation to the barbarism of world war.
Hence stagnation tendencies in production and the increase in parasitic activity in
the alienated world of 'coupon clipping', took second place to dynamic trends -
trends such as the movement from monopoly fusion of bank and industrial capital
at the level of the nation state, to the world trustification of whole sectors of
industries and onward to the final act of annexation of the non industrialised
world and so world war.
Given this motive, any criticism aimed at Lenin's failure to develop the concept
of finance capital would, to say the least, appear churlish. However, the matter
regarding the substantive aspect cannot be left simply at this. There is another
very important substantive issue in Lenin's work for which a developed concept
of finance capital is absolutely crucial: Lenin's concern about the growing
reformist trend within the working class. It was crucial to Lenin's understanding
of reformism that he develop further his understanding of parasitism within
capital as fundamentally related to developments in the social form of labour.
Because he did not identify the relationship, Lenin failed to categorise the trend
towards reformism within the labour movement theoretically and could only
provide a concept - 'labour aristocracy' - held together by nothing more than the
weight of empirical description. In other words, Lenin provided a sociological
explanation, when an explanation grounded within the developing forms of the
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law of value was required. The political implications of this have been profound
if one considers Lenin's insistence that revolutionaries work within the Labour
Party. Arguably this has done more to keep the Labour Party and its reformism
alive than to progress socialist aspirations (an issue taken up in some detail in
subsequent chapters).
Lenin argued that the very real growmg opportunism within the 'labour
movement' in the West, particularly Britain, could, in essence, be put down to
bribery. High monopoly profits and imperial preference provided the material
basis for fmance capital 'to bribe certain sections of the workers ...and win them
over to the side of the bourgeoisie '.62 The bribery, according to Lenin served
as the material basis for the creation of a patriotic bond dividing workers and
aligning them with their masters. The ensuing consolidation of nationalism was
then used to counteract the objective socialisation of labour in production; and
thus served to negate any political socialisation of labour throughout society.
This opportunism was strengthened and became systematised with the
emergence of reformist 'Workers Party's' (particularly the British Labour Party).
The point about political atomisation of workers in the face of their growing
objective socialisation is a crucial one. However, it is one which Lenin fails to
develop because he does not take it to the heart of the capitalist labour process
and provide a political economy of workers atomisation." That Lenin only
develops a sociological grasp of what latterly came to be recognised as the
emergence of 'labourism' is made strikingly clear by his optimistic prognosis that
the body (socialised labour) is essentially healthy and merely requires the
removal of an inessential 'abscess' (labourism) (see p729-30).
62 Lenin, ibid, p728.
63 This point will be extended in the following chapter.
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From a theoretical point of view, by not basing his understanding of the epoch
on the movement, development and decay of the law of value, Lenin failed to
develop an analysis on the basis of Marx's political economy. As a result, Lenin
failed to develop, on the basis of the social categories specific to capitalism, the
two most important trends of the epoch; the one developing in the 'labour
process', the other developing within capital. Specifically, Lenin failed to
develop a theory of finance capital on the basis of the decay of the contradiction
within labour and the epochal shift between the fixed and circulating forms of
capital in favour of the latter. Both of these, and their connections, must be
explained if the category of 'fmance capital' is to be understood in its full epoch
embracing role.
The failure of both Hilferding and Lenin to establish an adequate theory has had
substantial ramifications for modem Marxist theory. Marxist theoretical
development has been largely ossified during the past sixty years due mainly to
the defeat of the working class during the 1920s and 30s, a defeat which
manifested itself as Stalinism and capitalist restoration through Keynesianism
after a second world war. In this context, Marxism has fetishised the classical
Marxism of Lenin and Hilferding, thus carrying over their shortcomings. A type
of 'capital logic school' has developed, which has many variants, but one uniting
factor: it reifies the law of value. Below, two dominant trends of this school are
discussed: the revolutionary and the reformist. Firstly, the revolutionist trend is
analysed. Here Mandel's work becomes the focus of critique. After which
'regulation theory', which encapsulates the reformist trend, is subject to critique.
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2.5 The Capital Logic Approach 1
One has only to examme the work of that exempler of post world war two
revolutionary Marxist political economy E. Mandel to assess the degree to which
the law of value has become reified as some functional logical tool, unable to
explain or even conceive of capitalist decline." Mandel adamantly insists that
despite living in an era dominated by 'late capitalism';65 where the rate of profit
comes under attack from 'six basic variables of capitalist production'i'" and
despite the increasing 'attempts at private and state regulation of the economy';
'the law of value (still) prevails in late capitalism as a whole."
There are many political reasons one could cite for Mandel's rejection of the
possibility that the law of value is negating within capitalism. For example, the
fact that it may lead to the reformist position of a 'planned capitalism' adopted by
R. Hilferding; or even worse the 'Bernstein's' of this world." However, one gains
the first approximation to a more fundamental reason when Mattick observes
how,
Instead of explaining the crisis cycle and capitalist
development as governed by the law of value, Mandel
does the reverse : he seeks confirmation of the law of
64Mandel has dominated western marxist political economy with the shear volume of his theoretical
output; as such, he exemplifies what is good and what is bad about contemporary Marxist political economy
and is thus an ideal benchmark for critique.
65 'Late' is a category which appears to relate to a multitude of economic, political and ideological
changes. For example, (and in order) permanent inflation and the growth of multinational capitals; the trend
toward super state spheres of influence; the growth of 'regimentation' (where visible and invisible regulators
ensure the steady); and, finally, the continuous growth of the economy as financial giants become taken over
by 'anonymous boards of directors' bureaucratic functionaries' and Trade Union leaders. See E. Mandel
(1975J.
6 To quote Mandel (1975) - 'These variables include the following central items: the organic
composition of capital....distribution of constant capital between fixed and circulating capital...the
development of the rate of surplus value; the development of the rate of accumulation...; the development of




value in the surface appearance of capitalist production.69
The correct observation, if what has been stated so far is accepted, would have
been to say - 'as governed by the laws of the disintegration of value'. That
Mattick himself is never aware of this suggest a reification on his part too.
Nonetheless, Mattick's point about Mandel's reversal - seeking to prove the law
of value in empirical phenomena - is an important one. It is this very reversal
which leads Mandel to consider all aspects of a nations political economy; state
sponsored industries and services, permanent inflation, crisis theory itself...etc;
as being driven by, or as being proof of the existence of, the law of value.
'There is no doubt that only one law of value exists'," argues Mandel, and every
event is deemed to be proof of the existence of this 'abstract law of motion'. In
fact it is the stated purpose of his work Late Capitalism (1974) to reveal all the
main changes of appearance capitalism has gone through in its 'late' post world-
war two stage as, in Mandel's words, 'the function ofthe inner laws ofcapital'"
The problem is not Mandel's insistence on 'laws of motion', which is an
important ontological and methodological category. The problem is that just like
Hilferding, Mandel develops the law of value as a universal abstraction. It is no
longer a concrete abstraction pertaining to the social form of production relations
and their contradictory development and decay. With Mandel 'the law' is an
invariable given; an epistomological anchor to Mandel's historical analysis of
capitalism. There are no laws of a transition and partial negation of the value
form of labour here, his reversal - seeking confirmation of the health of the law
of value in empirical phenomenon - ensures this.
69 P. Mattick (1981), p174.
70 Mandel, op-cit p70.
711 Ibid p23.
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The reversal effectively turns every manifestation of 'late' capitalism into a
function of an 'abstract' law of value. The result of which is that Mandel divests
himself of a theory of transitional forms and reduces his categories of late
capitalism' to a political history of capital's complex exploitative movements
about the world economy. This in itself is a valuable aspect of Marxism. The
point however is this: because Mandel treats the law of value as an
'accumulation machine', which may falter, but can never wither away; his
category 'late capitalism' fails to provide a political economy'? of exactly what it
is that is so late about contemporary capitalism.
The heart of the problem resolves itself into an implicit rejection of the
dialectical categories of 'identity', 'difference' and 'law'" (to be discussed shortly)
which has lead to the reification of the 'law of value' despite all the caveats that it
is a 'social relation'. It is this which, arguably, blocks contemporary Marxist
accounts of decline in general of which Mandel is an exemplar case. Note his
definitionof the 'law of value',
the economic mechanism in a society of private producers
which distributes the total labour power at the disposal
72 By political economy I mean a Marxist political economy which should strive to explain the essential
inner structure ofcapitalism. Simply put, and paraphrasing the St Petersburgh Messenger (see chapter three),
one needs to disclose the essential laws which 'regulate the origin, existence, development and death, the
social organism' the essence of which in our case is the law of value. Mandel fails to deliver on the death, or to
be more specific to the present, the decay aspect.
73 This is refered to in more detail in chapter three. However, a brief explanation of these essentialist
categories is as follows. There are two types of identity at work in all social theory. There is the dominant one
having its basis in atomism which stresses the individual parts of an object cannot be one thing and
simultaneously something else. There is the less dominant one at the heart of dialectics which stesses that a
thing can be one thing and another simultaneously. This fact is the heart of the dialectical contradiction. For
example people are whole entities in themselves, this is as far a s atomism goes. the more essentialist response
would be to add; only in so far as they are only parts of a greater whole - society. The basis of the
contradiction between individual freedom and its social boundedness lies in the production process. In
capitalism this bond is constituted by the duality of labour as simultaneously concrete and abstract. The 'law'
one spoke of becomes in this respect the law of development and dissolution of the contradiction within labour.
As such the law is necessary and a real process. Conversely atomistic law can only accounted for on the basis
regularities perceived in the constant conjunctures of accidental non essential relations individuals encounter.
Subjective value theory in economics is one such 'law' which is based on the atomist view of identity and non
contradiction.
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of society...between various branches of production, via
the mediation of the exchange of all commodities at
their values."
What does this definition indicate? Essentially this: Mandel quite correctly
describes the quantitative aspect of value, but neglects the most important
qualitative foundations of the latter. In line with the argument put forward here,
such a loss can mean only one thing : the law of value becomes reduced in its
essence to an atomistic bundle of labour times united by the concept of 'value',
the 'substance' of which becomes reduced to 'the social average productivity of
labour'," which is nothing but another concept. Thus Mandel reverts to Kant for
his dialectic and Durkheim for his functional analysis of the institutions of 'late'
capitalism.
To amplify. Mandel claims any Marxist theory of capitalist political economy
must understand and relate three defining aspects of its reality. Firstly, the
appearances or superficialities of the concrete world of capitalism; secondly, the
intermediary links (eg, rising organic composition of capital, relative surplus
value extraction..etc); thirdly, the 'inner relation' (the value relation). The 'third',
according to Mandel, enabled Marx to 'grasp historical reality' (Mandel's first
aspect - concrete appearances), and give it unity. However, as the 'inner relation'
itself (the value relation) was a 'somewhat idealised and typified inner
structure.!" the 'second aspect' (intermediary links, eg, organic composition of
capital) has to serve two functions. Their interconnections must serve to verify
Marx's apparently 'ideal-type' 'inner relation' of value theory and also serve as
intermediaries to the manifold concrete appearances of capitalism. The strong
implication is that, for Mandel, the law of value serves as an ideal-type
74 Mandel, op-cit, p594.
75 Mandel op-cit p594.
76 Paraphrases are from Mandel, ibid, pI8.
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abstraction to be verified. Apparently, for Mandel there remams nothing
substantial to the law of value itself. There is no internal relation between the
categories he speaks of, and so these categories merely become so many
variables to be verified. Hence Mandel can, indeed must, argue that,
up to a certain point all the basic variables of this
mode of production can partially and periodically
perform the role of autonomous variables."
An investigation of the correlation between these variables is an important part
of 'Late Capitalism', for Mandel, because his thesis,
is that the history of capitalism (concrete appearance)
and at the same time the history of its inner regularities
and unfolding contradictions (value relations), can only
be explained and understood as a function of the interplay
of these six variables."
The problem Mandel faces along with much post war western Marxist political
economy, is that by failing to develop theory out of capitalism's real substantive
unity - the contradiction within labour - he is left only with a Kantian abstraction
called 'value'; with a Kantian 'substance' called 'social average labour time', with
which to unify the manifold appearances of capitalism. The latter explained as a
perpetual function of this abstract unity. In relation to what has been argued here,
one can say much Marxism has in fact fallen foul of all that Hegel criticised Kant
for with regard to the latters metaphysical scepticism. 79
77Mandel, op-cit, p38.
78Mandel,0p-cit p39, I have added bracketed words.
79 The interested reader is referred to Hegel's Logic (1975), p65-94. Hegel says of Kant 'There is a
dualism in his philosophy...on one side stands the world of sensation..This world he alleges to be a world of
appearances...on the other side and independent stands a self apprehending thought..(which) ...in the critical
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With value theory in such a reified state, the transgression to further explanatory
concepts such as 'Fordist regimes of regulations', proposed by regulation theory,
was, perhaps, inevitable. It is further evidence of a Marxism impelled towards
the methodologies of Kant and Weber in an effort to breath explanatory life into
the categories thrown up by the value form of labour. The problem is, however,
that a deeper ontological analysis of what is in decline then becomes an
impossibility. As we shall see the in substantive nature of Kantian inspired
categories, such as 'Fordism and Post Fordism, obscures a more profound
critique of capitalism in the twentieth century.
2.6 Capital Logic Approach 2
Regulation theory characterises the epochs of capitalism as the movement
between pre-Fordism, Fordism and Post Fordism. As a school of thought it has
its origins in the work of Agliatta (1979), with many subsequent additions by
others, for example Jessop, (1982, 1990 1992); and Hirsch, (1992). The
concepts have been widely deployed to explain many facets of social life from
the economy, the role of the State and even modes of architecture (Gunn, 1991).
However, it is as an explanation of regimes of accumulation and modes of
regulation that is of most concern to us here. Despite some variations, there
exists a certain core of ideas concerning the regulation theory which enable it to
be classified a school. It is these core ideas which will be subject to critique
here.
doctrine ....is divested of every specific form, and thus bereft of all authority' (P93). Arguably western
marxist value theory is left in as similar an abstract state as Kants 'self apprehending thought'.
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Regulation theories (RT) emerged precisely because of the failure of existent
Marxism to explain the deep structural crisis which has plagued western
capitalism since the mid 1970s. Theories have been one sided, so the argument
goes. Two prominent Marxist efforts have fallen short of a full explanation:
those of 'profit squeeze theory' and theories of 'the long wave'. Long wave
theory successfully locates the crisis ridden nature of capitalism in the immanent
tendency for the rate of profit to fall (TRPF). The contours of 'the long wave' of
capital accumulation are given their shape by the sequence of a rising rate of
relative surplus value extraction: cheapening of means of production and
consumption; rising organic composition of capital; initial success of
counteracting tendencies to offset falling rates of profit; and, finally, the eventual
failure of counteracting tendencies and actualisation of a falling rate of profit.
According to RT there is little problem with this per-se (Hirsch, 1991). That is
to say the reification the law of value suffers in long wave theory is not the
problem. The problem is simply that these abstract laws need to be concretised.
Their concrete manifestations, depict how, why and under what circumstances
the TRPF and 'long waves' will actualise and resolve themselves.
Bequeathed a concept of the law of value which apparently has no absolute
limits, RT search for more conceptually concrete manifestation to capture in
theory the movement of the abstract law of value. For example, Hirsch, initially
likes the look of 'profit squeeze theory'. But then concludes that the theory is
too superficial. It does not convey the true nature of class struggle beyond the
level of class struggle over distribution of incomes. In effect, profit squeeze
theory can only explain counteracting tendencies and not the nature of an epoch
of capitalist development (Hirsch, 1992).
RT's believe that the concepts of Fordism and Post Fordism can substantiate
(give concreteness to) the abstract laws of motion of capital, which apparently
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has no concreteness of its own (Jessop, 1991). In other words, whereas Marx
clearly envisaged the value form as having a content (concreteness), of its own,
that is a substance of its own - abstract social labour - RT's do not recognise this
and so have to create ideal type concepts such as 'Fordism' to do the job. Hence
it is the contours of Fordism, not the emergence, consolidation and decline of
abstract socially necessary labour, which becomes the focus of explanatory
attention.
The substantiation takes the following form. Fordism, for example, becomes a
process of two interrelated parts: a regime of accumulation (guiding the law of
value in the economy); and a mode of regulation (the involvement of the State
politically in regulating consumption and culture to assist the regime). Together
they serve as a synchronic 'concrete social framework' guiding the abstract laws
of motion of value, which apparently is external to it. The concept 'Fordism' has
many factors within its rubric. For example, the part that deals with setting the
regime of accumulation, exhibits a culture of mass production of standardised
commodities; the deskilling of labour; and scientific management, usually
Taylorism, as the main mode of control over workers in the labour process. The
bit that deals with regulation designs a central role for trade unions in national
wage setting; adapts controls over demand in the form of Keynesianism; and
creates a welfare state. All of which regulate consumption to accumulation and
so attempt to stave of the onset of the next 'long wave' in its decline phase.
If/when the mode of regulation cannot keep apace with the regime of
accumulation then a realisation crisis becomes actualised, the long wave comes
to a faltering end and the fragility of the only formal unity of the abstract law of
value breaks down. This heralds the beginnings of a Post Fordist accumulation
strategy.
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Thus, the deep structural crisis that hit western capitalism around the mid 1970s
is due to Fordism's failure as an institutionalised counteracting tendency to offset
the TRPF. Post Fordism IS an attempt (still embryonic) to
restructure/substantiate the formal unity of the law of value, by establish a new
regime of accumulation and mode of regulation. A regime of accumulation is
said to be in the process of coming to be. It includes a post Taylorist
organisation of labour along more flexible, individualised lines, with the split
between core and periphery becoming more pronounced; a micro-chip
technological revolution which aids and abet the extraction of relative surplus
value via mass production of differentiated commodities. The mode of
regulation must fit the more flexible regime of accumulation in the Post Fordist
world of the future. Hence, it consists of a strong authoritarian State, able to
distance itself from the economy, but capable of centralising its political rule.
The fragmentation of collectivities ushered in by a resurgent market, provides the
basis upon which the State can impose political atomisation. Reinforcing this
process is the dismantling of the welfare state; the privatisation of public assets;
the weakening of the old pluralist political system and destruction of national
wage bargaining systems.
Without a doubt, some of the descriptive parts of the theory have a certain ring
of truth. Although, as some have argued (Clarke, 1992; Bonefeld, 1992), one
would look in vane for any evidence of the ideal-type Fordist or Post Fordist
world portrayed by RT. The biggest problem however, is not empirical, but
ontological. Force fitting the dialectical movements of capitalist social relations
into ideal types, merely obscures the aforementioned tendencies inner
connections and mystifies their real context - a declining capitalism. Because
they deny value its real substantive content - abstract labour, RT's sever the
value world from its articulation and grounding in society and ground it rather in
the world of ideas and concepts. The law of value becomes an epistomological
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device to aid a functionalist analysis of modes of regulation and regimes of
accumulation. Further, because their law of value is a concept divorced from its
ground in society, it has no real developmental tendencies, or tendencies towards
decline. Hence the law of value becomes a universal law of society in the
abstract and can apparently arise, unscathed, from every conceivable crisis, 'long
wave' or otherwise. The political implications of moving away from labour as
the ground of Marxist analysis is clear too. Capitalism is universally dynamic,
there is life in the old (ageless") social relation yet, therefore the left should press
to reform it (in the interests of the working class of course!) It is no accident
that many adherents to RT have called for trade unions to 'get real'; strikers to
stop their old fashioned (read 'Fordist') nonsense; and for the Labour Party to
'modernise' itself ready for another attempt to reform capitalism.
The argument in the next chapter confirms that Trotsky's famous warning - 'from
a scratch to the danger of gangrene' - was never more appropriate to the
Marxism's considered above. It will be argued that the neglect of Marx's starting
point - the two-fold nature of labour - is the main reason why Marxist theories of
decline have remained trapped within an explanatory discourse concerned with
intra capitalist struggles, creating false dichotomies between industrial and
financial capital. It is also the main reason why modem Marxism is forced to
seek out Kantian abstractions such as Fordist regulation regimes. As noted, the
root of the reification of value theory lies at the level of (post Marx) classical
Marxism. To recapture the substantive and methodological point of departure
for an analysis of capitalist decline, requires that one clarifies the ontological
significance of Labour in Marx's work. This task is taken up in chapter three.
The proceeding chapters will then operationalise the theory of capitalist decline
constructed in chapter three and develop a genetical and historical account of the
decline of the capitalist social relation in Britain. This chapter ends with a brief
recapitulation of the critique so far.
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2.7 Overview and Summation ofthe Critique
I have argued that bourgeois theorists disarm themselves of a real analysis of
British capitalist decline, when they choose to ignore the specific social form
under which production occurs. By choosing instead to view the production
process as a neutral technical zone they are compelled to seek the source of
decline in inessential aspects, namely : state interference or the psychological
disharmonies between management and labour. In the case of the Right there
can be no mystery as to why their analysis should centre on the universal
technical aspects of production and exchange. Quite simply, by doing so, they
attempt to persuade all who will listen of the 'naturalness' of market based
relations and the 'unnaturalness' of non-market state forms of production.
If the non-Marxist Left (NML) theory also reifies the production process, at least
its analysis has the benefit of revealing beyond doubt that state intervention is far
from being a hindrance to markets, in point of fact a positive necessity in
bolstering an ailing British capitalism. Essentially, however, NML theory throws
little light on the source of decline. The cumulative causation's of decline it
offers, such as, 'supply-side deficiencies' and 'inelastic demand' capacities of
British commodities; are merely the manifest effects of a deeper ontological
source of decline which escapes their atomist method of enquiry. Their views, it
can be argued, express the interests of those groups in society who seek class
compromise between labour and capital. In as much as this is the case their
political economy centres on the belief (however conscious or unconscious) that
in order to maintain general market relations, value expansion must, at certain
points, be sacrificed to the bureaucratic administration of useful needs. This
maintains control over organised labour by keeping them at arms length from real
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political decision making at the point of production. This in turn, prolongs the
political rule over production as a whole for a somewhat unstable factionalised
capitalist class.
As far as the Marxist contribution to British capital's decline is concerned
the situation, is far from satisfactory. With the law of value dismissed or ignored
(arguably for the reason given in this chapter) their central categories owe more
to Kant and Weber than to Marx. 'Hegemonic class rules', 'Fordist' and now
'Post-Fordist production regimes', tom from their basis in value relations and
their content - abstract labour - are, at best, mere descriptive abstractions.
Similarly, their 'ideal-type' comparative decline analysis of Britain vis-a-vis other
more 'mature' capitalist nations, becomes a poor substitute for analysing the real
source of decline: the decay of the capitalist social form (value) and social
content (abstract labour) of production.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONSTRUCTING A MARXIST THEORY OF DECLINE.
3.1 Marxism and the Category ofDecline
Ifwe did not fmd, concealed in society as it is, the material conditions
of production and the corresponding relations of exchange prerequisite
for a classless society, then all attempts to explode it would be quixotic.
(K. Marx, The Grundrisse, p159)
The quote above reflects Marx's belief that if the present society contained no
transitional forms (on the basis of which a movement towards a classless society
is possible), then the whole Marxist project would be utopian, little more than a
leap of faith. Marx, however, firmly believed capitalist society was inherently
transitional. When the May 1872 edition of 'The European Messenger' of St
Petersburg reviewed Capital, Marx was of the opinion that its reviewer had
captured the spirit of his scientific endeavour - to capture in thought the
transitional nature of society. Later editions of Capital carried the proceeds of
this review. The reviewer made the particularly important point that the outcome
of every accurate scientific investigation into economic life must be an attempt to
disclose,
the special laws that regulate the origin, existence
development, death of a given social organism and
its replacement by another and higher one.80
80 Marx, Capital Vol 1 p28 (Progress Publishers 1983).
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The European Messenger was quite taken with the fact that Marx had adopted
this approach to the study of capitalist society. An approach which compelled
him to search out the 'law of the phenomena' and its 'transition' from its present
form into another. Indeed it is this aspect that 'the messenger' (to Marx's
pleasure) holds aloft as the objective of 'scientific investigation into economic
life'.
With some exceptions, Marxist's analysing British capitalist decline often infer
that something is 'ebbing', 'shrinking', dwindling'..etc. When they refer to
phenomenon such as profitability, balance of payments crises..etc, they are
indeed adequate expressions. However, such words do not capture what was
inferred by the European Messengers reporter who spotted something more
profound in Marx's explanation of what was occurring within the social relations
of capitalism. In order to capture the spirit of what decline infers here, one
would use more appropriate words such as 'decay', 'dissolution'. 'disintegration',
'decomposition'..etc. These words give better expression to the manifestations of
a deeper process, what Marx sometimes referred to as the 'self negation of
capital'.
Marx chided Adam Smith and David Ricardo whom he considered to be the best
of bourgeoisie political economy, for dealing inessentially with the problem of
capitalist decline. Adam Smith and David Ricardo simply could not conceive of
an internal cause of capitalist decline. Any notions of decline they did harbour
were 'partial' and 'reversible' decline (much like the terminology of the modem
day 'de-industrialiser'). Smith, for example, pointed to problems of too high an
interest rate; Ricardo pointed to nature - the decreasing marginal efficiency of
land. Marx in Capital by contrast established the manifestations of decline,
when developing his critique of the organic composition of capital and the
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related socialisation oflabour. Such incites provide indications of the source of
decline, although, nowhere did these indications receive elaboration. Henry
believes that Marx could conceive of the regressive antagonistic aspect of
capital, even if Marx did not draw them out fully on paper, solely because of his
chronological place in history;
Marx was able to write capital only when the subject
of his enquiry, capitalism, had reached a level of development
in which it showed its regressive features as well as displayed
the social forces that could lead to its elimination.81
Certainly this fact was a very big help, however there is more to the matter than
this. Marx had a different methodological outlook than bourgeoisie political
economy. The key factor was his ontological commitments to the centrality of
labour, the transitory forms labour evolves through and the specific dual form it
took under capitalism. Marx brought a mixture of Aristotelian and Hegelian
categories of philosophy to bear in shedding light on this ontology of labour (a
point that will be expanded below). Marx, in a famous passage in Capital,
points out,
a commodity presents itself to us as a complex of
two things - use value and exchange value....Labour
too possesses the same two-fold nature; I was the
first to point out and to examine critically this two-
fold nature of labour contained in commodities...This
point is the pivot on which a clear comprehension of
political economy turns..
81IF. Henry, The Making ofNeo-Cl.assical Economics, p180, Boston Unwin Hyman, 1990.
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Thus, Rubin was right to stress that Marx's 'starting point is not value, but
labour'. However the critique does not stop at 'why labour has of necessity to
take the form of value', but, if it is to do justice to the claims made in the
European Messenger which Marx approved of, must beg a more penetrating
question: under what conditions does the dual nature of labour contained in
commodity form begin to degenerate and with what consequences for the
categories of value? Marx skirted around the issue, but never made the
degeneration into a more precise theoretical form. Certain remarks made in The
Grundrisse, do provide a strong indication of how the dual nature of labour
begins to transmute and what the consequences of this transmutation are.
In the Grundrisse Marx was quite specific about how and why the social
labourer is substantiated in production on the basis of concrete social labour; and
how and why the value form becomes increasingly subordinated. Marx argued
that under capitalism labour time is the ultimate source of wealth in the form of
value. However capitalism faces an inescapable contradiction which eventually
brings about its decay. As capital develops so too does the social productive
power of labour, so much so that the product of labour bears less and less
relation to labour time and so value creation. In other words commodities
produced are substantiated more and more as use values and less and less as
aliquot parts of the value form (Grundrisse p704-706). Given that labour power
is the commodity par excellence, then, it follows, although Marx does not spell it
out, that the value form of labour (Marx's most important discovery) is in decline.
If the value form of labour is in decline, this can only mean that its substance -
abstract labour - is in decline also.
Marx is quite clear as to the cause of this tendency toward the negation of the
commodity form of production - it is the emergence of the socialised labourer
and its productive potential which outgrows its value form. Therefore, one may
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say that the essence of decline is found in the process whereby one identity
(ground) for the social relations of production - abstract labour - begins to wane,
while another identity - socialised labour - begins to develop. As Marx argues -
it is neither the direct human labour he himself performs, nor
the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation
of his own general productive power, his understanding of
nature and his mastery over it by virtue of his presence as a
social body - it is, in a word, the development of the social
individual which appears as the great foundation stone of
production and of wealth. The theft of alien labour time,
on which the present wealth is based, appears as a
miserable foundation in face of this new one As soon as
labour in the direct form has ceased to be the great
wellspring of wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to
be its measure, and hence exchange value (must cease to be
the measure) of use value.....With that, production based on
exchange value breaks down, and the direct, material
production process is stripped of the form of penury and
antithesis (ibid p705-706, my emphasis in bold).
The limited nature of capital, due to the developing social integration of labour,
is perhaps never made more clearer by Marx than in the following
pronouncement;
On the one side, then, it (capital) calls to life all the powers
of science and of nature, as of social combination and of
social intercourse, in order to make the creation of wealth
independent (relatively) of the labour time employed on it.
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On the other side, it wants to use labour time as a measuring
rod for the giant social forces thereby created, and to
confme them within the limits required to maintain the
already created value as value. Forces of production and
social relations - two different sides of the development of
the social individual - appear to capital as mere means, and
are merely means for it to produce on its limited foundation.
In fact, however, they are the material conditions to blow
this foundation sky-high (ibid p706).
There is, then, clear indication from Marx that the essence of decline involves an
inverse relationship between abstract and socialised labour; the former
weakening as the latter strengthens its grip on production relations.
I wish to argue below, that this socialisation of labour is central to what Marx, as
mentioned above, refers to as the 'self negation' of capital. In addition, it is
argued that this negation was the basis for the emergence of finance capital in
Britain. The fundamental role of fmance capital is to oversee and attempt to
arrest capitalist decline. To get to a point where this can be substantiated,
requires that two prior stages of explanation must be initially negotiated. Firstly,
an explanation of what exactly abstract labour is will be undertaken. This will
situate the category within Marx's general exposition of the essentials of the law
of value. Secondly, a little must be said about the ontological status of
categories such as 'negation', 'essence' 'law', 'identity' and 'difference' and their
role in society in general and the decline of abstract labour formation in
particular.
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3.2 The Role ofAbstract Labour in Marx's Theory ofValue
The law of value is not just a theory which helps one understand social reality,
rather it is inherent in the structure of capitalist society, giving that society order.
The theory of value expounded by Marx is thus a set of interrelated concepts
which capture the living process of this law and how it constitute the essence of
capitalist society. The fundamental and ideal condition for the existence of the
law of value is that the dominant form of labour is wage Labour. This indicates
that labour's only connection with production is through the selling of its labour
power to a capitalist class who, by definition, own and control the means of
production and so surplus labour. Once labour is separated from the means of
production, the latter is no longer the natural mediation for the self expression of
man. Instead the means of production now stands opposed to labour as capital,
something alien which creates and recreates labour's exploitation and
alienation.82
When wage labour dominates economic discourse, the direct production bonds
between people are severed and older collective relations die. Ideally it is only
through productive activity that labourers themselves are associated to each
other. The best approximation to this ideal scenario was the period of British
history following the abolishment of the poor laws in 1834 and the defeat of
Chartism which ushered in the economic and political atomisation of labour for
decades to come. Given such conditions in their ideality the implication is clear:
divorcing labour from the means of production atomises every individual
labourer one from another. However, it is not only labour which becomes
atomised. In addition, the owners and controllers of capital also stand atomised
from each other. Therefore, it can be stated that, given a fully functioning law
82See K, Marx & F, Engel's Collected Works, No3, wher Marx and Engels provide their exposition of
alienated labour in all its forms.
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of value (eg, unbridled by payments to labour outwith the wage relation and
devoid of monopolistic control of markets by capital), then members of all
classes relate socially only as commodity owners.
An individuals being or identity as a commodity owner, is the basis of a peculiar
dual 'identity' endured under capitalist relations83 . As individuals with use value
needs and 'bearers' of the exchange value producing process. For example,
labourers own their own capacity to labour, a useful activity which must become
an exchange value creating activity if the capacity is to be realised. Capitalists,
having realised labour's capacity by exchanging it for a wage and uniting it with
the means of production, are also commodity owners of many potential use-
values at the end of the production process. However, like the workers labour
power, it remains only a potential use value until it is exchanged. In this way the
capitalist too is the bearer of a value relation.
The 'ideal', then, is to have no directly social production relation between
individuals (intra and inter class). Social relations outwith, such as feudal, are
crushed under the Juggernaut of expanding capital', to paraphrase Marx, until
individuals are of necessity mediated by exchange at every tum. Here then
is the ontological basis for the rise and dominance over society of the value form,
the social basis of prices. Stated briefly, capitalist society, as all societies must,
expends and distributes social labour. However, as indicated, capitalist social
relations atomise individuals into private commodity producers. A fact which
poses the ontological contradiction of how their private concrete labour (whether
it is the worker or the capitalist with a factory full of potential use-values worked
up by concrete labour) is to be socially sanctioned in such a manner as to reveal
its expenditure and distribution as socially necessary.
83Wecome back to the category of ,identity' shortly.
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Clearly it is through market exchange and so the 'price mechanism', that
this ontological contradiction is resolved. But this is only the phenomenal form
of the resolution. The market transforms use values into exchange values.
However to do this requires some common ground between these two different
natures, otherwise their relation would be accidental. As Marx proved against
Samual Bailey, the accidental claim is untenable. The ground must in fact be a
negation of the two qualities; a negation which preserves each within the one
form, or the one identity, otherwise their could be no unity. It must also
constitute something different too, otherwise it would collapse back into being
simply use value related or exchange value related.
Marx was aware that the existence of commodities proved that an inner unity did
exist. Marx ( in Capital) traced the emergence of a universal equivalent
commodity in the shape of gold. Its capacity as a universal equivalent rested on
the fact that class struggle over surplus value extraction had forced on society the
need for one commodity to be singled out as a vehicle primarily of exchange,
which would best represent the social value of particular commodities. As the
private and particular value rested on the particular and private labour time
taken, then the universal equivalents secret is that it represents socially necessary
labour in the abstract. The abstraction here is a real one; it is a social process,
which the bodily form of gold does its best to contain and represent. Gold, as
the universal equivalent, then, becomes the ground or negation through which
particular exchange values are socially measured for their allotments of abstract
socially necessary labour. As money capital, gold is the form of value par
excellence; thus gold is the ground of the form of value and simultaneously the
ground of its substance - abstract labour.
It is important to recognise that the ground or negation of use and exchange
value cannot be achieved by any mere symbol, such as, for example, a currency
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in and of itself. A currency represents exchange value and bears no relation to
use value, eg, is not itself a use value. Therefore the ground/negation offered by
currencies would only be apparent not real. Again it must be stressed that the
real ground uniting exchange value and use value must have a commonalty to
both: it must have, in other words, both potentials within it. In a word it must be
a commodity. Without commodity money, that is to say, without gold, use and
exchange value would begin to lose the ability to unite. That is to say exchange
value would weaken its dominating orbit around use value: use value would less
and less be tied to socially necessary abstract labour criteria. In fact use value
would be tied increasingly to the conscious regulation of concrete labour's social
necessity for society (at first through embryonic forms of planning, ultimately in
an organic plan necessarily involving the whole society in some way).
Necessarily so, because once use value had moved from the orbit of exchange
value entirely, then its other ergon - meeting social needs - would dominate. The
expression of this new ergon could only be accomplished if all individuals where
politically active in deciding these needs. Much of these issues will be raised
later in the thesis, for now it is suffice to know that implicit in Marx's value
theory is its suppression.
For Marx, then, generalised commodity exchange, as it deepened its hold on
society, was, stripped of all inessential content, the social process between
individuals which reduced their holdings of concrete private labour to
abstract social labour. This social valuation of private labour, then, is achieved
through their negation as abstract socially necessary labour, which is given
actuality by the exchange of commodities. In this manner as Marx remarked
constantly, our social relations take the form of things because things take the
social form of value relations. As our social exchange relations develop so too
does the expression of value. Eventually, as indicated, it becomes a universal
equivalent: gold, which is represented at a suragatery level, by the world
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currencies that at different periods of capitalism's history act 'as good as gold' in
ever decreasing power, for example, Sterling and latterly the Dollar.
The whole drive behind such social relations of course evolves out of the
capitalists need to extract a surplus from labour. As owner of a commodity,
labour power, the worker is paid his value in exchange for the use of his labour
power (the wage subject to the class struggle may be higher or lower but must
gravitate towards his value)84 If this for example was the equivalent of three
hours work and the worker had sold the use of his labour for eight hours then a
surplus value of five hours falls to the capitalist. This is just a simple illustration
to make the essential point that the capitalist, as controller of production, is
interested in production and exchange solely in respect of its valorising capacity.
Therefore, not only is one dealing with a productive organism which can become
social only via the circulation of commodities, the latters capacity resting on its
dual nature as both a use-value and value; but also with a society where the value
form takes overriding priority in relation to 'productivity' or the over coming of
'supply side restriction' so fetishised by both Left and Right of the political
spectrum which concerns itself with De-Industrialisation.
This brief excursion into the basic ontology of Marx's L.T.V. leaves one
with these initial conclusions: concrete labour is the basis of abstract labour,
abstract labour is the basis of value and value is the basis of money/prices, in a
word they are 'identities in difference'. To be more precise, the different social
categories above, from class struggle to price, are the product of the
contradiction between two identities: concrete need fulfilling labour and abstract
exchange value creating labour. The dual identity was touched on above, it is
the ground for the suppression of capitalist value relations. it is also, because of
84 Marx deals with the physical and moral elements that determine labours value in Capital Volume One
Chapters vi vii
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this, the ground of the developing categories of a theory and practice of
transition. The fuller ramifications of this contradiction are detailed below.
3.3 Identifying the Categories ofTransition
Marx's critique of capitalism was fundamentally a critique of its transitory laws,
the principle law being the law of value. Modem Marxism travels along a
different ontological path than Marx. For them (see chapter two), the law of
value is not in a state of transition, but, on the contrary, is deemed to remain
fundamentally undisturbed as capitalism 'develops' from one cyclical crisis or
long wave to the next. As a result the full implications and meaning of capitalist
decline have become obscured. To unearth the meaning of capitalist decline,
requires one disclose the nature of the transitions undertaken by the law of
value. It is commonplace amongst Marxist to claim that the law of value is a
social relation, but not so common to expand on the ontological context of this
'law'.
Meiklev reveals the strong relationship between the essentialist world view of
Aristotle and Marx's way of looking at the world. Marx's doctoral thesis appears
to offer confmnation of his essentialist leanings. He sided with Epicurus's claim
that atoms are internally related parts of a substantial form and that knowledge of
the world must take this into account. Democritus's claim, that the world was
constituted by the blind collision of atoms having no specific formal relation, was
fmnly rejected by Marx. Teeple summaries one of the major ontological findings
Marx took from his dissertation;
85Scott Meikle, (1985).
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The atom as first principle (essential form) and
appearance (given determinate material qualities)
represent respectively the two sides of the realised contradiction.86
Thus Marx appears to have been won over towards the disposition of
essentialism very early on in his intellectual development. As Rosdolsky (1977);
Rubin (1979) and others have adumbrated, this disposition towards a materialism
that went beyond appearance to grasp the necessary forms, was to prove to be
the key in Marx's revolutionising of the categories of political economy
bequeathed him by Smith and Ricardo. As Meikle points out, 'Marx's
understanding of the historical process embodies categories of essence, law and
necessity', all of which he was to gain from Aristotle." In addition, to the
influence of Aristotle, one cannot forget that Marx also 'avowed himself a pupil
of that mighty thinker Hegel'. Hegel's categorical understanding of negation
was undoubtedly a decisive factor in Marx's unique synthesis of Aristotelian
essentialism and Hegel's dialectical 'logic'.
There are differences between an Aristotelian understanding and an Hegelian
understanding of the categories mentioned above. Fundamentally their
differences have been sublated by Marx and so Marxism; the categories have
been taken to a deeper level of abstraction. This implies Marxism appropriates
the categories of essence, law, identity, negations..etc, in a different way than did
Aristotle or Hegel. It is outwith the scope of this thesis to consider what those
theoretical differences might be. The thesis simply hopes to put Marx's synthesis
into practice and be judged on its explanatory power in determining just what is
at the heart of capitalist decline in Britain.
86G. Teeple, The Doctoral Dissertaion ofKarl Marx, in The History of Politcal Thought (journal), p99, Noll,
(1990).
87Meikle, 1985, op-cit, p3.
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What one can say, however, is that Marx paid homage on a number of occasions,
in Capital and elsewhere, to Aristotle's grasp of material reality as constituted by
real natures, which have a purpose (efficient, material, formal and final cause)
determined by their form (essence) and develop and decay on the basis of
necessary laws, which, barring accidents, realise the purpose. Aristotle's grasp
of the real nature of his own society, as Marx indicated, almost uncovered the
secret of value. Clearly, Marx was an advocate of Aristotle's method of enquiry
and ontological persuasion. Meikle's argument (1985) that Marx was an
essentialist cannot be seriously contested, nor can the explanatory power of
seeing Marxism in this light be seriously doubted.
However, there is more to Marxism than its Aristotelian heritage. Marx also had
the benefit of Hegel's explication of negation, which brings into relief a much
sharper understanding of dialectics, than is evident in Aristotle's work. Certainly
the category of negation is absolutely decisive in Marx's critique of political
economy and to his understanding of its downfall and the necessity of
communism (even if it is not inevitable). To take account of the sublation one
can call Marxism 'dialectical essentialism'. One needs to explicate the
dialectical essentialist understanding of the categories and progressively
introduce them into political economy. Hence below I introduce the categories
essence, identity, difference, dialectics, law and negation, progressively, before
combining them in a critique of capitalism in transition and decline.
Taking essence first. The essence of an entity is not reductive to anyone thing,
on the contrary, it signifies the irreducible relation between an entity and its
parts. The relation is a contradiction. As a first approximation one can say the
contradiction is that systematically (and so necessarily) the parts of an entity
are repulsed from and attracted to the entity. More fundamentally the
contradiction resolves to this: the parts of an entity are an identity in so far as
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they are species kinds of that entity, but simultaneously they are different, in so
far as they are individual parts. Take societies in general, individuals are
identical as social beings, but as individuals, they strive to attain/retain their
difference. This is a natural state of affairs which no society can do away with.
Individuals can only be individuals in and through society. In class divided
society, however, individuals have their identity divided. The class an individual
belongs to is the basis of their divided identity. This double identity is the basis
of alienation and the basis of an individuals reluctance on most occasions to
identify themselves with a class (a divided identity) even though objectively they
prosper or become ruined because of its existence. Only on certain occasions
can they be drawn to act as a class because their lives as individuals have
become insufferable.
A more specific appreciation of the dialectic between identity and difference can
be ascertained by considering the dispute over the working class nature of
individuals in capitalist societies. Their condition as exploited wage labour
serves as the basis of their more substantial identity. Yet members of this class
will always be different too, as particular individuals and/or groups, for example,
oppressed women, blacks..etc. They strive to assert their differences (eg,
feminist and black liberation movements), sometimes by denying their more
substantive identity (as class bound), sometimes by embracing class identity.
Whether class identity is denied or embraced, it is always the conditional fact of
life in class based societies. Thus it could be argued that for the black movement
to actuate their differences and express them freely, they have first to embrace
and change their more fundamental identity or class status which binds them to
their oppressed status. In this instance it is a great disservice of working class
movements to attempt to crush difference under the category of class identity. A
political act which alienates the oppressed from class politics. Far better to
embrace difference and identity in a revolutionary politics. Perhaps this was
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Lenin's point in his critique of 'economism' as the current vogue in revolutionary
politics in What Is To Be Done? It was certainly implicit in Trotsky's
formulation of the 'united front' strategy.
If identity and difference are the essence, then the concept of dialectics expresses
the negation of the two as the living contradiction of all entities/societies. The
drive for individuals to produce those social conditions most conducive to the
development of the individual is a dialectical one. Individuals must negate
themselves as social beings in society, thus individuals will use their capacities
and powers to make a society which best expresses their desire for freedom.
Thus the dialectical relation of identity and difference in society cannot be done
away with, but they can be expressed by people in different forms. Ultimately
the best form is the one which does not sacrifice identity in the name of
difference (eg, as capitalism does) or difference in the name of identity (eg, as
the Soviet Union did). I believe Marx's fundamental point was that in class
societies, formed on the basis of one class owning and controlling the extracted
surplus labour of another, identity and difference will take alienated forms and
will also be out of balance (suppressing either one or the other) because of this.
One does not have to look far to see the fetishism of the 'individual' within our
own society.
Turningto law. Law is the movement of the contradiction between identity and
difference which constitutes an entity/society. In this sense law is inherently
bound up with dialectics: law the name we give to dialectical processes of
change and development. It is what organically binds society as a society and
not a mere aggregate of individuals or institutions. Thus theorists who on the
one hand deny atomism, but on the other hand speak of the social whole, while
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denying dialectical laws, are contradicting themselves. 88 Without dialectical
relations between individuals, institutions and classes, society would fragment
and would not, therefore, credit the name.
Social laws, then, are the dialectical negation of individuals within a class based
society. The form of social class relations and scope of labour's productive
powers interact to create a historically specific form of surplus labour extraction.
It is through this prism that the dialectical laws of the negation of individual in
society takes specific form too. Thus social laws of development refer generally
to the movement of the contradiction between the identity imposed by
determinate social production relations and difference imposed by the need for
human individuality to express its powers and capacities.
Prior to capitalism, forms of slave and feudal class relations remained parochial
as a result of which the social ties of a direct dependency were more
pronounced. As Meikle, suggests, such relations exist on the threshold before
the first turning point in the historical relationship between individuals and
society, where direct dependency dominatcs.» Because of this the forces of
identity naturally overwhelmed those of difference. Individuality was stultified
and could not find true independent expression, hence was not the central issue
then that it was to become. Capitalist production relations, through the intrusion
of the value form and its resultant the market, polarise the categories of identity
and difference as no other society before has done. However, in doing so,
capitalism lays the ground for a more thorough assimilation of identity and
88Adam Smith and Emile Durkheim are two of the more important philosophers who spring to mind here.
Although the contradictions of such theory abound with modem theorists of society, for example, so called
'institutionalists' such as IK. Galbrath and of course the non Marxist de-industrialisers critiqued in proceding
chapters ofthis thesis.
89As Meikel, op-cit points out, there are two turning points, one from the direct dependency of slave and
feudal forms of society, the other from a society of alienated apparant independence (capitalism) to
communism. The movement is dependent for its dynamic on the forms of extraction of surplus labour, which
in tum relate to the productive powers of labour and social relations corresponding to them.
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difference, in the shape of communism. A fact implicit in Marx's depiction of
communism as 'freedom from necessity' (not the abolition of necessity). Or as
Meszaros would have it, people would mutually benefit from the interchange of
their capacities and powers, rather than the exchange of value which
characterises the society preceding communism.w The 'freely associating
producer' of communism is a concept which perfectly encapsulates an
unalienating blend between identity and difference. Meszaros, reflecting on a
point raised by Marx, captures the essence of it, 'Marx defines communism as
"the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man
and man - the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence,
between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity,
between the individual and the species". This utterance should not be
interpreted to mean that now "individual" and "mankind" become the same
concept...On the contrary, when the possibility of resolving the age old conflict
between individual and mankind is in sight, only then it becomes possible to
draw adequately the line of demarcation between the ontological sphere of the
individual and that of mankind'." Of course the movement and revolutionary
transformation from capitalism to communism is a protracted historical process,
the necessity of which may not be realised.v Capitalism flatters to deceive when
it comes to expressing difference as freedom. While society remains capitalist,
the market breaks all direct bonds and elevates individuality to a higher plain,
until the cult of individualism it fosters, denies the validity of any identity
separate from bare individuality (this is in fact the real ground for the emergence
of an atomistic world view).»
901. Meszaros, The Communitarian Syatem and the Law ofValue in Marx and Lukacs, in Critique, N023,
1991.
911. Meszaros, (1986), p276-7.
921n many ways this thesis is concerned with disclosing under what circumstances capitalist relations in
Briain, although in decline, have sought to frustrate this necessity, through the incorporation of the working
class into Labourism (to be defined later in the text).
93Hegel, to his credit, lays waste to this eroneous view prominant in 19th century bourgeoise philosophy. See
the shorter Logic, edt by W. Wallace, pI44-45, third edt, (1975). However, as Meikle (1985) points out,
atomism has renewed its ascendency in philosophical quarters during the twentieth century.
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At a deeper level the identity constituted by capitalist society (regardless of the
claims of the atomist, or the claims of superficial appearances which present
themselves to us) is imposed in a more rampant form: the value form.
Individuals, as wage labourers, in order to be enabled to use their creative
powers and realise their individual capacities and needs, must have their
individual capacities reduced to the identity of the value form. Thus individual
differences are suppressed under the imposed identity of wage labour: the
identity of being commodities and the identity of producing commodities. The
process at the heart of the relationship between identity and difference is
negation. A category which needs to be introduce at this point. Marx and
Marxism is indebted to Hegel's understanding of the dialectic and in particular
the category of negation in the dialectical process.
Negation refers to the movement between two qualitatively different social
categories, based on their grounding in a third social category which exists to
mediate the two. The reason mediation is possible is because the third category
has elements of both qualities within itself. Without the ability to negate, the
two qualitatively different categories would be discrete and so accidentally
related. This is in fact the philosophical disposition of the atomist regarding the
nature of being. They believe the one is identical to the one and to no other. As
Hegel observes, I So long as the one is fixed as one, it is certainly impossible to
regard its congression with others as anything but external and mechanical'.»
Clearly this is a conflation of identity and difference, so that identity is conceived
as simply being different. Thus things, atoms, individuals are seen as having
their identity in their difference. Yet, as the atomist acknowledges, individuals
experience repulsion and attraction. The atomist would claim externality here in
the sense of accidents. However, as Hegel observes in his Logic, the systematic
94Hegel (1975), op-cit, p144-45.
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nature of repulsion and attraction calls forth the prospect that there must be an
internal relation uniting individuals: a necessary relation, a necessary identity
more ontologically significant than an identity conflated to difference.
Hegel indicates the essence of negation, 'Quality, as determinateness which is, in
contrast with the Negation which is involved in it but distinguished from it, is
Reality' . Negation is no longer an abstract nothing, but as a determinate being
and somewhat, is only a form of such being - it is as othemess'< For Hegel
reality is the inner unity between individual qualities, based on their negation by
something 'other', which is an inherent and necessary part of them. Of course
the individuals and the 'otherness' which internally bind them through the process
of negation, can vary in form and content. For example, one may speak of
individuals and society (as we have done above), or of the relationship between
production, exchange, distribution and consumption, within a specific social form
of surplus extraction. Marx, for example, chides the vulgar Hegelian economist
for the abstract identites they would create between the negation of 'production'
into 'consumption' and vis-versa. For Marx this was not the key to the real
negation. Firstly, the economists left out the mediating links of distribution and
exchange. Secondly, attention should have focused on the specific form of
production relations. Then, and only then, can it be shown that production
relations exhibit the essential powers of negation, which are the primary
determinants of how and when and under what conditions distribution, exchange
and consumption occur.w
Reality is thus a process whereby, what appear to be discrete individuals, are in
fact individuals who experience unity through negation into 'otherness'. The
reality denoted depends on the object in question. 'Individuals' may be about
95Hegel (1975), op-cit, p133, ibid.
96Marx, The Grundrisse, (1973 edt),p88-100.
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individuals generally and 'otherness' may refer to society in general. It may also
refer to the historically specific production relations of capitalism and the law of
value. It is this reference point which is our concern. Thus it is time to turn
negation specifically on the categories of capitalist political economy, to support
a theory of its decline.
Bringing essence, law, identity and difference and negation together and referring
to the earlier overview of the theory of the law of value, one can say, as a frrst
approximation, that the essence of capitalist society is the contradiction between
use value (difference) and exchange value (identity). The inner core of the
contradiction and so essence of capitalism, is the contradiction within labour,
which is the real ground for the contradiction between use and exchange value.
As indicated above, labour has a two-fold nature - in creating use values it is
concrete labour; in creating exchange values it is abstract labour. That is to say
the substance of useful labour is concrete while the substance of value creating
labour is abstract labour.
The dual nature of labour is very important to understanding the laws of
transition Marx spoke of. The dual nature of labour is in fact the basis for two
identities at work within capitalism. An identity substantiated by the fact that
labour creates use values for need; and another identity substantiated by the fact
that under capitalism one has abstract labour creating exchange values for profit.
There is a contradiction between the two: they live off each other, but one must
subsume and eventually must destroy the other.
Whilst abstract labour formation remains unrestricted and in the ascendance,
the social identity of the value world dominates individuals and negates concrete
need fulfilling labour. In such a situation it acts as a barrier to class identity. As
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indicated earlier, gold was absolutely crucial for the continuation of the
dominance over use value and concrete social labour producing it. As the
universal equivalent, it is the best attainable (after much social trial and error)
material encasement of the expression of value and its content abstract labour.
One can understand the full horror of the capitalist class in the 1930s, when each
western capitalist economy in turn gave up the gold standard, only if one
understands that, without gold, capitalism losses its ground for abstract labour
and the value form: the fulcrum through which the value form dominated and
sublated the identity of use value and need. A decline from gold allows the
identity of directly social labour to grow and assert itself, just as importantly, in
taking away the ground for abstract labour, it weakens the dominance of
exchange value and the 'naturalness' of the profit motive. In effect the decline
from gold signifies the decline of objective commodity fetishism, which seriously
undermines subjective commodity fetishism. From this point on capitalism is in
decline and the use of political atomisation (reification) to slow down and halt
the ascendancy of a working class identity based on social labour and need,
becomes crucial to the systems survival.?" One begins to see Marx's intimations
about the decline of capitalism in a much clearer fashion and hence just why
bourgeoisie political economy, as Marx suggested, recoiled in horror at the very
conception that crisis could be anything other than external and therefore
reversible. For example, Marx wrote;
Apart from the terror which the law of the declining
rate of profit inspires in the economist, its most
important corollary is the presupposition of a constantly
increasing concentration of capital's, ... This on the
whole, is the result of all laws of capitalist production.
And ifwe strip this fact of the contradictory character
97Points which receive more detailed exposition as the thesis develops with its case study of British capitalism.
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which, on the basis of the capitalist mode of production
is typical of it, what does this fact, this trend toward
centralisation, indicate? Only that production loses its
private character and becomes a social process, not
formerly - in the sense that all production subject to
exchange is social because ofthe absolute dependence
ofproducers on one another and the necessity of
presenting their labour as abstract socially necessary
labour (by means ofmoney) - but in actualfact. For
the means of production are employed as communal,
social means of production and therefore not determined by
the fact that they are the property of an individual,
but by their relation to production, and the labour
likewise is performed on a social scale.98 (Emphasis mine)
If, then, abstract labour formation begins to weaken, the negation of useful
labour is incomplete. In this case the social identity forged around use value and
need gains ground and directs individuals into collectivities, in order to attempt
to consciously administer what was once the preserve of market spontaneity.
The barriers erected against class identity become considerably weakened.
These are laws which develop of necessity. Whether the working class can
consolidate their identity as a class is of course not as subject to necessary laws.
Chance takes a major role; the confidence of the class; the weakness of the
capitalist class; the strength of the capitalist class to turn potential class identity
into differences of colour" and sex; international situations; the strength and
political affiliations of the intermediate classes ..etc.
98 Karl Marx, Theories ofSurplus Value, Part Three, Lawrence and Wishart, p445 (1978 edt).
990n this issue see Hillel Ticktin, The Politics ofRace in South Africa, (1991), who explains how the issue of
race helped divide the South African working class and enable the capitalist class to continue to rule, on the
basis of concessions to the white working class. Chief concession being to redistribute a portion of the surplus
value extracted to a substantial section of the white working class. Ticktin's analysis deploys the category of
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All this is a far cry from the theory of 'de-industrialisation' critiqued in chapter
one. illustrating the differences between Marxist ontological claims and the
implicit ontological claims of de-industrialisation theory, brings into stark relief
the greater explanatory potential of Marxism with regard to capitalist decline. To
the de-industrialiser, society is a simple compounding of either discrete
individuals or institutions. Even when some allow of 'classes' into their theory,
they are generally of a subjective, discrete nature, atomised from the point of
production and struggling with other classes over the distribution of use-values.
The Marxist view is radically different. In this view society is a substantive
organic whole which, whilst constituted by individuals, institutions and classes,
cannot be reduced to a mere aggregate of them. Whilst it is not ignored that
individuals are important with their own identity and rationality, it is nevertheless
emphasised that they are bound together by a more essential knot, as it were; that
is, they are bound together as species kinds via an essential unity they all share.
'When we consider bourgeois society in the long view and as a whole', noted
Marx, ..' then the [mal result of the process of social production always appears
as the society itself, ie, the human being itself in its social relations'. The
production process as such has only one subject - individuals - 'but individuals in
mutual relationships, which they equally reproduce and produce anew'.100 It is
the acknowledgement of this essential unity that distinguishes the atomist from
the essentialist. Every individual, institution and class, is related to, and
develops specific characteristics from, the given social reproduction relations in
society. This is the basis of a very important category of identity to Marxism. As
explained above, our identity as individual human beings is cemented by a real
contradiction: we are individuals with certain unique self interests and traits only
abstract labour to reveal that apartied, far from leading to an increase in the ruling classes extraction and share
of sumlus value, was in fact a burden on the process.
10K. Marx 'The Grundrisse', (1973), op-cit, p712.
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because we are a mere particular of the substantially greater social reproduction
process.
The importance of 'identity' to political economy is of course very great.
Indeed, it is embedded in the many categories applied to the study of 'de-
industrialisation'. In fact one can say that the atomist viewpoint on 'identity'
(basically a thing or individual is its discrete self and nothing else) actually
determines that Britain's 'problem' is the de-industrialisation of the material
production base. The dialectical essentialist understanding of 'identity', on the
other hand, reveals the 'British problem' to be nothing less than the decline ofa
socialform ofproduction relations. For example, take some of the categories of
the debate around de-industrialisation considered in the previous chapter :
'labour', 'use-value', 'industry' and 'manufacturing'. To de-industrialisers, as
'identities', they are of course their empirically given selves, as they manifest
materially and most certainly not anything else. For Marxist's, on the other hand,
the matter is rather different. They are all the above and more besides. For
example, labour is also abstract labour; use-value is also an exchange value and
so a commodity; industry and manufacturing is also a valorisation process, or,
value creating zone.
All the latter characteristics of each category share the same space with
the former characteristics and yet are very different : identical but different.
This, for Marxists is the natural order of all things capitalist and relates to their
general world view that industry and its universal labour processes only exists in
and through social form. As far as capitalist society goes the former (technical
aspect of production) can only hold together as an ordered unity through the
latters social form (the valorisation process). These latter characteristics are not
of course innate, natural, or, eternal. Rather, they are seen by Marxism to be
historically specific and social, and as such as having a transitory nature. From
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this point of view 'de-industrialisation' cannot be explained by technological
determinism, because the material technical aspects only exist and generate
change through the social form. Therefore de-industrialisationmust be explained
as the decay of this social forms ability to advance industry.
To explicate the implications of this dual identity, for a theory of transition and
decline, one needs to turn to the categories ofpolitical economy to reveal under
what conditions abstract labour may weaken; might fail to negate concrete labour
and become partially negated itself. One must also know more about the link
between this and the development of labour's other identity, concrete social
labour activity, and in what manner it expresses itself socially in an ever more
direct fashion.
3.4 Political Economy and the Categories ofDialectical Essentialism
In the previous chapter modem Marxism was subject to critique regarding its
reification of political economy into a kind of functionalist capital logic. The
source of this is a particular conception of 'law' and hence what the law of value
is perceived to be. The particular conception is atomistic. Which is to say, the
world is deemed to be, if not a direct ensemble of individuals and classes of
individuals, then without a substantive and knowable essence. 'Law' then has
two meanings: as the outcome of regularities, open to proof and falsification;
and/or as the product of a concept engineered to create theoretical unity out of an
essentially accidentalist world. In the case of the latter, law becomes an ideal-
type, originally made famous by Weber, although it has longer roots in Kantian
metaphysics. It is this conception of 'law' and so the law of value as an
inessential regularity, which lies behind Regulation theories need to create ideal
type concepts such as Fordism and Post Fordism. It is also Hilferding and
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Lenin's slippage in and out of atomism and essentialism, which hinders their
development of a theory of finance capital. Activating the conception of law
explicated in the previous section, provides a substantive basis for the categories
of political economy and, so to speak, breaths life and death into them. The
result is that one begins to get a better understanding of the nature of the epoch
we now live through.
Ticktin101 has attempted such a dialectical restructuring of Marxist categories
to make sense of the epoch. In the process he has unleashed a theory of great
explanatory potential. One of his central methodological points concerns the
category of 'law'. If we approach this with an alien ontology, argues Ticktin, -
perceiving 'law' to be a mere pattern of events or constant regularities - then one
can juggle the categories of political economy till doomsday and still not get very
far in an understanding of the epoch. Ticktin follows Marx and views 'law' as an
ontological as well as epistomological fact. 'Law' is the movement of a
contradiction, or, as Ticktin describes, the unfolding of the process of
interpenetrating of the polar opposites of that contradiction,l 02. When the law
of value is recognised in this way the categories of political economy can begin
to be related dialectically. Further still, because the law of value is the
movement of a contradiction, then its development cannot be linear (out goes
Hilferdings peaceful transition to socialism); and it must adhere through a
process of origin, development and decay.103
For Ticktin the movmg contradiction of interpenetrating opposites within
capitalist society can be located within the commodity form of labour - 'the
particular categories of concrete and abstract labour'.104 He points out that as
101 See Hillel Ticktin's articles - The Transitional Epoch, Finance Capital and Britain and Towards A
The0'}hofFinance Capital, in Critique 16 and 17 respectively.
1 Critique 16 p25
103 ibid
104 ibid1 1 ,
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this inner contradiction grows, so too do the social pressures which threaten to
tear the form of abstract labour from the working class. Out of this process, the
contradiction, in order to maintain itself, develops new forms and laws which
serve, not only to complicate the analysis of commodity production, but also to
ontologically alter it. Ticktin argues that it is only by commencing from the
contradiction of the commodity form and its laws of development, that all the
earlier mentioned categories in Hilferding and Lenin's theoretical arsenal can be
structured into a coherent theory of fmance capital and so theory of capitalist
decline.
Ticktin's recognition of 'law as contradiction in motion', enables him to structure
the categories of political economy according to whether they stress the
developmental tendencies of capitalism, or whether they express its laws of
decline. For example, the developmental tendencies of capitalist accumulation
bring forth increasing amounts of fixed capital, leading to increased valorisation.
The massive amounts of surplus capital which result can then expand production
even further and!or result in the exporting of capital which serves to
intemationalise the division of labour. Simultaneously, however, certain laws of
decline are in operation. As it is Ticktin's task to present a theory of finance
capital, and as finance capital is the embodiment of the laws of decline, then
these laws of decline are given central attention in Ticktin's analysis. Hence it is
emphasised that the very increase in fixed capital which reaps so much profit for
capital, also calls into question capitalism's existence as the laws of decline
assert themselves. For example the more fixed capital the slower and more
costly the accumulation process, the greater the organic composition of capital,
the greater the moral depreciation of capital and, most importantly, the greater
the socialisation of labour which makes the increasing costs of investment even
more risky. The result is the increase of forces threatening to negate the law of
value.
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Capital thus begins to experience profound difficulties in its particular forms as
fixed and variable capital, as a result the growing tendency is to revert to type -
circulatory capital. This reverting to type is the basis out of which finance
capital emerges to control accumulation. Finance capital as collective capital,
because abstracted away from ownership of any particular capital's, attempts to
monitor the process whereby money capital circulating within itself, by-passing
the source of its existence (abstract labour) which has become the source of its
decay (socialised labour). Initially, capital responds by shifting to industries
and/or countries with low levels of fixed capital, such as railways, mining and/or
the USA" Argentina..etc. This relieves the problem only to create it another
day, because in the race for ever higher profit rates, or simply to maintain them,
capital must develop its own fixity and a socialised labour once again. Hence the
systematic tendency for the world capitalist system is toward parasitism - ever
more reliance on circulation without valorisation.
Parasitism includes a number of related activities for Ticktin. It refers to a
finance capital which must slow down or even retard the rate of development of
socialised labour, whilst still living of surplus value. The result is the dominance
of a finance capitalist class extracting profit via the exchange of fictitious capital
and the sucking dry of productive capital via mergers takeovers and asset
stripping. The former mode being dominant in Britain where finance capital had
an 'independent' existence, the latter mode being dominant in Germany and the
USA where finance capital had a stronger affmity with industrial capital.
In essence finance capital is the epoch of an abstract social capital facing an
abstract social labour and consciously outflanking labour's attempts to take
political control of socially based production. Ticktin points out that the starkest
example of this process had occurred in Britain prior to world war one. In this
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sense the pre-war period was in essence a 'transitional epoch' with British finance
capital leading the decline internationally. The epoch becomes more
complicated however. First by the Russian revolution of 1917, which weakens
capital's ability to operate as world capital, and so weakens the finance capitalist
class politically. Second by the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union
eventually leading to Stalinism, which becomes a powerful atomising force, not
just on the Soviet working class, but the world working class. In effect the two
main adversaries of this epoch - capital and labour - had been weakened and this
had provided the material basis for the development of production based on
capitalist and non capitalist/ non socialist forms. What emerged out of this
stalemate in the west was eventually to be termed the Keynesian welfare state' :
a government administration of industrial capital which forced an emphasis on
consumer products and the direct but bureaucratic production and distribution of
use values such as health care and education. Ticktin points out how, with
finance capital constrained and the working class atomised by Social Democracy
and Stalinism, a compromise was established in this epoch of transition. A
compromise which developed deeper roots throughout the early to mid decades
of the 20th century. The Keynesian welfare state solidified this compromise as
'nationalisation', 'full employment guarantees', 'social welfarism', state subsidies
to private capital and the construction of a sterling area wholly for the benefit of
finance capital.
Referring back to the previous chapter the point was made that a theory of
finance capital, in as much as it must incorporate the valorisation process and the
speculative forms of money capital, has to be a theory which grasps the full
implications of the epochal shift that finance capital represents - something
Hilferding and Lenin's theory did not achieve. So how has Ticktin's theory,
which is developed on the basis of a dialectical essentialist understanding of
'law', fair in this respect? Undoubtedly it has great explanatory power. It
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provides a sound basis for a theory of a transitional epoch, the heart of which is
the repulsion of finance capital at one pole and the socialised worker at the other
pole. Ticktin has retrieved the Marxist understanding of the categorical links
which brought about the polar antagonisms which characterise the epoch. In the
process new life has been breathed into categories such as abstract labour, value
etc.
His theory, however is a prolegomena rather than a finished article; a source of
further enquiry rather than an end result. A point endorsed by the fact that,
although Ticktin refers to the socialisation of labour in Britain, he never, in a
detailed way, explains how this relates to labour's abstract conditions of
existence within capitalist production. In the last section of this chapter this was
explained as dialectical developments in the dual identity within capitalism -
abstract labour and socialised labour. The latter providing the substantive
ground for the development of use value and need over and above exchange
value; the former providing the substantive ground for exchange values
dominance. While abstract labour dominates, signified by adherence to gold,
the commodity form of production remains systemic in its control over labour.
Hence the recognition of a gold standard is crucial to commodity fetishism.
Once socialised labour gains ground, the adherence to gold weakens as capital
can no longer dictate wage adjustments and the movement of labour, but is
instead, forced to increase prices and monopoly control over prices. This heralds
a weakening in commodity fetishism, or, in other words, substantiates to a
greater degree labour's identity as socialised labour. eventually the adherence to
gold collapses. With the ground for abstract labour diminished, abstract labour
formation becomes restricted and labour moves steadily from a class in itself into
a class for itself. The commodity form of production is unable, alone, to achieve
systemic control of labour. At this point there is potential for labour to actualise
its power and transform itself into a class. This potential can never again be
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eradicated, although its actuality can continuallybe frustrated. To stop potential
from leading to actual class formation, capital has to seek out external forms of
control over labour.
From this point accumulation of capital and mechanisms of control over labour
become external to the identities of either abstract labour or socially integrated
need based labour. One has to be precise about what external means in this
context. Firstly, it does not mean outside or discrete from, quite the reverse in
fact. It means a new external source of identity for capital to ground or, rather,
negate itself alongside its weakening ability (or desire) to negate itself in the
value form of labour. Of course this negation is alien to capital because it does
not expand value. However, it does allow the development of political and
economic controls over labour, additional controls the ailing systemic controls
now require. Because external, the controls sometimes conflict and sometimes
gel with valorisation. Nevertheless, as the forces of socialised labour mount
against the weakened abstract labour, external control over labour takes more
and more precedence over accumulation. This, as explained shortly, is the heart
of the development of Labourism.
This double identity is implicit and not explicit in Ticktin's analysis. The
interrelationship between abstract and socialised labour on the one hand and
finance capital on the other hand, therefore, remains to be fully explicated and
then grounded in a more detailed study of a particular economy
(operationalised). In more concrete terms, Ticktin's reflections that British
labour in the epoch of transition is 'backward', 'parochial', 'nationalistic', and
'cemented with the privileges to which Lenin so graphically pointed', penetrating
as they are105 remain reflections, which still require to be taken up and
developed. These reflections and the theory of finance capital must be
105 C . . 17 7ntique p
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embraced within a theory of 'Labourism' - the subordination of a re-atomised
socialised working class to the needs of a declining capitalist system.
Ticktin's main aim was to reinvigorate the Marxist theory of finance capital by
bringing the essential categories of capitalism back to centre stage and
structuring them dialectically to provide an understanding of the transitional
epoch. In this respect his theory is successful. The fact that his regeneration of
the theory of finance capital has either been ignored and!or passed over in silence
and so neither extended nor contested in recent years, would appear to confrrm
Ticktin's comment that Marxist methodology is as 'clear as mud' to modem
Marxism.! 06 It also, unfortunately, confirms the element of political
expediency and class compromise which pervades much modem Marxism. For
example, Marxists who believe healing the 'rift' between industrial and finance
capital will secure the best 'short term deal' for labour, hardly take kindly to a
theory which reveals beyond doubt the idealist bourgeois nature of such an
undertaking.
What I wish to do now, in accordance with the task of this thesis, is to utilise
Ticktin's retrieval of the Marxist explanation of the categories at work in the
epoch of finance capital, and, in light of the theory developed in the previous
section, build on it to provide a deeper understanding of the decline of capitalist
social relations in Britain. Labourism as a category of capitalist decline, must be
fully explained on the basis of developments in the dual identity of labour and
the necessity to impose external (in the sense indicated above) controls over
labour to pre-empt its development as a class for itself. Thus labourism as a
category of decline, will be identified as the systemisation of external control. In
as much as it is, it must be related to finance capital as a new ground for capital's
106 Critique 16 p24.
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continued existence under conditions where the old ground has experienced
serious degeneration.
The remainder of this chapter is given over to developing a political economy of
labourism and the internal role that fmance capital plays in the process. The
following chapter will then apply this theory to Britain and in so doing provide
an historical materialist overview of the socialisation of labour and emergence
of fmance capital. Subsequent chapters will explain in detail the conditions
within British capitalism for the eventual consolidation of Labourism as a
systemic control over labour during the interwar years and the crucial role
fmance capital played in the process.
3.5 Decline, Labourism and Finance Capital
Decline refers in essence to the decay of the contradiction within labour. As
mentioned this relates to the loss of abstract labour's substantive identity and the
gains made by socialised labour's substantive identity. However, the latter gain
expresses two meanings, the one negative the other positive, which we need to
be clear about at this stage. On the one hand it refers to a negative
decomposition of labour's abstract identity. It is negative in the sense that,
without communism the concrete use value creating, need fulfilling, character of
labour becomes decomposed and bureaucratised: it becomes the eventual basis
for the systematising of external, control over labour. On the other hand it
potentially refers to the more positive Latin meaning 'decadere', or, literally,
'falling away'. In this case the positive signifies the process whereby the falling
away of the alien character of labour - its value creating abstract side - advances
on the basis of the realisation of democratic control over needs. For the latter to
actualise, to counteract the former, requires the subjective intervention of labour
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as a class for itself; anything short of this will allow the subjective intervention of
capital to determine the outcome in its favour. The capitalist class is the ruling
class and collectivises its rule around the money form. It is, therefore, more able
to constitute itself subjectively in order to continue its rule. Labour, on the other
hand, is atomised by the money form and less able to constitute itself
subjectively. Even when the substantive basis of the money form diminishes, its
powers to atomise labour are still potent. To add to this, labour, to be
successful, has to abolish the capitalist system and erect socialism, if it is to
actualise its substantive identity based on socialised labour. This requires a far
greater degree of subjectivity than anything required by the capitalist ruling class.
This dialectic becomes evident within the overall dialectical development of
capital accumulation, to which attention now turns.
A theory of capitalist decline must start from the recognition that capital
has of necessity to accumulate surplus value in order to survive. We know from
the above that the substance of value is abstract labour and that abstract labour,
the product of the value relation between Capital and Labour, takes as its highest
material form money capital. Money capital is the highest material form
because it best reflects capital's essence as above all circulating capital.
Capital, in order that it accumulate surplus value, must perpetually circulate:
must maintain itself in a form which allows it to be value as a process of
expansion. In this sense, money capital is the general form of capital which
allows this perpetual motion.
The problem for capitalists is that to accumulate, capital must relinquish its
general form and assume particular forms, such as variable capital, commodity
capital and fixed capital. However, all these particular forms exhibit the
potential for fixity above and beyond what capital would, ideally, prefer, thus the
fixity can become increasingly alien to capital as circulating capital. It is the
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process from necessary fixity to alien fixity which underlies the negation of the
contradiction within labour and so underlies capitalist decline. Let us consider
the matter more closely.
In essence capital is circulating capital. However there is a contradiction
at the heart of its circulatory nature. The contradiction for capital is this: within
its more 'highly developed determination as circulation for the expansion of
value' (to paraphrase Marx)107 , there is a contradictory unity between its more
concrete determinations; namely, production and circulation. Ideally, for 'capital
as such', ie circulatory value expanding capital, the process of production should
eventually reflect the process of circulation. This ideal relationship was
emphasised by Marx in Capital (Volume Two). Specifically, he points out how
capital requires three interrelated forms in its overall circuit : money capital,
commodity capital and productive capital. As Marx explains : 'Capital describes
its circuit normally only so long as its various phases pass uninterruptedly into
one another'. This requires that production turnover (circulation) become as
quick and efficient as possible. When capital achieves this then, 'money capital,
commodity capital and productive capital do not therefore designate independent
kinds ofcapital ,.108 In such a situation capital exhibits a necessary fixity.
However, as Marx also points out : 'it is in the nature of things that the circuit
itself necessitates the fixation ofcapital for certain lengths of time in its various
phases,.1°9 As such this necessitating systematically develops and 'designates'
the potential for 'independence' between two kinds of capital; namely, fixed and
circulating.110 These two categories of 'capital as such' contain a contradictory
107 K. Marx in K, Marx and F, Engels (1975), Collected Works (1857-61), (MECW), No 29, p9
Lawrence and Wishart.
108 K. Marx Capital, (1974), Vol 2, p50, Lawrence and Wishart.
109 K, Marx, Ibid, (my emphasis).
110 This fundemantal contradiction between fixed and circulating capital has been largely ignored by
Marxists engaged in developing a theory of Finance Capital. As, far as I am aware Hillel Ticktin is the only
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unity which in specific conditions threatens to breach commodity production and
the contradiction within labour. Thus arises an alien fixity. Specifically, the
contradiction which appears as the opposition between fixed and circulating
capital intensifies the rift between the two polar opposites of commodity
production - exchange value and use value; abstract labour and concrete labour.
Examining this dialectic more closely, we note that, having entered the
production process and feeling the competitive pressure, capital becomes seized
with the initiative to make the particular individual concrete labour it exploits as
close to abstract socially necessary labour, or better still, below abstract socially
necessary labour as it is possible for concrete labour to get. This implies the
development of the productive powers of labour are increasingly integrated,
concentrated and centralised. Thus, In capital's attempts to realise the goal of
abstracting labour activity in production, it is compelled to assume an
increasingly fixed form in production. Hence the tendency to ground out of
existence concrete labour and impose the sole dominance of abstract labour to
aid circulation and rapid valorisation, leads to its opposite in the form of a
greater and greater degree of fixed capital. The opposing yet attracting forces of
fluidity of labour and fixity of capital, expresses capital's development from its
formal subsumption of labour to itsfeal subsumption of labour.
Formal subsumption refers to the fact that when capitalist social relations
initially takes over a societies political economy it does so in a formal sense, that
is, it leaves the old ways of material production relatively untouched. Hence
labour is only formally sublimated under the identity of abstract labour and is still
strongly attached to parochial forms of identity in social labour and need. Under
these formal conditions capitalist social relations are expressed predominantly
Marxist to have made this connection. What follows has been influenced by aspects evoked by Ticktin's afore
mentioned theory in Critique Nos 16 and 17.
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(hence not exclusively) by the wage-labour relation and absolute surplus value
extraction. That is to say, capital accumulates and circulates via a production
process constituted by artisan crafts of a heterogeneous nature, all with their own
controls and restrictions on the flow of valorisation. A sense of identity with the
use value creating telos of production is still strongly evident.
I take capital's real subsumption to mean the compulsion to break down
labour heterogeneity and fixity under the driving whip of capitalist competition to
increase the rate of exploitation. Here the identity grounded in abstract labour
finally dominates the rationale of labouring activity: labour becomes the
infamous cog in a value creating exercise. Commodity fetishism reaches a peak
as labour's use value creating identity becomes successfully negated by the value
form. This compulsion saw the movement toward the creation of a labour
process more in keeping with capital's value expanding essence. That is, it saw
the movement towards a labour process occupied by increasingly abstract
homogeneous labour. A 'labour' more adequate to capital, because more
adaptable to a speedy circulation through the labour process.
The attempt to reduce labour craft fixity and control over the flow of
production, however, leads to the simultaneous growth of capital's fixity in the
production process, in the material form of concentrated machinery. So, the
drive to accumulate compels the capitalist system to increase the abstraction of
labour, but in the process this requires a greater level of fixity on capital's part;
the very thing which hinders capital's ability to circulate and accumulate! This is
not, of course, the end of the contradictions building up for capital. More
fundamentally, capitalism also begins to dig its own grave, in as much as the
compulsion foists upon capital another, all consuming, contradiction - the
developing social integration of labour, which threatens to negate its value form
of existence as abstract labour.
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The contradiction is embedded within the heart of capitalism and cannot be
resolved. On the one hand, in order to expand, capital has of necessity to
reduce the fixity of craft type labour and expand the proportions of its form as
fixed capital. As such capital is compelled to expand in a form which can only
circulate value in slow seepage's over many turnovers. Exactly how many
turnovers will depend on the size of fixed capital; a particular capital's position in
the commodity market; and capital's ability to control an increasingly socialised
workforce. On the other hand capital has to reduce all the fixity building up
within the production process to socially necessary abstract labour, by dissolving
itself once more into its general money capital form. It must do this ifvalue is to
circulate and realise the expansion occurring in the production process. The
contradiction is an acute one for the capitalist class. As Marx noted:
As long as it is tied up in the process of production, it is incapable of
circulation, and hence is virtually devalued. As long as it is tied up in
circulation, it is incapable of production, posits no surplus value, is not
·t I· 111capt a In process.
As Marx implies, and building on what has been suggested above, any 'bottle
necks' in the production sphere, must act as a drag on capitalist circulation and,
in as much as it does, act as an effective devaluation of capital.
Another source of devaluation occurs too. Fixed capital is prone to increasing
rates of moral depreciation of the value imparted to commodities due to the
intensity of competitive accumulation between capital's. This fact intensifies the
imperative for production, as valorisation process, to occur as smoothly and as
quickly as possible. These obstacles and the growing organic composition of
III K, Marx, Op-Cit, (MECW No 29) p9.
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capital, which give them expression, however, great though they are, pale into
insignificance next to the most fundamental problem for capital. The higher
levels of fixed capital bring on to the historical stage a higher concentration of
directly socially combined living labour; which increasingly, through emerging
economic and political organisation, acts as a barrier to capital's exploitation of
labour and so a barrier to the smooth efficientuse of fixed capital.
As the degree of fixed forms of capital develop, both moral depreciation of
capital and increased socialisation of labour develop the contradictions within the
capital value relation in ever more chronic fashion. Eventually, for the larger
dominant capital's which emerge in each industry, the atmosphere in the
production process becomes unconducive to the risking of huge amounts of
money capital in the increasingly large scale investments of fixed capital required
to valorise capital. The development of public limited joint stocks of capital,
lessen the individual risk, but do not abolish the conditions. In fact the
centralisation implied, is the basis of capital's organised collective response to
labour.
To briefly recap, I have argued that, due to the competitive compulsion to
expand value, capital must increasingly forgo its essential nature as circulation
capital and develop two contradictions, the one debilitates its further
expansionary tendencies - greater concentrations of fixed capital - the other
threatens capital's very existence - the greater socialisation of labour. This latter
aspect forms the focal point of capitalist decline. For in as much as capital is
expanding value and the substance of value is abstract labour and the greater
socialisation emerges to negate abstract labour; then we can say the process
described above heralds the decay of the contradiction within labour in its
positive meaning - as the falling away of the value form of production which
123
alienates human labour. This gives added impetus for capital to do the next
obvious thing: come off the gold standard.
The reaction of capital is to protect the gold standard and revert to type,
that is, stagnate the development of productive forces and take flight back into
the purer circulatory form of money capital. Due to the socialisation of labour
and negation of its essence - abstract labour - capital's flight into circulation
takes an essentially parasitic form. The latter is simultaneously capitalism's
highest attainment (the money form) and its most decadent (a money form
without any substance). However the lack of substance provides it with short
term flexibility: it can prey of productive capital and labour and in so doing
manoeuvre accumulation either abroad or to other industries, where labour is less
socially integrated and the composition of capital is lower.
This brings one to the actualisation of decline in its negative connotation. For,
as the ground for capital declines and takes flight into parasitic activity (eg,
earning interest through secondary shares, loans to Government and fmancial
speculation), although the use value nature of production asserts itself
increasingly, the subjectivity labour must assert to realise the potential for
socialism, is a difficult task to achieve. Capital, with its greater substantive base
for collective unity, can make use of the lack of subjectivity of labour and hence
labour's wavering in the transition from a class in itself to a class for itself and
ground a second lease of life for itself in bureaucratically regulating use value
and exchange value. Hence without a political transformation on the part of the
emerging socialised labour, the use value nature of production, and so the
provision of needs, becomes bureaucratically controlled by an ailing capital
faced with the breakdown of the value relation. This situationpotentially opens
up room for a new social category to emerge within the decaying form of
capitalism, as the contradiction within labour between its concrete and abstract
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form becomes mediated by a bureaucratic regulation of production. If this
potential becomes actual then the further abstraction of labour in production can
recommence, relatively safe in the knowledge that the socialised labour which
emerges to negate capitalism, becomes transformed and re-atomised via a
bureaucratic regulation of labour in both an economic and political sense.
However, because the bureaucratisation of use value is a negation which must
enhance the identity of use value and needs (even if undemocratically), very
special circumstances are required before capital would tie itself into such a
situation. Hence, although a necessity to stave of decline, capital will only
systematise Labourism if labour has been pacified to such an extent that use
value and need can be extended without the necessary extension of the social
integration of labour around a political programme for socialism. Thus for many
decades the potential may not actualise, if ever, and capitalism will be visited by
permanent unemployment beyond the needs of a reserve army of labour. For de-
accumulation (deflation) and unemployment would be the only methods of
control over labour.
The potential of course has realised itself in the historical process.
Gradually Labourism became systemic and allowed the continuation of
accumulation, hence the post war boom. The orthodox view of Labourism is to
refer to it as a political phenomenon with contradictory 'Left' and 'Right'
political manifestations. The argument here however, is that it must be given
further recognition as a socio-economic production category which
bureaucratically regulates and atomises the labour process and in so doing allows
the further abstraction of labour. When systemic, it becomes the new ground for
capital's continued, if compromised rule. It is also very much evidence of
capital's decline. Labourism rests on the bureaucratic regulation of use value and
need. Thus for capital to ground itself on this, is tantamount to assisting the
further weakening of its original ground abstract labour. For example, the gold
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standard, to all intents and purposes by this time a sham, but one which keeps
the semblance of commodity fetishism, must be done away with when Labourism
becomes systemic. Essentially capital could be assisting its own negation. That
is why Labourism is not something capital will engage with lightly. The next
chapter examines the historical development of the genetical process outlined
here. A brief history of labour's social integration in Britain, is recounted, as it
bears on the theory outlined here. The rise of fmance capital, as a response to
the threat from the social integration of labour, is explained in chapter five. The
main task of chapters four and five will be to explain the necessary reasons for
capital's loss of control over labour; the process whereby fmance capital emerges
as a necessary response to this loss of control; and the speculative nature of
fmance capital's initial flirtation with Labourism, before it eventually succumbed.
Exactly why and under what circumstances fmance capital eventually succumbed
to systemic Labourism, will be the subject of chapter six.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE SOCIAL INTERGRATION OF LABOUR
Marx once commented that the proper scientific path of critique was to move
from the concrete to the abstract, then from the abstract back to the concrete. He
was, of course, referring to the manner in which thought grasped first the
appearance, then the essence and, finally, the complexity of that essence in its
more concrete environment. This chapter and those subsequent to it attempts to
redeem the scientific value of this method of enquiry with regard to the theory of
the concrete essence of capitalist decline in Britain. Chapters one and two dealt
with the concrete appearance, in as much as it provided a critique of current
theories of decline. Chapter three moved back to the abstract, in the sense that
the essential social form of capitalism was sought out and the inner contradiction
leading to capitalist decline and transition were exposed. This chapter and the
rest of the chapters of the thesis, will bring the abstract back into the concrete to
provide a dialectical essentialist history of capitalist decline in Britain.
The immediate task of this chapter and chapter five is to provide a historical
overview of the emergence of socially integrated labour and finance capital (as
the dominating form of capital). A crucial part of this overview is to reveal how
and why the emergence of these two manifesting forms of labour and capital,
necessarily corresponds with the emergence of Labourism. Chapter six will then
provide a detailed dialectical essentialist theory of the history of the specific
class struggles which allowed Labourism to gain hegemony over the British
economy to become a systemic control mechanism over labour. Special
historical conditions where necessary for the class struggle to be compromised
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by Labourism. To capture this chapter six seeks to discuss the major pillars of
Labourism and how they necessarily evolved, however at first discretely and
with only accidental relations between them.
Through the prism of the debate in the nineteen thirties surrounding 'the plan or
the market', the chapter then discusses the special conditions provided by
Stalinism for transforming the discrete pillars of Labourism into a holistic system
of control over labour. Throughout, the dominating influence of finance capital
will be explicated. Chapter seven then analyses the Labourist system as it
emerged after world war two. Attention focuses on its essential instability as a
ground for capitalist survival. It will be argued that the initial intention of
bureaucratically regulating use value and exchange value, to prevent their
outright oppositions and the open class struggle it presupposes, merely
purchased a short period of compromise, before inevitably heightening the class
antagonism between capital and labour. This and the following chapter, then,
sets the historical scene by specifying in more concrete terms the emergence of
the epochs two main protagonists: socially integrated labour and fmance capital.
4.1 The Challenge ofSocialised Labour
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century quantity turned to quality as far as the
British labour movement was concerned. The labour movement began to assert
its class presence. The threat that labour posed dealt capitalism in Britain a blow
from which it could never fully recover. The strategy from this point on for
capital, as will be explained in the following chapter, was to develop as finance
capital and to hang on to political power in an effort to slow down the negation
of value relations. There is little surprise, then, that labour historians have paid
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particular attention to the labour movement in the period 1870-1926. This was
the period of capital's peak and decline in Britain. Scupulus attention by the
labour historian has provided microscopic detail of the duration, extent and
number of strikes and lockouts; the reciprocal developments in trade unionism;
and responses of the TUC and the Labour Party. However as Cronin correctly
points out, little in the way of a general theoretical understanding of the era has
been forthcoming.112 A lack of theory inevitably means that labour history 'is
chopped up into the history of one or another industry or union, and such history
revels in the local and particular...confined to narrow bands of time'.
Empiricism, then, has robbed the labour historian of a more profound
understanding of why the years post 1870 are important. They assume its
importance, then move from signpost (growing strike rates, union legal immunity
gains) to signpost (growth in union membership, the development of the Labour
Party) to 'prove' the importance of the post 1870 era. The main preoccupation,
(due to any number of political reasons) appears to be to, 'emphasise elements of
continuity over those of change, to denigrate and minimise the genuine
achievements of labour, and to stress the strength of tradition, sectionalism and
conservatism among workers rather than the secular increase in class awareness
and organisation.' 113
To emphasise the forces of continuity is profoundly conservative, especially so
when, in denying the social world an essence, they have nothing but accidental
relations to pin continuity to. Continuity and change, for the labour historians,
can only be built on the regularity of surface facts (appearances). The
conservative historian then chooses to ignore/play down new 'regularities' and
fetishise old ones, possibly in the belief that the new will somehow go away.
112 J. E. Cronin, (1982), Strikes 1870-1914, in, C. Wrigley.
113 J. E. Cronin, ibid, p8I..
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Marxism bases its analysis of continuity and change on capitalism's essence: the
commodity form of production. Developments here will decide whether a
particular act is evidence of continuity or change. In point of fact the same act
can be evidence of change even if it has occurred many times previously, it all
depends on the context: the current development of the contradiction within
labour's dual form. For example, strikes by labour have been continuos
throughout the development of capitalism. However, a strike when the capitalist
system is at its peak and commodity fetishism is strong, may be qualitatively
different to a strike in a situation where the development of the contradiction
within labour has weakened commodity fetishism considerably. Thus what is,
apparently, evidence of continuity, can also be evidence of profound change; it
all depends on developments within the essential contradiction.
With this qualification in mind, we can point to a number of tendencies, all in
existence to one degree or another before 1870 (continuity), which came
together after 1870 to transform the labour movement into an insurmountable
obstacle for capital (change). Of these the most significant were: the rate and
nature of strikes, the trend toward deskilling, the development of a distinct labour
community and the concentration of labour with the growth in large scale
productive units. At first the latter grew slowly through internal growth, then
more rapidly through merger and acquisition.u- It is in and through these
tendencies that labour becomes socially integrated and expresses its capacity for
collective action. The outcome is that labour begins to realise its capacity to act
as a class against capital. The effect of each tendency on labour will be
explored separately here. After which the manner in which they interrelate to
socially organise labour and repel capital, will be explained.
114J, E, Cronin, ibid, pSI.
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4.2 The Concentration ofLabour
By 1870 the real subordination of labour was in full swing as the factory form of
organisation became dominant. The average size of factories had been
increasing for decades, but began to increase dramatically in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century. This concentration of capital, found its corollary in the
concentration and general development of a proletariat. According to Marglin,
'The putting- out system, with its pitiful vestiges of worker control, virtually
disappeared in Great Britain by mid-century. And weaving was about the last
important holdout of cottage industry. Where this alternative was not available,
the worker's freedom to refuse factory employment was the freedom to starve'.
115 Thus in the intervening period between the abolishment of the Poor Law Act
(1834) and the first stirrings of a State sponsored social wage (1905), labour,
subordinated by capital (formally at first through the market, then increasingly
and more substantively within production), became governed by abstract labour.
However, the governance, no sooner than it had occurred, began to be threatened
by the social integration of labour, which the concentration and intensified
abstraction of labour in production predicates.
The concentration was rapid. Factories producing commodities such as clothing,
shoe making, hosiery and furniture...etc, took the place of small outwork
units.! 16 Transport and mining industries had grown enormously and by 1911
employed some 15% of the working population.117 Hinton claims that by 1890
'The growth of the mines, railways and factories swelled the intermediate stratum
of the working class, the semi-skilled', who now accounted for 45% of
labour.118 The impetus of being the 'workshop of the world' between 1830-1870
115 s. Marglin, Origins and Functions ofHierarchy in Capitalist Production, in T. Nichols (1980).
116 J. Hinton, (1982), The Rise of a Mass Labour Movement, in, C. Wrigley, p23.
117 J. Hinton, ibid, p22, in, C. Wrigley.
118 J. Hinton, ibid, p23.
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had spurred on competitive accumulation and generated vast sums of retained
profits. This, and the development of joint stock and limited liability company
status, paved the way for the deepening of capital's concentration and
centralisation post 1870119 .
By 1885 the number of limited companies were as many as 10,000 and by 1913
the limited liability company form had characterised 65,000 units of productive
capital and extended throughout most industries120 In London alone by 1890
the concentration of labour was evident; 750 of the 8,500 factories accounted for
56% of the workforce. 121 Across the industrial landscape large conglomerates
of productive capital's in textiles, iron, steel, printing, foods and chemicals..etc,
appeared in rapid succession after 1870.
Many more citations can of course be made of the same descriptive nature. For
our purposes, the empirical evidence is clear in its implications that the late
nineteenth century bore witness to an acceleration in the development and
dominance of large scale production units and, by definition, the concentration
of labour.122 Musson concurs with most economic historians when he
observes how 'the growth of joint stock organisation was closely associated with
a remarkable expansion in the scale of business operations, as large companies
developed not only by expanding their own operations but also, increasingly, by
taking over, amalgamating or combining with other firms. The joint stock
119 P. Mathias (1983), correctly points out that productive capital centralised and concentrated
overwhelmingly by virtue of retained profits. British Banks invariably kept their distance, supplying short
term loans. Whilst the other main source of external finance - stock market flotation - accounted for only a
quarter of the finance necessary for expansion. Reasons for this have been suggested and will be expanded on
later in the chapter. Nevertheless, the point we sh not forget is that during the period post 1870 to 1913 the
stock exchange did advance the move towards greater concentration and centralisation of capital.
120 A. E. Musson (1977), p246-247.
121 A. E. Musson, ibid, p245.
122 Musson, ibid, p245-255.
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company facilitated, through transfer of shares, the merging of private family
firms or companies into larger corporate concerns'.123
Of course joint stock and limited liability facilities existed pnor to 1870,
However after 1870, along with retained profits, they became an indispensable
aid to productive capital's future development. This situation, it should be noted,
was not simply born out of the need to fund an ever larger turnover of capital
investments. Primarily, this reliance was due to the fact that productive capital
had begun to experience falling rates of profit and falling prices and increasingly
sought a distance from valorisation, while maintaining links with it. Trade cycles
had troubled capital intermittently for decades. However, trade cycles in the
context of over accumulation difficulties and the concomitant problem of a rising
organic composition of capital (which again is predicated on a concentrated
labour), meant the joint stock company was a necessary path to maintaining
capital as circulating capital. Thus, in response to a rising organic composition
of capital, over accumulation and the threat from a socially integrated labour,
capital was forced into its first spate of horizontal and vertical mergers124 .
Merger mania helps the dominant factions of capital to keep up profit rates while
keeping the other 'negative' forces at bay. Thus the merger of capital is designed
more to distance capital from the market; regulate profits and prices; and retard
the development of new fixed capital, rather than for 'rationalisation' (read
valorisation) purposes. 125
123 Musson, ibid, p248.
124 Horizontal were the merger is with other similar productive capital units making and at the same state
of developing the same use value. Vertical were merger is to buy up previously independent suppliers down
the line or a number of retail outlets up the line from the finished use value. The firmer is more in evidence
when the general rate of profit decline and or trade is depressed. The latter is the greater tendency when
accumulation is booming and scarcity and high prices of supplies threaten the profits of productive capital.
125 I discuss later how finance capital has a determining role in merger activity, by relating it to one of a
number of internal controls it administer over productive capital and so socialised labour. In this instance
however, mergers are productive capitals response to a rising organic composition of capital.
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It is note worthy how many non Marxist analyses implicitly views retardation as
a problem of 'quaint, but mysterious English tradition'. Mathias, in an otherwise
sound empirical account of Britain's' economic history, for example, can only
lament the fact that, 'In England, too often, the objective was to share markets
and set prices which when followed allowed the least efficient firm to make
profits and go its own way. Very often Britain seemed to get the worst of both
worlds in this respect' .126 In one respect Mathias is correct - British capital did
get the worst of both worlds. However the both worlds referred to are more to
do with a high organic composition of capital and the simultaneous emergence of
social and organised labour, than the move to monopoly and retardation of fixed
capital investment, orchestrated by a mysterious 'English traditionalism'.
This brings us to some crucial underlying points which need to be made
regarding a Marxist interpretation of the empirical data regarding industrial
concentration. The period 1870-1913 saw major developments in the
centralisation and concentration of capital - and along with it the concentration
and centralisation of socialised labour. As a result of this socialisation, labour
fmds organisation against capital is both easier and more powerful in its impact.
In effect, mergers, cartelisations, amalgamations, all designed to overcome a
rising organic composition of capital, inadvertently develops, in a kind of 'hot
house fashion', the very force which can potentially destroy it - socially
integrated and increasingly organised labour. Of course, the converse is true
too: the concentration of capital also brought with it the socialisation ofcapital,
indeed it sets the basis up on which finance capital eventually develops, (this is
an issue which will be expanded upon in chapter five below).
The 'hot house' socialisation of labour had important ramifications., not the least
of which was its facilitation of collective strikes Cronin points out that the
126 Mathias, op-cit, p361.
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period between 1870-1914 was one when the strike weapon against capital
became the dominant form of workers collective action.127 The most important
fact, however, is the context within which waves of strikes took place. Against a
background of industrial retardation and developing concentration of labour, the
emergent strike waves shook capital to its foundations.
The overarching context, which forms the ultimate basis to the manifestation of
worker power, was that labour's negation into abstract labour had reached the
point where it experienced a negation of the negation into socialised labour. This
double negation gave added impetus to the other side of labour's dual identity, it
use value and need fulfilling capacity. As this double negation began to assert
itself, a number of other crucial manifestations surfaced. Capital found it
increasingly difficult to keep wages in any rough approximation to the value of
labour power. In addition, the rise of a labour movement challenged capital's
right to distribute labour from one industry to another as and when valorisation
required. Taken together, the estrangement of wages from the value of labour
and the growing quasi-fixity of labour, lead, inevitably, to a build up of pressure
upon capital to either discipline labour and remain on gold; or to take flight into
parasitism in the City and/or international accumulation and remain on gold, a
decision which eventually became irresistible.
Capital chose the latter path. Exactly why it did will be the explanatory task of
the next chapter. What can be said here however is that whatever the path
chosen its route would only buy an extension of time before its inevitable
termination: the fall from the gold standard. As gold formed the objective basis
for abstract labour and so commodity fetishism, it is understandable that its shell
like existence would be fought over by factions of capital and the Labourist
element, with some ferocity. Collective strike action is an important
127 J. E. Cronin, op-cit, p74.
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manifestation of the developing contradiction within labour and capitalist
decline, hence its concrete manifestations need to be discussed. Before
discussing the strike waves, two other important developments, themselves
implied by the concentration of capital and labour, needs to be mentioned - the
development of working class communities and the tendency toward
homogenised labour. The strike waves which affected Britain during the period
1870 to 1926 served to gel all of these factors and push labour towards
becoming a class for itself
4.3 Community and the Deeper Social integration ofLabour
The increasing socialisation of labour in production becomes profoundly
enhanced by labour's community ties outside of the point of valorisation.
Community and the socially organised labour process combine and interact upon
workers consciousness, breaking down and weakening the strong impulses of
commodityfetishism. This is especially so when the fixing of profits, prices and
wages, in the larger monopoly capital's - in order to manoeuvre against rises in
the organic composition of capital - becomes an increasingly conscious and
bureaucratic affair. The strength of labour implied by work and community ties,
found expression in the so called 'Great Depression'. The 'depression' struck
around 1875 taking hold until the mid 1890s. However, with the evidence
provided by the many accounts of this era, it could only be classed as a
depression for capital not organised labour. Capital's valorisation prospects were
depressed whilst the material standard of life for labour in work was generally in
a state of elevation. As one historian points out, 'Money wages almost doubled
between 1850 and 1910, rising by one third between 1880 and 1914,128 One can
128 Mathias, op-cit, p345.
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conclude with some validity that labour's growing socialisation and organisation
in production and community defences, provided the basis for the positive
change of fortune.
By the late nineteenth century the urbanisation of the working class had
increased dramatically. Labour was drawn together within a number of very
large cities; London, Manchester, Glasgow, Liverpool and Birmingham were
among the 30 largest cities in the world. It was also communalised into a
number of suburban towns which were on the increase in this period.129 By
1901 twenty five million people, it is estimated, lived in cities or towns. Thirty
cities in England and Wales had a population of over 100,000 and Glasgow had
concentrated within it some 20% of the entire Scottish population. 130 This
new urban population growth undermined the paternalist relations fostered in the
mill towns which densely peppered the North of Britain, establishing a more
independent working class. Another important factor in the strengthening of
community was the decline in migrationfrom mining communities after 1870.131
Of course urbanisation often brought labour further within the orbit of middle
class hierarchy and status, leading to divisions within labour in the form of
increased paternalism and the development of a 'labour aristocrat'. The effect
was to atomise any tendency towards collective thought and action.
Nevertheless, such factors of division were outweighed by the developing social
integration of labour in production. One can concur with Cronin when he
argues that sufficient emphasis has not been given to the effects of urbanisation
on 'the development and implications for politics and other forms of collective
action' upon the working class.t32 More especially when strong evidence
129 K. Robbins (1983), p57-58.
130 Robbins, op-cit, p56-57.
131 J. E. Cronin, op-cit, p85.
132 J. E. Cronin, op-cit, p85.
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suggests that 'these increasingly solid communities represented a substantial
increment to the strength of labour'.133
There are numerous examples of the powerful effect of socially integrated labour
across community and workplace One particularly important occasion when
labour's political organisation at production intertwined to great effect with its
political organisation of community was the Glasgow rent strikes of 1916.
During the first imperialist war Glasgow housing communities, supported by
striking shipyard workers from the Clyde and many trades and community action
councils, overturned Government inspired inflationary rent increases and forced
Parliament to create legislation guaranteeing a rent ceiling. 134 One of the major
factors uniting Clydeside workers committees (and similar committees on the
Tyne and in the Midlands and London too) across the community and
workplace, was the developing abstraction of labour in production, which
manifested itself as the problem of deskilling. Capital's compulsion to crush
all vestiges of difference within labour at the point of production, gathered pace
alongside the development of large scale industry after 1870. As such it is a
tendency which, when overlaid and interconnected with the concentration of
labour and strengthening of community ties, has important consequences for both
labour and capital.
4.4 Labour's abstraction in Production: the Tendency andIts Contradictions
There has been much debate within sociology surrounding the terms 'skilling' and
'de-skilling', more particularly after Braverman's regenerative essay on the
133 J. E. Cronin, op-cit, p85.
134 See for example J. Hinton's account (1972).
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sociology of work in capitalism (1974). There are two sides to the debate: pro-
Bravermanites and anti-Bravermanites. Pro-Bravermanites depict an inevitable
trend towards deskilling. Anti-Bravermanites argue either that there is (as well as
a process of deskilling) constant reskilling also; and/or that there is little
objective criteria on which to judge what should be classified as 'skillful', ergo
there is no way of asserting a general trend towards 'de-skilling). The problem
with both sides in this debate is that they discuss labour activity separated from a
grounding in its dual identity: as social need fulfilling activity and abstract labour
formatting activity. As sociological categories, both arguments - for and against
deskilling - oppose each other and cannot be reconciled. Situated within
Marxian categories of political economy, however, their reconciliation, is
possible.
Deskilling and reskilling are better seen in the context of the interpenetrating and
opposition of the identity of abstract labour and difference of concrete labour.
The real basis of 'deskilling' is the furtherance of abstract labour formation.
Capital's compulsion to abstract labour, necessitates a continual breaking down
of any obstacles standing in the way of labour's ability to move between tasks in
the process of valorisation. Evidence of 'reskilling' does not do away with this
necessity. What it does point to is that the balance of class forces have swung
against capital, although not necessarily towards labour. When the balance has
swung towards labour, labour asserts its political power in order to claim the job
they perform as 'skilled', wresting as many of the material gains and securities as
it can from capital. When the balance of class forces swings against capital, but
not in the direction of labour, then forces for class compromise (for example,
Labourism) can establish 'tradition, custom and practice as 'skilled'. This creates
divisions within labour and/or 'purchases' the necessary compromise with capital
vis-a-vis labour.
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As the biggest balance of force to swing against capital is the elimination of the
ground of abstract labour and the development of the ground of socially
integrated labour, then what manifests as 'reskilling' is, more fundamentally,
evidence of the break up ofabstract labour formation. Thus, in as much as a
healthy capitalism has a tendency to grind labour to abstraction, this tendency
will manifest itself as a defmite trend towards what is referred to as 'deskilling',
expressed in essence as labour's ever greater flexibility and malleability between
tasks in the process of expanding value. By the same token, the more that
abstract labour's ground in gold weakens under the weight of a greater identity
developing in socialised labour, the more the issue of 'reskilling', as status
divisions within labour, will appear to dominate political discourse between the
classes. This dialectic was very much in evidence during the period 1870-1926.
In fact it forms the real basis of that less essential concept the 'aristocracy of
labour' and the subsequent political and theoretical contusions which emerge
from it.
At first glance to point to a trend towards the greater abstraction of labour in
British capitalist society from the 1870s appears to run up against the fact of a
prominent 'labour aristocracy'. Whilst not denying that labour had deep
sectional divisions this sociological phrase makes too much of subjective
separation within labour and ignores the objective forces at work unifying labour.
The category arose out of a misunderstanding of the epoch between 1870 and
1926, and although correctly identifies that something important was developing
in the sphere of class compromise, it erroneously conceptualises it as the
problem of a labour aristocracy, rather than as the development of Labourism - a
category of political economy developingmore out of capital than labour.
The question of why the British working class had not acted as a class to
overthrow capitalism, became all too easily, yet superficially answered - a
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section of the working class had become 'embourgeoisified'. Like most
sociological concepts 'labour aristocracy' is almost impossible to clearly defme.
If one bases it on 'skill', as defined by traditional artisan craft skills, then its
foundations are dubious. Throughout the period under discussion old artisan
craft skills were being made obsolete by new technique and machinery. All
industries experienced the effects of the abstraction of labour subjectively as one
of 'deskilling'. John Burns, a leading figure in the Amalgamated Engineering
Union (one of the supposed exemplars of labour aristocracy), appears to refute
any suggestion that a labour aristocracy could be holding sway, when he argued
that, 'Labour saving machinery is reducing the previously skilled to the level of
unskilled labour, and they must, in their own interests, be less exclusive than
hitherto,.135 The quotation sums up the fundamental force at work in the first
part of the era - the abstraction of labour.
The general view amongst a substantial section of historians136 - albeit with a
variety of approaches - appears to be that a definite trend towards the dilution of
skill was occurring. Apprenticeships were becoming less of a necessity in
gaining acceptance into the swelling ranks of the 'nominally skilled'. As a result
of this, and as a reflection of the threat of 'new unionism', craft unions were
forced to open not close their doors to the wider labour movement. Hardly the
act of a vibrant and confident 'labour aristocracy'. As one source confrrmed,
The growth of the semi skilled sector at the end of the century was indeed
one element...in the narrowing of the gap (in status, not earnings) between
skilled workers and the rest of the working class (as reflected both in the
growth of non-apprenticed skilled labour, outside the control of the craft
135 Cited in H. Pelling (1976), pl0l.
136 For example see, E. H. Hunt, British Labour History; G. Anderson, (1982), Some Aspects ofthe
Labour Market in Britain, in C. Wrigley, op-cit; H. Pelling (1976), op-cit; 1. E. Cronin, (1982), Strikes 1870-
1914, in C.Wrigley, op-cit.
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unions, and in the corresponding emergence of all-grades trades unions as
opposedto exclusive craft unions) and a cause of skilled workers'
integration into the mainstream of the labour movement.
Evidence of a deep distinction within labour on the lines of a 'labour aristocracy',
tends to fall back on wage differentials and a host of subjective factors, which,
whilst important, cannot account for the failure of working class revolutionary
politics to emerge. According to one source wage differentials on occasions
amounted to as much as 30-40% within the same industry. However,
Hobsbawm has argued, convincingly, that such differentials rest on the
traditional craft unions ability to limit or control the market supply of labour and
less on inherent substantial skill differences.137 The dilution of skill and
alongside it the increasingly open membership policy of certain craft unions,
implies that even wage differentials cannot be used to conjure up a deep division
within labour, because they would apply increasingly to labour in general.
Wage differentials in any case were never consistent, but forever fluctuating. In
some years, unskilled labour would earn a wage equivalent to 'skilled'. In other
years 'unskilled' wage labour could be lower or even higher than skilled' labour.
The biggest factor was not so much an objective division within labour, but the
intensity of capitalist demand for labour. The latter was a factor in certain
status differences within labour138. Again hardly the basis for an account of the
deep chasm within labour causing revolutionary failure.
137 See Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, ch 15.
138 Of course the main basis is to do with the intrinsic importance of labour for human development. It
was not just Marx, but people like A Smith before him and E. Durkheim after him who pointed out the
stultifying effects of the capitalist division oflabour on human welfare. For this reason labour will always
strive to create their own unique input into the most seemingly menial of tasks apportioned to them as an off
spin of capitals desire to control every vestige of labour process activity. This fact is implicit in Braverman's
work and in articles such as produced by 1. L. White who reveals how the attempt to deskill the cotton industry
in Britain although successful in large part, could never vanquish labours ability to stamp their own identity on
the labour process; see White's, (1982), Lancashire Cotton Textiles, in C. Wrigley, p209-229, op-cit.
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The effects of a cultural divide within the working class, whilst evident is
somewhat overstated. As dilution of skill took effect, craft unions tended
towards a policy of general unionism as befitted labour's developing abstraction.
In the case of the engineering workforce, the effects of labour abstraction -
deskilling - transformed it into a revolutionary vanguard139 Thus, although
vestiges of status and wage differentials remained to divide labour, the view that
this amounts to a categorical divide amongst labour is overplayed and weakens
an understanding of the growing homogeneity of labour and the real chasm
developing between it and capital. The real process and trend towards
deskilling after 1870 served to radicalise rather than embourgeoisify traditional
craft workers and draw them closer to the emerging general unions of the 1880s
in the fight against capital. The deskilling of traditional craft labour accelerated
and intertwined with the massive amounts of new unskilled general labour in
transport, mining and municipal industries such as the Gas industry.140
The reality is that there was more of a convergence than a distinction between
unions during the period 1870-1913. The emergence of Labourism, as defined
in this thesis as a category of political economy, moves away from blaming
sectionalism within labour as the main culprit and locates the cause in an
effective counter revolution by bourgeois forces. A Labourism, moreover,
effectively under written by the doctrine of 'Stalinism in one country' (how this
occurred, will be addressed in a later chapter). Of course, in emphasising the
forces at work in abstracting the identity of labour over those of difference, does
not mean one ignores the important sectionalism between 'skilled' and 'unskilled'
labour. This sectionalism was clearly evident and capital played on it
relentlessly. What it does mean however, is that one can remove the
139 See J. Hilton's detailed study, The First Shop Stewards Movement (1972).
140 So much so that, as Pelling points out, by 1890 at the TUC conference 'there was clearly sufficient
support for their (new union) views from some of the old unions to prevent any appearance of a split in
congress along the lines of new against old', H. Pelling (1976), op-cit, pl02.
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overbearing excuse of a 'labour aristocracy' which blocks an appreciation of the
radicalising effects of the tendency to increase the abstraction of labour and the
full implications of the counterrevolutionary nature and roots of Labourism.
'Deskilling', then (seen as the greater malleability and flexibility of labour, as part
of the tendency toward the greater abstraction of labour in production, rather
than the fetishisation of some notion of universal skill), takes on a vital and
significant role in the destruction of central pillars of capitalist containment and
rule. Firstly, deskilling tends to break down the negative impact on labour of
competition between workers in the market place for jobs. More crucially
deskilling, in the form that it manifests itself in capitalism - abstraction of labour
- leads to an increase in the social powers and interconnections of labour. As
such it is the basis upon which labour's collective solidarity at the point of
exploitation is constructed, adding powerful assistance and cohesion to the
developing concentration of labour and stability of its community ties.
It is worth reminding ourselves once again of the forces within the accumulation
process which compel this process. The dynamism to accumulate impels on
capitalists the need to control the labour process - so eliminating any control
labour may exert over the product and the pace of work. Necessarily, therefore,
capital drives to make production as free flowing a value expanding unit as is
possible, hence the latent tendency to reduce labour to abstract labour. For the
capitalist, then, labour must become as circulatory as capital. It is on this basis
as a necessary feature of capital, that a distinctive trend towards deskilling
occurs. Therefore the greater quest by capital for control over labour and
increased profitability, holds within it the potential for turning the world of
capital upside down by breaking down the divisions amongst workers and
uniting them in the common aim of securing, for the goal of need, the social
powers of production.
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Having outlined the concentration of labour; its increasing communal ties and its
developing tendency to abstraction and so objective homogeneity in production,
an account for the growing wave of strikes which took place during the period in
question will be proffered. This wave of strikes, it is argued, had the effect of
develop and deepening the interconnections of the process so far outlined. As a
result the social integration of labour deepens and extends its social organisation
against capital.
4.5 The Strike Waves and the emergence ofa socialist voice
Taken together, the concentration and centralisation of capital and labour; the
increased urbanisation allowing for community links between the working class;
and the trend toward the deepening of labour's abstraction, provide the
substantive ground in and through which a number of distinct strike waves
consolidated the organisational forces of labour and effectively shattered the
confidence of capitalist accumulation in Britain. Of course, each strike wave
eventually receded to a degree and allowed capital to claw back some of the
concessions made on wage and work conditions. However, each wave
deepened the organisational, as well as socialising forces, of labour and
weakened the forces of atomism and internal division. For example, the first
wave of activity - 1870-1873 - which was marked by a ten-fold increase in strike
action,141 unified the class around agitation for the 9 hour day. The outcome
was an extension of union organisation amongst labour. Membership of TUC
affiliated societies grew from 250,000 in 1870 to 1.2 million by 1874. In the
depression years which followed in the wake of the economic victory, the
141 J. E. Cronin,op-cit, p86.
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working class as a whole learnt, with the onset of deflation, that the tactic of
indexing wages to prices, worked effectively during the boom, but served as a
basis of wage cutting during the depression. The lesson learnt was that in future
struggle, labour must not restrain wages to value, as implied in indexation, but
must instead go beyond value.
The next wave of strikes over the period 1888-1891, specifically the militant
upsurge of new unionism, signified evidence of a more profound nature: the
further abstraction of labour was beginning to give way (negate) to the deeper
socialisation of labour. The Gas Workers Union; the National Union Of Dock
Labourer's in Glasgow, Liverpool and Irish ports; The National Amalgamation of
Labour on the Tyne; the General Railway Workers Union, as general unions, all
gave expression to labour's growing abstraction and organisational potentia1.142
It is not simply that New Unionism opened up to labour in general the
opportunity to organise against capital; just as importantly it encouraged the
breakdown of the subjective divisions within labour. Perhaps more important
still, New Unionism heralded the emergence of a socialist voice (in the form of
syndicalism and, to a lesser degree, municipal socialism). This 'socialist voice'
operated at the level of the class as a whole; urging unity and rejection of the
forces of division still latent within the labour process.
The successes of the strike wave143 and the emergence of a socialist voice was
decisive in forging the view amongst the more militant strands of labour that
capitalism was to be challenged, not over this or that reform, but as capital.
Capitalist apologists grew very anxious during this period. The following
remarks reflects the contemporary bourgeois intellectuals hankering for the
golden days of craft unionism and his growing horror of what, he feels, New
142 See H. Pelling, op-cit, chapter vi, for a detailed account of the rise of new unionism.
143 According to Cronin, op-cit, p86, union membership almost doubled in the period 1888-1890 whilst
the number of, mostly successfully executed, strikes rose from 517 to 1211.
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Unionism heralds, and illustrates well above all the class anxiety of capital as a
whole;
The older unions, presided over by men having some knowledge of political
economy and of the conditions of trade, have a defined policy. They desire,
when it is possible, to improve the conditions of the working man .
This policy is stigmatised by the secretary of the new Union. His policy and
that of the union is that of the daughter of the horse1eech; it is a policy of
continual importunity. The new Union cares not whether men are ill or well
paid; it is ever ready with a fresh demand. Concession does but wet its
appetite; it claims for labour the whole of the profits made by labour and
capital combined; it aims to be the absolute dictator of the conditions of toil;
to say who shall work and how much he shall receive ....The principle which
underlies the militant union is the principle of socialism. In the first place, the
individual's subordinated to the class; in the second place, the class desires to
obtain the whole of the profits which are derived from capital and labour
combined. In other words, it desires to confiscate capital. 144
The wage gains of 1888-91 were quickly recouped, through deflation and the
discipline of unemployment after 1891. Nevertheless the real victory for labour
was in establishing the spectre of socialism as an ideological alternative to
capitalism. This development increased labour's socialisation and, in tum, its
organised response to capital. This ideological gain was not to be clawed back
as wages and conditions were to be. The spirit of socialism now gripped the
leaders of the labour movement. This would now serve as the foundations upon
which the next wave of strikes would be pitched, between 1911 and 1919. This
wave of strikes culminated in insurrectionary activity in the context of, what
144 Edmond Vincent, (1974), The Discontent ofthe Working Classes, in T. Macay ,A Plea For Liberty,
p213-14, cited in J. Saville, Trade Unions and Free Labour, in M. W. Flinn and T. C. Smout, Essays In Social
History, p253-254.
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many consider to have been, a near revolutionary situation during 1919.145 The
underlying socialisation of labour when a strike wave hit hard in 1911, brought
an immediate response, not only from capital, but from the capitalist
Government, forced into the arena directly and overtly to support productive
capital in its hour of need against the forces of labour.
Troops were mobilised in an attempt to break strikes unfolding in the Mining
villages of Wales and in the Ports of Liverpool and Glasgow. Strikes made a
quantitative breakthrough between 1910-1913, averaging 750 workers a strike,
as opposed to 350 during 1889-1892. The success rate was also high - 44% of
strikers (1.1 million) victorious. However, just as important was labour's
qualitative breakthrough, both 'in the extent of organisation achieved in the teeth
of tremendous and quite unrelenting employer opposition; and 'the serious
diminution in the control which the leaders of the men used to exercise over their
rank and file ,.146 This break with the union leadership had opened workers to
the ideas and influence of syndicalism to a greater degree than before. A 'new
philosophy of direct action and militancy,147 infused labour. Some of the
leading militant workers experienced growing awareness of the necessity of
overcoming the reformist actions and compromises of both union leaders and
government bodies, and became drawn to syndicalist ideas. Despite the many
failings of syndicalism it did develop a partial critique of Labourist trends of
class containment in this epoch. As such their rejection of Parliament, Labour
Party and trade union bureaucrats, and their call for independent industrial action
by labour, won them much support. More specifically, syndicalism consistently
offered an alternative to reformist unionism through its adoption of an ideology
of workers control.
145 See for example, the article 1919:The Critical Year, by C. Wrigley (1980), in his pamphlet, The
British Labour Movement In The Decade After The First World War, Dept ofEcon, Loughborough University.
146 J. E. Cronin, op-cit, p90.
147 1. E. Cronin, op-cit, p90.
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Recognition of the threat to survival posed by labour for capital is clear in the
vigorous efforts of the state to contain labour by bureaucratic means. One
Royal Commission (1867-9) after another (1889-92 & 1903) tussled with the
'labour problem'. Special Labour Departments were established from 1893.
Efforts were made even earlier than this to foster relations with union leaders as
a means to help contain the power of labour. In this respect one has a series of
legislation designed to gradually immunise unions from legal action and push
them towards a compromised existence within capitalism: The Trade Union Act
of (1871), ended the danger of prosecution for conspiracy against unions taking
strike action and gave legal protection to union funds; The Conspiracy and
Protection ofProperty Act (1875), provided limited rights for peaceful picketing.
The Employers and Workman's' Act (1875), ended worker liability for breaches
of the employment contract. In addition the 1906 Trade Dispute Act, which
granted direct immunity to unions, tightened up legal loopholes exploited by the
Taff Vale Company decision of 1903 to sue the Amalgamated Society ofRailway
Workers.
This plank of labour law, as the Taff Vale decision demonstrates, brings into
relief the fact that labour law was not simply afunction ofincorporation, but the
outcome of heated class struggle. Ultimately, however, labour law was used to
codify the Labourist compromise and, in so doing, it served as the basis upon
which both trade union officialdom and capital would bureaucratically derail
labour militancy. To this end the incorporation of union leaders and institutions
was of paramount importance throughout the period - especially so in that it
served to allow official trade union leaders the time, resources and status to
battle against socialist forces within labour.
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By the end of the First World War, capital had been forced off the gold
standard and the State had begun to intervene heavily in the process of
valorisation. Capital was losing control over an increasingly collective labour.
Throughout the period and up until the mid 1920s the ruling class were in a state
of disarray, finance capital sought one solution and Labourist forces another, in
their attempt to contain labour. Tension mounted when the influence of the
Bolshevik revolution began to assert its impact on the British working class.
Bentley captures the atmosphere in the ruling class camp in this period when he
remarks how
The socialism which Lloyd George confronted after 1918
seemed to him somethingharder and colder...In the country
he spoke not of socialism but of bolshevism (and) he wrote
of 'the great struggle which is to come'.148
The first two decades of the 20th century saw independent working class
collectivity reach new heights in Britain; heights which have never been attained
since. As indicated above, syndicalist ideas of socialism had gripped the most
politically advanced sections of labour. The main thrust of its practical politics
was that trade unions were to become the vehicle for achieving socialism; and
the General Strike was to be the main weapon in the trade union arsenal. The
militant sections of collective labour were predominantly concentrated in Coal
mining, Docks and Railway industries. Between 1910-14, a series of strike
waves deepened its hold over labour and began to bring whole cities to a
standstill. The State had increasingly to resort to sending in police and troops in
148 M. Bentley, (1974), The Liberal Response To Socialism, in, K. D. Brown, Essay's in Anti-Labour
History p49, MacMillan.
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an attempt to regain control. This, for example, was the case ill Hull,
Manchester, Salford, Liverpool and Glasgow.149
The period 1910-22 witnessed the development of key worker organisational
initiatives such as Worker Trades Councils and Worker Co-operatives,
alongside of the emergence of Councils of Action. These organisations were
responsible for, amongst other things, the 'hands off Soviet workers' campaign.
The States Minister of Labour in 1920 revealed their general awareness,
however rudimentary, of the qualitative changes taking place within socialised
labour when lamenting the fact that, 'What is called 'class consciousness' is
obliterating the distinction between those who follow different occupations'.150
Amidst post war demobilisation and unemployment, key sections of the
labour movement were beginning to move from the bounds of a class in itself to
the bounds of a class for itself. The trade union bureaucrat, who, particularly
during the first world war, was seen as an accomplice to State inspired working
class oppression, could exert, as yet, only marginal influence over labour. Thus
labour was still in large measure autonomous from the rigid policing role of the
State and its agencies. Hence it really was a crucial period of class warfare and
working class potential. According to the British labour historian J. E. Cronin,
this was the period when 'technical, social and economic processes' were at
work, combining, to internally homogenise the working class and cause it to be
'less sharply divided within itself. 151 The concentrated socialising forces of
labour were beginning to make their class presence felt. Within the cities, a
distinct working class culture was emerging, which allowed the point of
149 For a concise empirical history ofthe conflict between capital and labour in Britain, see 1. Sheldrake,
(1991Jr/ndustrial Relations and Politics in Britain 1880-1989, Pinter Publishers.




production struggles a basis upon which to spill over into political struggle.
Cronin again notes how:
The militancy of 1917-20 transcended the issues of wages
and prices and dilution and even war itself. It was, more
than any previous or subsequent unrest, a mobilisation of
the working class as a class and of their institutions and
neighbourhoods.152
Engineering workers epitomised this. Their growing militancy was due to the
dilution of their skill status during the war, undermined by a flood of semi-skilled
men and women. Effectively, the growing abstraction of their labour under the
drive of war production needs, led to their radicalisation. Thus as Hinton's study
reveals, this supposed bulwark of aristocratic reaction, became a central focus
of socialist ideas and latent soviet power.153 Hinton explains how, realising
there would be no turning back to craft exclusion after the war, Engineers,
unabridged by union hierarchy and set free from parochial craft concerns were
able 'to release the traditions of local autonomy from the narrow embraces of a
defensive craft consciousness, to transform them into weapons of an ambitious
class offensive'.154 Of course the shop stewards movement fragmented after the
war under the impact of capital's counter offensive. However, this should not
blind one to the fact that the capacity for militant action realised by sections of
the working class give living expression to the socialist claim that workers can
make 'the ideological transition from syndicalism to sovietism,.155
152 ibid p31.
153 J. Hinton (1972), op-cit.
154 Hinton (1972), op-cit, pIS.
155 Hinton (1972), op-cit, pIS.
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There is a tendency amongst many Marxists to be cynical of the optimistic
assumption that the working class in Britain were acting as a class on important
occasions during this period; usually on the grounds that such optimism is born
of an 'economistic' outlook, which romanticises working class struggle. To
some degree this may be justified - there is a definite tendency towards
'economism'. However, this cynicism is overly pessimistic also. The cynic, by
and large, looks at this period of British worker struggle through the distorting
prism of Stalinism and Labourism and, as such, the hold these categories have
exerted on working class politics since the nineteen thirties. What we must not
forget is that during the period presently under discussion, Stalinism had not yet
developed and Labourism had still not gained a central foothold in order to re-
atomise the growing worker collectivities and stratify them into bourgeois
collective bargaining groups.
Until the Fabian/Labour Party and TUC could effectively join forces with
Conservative social chauvinists such as the Chamberlainites, to ensure a
bureaucratic atomisation of the emerging socialised working class, it was
Syndicalist's such as Tom Mann who inspired the workers movement politically;
and it was the Anti-Socialist Movement, the Economic League, and the Liberty
and Property Defence League ideologues who inspired the capitalist counter-
offensives. At this stage, then, everything was still up for grabs in the class
struggle between capital and labour.
Up until that watershed in British working class formation - the 1926 general
strike, the Labour Party and TUC, despite the States careful nurturing, were
essentially still on the side lines with respect to any hegemonic control over the
working class. This period, in working class history was characterised by a
struggle between, on the one hand, Syndicalism, striving to breakdown the
political divisions between workers; and, on the other hand, Labourism,
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attempting to consolidate its reason for existence, by working flat out to
deepening sectional divisions in the working class and deepens the divisions
between the British working class and international labour via patriotism.
To summaries, then, the period 1870 to the mid 1920s was a crucial one for both
capital and labour. The period witnessed the concentration and centralisation of
capital and labour; labour's urbanisation within communities and the weakening
of divisions within labour. Under the welter of a series of strike waves, labour
became both more socially integrated in production and politically organised
outside of production against the forces of capital. Before moving on to
consider the rise of finance capital which is implied by the developments already
identified within labour, it is worth taking stock and clarifying some of the
important implications from what has been asserted above. By doing so,
hopefully a deeper ontological understanding will be gained as to why the initial
movement away from production by fmance capital was an absolute necessity for
their survival.
4.6 Socialised Labour And The Decommodification ofLabour.
The category, socialised labour, has a number of attributes which can be
divided, for analytical purposes, into two levels of abstraction from the
complexities of the capital relation. At a deeper level of abstraction one has
socialised labour's genetic attributes; these are properties of the inner laws of
capital's decay. At a more concrete level of abstraction one has socialised
labour's historical attributes; these are empirically verifiable trends within
production and within the labour market. Taking the historical attributes first,
these manifest around the creation of 'internal labour markets' and the
increasingly 'relatively autonomous' spheres of control in production, which the
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emerging socialised labourer forces capital to concede on an increasing basis
from 1870 onwards. The fact that these categories in later decades (after the
consolidation of Labourism post 1939) became transformed as mechanisms of
control over labour, is not the immediate point. Initially they were capitalist
concessions which cost capitalists dearly. Economically, they raised labour
costs, hindered technical change and deflated profit rates. Politically, they
advanced the self confidence of socialist forces. In essence the dominant
capitalist enterprises were forced, under compulsion of class struggle, to
intemalise the employment relation: that is to keep it once removed from the
strict criteria of valorisation. Hence wages, work conditions and the division of
labour are fixed by internal administration between management and the
developing trade union bureaucracy and less by market forcesJ56 Put in
genetical terms, the decline of abstract labour and so rise of a socially integrated
labour, means that the first embryonic forms of the decommodification of labour
begin to take shape. It is these latent implications, as well as the threat of
socialism, which thrusts finance capital onto the scene to oversee and attempt to
reverse the decline of the capitalist system.
156 Industrial Relations and Labour Process Theory literature is replete with examples of this trend. On
intemal1abour markets and there connection with the 'relative autonomy' experienced by the emergent




THE RULE OF FINANCE CAPITAL, ITS NATURE AND EXTENT.
In this chapter a more detailed explanation of finance capital will be provided. It
will be argued that to understand what the category of fmance capital is, it is
necessary to address three crucial perspectives: One is required to explain why
fmance capital emerges; who the finance capitalists are; and, fmally, how fmance
capital exert their rule over other factions of capital and, more fundamentally,
over labour. Of course there can be little doubt that all three perspectives
overlap in various ways. For example, why fmance capital emerges to rule, will
have ramifications for who will constitute the fmance capitalist and how they will
practice their rule. Nevertheless, in the first instance, any comprehensive
theoretical account must address each perspective in isolation.
In the early days of finance capital's existence, why they ruled and how they
exerted their rule produced more contradictions for capital than cures. One of
the main contradictions was that fmance capital were initially drawn towards two
opposing positions, which had contradictory policy implications: an attraction
towards Labour, with the aim of endorsing Labourism as a new system of
controls over labour; and, simultaneously, a repulsion from labour, into finance
circulation and a parasitic relation to production. As opposing positions, they
disrupted fmance capital's ability to exert hegemonic control over other factions
of capital and labour. Instead their controlling influence could only be partial
and so ill defmed. As a result, British capitalism lurched from one crisis to
another, without any apparent long term strategy. It was a scenario which
characterised the period between 1870s-1930s in Britain, one which we will
endeavour to recap on later in this chapter, when critically assessing the
historical manifestations of class struggle as it unfolded during this period. In
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doing so, it will hopefully bring into sharper focus the reasons for the
indeterminacy which characterised the era. For, although necessary for capital's
survival, Labourism was never inevitable, or, pre-determined in any sense. The
task of this first section will be to lay the foundations of such an enquiry by
providing a detailed theoretical account of the why's, how's and who's offmance
capital's rule. I open with a critical consideration of why fmance capital emerges
to exert its capacity to rule, then move on to consider how they exert their rule,
before, finally, providing an exposition of who the finance capitalists are.
5.1 Why Finance Capital Emerges As Ruling Capital
The rule of capital in general, is exerted automatically through the money form;
the necessity that one particular faction of capital emerges to rule collectively,
belies the fact that the automatic functioning of money and commodity exchange
has begun to lose this capacity. Thus an answer to why finance capital emerges
to exert its rule, must commence with the power of money capital.
Sayer (1991) points out how, for Marx, capitalism at the peak of its powers,
exerted a spontaneous rule over individuals (whether they be capitalist or
labour). The rule took two related forms. Firstly, commodity fetishism atomised
individuals, in the sense that their social class relations could only fmd
expression as a private individual relation through commodity exchange.
Secondly, based on the above, the laws of private property subsumed classes as
abstract juridical individuals; again the result is to deepen the forces of
atomisation and spontaneous control by the market. The State, when capitalism
is at its peak ofpower, rests on these two pillars of control and thus appears as a
neutral arbitre, between free and equal individuals, while in essence, m
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maintaining the existence of these forms of atomisation, the State endorses and
supplements capital's class rule over labour.
In so far as capitalism is able to develop and maintain spontaneous control over
labour in the above described manner, individual capitalists and groups of
capitalist do not have to consciously manipulate the system to achieve the same
end. Capital, at the peak ofits powers, owns and controls the only social power
resource required to rule: money capital. The circulation of money capital,
successfully atomises classes into individuals, who relate to each other only as
commodity producers and exchangers. The capitalist, as Marx argued, keeps
his social power over society 'in his pocket'.157 Sayer elucidates the meaning of
this profundity. 'Power', he attests, is extemalised, residing now in objective
forms outside of people rather than in their differential subjective identities. It is,
literally, disembodied. And it is this objectification which enables power to be
exercised by individuals as individuals rather than as personifications of a
community'.158 Thus, capitalists gain a common currency of power in money,
whilst labour as a class becomes atomised into abstract juridical individuals. In
effect capitalists rule their system without really trying to act in common as a
class .. the basis of their rule - money - achieves this for them.
A capital at the peak of its powers and capacities, then, provides in money
capital, the source of capital's rule over labour. Of course, factions within
capital will continue to compete, conflict and jockey for power within the State.
However, at the peak of power, this will have more to do with the particular
interest of one faction of capital in extending its particular share of surplus value
over others. But, what of a capitalist system in decline? No animated object can
be frozen at the peak of its powers of development, there must be growth and
157Marx, (1973), The Grundrisse, p94, cited in D. Sayer, (1991), p67.
158D. Sayer, ibid, p67.
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decline. If the forces acting for decline become greater for capital, then one can
imagine its forces of spontaneous rule through money capital may considerably
weakened. Chapter three carried the argument that money capital, is the basis of
commodity fetishism, which has as its ground abstract labour. In turn, it was
argued that abstract labour must be grounded in gold if it was to substantiate the
interpenetration of exchange value and use value and thus subordinate society to
the extraction of surplus value. Given this argument, the decline of the system
from the anchor of gold, surrenders abstract labour's ground and leaves its
(positive) negation - socialised labour - with ever more scope to stamp its telos
on society and the class structure. The ramifications of the decline from gold are
enormous. An essential ramification is that commodity fetishism breaks down
and individuals from both classes find it easier and all the more necessary to act
as a class. This has important implications for the emergence of the collective
mobilisation of finance capital.
The gold standard substantiated capital's aim to grind labour as a class into
abstract individual atoms ojlabour. Capitalists could rule almost by automaton.
Thus it is little wonder the bourgeoisie, in debates surrounding the gold standard
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, projected mystical and
godlike powers and adulation on gold. It was thought to be the vital equilibrium
of capitalism, whose disappearance would cause chaos and stagnation. As one
source put it, gold was a, 'thermometer measuring the economic activity of a
country' . It provided a warning against unbalanced budgets, restricted credit
expansion to the expansion of value and acted as a cure for inflationary excess
(the de valorisation of money capital). It also acted as a crucial counterweight
to the rise of 'collectivism' and 'municipal socialism', which, for capital, had been
a kind of cancer like development, destroying 'individualism'. As Roberts
pointed out, to the capitalist, 'the spectre of collectivism was everywhere'.1 59
159R Roberts, (1984), p24-5.
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There had been a 'rapid extension of municipal trading' between 1890 and the
mid 1900s (local and central government public ownership and provision of
commodities such as gas and water..etc).160 To the capitalists of the era, this
heralded the development of socialism, or, for them, what amounted to the same
thing, mankind's stagnation and descent into barbarism. As one source would
have it, 'The conclusion..to which we are driven, is that the balance between
individualism and state action has been upset by the introduction of municipal
trade. Weare entering upon a barren region of human stagnation, where reigns a
steady decay of all the faculties making for the good development of the
race...Effort is stunted intelligence is weakened and responsibility destroyed'. 161
The desperate attempt to cling to the powers of gold, was an attempt to weaken
such municipal advances as the thin end of the wedge to socialism. Ultimately,
the concern with decay and stunted development, had more to do with the
degeneration of the social commitment to the circuit of capital and valorisation,
than to mankind's species powers.
The importance of gold becomes apparent when capital moves off it for any
reason. When British capital set itself adrift from the gold standard, as a
response to the need for war planning in 1914, the forces of collectivism became
magnified and the bourgeoisie could hardly wait to re-establish gold's 'curative
powers' as soon as the war came to an end in 1918. This was because, allied to
an increasingly socially integrated labour, then coming off gold provided fertile
ground for the emergence of a militant and politicised working class. As
described in the previous chapter, strike waves increased their intensity, trade
union membership soared and socialist ideas spread rapidly. Capital's 'knee jerk'
reaction was to move back to gold immediately the first world war came to an
end and as soon as the domestic class struggle allowed. However, before the
160R. Roberts, ibid.
161RT. Nugent, in R Roberts, op-cit.
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return to gold could be completed, capital had to work hard over a number of
years to provide a collective response that was coherent enough to take the sting
out of labour's threat. The extent of labour's militant advances during this
period, haunted capital for some decades and proved to be a major restraint on
finance capital's attraction to Labourism between the wars (a situation discussed
in detail in chapter six).
Money capital which is backed by gold, then, provides the potential source of an
automatic social power for capital; whilst any movement away from gold,
weakens this social power and develops the need within capital for collective
(therefore a more conscious) response from both classes, who are compelled to
fight it out for control of the system. Capital has to consolidate its position as a
class for itself, in order to prevent labour's transformation to a similar ontological
status. This means capital will attempt to regulate the ideological forms under
which labour struggles; endorsing reformist ones and doing its best to limit the
effects of communist theory. Thus it is no accident that much of the debate in
the late nineteenth century was systematically edged toward the safer terrain of
municipal trading. Municiple trading, although indigestible to capital, was
preferable to municipal socialism. However, when the socialisation of labour
developed further still and the ideas of syndicalism began to grip labour,
municipal socialism soon became the 'preferred' option (supplemented with
national chauvinism) of a bourgeoisie struggling collectively to maintain control
of the system. Fundamentally, the class struggle is defined and redefmed by the
opposition and attraction between use and exchange value. Both are grounded in
abstract labour, however, without gold backing, abstract labour loses its ground
and as a consequence can no longer act as the automatic mechanism which
ensures the subordination of use value and need (and so the working class) to the
criteria of exchange value and profit. As a result the opposition of use and
exchange value overrides any attraction - class struggle becomes more naked;
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capital for its part, fights for the world of value, labour transgresses this 'world'
and pushes needs and expectations of needs beyond the dominating orbit of the
'value imperative'. It is within such class eruptions that finance capital emerges
to attempt to ensure the survival of the crisis ridden capitalist system.
Labour will struggle use value further away from its orbit around abstract labour;
capital will struggle to ensure exchange value remains the dominating form of
production relations. The point is, with abstract labour shaken from its central
co-ordinating and controlling position within the economy, both capitalists and
labour are forced to act collectively to achieve their aims. Capital must control
the drift towards use value and need as the driving motive of production, whilst
also harnessing the depleted force of exchange value. To do this necessitates
that capital maintain the dominance of exchange value throughout the
commanding institutional heights of capitalism: in the major boardrooms, in the
City of London and in the State. The task of collectivising to protect the overall
interests of capital, falls to those strategically placed individual capitalists who
have hegemonic financial control over these institutions. This elite association of
capitalists are the finance capitalist and they form into a collectivity called
finance capital (an issue we return to shortly).
To reiterate, when the gold standard exists, capital is equipped with its own
internal form of control, without the necessity that it acts in unison, as the
contraction and expansion of market forces will do the job eventually. As Marx
said (in relation to capitalists more than anyone else) 'Every individual possesses
social power in the form of a thing'. However, 'Take away this social power
from the thing, and you must give it to persons to exercise over persons'.162
Putting this in more specific terms, capital, robbed of the social power of gold,
must assert its rule collectively over labour. The collective response to labour
162Marx, The Grundrisse, p94.
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now becomes a necessity and no longer a contingent luxury. This is crucial and
has the most important ramifications.
The fall from gold signifies capitalist decline. The decline should not be seen as
accidental or superficial, in the sense that capital can retrieve the gold standard
(or something similar) at a later date, rather, it is an irreversible degeneration of
the capitalist social relation. Capitalist decline means that the social power
conferred on money to atomise and commodify classes, has been weakened
considerably by the advance of socialised labour. The social integration of
labour, forces the negation of abstract labour's powers of atomisation and
constitutes labour as a collective force facing capital. The gold standard from
this point, is no longer viewed as a universal natural condition, but a threatened
and endangered species, embroiled in the politics of decline.
Gold may remain, shell like, for some period after the dialectic of the situation
warrants. In fact the contradiction for capital is that gold must remain at the
centre of economic exchange, even as a shadow of its former capacity to
establish the condition of commodity fetishism automatically. Yet
simultaneously capital is aware that, because the objective conditions amass
against gold and weaken it as an anchor of internal control over labour (and
control of other capital's too), then alternative forms of control must be sought.
The alternative form must be capable of seizing control of, and over, an emerging
political economy of use value and need. Because of this capital is forced to do
the unthinkable: come off gold for good and begin to establish Labourism. It is
precisely the consequence of these opposing policy directions - desiring to
remain tied to gold, but needing to ditch it - which become the motive force for a
disparate capitalist class to draw itself together as never before and begin to
assert a more conscious rule over the declining system. This is the basis upon
which finance capital emerges and exerts its power to rule capital in general
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against the threat of labour and its increasing potential to move from a class in
itself to a class for itself The waves of labour militancy throughout the
twentieth century, have had the effect of honing and refming finance capital's
ability to exert its collective rule. The militancy of the 1870s to 1920s, issued
forth the strategy of imperialism; labour's subsequent acquiescence to Labourism
between the 1930s to 1960s and the restrictions placed on international capital
movements, forced fmance capital to collectively reorientate towards domestic
accumulation and the sterling area. Finally, the renewed waves of militancy
between 1960s to 1980s, forced fmance capital to put an end to Labourism and
re-establish more intense forms of parasitism, in an effort to circumvent labour
once more. Although each situation served to threaten the rule of fmance capital
in different ways and to different degrees, they also effectively served to hone
such rule and intensify the development of the collective cohesion of fmance
capitalists. These issues will be addressed shortly in more detail. The
immediate and essential point to make her is this: the potential political power of
socialised labour, in the face of the loss of capital's central means of achieving
objective commodity fetishism automatically, provides the vital condition for the
emergence of fmance capital. Thus all knowledge of why it rules ultimately
hinges on this understanding.
The threat from living labour and capital's weakening grip on the gold standard,
provides the most crucial reason for the rise of fmance capital. However, it is
still not the whole reason. Implicit in the emergence of socialised labour, is the
rising organic composition ofcapital (dead Labour) and the tendency for profit
rates to decline. We need to reflect on this other side to 'the problem of labour'
in order to have an allsided account of why finance capital emerges to exert its
rule. It can be said that the weakening of the power of money capital to assert
control over labour provided the necessary conditions for fmance capital in
Britain to assert conscious rule, whilst the effort to deal with the threat of
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socialised labour and the rising organic composition of capital, made actual
these necessary conditions. More specifically, the manner in which finance
capital in Britain dealt with the problem of a rising organic composition of
capital, also had important ramifications for why and how fmance capital exerted
its rule over labour.
On most occasions, the organic composition of capital is treated as a universal
technical process. Whilst it is, both universal in its applicability to capital in
general, and technical in its manifestations, it also operates in particular ways
within specific economies. Unfortunately, the particular concrete manifestation
(products of the peculiar structures of class struggle within different economies)
are usually overlooked. Yet, the way the problem of the organic composition of
capital is dealt with is invariably specific to economies. Therefore, analysis of
the organic composition of capital, can unlock vital clues as to how finance
capital develops in particular economies. In what follows we discuss both the
universality and the particularity of the problem of a rising organic composition
of capital, thus developing a firmer understanding, both of the insurmountable
nature of the problem facing capital and the reason why fmance capital rules in
the manner it has done and continues to do in Britain for over one hundred years.
5.2 The Problem ofa Rising Organic Composition ofCapital
The organic composition of capital (OCC) is a central feature of Marx's theory
and subsequent Marxist economic discourse (see for example, Mandel, 1975;
Fine & Harris, 1979; Ticktin, 1983). The concept has its complexities, however
its essential logic is simple, yet profound: the composition of capital will rise
systematically relative to living labour power, despite fluctuations, and the
general rate of profit across the economy (and economies) will decline. In what
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follows I develop an overview of the technical argument, then apply its
dialectical implications for the British class structure and development of finance
capital.
The Organic Composition ofcapital: A Technical Exposition
The acc is constituted by two related parts: the technical composition of capital
(TCC) and the value composition of capital (VCC). The VCC is the social
measurement of the existing value tied up in machines and labour..etc, and the
expansion of value, or the extent to which the economy as a whole increases the
productive powers of labour over and above existent values (a manifestation of
the capital labour social relation mentioned earlier). The TCC is the use value or
material technical side of this process. It measures the relationship between the
development of machinery and labour activity. The common sense finding is that
as capitalist industry has developed and expanded the use of machinery (in all its
forms) increasingly outstrips that of labour; in fact labour activity (in terms of
hours spent working) may even begin to decrease absolutely. Whilst this may be
progressive in universal terms, in that it sets the basis of freedom from the
necessity to labour long hours, it has a negative effect on VCC and so is negative
only within capitalist relations.
If one leaves out the extension of the working day, VCC can only rise if
employers' apply machinery to the labour process at an increasing rate. By
doing so it increases the productive powers of workers and delivers an increase
in relative surplus value. It is relative, in the sense that a greater amount of
labour power creates extra value for the employer relative to the pay and hours
worked by workers, which may remain fixed. Thus under the strict discipline of
competition employers are compelled, in general, to raise the TCC in order to
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raise the VCC and so relative surplus value. The problem for capital is that the
continual raising of TCC (the increase of machinery relative to labour) reduces
the source of value: labour power (or living labour). The more that capital is
driven to increase TCC in order to increase surplus value, the less living labour
is required. Because labour power is the source of surplus value, then this is
indeed a real problem for capital in general.
As mentioned, acc is the result of the outcome of inevitable progressions in
TCC related to changes occurring to VCC, a point we need to detail. Briefly, the
TCC always rises, but cannot be directly measured as it deals in different
qualitative kinds of labour and capital. However, observation informs us that
TCC rises, which is to say that more capital is increasingly employed relative to
labour. Although one cannot see the VCC, it expresses in value terms the TCC
relation through the social process whereby production (viewed as the sum of
TCC) mediates through market exchange and mediates back to production. The
VCC, unlike the TCC, can grow or diminish, depending on the socially
necessary labour time taken to produce the TCC and commodities in circulation.
The interplay between TCC and VCC determines the overall movement in acc.
For example, when the TCC rises, but the VCC remains unaltered or falls, then
the acc will decline relieving the rate of profit across the relevant industry
and/or the economy which subsequently rises. However, if the opposite is the
case, then profit rates may fall. The primary way of keeping up rates of profit
and so dampening the upward movement of the acc, is to increase relative
surplus value extraction (RSVE). It is the need to do precisely this, which of
course drives so relentlessly the rise TCC.
The problem for capital is that increasing RSVE reduces the amount of
necessary labour needed to valorise an ever increasing amount of capital. This
reduction means that the source of surplus value - living labour - is being reduced
167
at the very time when RSVB needs to become ever more intensive to offset
inevitable rises in VCC (despite counteracting tendencies, Marx, Capital, ch13
&14). There reaches a point where RSVB cannot keep pace with the rise in
VCC. At this point acc rises and profit rates fall. Empirically the tendency to
reduce living labour is clearly defined in western capitalist economies. In
relation to the threat it imposes on profitability rates, the reduction is of vital
concern to capitalism. As an objective fact, it is something capitalist
organisations have to deal with. But, from a macro level, it is something that the
circuit of capital must attempt to circumvent. This brings one to a crucial point
concerning the particularities of the responses possible to the universal problem
of a rising acc. The particular circumvention adopted in Britain aligned itself
with the primary reason for the emergence of fmance capital - the emergence of
socially integrated labour and decline of commodity fetishism - to produce a
specific manifestation offmance capital's rule in Britain.
Specific Responses to the Universal problem Ofthe Rising OCC
The problem of falling profit rates linked to the rising acc, has been inherent to
capitalism for well over a century. Ticktin (1983), has written about the way
fmance capital responded in the latter part of the nineteenth century and early
part of the present century, by circumventing the growth of fixed capital and
seeking out fresh reams of surplus value in industries with an inherently lower
level of fixed capital and so higher levels of circulation. The rising acc forms
much of the backdrop of capitalist decline, a problem which still exists today,
hence capital has learned by trial and error, for over a century, to deal with it.
Trial and error alone, however, would not have allowed capital to survrve.
Capital must, therefore, have developed strategies to deal with the problem
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systematically. The problem can only ever be contained, never resolved, for it is
inherent to capital itself. Capital, as dead labour, mounts up in ever greater
proportions to living labour, as the fatal residue of its insatiable need to extract
ever greater amounts of surplus value. For labour, it holds the immediate
prospects of intense alienation and exploitation. More fundamentally, however it
contains the promise of freedom from necessity. For capital it holds the fear of
terminal decline. Dealing with the OCC strategically, therefore, becomes a
necessity for each capitalist economy.
The problem for a system which lives by feeding vampire-like off the back of
living labour is immense, as the following points illustrate. The trend across
economies in the western hemisphere for over a century has been one of a slowly
expanding workforce, but in the context of a rapidly decreasing utilisation of
living labour power. For example, the annual hours of necessary employment in
Britain is a shrinking cake which must be divided and re-divided amongst a
growing workforce (one reason why, over and above class struggle, systematic
reductions in average weekly hours of labour have become such a necessity).
Here one has a general indication of the fact that a rising OCC means less social
labour time is necessary to set into motion larger amounts of capital and
commodities. Recent figures for European OECD economies highlight this. For
example, between 1980-87 on the basis of an employment rise of a mere 0.2%
GDP averaged a rise of 1.9%, productivity averaged at 1.7% ('The Kreisky
Commission on Employment issues in Europe', in A Programme For Full
Employment in the 1990s, OECD Report, 1989). Recently the Employment
Gazette (Nov, 1992, p544), noting the general trend in the EC reflected on the
fact that ' Nowadays it is clear that on a full lifetime basis there has been
significant reductions in working time. The generally later entry into the labour
market...and generally earlier retirement means that over a life time working
hours are significantly lower than even a decade ago. Charles Handy's analysis
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of a trend from a lifetime of about 100,000 hours work (47 per week for 47
weeks per year for 47 years) to about 50,000 (35 hours per week 35 weeks a
year for 35 years) appears to have some truth in it'.
Thus, ignoring shorter run fluctuations in employment figures and profit rates,
and ruling out the wholesale destruction of science and technological
applications to the labour process, there remains an inescapable general
tendency that the OCC keeps increasing, profit rates keep declining and that
surplus population keep increasing. Marx's point that '...capitalist accumulation
itself..constantly produces and reproduces in the direct ration of its own energy
and extent, a relatively redundant population of labourers...' (Capital Vol 1,
p590) is as true today as it was in the middle of the last century, with one
qualification: the depression years of the 1920s and 1930s witnessed the
development of an absolutely redundant population of labourers, because capital
and labour where in stalemate, with finance capital refusing to move towards a
Labourist compromise. Once the compromise (Labourism) had been established,
labour became fully employed, through the mixture of commodityproduction and
the State's administration of a social wage. In the present era, with the collapse
of the Labourist compromise, the social wage has been cut back and redefined
through internal quasi-markets to create a tighter relation with its commodity
status. Hence, once again, over the past 20 year period, one has the phenomenal
appearance of an absolutely redundant section of labour.
With little or no new social forms of labour control in sight, save depression and
decline itself (a point we take up in coming chapters), the absolute redundancy of
labour in evidence today signifies a prolonged stand-off between capital and
labour. The recent G7 Conference in Detroit (Feb, 1994) to discuss the problem
of the 35 million unemployed throughout the OECD, was evidence of capital's
concern with the stand-off situation. However a conference of concerned
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capitalists, cannot hold back the tide of objective socialisation and a nsmg
organic composition of capital. It is, therefore, of little surprise that the
conference came to nothing noteworthy. Nevertheless, it is worth repeating: the
very fact capital considered holding such a conference, is testimony to the fact
that the ruling classes, internationally, are concerned at the possible future
political fallout of an unemployment problem they can do little about, within the
confines of their declining social system.
Of course capitalism is an antagonistic social relation, not a mechanism, hence
decline on the basis of a rising organic composition of capital and the threat from
labour, is neither pre-determined nor unilinear. Within specific economies and
specific companies, profit rates may very well move upwards and downwards,
this is necessary: capital's struggle to valorise labour power is always particular
and circumstantial, as well as a universal relation. Nevertheless, the general
trend is a downward movement in the rate of profit. The general trend may be
down, but specific economies will develop specific accumulation strategies in
an attempt to circumvent the process. In addition, the accumulation strategy
adopted, however pragmatically followed, will tend to be imparted to, or
reflected within, the company strategies of the largest and most dominant public
limited enterprises of the specific economy in question. For example, the
German economy and the dominant enterprises of which it is comprised, have, to
date, tended to ward off the rise in oee in the, supposedly, orthodox way: by
advancing RSVB at an even faster rate than vee rises. The German economy
has put an emphasis on developing the Tee through a deeper commitment to
advancing technological know-how, research and development and commitment
to fixed capital investment. Financial capital in Germany provides the bulwark
of this accumulation strategy, a process explained by Hilferding long ago (1911).
As Will Hutton enthuses, ' The German banks are uniquely powerful, holding
shares themselves and on behalf of others in the major German companies,
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making long term loans, acting as information clearing houses, assessmg
industrial and commercial prospects in partnership with borrowers. They are the
stable backers of German industry...'163
Hutton, like many other social democrats on the left, appears to think such
arrangements are permanent and beneficial to both capital and labour. One must
remember, however, that the so called 'social market' approach, eulogised by
social democrats, is predicated on the political atomisation of the indigenous
labour movement and its acquiescence and alienation within strong institutional
networks, which act to guarantee their bureaucratic policing. The suppression of
labour is the primary condition, however another very important condition for the
successful execution of this type of accumulation strategy is necessary too: the
ability to capture and control an expanding world market, a contained working
class and the commitment to fixed capital formation and expanding world market
share, means that, although the commodities produced and marketed are hosts to
less and less deposits of exchange value, the total surplus value created can be
enough to outstrip the rising TCC. The result is an accumulation strategy which
can pull up the rate of profit (but only whilst such specific social conditions last
it needs to be emphasised).
In as much the specific conditions still hold for German capital, the German
economy will remain committed to domestic valorisation in and through stringent
bureaucratic controls and related legal network ('co-determination'), which, taken
together, compromise the commodity status of labour. Any sustained loss of
market share and/or prolonged world recession, however, will inhibit surplus
value formation and shake the containment of labour strategy to its foundations.
Likewise, any move towards a State which expands the social wage faster than
the capacity to valorise, will fall victim to sustained bouts of inflation and,
163Will Hutton (1995), p264.
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redistributing too much of the surplus value away from capital, which may call to
a halt the incumbent accumulation strategy.
Any of the above, may bring an end to an accumulation strategy which has
remained intact in Germany (barring inessential changes) since the end of the
second world war. The recent depression in world trade and commitment to re-
unification, has seriously tested the German economies commitment to this
particular path. A point worth reiterating, however, is that the commitment is
predicated, above all, on the successful institutionalisation of potential and actual
conflict between capital and organised labour. That is to say, the German ruling
class have.l only been able to adopt this particular accumulation strategy,
because of its control over the labour movement. The control is still largely
intact. For example, we are informed, 'In the recent German recession
Volkswagen were able to negotiate wage cuts and reduce working hours in
agreement with its unions, and Daimler Benz slashed its labour costs by over
DMl.5 billion within a year' (Hutton, p263). Thus so called 'co-determination'
institutions, which lie at the heart of the compromise, rest on the deep
compliance of official trade unions, which themselves rest ultimately on labour's
defeat during the fascist period. The recent disquiet amongst the organised steel
workers, on the one hand, and the growing belief within the fmancial community
that industrial ties are too constricting, on the other, indicates the beginnings of
possible fault lines appearing in the German accumulation strategy.
Another way fmance capital may attempt to deal with a rising acc, the British
way (which is our main concern here), is to gain monopoly control of the
domestic market with the intention to suspend, or dampen down, the
development of fixed capital investment (in other words the growth in TCC).
The nexus of fmancial controls and personal links, extending from the level of
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the company to the City of London (see below), have undoubtedly served such a
function. This accumulation strategy is predicated on the inability to politically
suppress and atomise labour sufficiently. The poor development of fixed capital
and the inability to control labour, of course, have negative ramifications for
relative surplus value extraction. In other words, Dampening down the Tee and
labour resistance to valorisation, tends to limit the growth in the pool of relative
surplus value extracted. The negativity is amplified by the fact that British trade
union bureaucracy can gain a foothold within the social structure. Using
labour's militancy and the pragmatism of investment strategies and the necessary
loss of real identity suffered by management, trade unionism can win
concessions for itself and labour, which further limit surplus value accruing to
capital. It is on such a basis that trade unionism becomes a central part of
Labourist containment.
However, the negative effects of the above on the ability to extract relative
surplus value need not be too much of a problem for the large and dominant
sections of British capital in the short term, for three reasons. Firstly, dampening
the rise in ace means that vee need not increase with the same order of
intensity to affect the rate of profit. Thus, although there can be a restriction on
the rate of growth of relative surplus value extraction, the rate of profit need not
decline because the limited growth of Tee and vee also means the limited
growth in the ace. Of course the average rate of profit will be lower in such an
economy, however, the system may determine this to be as good a trade off for
survival than any other. Secondly, In conjunction with the above, there are
added supplements acting to push up the rate of profit. One supplement is an
overbearing emphasis on psychological management theories to increase surplus
value extraction, without recourse to a rise in Tee to accomplish it.
Specifically, 'human relations' management practices take the place of Taylorist'
orthodoxy (which implies high levels of fixed capital). The supplement serves to
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intensify and extend the use of labour power to make up for the relative lack of
deployment of capital. The intensification of labour, increases both absolute and
relative surplus value extraction, although not to the degree that a systematically
high rise in TCC would achieve. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, a
necessary trend towards fmance speculation in secondary shares and money
markets provides a crucial means whereby capital may mark up its low average
rate of profit. The outcome of such an accumulation strategy is that capital can
control labour sufficient enough to survive. In addition, profit rates for finance
capital and other dominant sections of productive capital which are related to it,
can, in general, be maintained (through the mark up); whilst the relative rate of
growth of the productive forces is retarded. While British capital could maintain
its central place within the sterling area, the relative stagnation of productive
forces did not have to manifest as de-industrialisation, due to the fact that the
relative obscelecence of TCC, which produced high prices and poorer quality of
commodities, could be passed on to colonial countries, captive within the orbit of
sterling.164 A manifestation of this strategy of accumulation, as the sterling
area began to uncoil, has been, amongst other things, the accelerated process of
de-industrialisation experienced by the British economy. As emphasised in the
opening chapter, de-industrialisation became part of the social furniture of British
capitalism during the fourth quarter of the last century. The decline was halted to
a trickle between 1940 and the mid 1970s, due to the fact that finance capital had
secured a Labourist containment of labour. We take up a detailed account of
how Labourism eventually became systemic within capital's decline, in the next
chapter.
It is relevant to mention here, in relation to the problem of the rising acc, that in
recent decades the decline of industrial capital has accelerated in response to the
164S ee Coake1y& Harris (1983), for a good account of the important role the sterling area played for finance
capital and the City of London.
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dissolution of the Labourist compromise. To this end, in recent decades hybrid
forms of control of labour have been in evidence. Alongside the more obvious
collapse of national level wage regulation and the decline of social welfarism, the
casualisation of work via part time working and subcontracting has increased.
This process has reduced the power of labour to resist increased work loading; in
combination with multi-tasking it reduces the porosity of labour power and leads
to the re-commodification of labour in exchange. The valorisation of labour
power is also extended via so called 'temporal flexibility' projects: 'roll on roll off
shift working' and/or annual hours/over time, increases absolute as well as
relative surplus value expansion. The latter also ensures that any new capital
investment that is made, is used as much as possible before it becomes 'morally'
depleted due to new technology and so new standards of socially necessary
labour usage. The use of a more flexible labour supply and valorisation ensures
that more of labour power is productive for employers within a given working
day and less of it takes the form of constant capital or unproductive labour
power. The main point is that British capital, by adopting these methods and by
making use of the City of London, has, despite the colapse of Labourism and the
sterling area, continued its systematic approach to circumventing the problem of
a rising ace. Thus the present era is distinguished from the Labourist one, by
the fact that capital must now squeeze, from section of labour power as much
value creating capacity as possible, whilst condemning other sections of labour
to structural unemployment, amidst economic depression and social decay, in
order to achieve the same goals of controlling labour as a whole and the ace
problem. The result is that Britain has been the graveyard of productive capital
during the past two decades. In essence this mirrors the initial response of
fmance capital to capitalist decline in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
but with one crucial difference: this time it cannot use the potential of socialised
labour against labour and create Labourism. The latter creation is specific to the
class structure of the era.
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The manufacturing sector epitomises the effects the post Labourist
accumulation strategy has had on industry in general. Consider the evidence of
British manufacturing during the decade 1979-89. The so called 'Thatcher
miracle' in this industry flatters to deceive. During this period labour
productivity increased by some 50%, yet output increased by only 12%. A fact
which implies a massive reduction of employment. The massive rise in
productivity of the existing workers became predicated to a large degree upon
work intensification under the rubric of 'multi-tasking'. Despite the massive
increase in productivity, very little of the capital reverted back into production:
investment rose by only 10%, whilst profit rates increased by some 44% (see A.
Glynn, in J. Michie, 1992). This indicates something profound: the productivity
miracle was firmly entrenched within the circuit of capital strategy to fend off the
rise in TCC and increasing VCC via the intensified use of labour power, which
British capital, domestically, is committed to. It is this peculiar strategy that set
the defIninglimits to Thatcherism: both in its rise and its downfall.
To come back to the main point. Finance capital emerges to oversee and guide
the systematic circumvention of the problem of a rising OCC. The strategy has
had to adapt and change, from the one of fmancial flight and imperialist conquest
in pre-Labourist days, to one of Labourist containment, and, subsequent to the
collapse of Labourism, on to the present post Labourist response, which has
intensified the process of decline (a point developed in chapter seven). The
actualisation of such strategies, is evidence of the necessity that finance capital
must assert its rule. It is a rule which extends from the major boardrooms of
capital, through the institutions of the State and to the City of London. One
recent empirical indicator of the extent of this rule, is the extent to which profits
have been systematically siphoned off from the manufacturing sector: only 10%
of the 44% profit increase in manufacturing during the period 1979-89 went
177
toward re-investments, the rest was poured into the secondary stock market and
into higher dividend payouts (of course one can collect such data from most
decades of this century to reveal a similar act of siphoning of surplus value). This
circuit of capital strategy has ensured the phenomenal growth of financial
capital's power throughout the last decade or more. Another manifestation of
this power over the economy is the physical growth of financial institutions. For
example, again a modem one, which could no doubt be replicated in other ways
in other decades, banking, insurance and finance saw a massive 320% increase
in investment into their infrastructure between 1980-90(Glynn, in Michie, 1992,
p77-88). Thus, why finance capital should need to act collectively in order to
exert its rule over labour (and the rest of capital), has, hopefully, been made
clear. At this point analysis moves to consider who the finance capitalists are
and how they assert their collective rule.
5.3 The social & political ties offinance capital
Finance capital, must control productive capital internally (within the site of
valorisation) and externally (from the vantage point of the economy as a whole).
Finance capital must also be able to control important institutions of the State,
including the Treasury and Bank of England, if it is to exert its rule throughout
society. Moreover, because the fact that finance capital manoeuvres against
organised labour and a rising OCC, both of which affect capital as a whole; and,
on occasions, secures for productive capital monopoly profits and lucrative deals
abroad, it helps a great deal in facilitating the rise to power of finance capital. Of
course finance capital secures important material benefits for itself too, otherwise
it would be reluctant to take on the task of defending the system. It earns the
right to become world banker and to become chief exporter of capital. By
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exporting capital it was and is able to replenish itself on the surplus value of
other nations labour. The material conditions, then, between , is conducive to
fmance capital's rule.
Nevertheless, to actualise this rule is quite a hegemonic achievement, demanding
that fmance capital develop certain social and political ties beyond the immediate
fmancial institutions. The ties must be firm too, or else the fIrst sign of crisis
could disintegrate the hegemony. During the first world war, for example,
fmance capital became effectively bankrupt (the celebrated foreign earnings of
£4 billion by 1914 dissolved to nothing). To add insult to injury, the flow of
capital abroad had become blocked in the wars aftermath. Economies had
placed restrictions on foreign securities during and after the war. Such potential
for international restrictions on the flow of capital and the growing class tensions
within Britain, required resolute collective action from capital. The debacle
convinced the British ruling class that they must attempt to create favourable
internal conditions for the return of inward capital investment. In other words,
fmance capital resolved, with the help of other capital's, to exert short term
discipline upon itself by allowing the State to act in its long run interests. To
carry through such a project required the deepening of social and political ties
between itself, productive capital's and the State institutions. In this respect the
social ties between merchant bankers, the Bank of England, private banks,
insurance company's, trust funds and the larger magnates of productive capital in
textiles; coal..etc, become an essential fabric to fmance capital.
Useem (1984) has identified what he believes to be an elite group of business
leaders who exert an overall influence on the British economy. This 'inner
circle', as he calls them, rule because they take an interest, not in this capital or
that capital, but in the capitalist economy in general. The generality of their
concern, in turn, reflects their interests in all aspects of accumulation. The 'inner
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circle' are based within the largest corporations (industry and finance), from
which base they form 'inter corporate networks through shared ownership and
directorship of large companies'.165 The inner circle, according to Useem, are
not a recent phenomenon. They have their developmental roots in the growth of
'managerial capitalism' out of 'family capitalism', and reach their apex when
capitalism transforms into 'institutional capitalism' (capitalism controlled by
institutional share ownership).
Useem, for purposes of empirical proof, conducted snap shot research on the
largest 196 corporations in Britain between 1979-80. The corporations included
a mixture of all the clearing banks, a sample of influential merchant banks and
insurance houses and over 100 industrial companies. Focusing on the
interconnections between key Directors, some 2211, 418 of which had multiple
directorships in the top 196 companies, Useem found to be part of an definite
inner circle exhibiting a 'class wide corporate leadership'.166 As Useem
elaborates, 'Upper class, corporate and class wide principles of social
organisation distinctively shape business political activity. Thus, their relative
importance is of fundamental interest for comprehending contemporary corporate
activity - from the orchestration of public opinion on behalf of 're
industrialisation' to renewed assaults on organised labour and government
regulation'. 167
Thus an inner circle is said to exist, which, acting as 'class leaders', organises
itself against government intervention and the threat of labour. Useem puts it
more clearly still, 'This political mobilisation of business can be traced to the
decline of company profits in both the United States and the United Kingdom
and also to heightened government regulation in America and labour's challenge




of management prerogatives in Britain'.168 This political mobilisation, then, is
the basis of what Useem refers to as, an external 'extra corporate logic', which
compels the class leadership into government bodies (eg the Treasury), public
quangos and Boards of Directorships ..etc, in an effort to enforce the class wide
interest.
Regardless of the categories deployed ('managerial capital', 'inner circle'..etc), the
analysis has clear fmdings: capital has formed a leadership to counteract the fall
in profits, the problem of labour and to control government intervention. Useem
limits his analysis to the 1970s and 80s, where he argues, the inner circle,
through institutional capitalism, became most thoroughly assimilated as class
leaders. However, as the problems of falling profits and control of labour and
government intervention, has haunted capital since the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, then the need and existence of such class leadership goes
back further than Useem cares to mention. However, Useem is correct to point
out that the inner circle cannot be conflated to vestiges of feudal aristocracy, or
any other particular part of capital, such as the partial interests of 'industrialists'.
This is because, as particular interests, they have little inclination or basis upon
which, to form a hegemony for the general interests of capital. Heredity status
may prove a potent drive for the aristocratic element of capital to enforce its rule,
however, it is hardly of such crucial concern to capital as a whole, that they
would allow this faction to rule the sway of accumulation.
The point of the inner circle, and its source of defining strength and collectivity,
is that it is an ensemble of industrialist; of those of an aristocratic heritage; and of
bankers and merchants. Their commonalty is derived from the notion that, as
leaders in their particular functions within capital, they have grown out of
(transgressed) these functions and developed links and interests across capital as
168Useem, ibid, p4.
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a whole. Scott (1991), for example, describes the development of the Ridley
family, made (in)famous recently by Nicholas Ridley. The Ridley family go
back to the eighteenth century. Developing wealth based on merchant capital,
they moved progressively from this to become parochial industrialist and landed
magnates of the North East, to general industrialist (through share dispersal),
before entering the City of London and their role as guardians ofmoney capital
interests in general. It is from this base that, according to Scott, the Ridley's,
and many like them, first acquired political leverages within Public bodies and
Government institutions. The trail leaves a series of social ties and networks
which bind capital into a collective force.
Scott (1989) points out that between the top 200 industrial companies and top 50
fmancial companies, there exists a 'constellation of interests', which,
supplemented by social and political ties, amount to evidence of a ruling elite,
which Scott defmes elsewhere as the fmance capitalists. It is from this power
basis that fmance capital extends its influence throughout the public sector,
media and society.
This is not to say that finance capital rules every decision, inconceivable
considering the reality: capitalism is not a rational closed world offixed regular
laws of motion. What it does suggest however, is that, given the decline of
capitalism and the ensuing struggle for survival, these 'class leaders' can inform
and define the contours of what is possible and politically acceptable, in terms of
class concessions. Finance capital, emerge to tackle the problem of falling
profits and the 'problem of labour', these are ultimately insurmountable, therefore
their rule will be ambiguous and fraught with compromise and failure as well as
partial successes. The development of these as problems, then, also witness the
development offmance capital's rule. With this in mind it is to the aspects of the
development of the fmance capitalist that attention now turns.
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Stanworth + Giddens study (1975), reveals how finance capital developed its
hold over the economy. They concentrate on the network of links developed
through interlocking directorships between 1906 and 1970. Between 1906 and
1939 a progressive deepening of interlocking directorship connections occurred
between financial institutions and the top 50 productive capital's. Stanworth and
Giddens surveyed eighty five company's in all, including the top fifty industrial
corporations, a selection of the most important merchant banks, all the main
clearing banks and ten of the largest non life insurance companies, together with
the Bank of England. Aside from the deepening 'extra-corporate links', what
becomes clear from their study is the unique co-ordinating role the Bank of
England increasingly played throughout the whole of this period. The Bank of
England, situated at the centre of the State and the economy, effectively ensures
finance capital as a category, is greater than the sum of its parts. In 1906 thirty
six companies out of the top eighty five had a substantial network of linkages.
By 1920 the figure had risen to fifty three. By 1930 the figure had risen once
again this time to sixty two. Just as important was the thickening of these
arterial links. For example, of the thirty six links in 1906, thirty four were the
product of forty one multi-directorships. By 1930 the sixty two links between all
firms was consolidated by ninety two directors constituting a network of some
one hundred and thirty two links.169 The latter figure implies that the rise in
multiple directorships, connecting finance capital to productive capital had risen
substantially. All of these developing links were gathered and given holistic hue
by the Bank of England, the Court of which was constituted by finance
capitalists. A similar study by Aaronovitch (1955), provides similar evidence.
Alongside evidence of increased direct social integration between finance
capitalists and large productive capital, there is the extensive evidence of formal
169 See P. Stanley + A. Giddens (1975), p5-28.
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and informal social links amongst the financial community. In this respect the
City is no mere ensemble of competing interests, but as Boyce argues, the City
displays a 'corporate spirit' producing the foundations of collectivity by a cross
network of commercial trading, stock exchange dealings and interlocking
directorships.170 Whilst in Whitley's171 important study it was revealed that
extensive social ties fixed between 27 large financial companies, including the
Bank of England, clearing banks, discount houses, merchant banks and insurance
companies, in terms of education background, club membership and interlocking
directorships. On the basis of his data he concludes that there is evidence of
what he terms a 'financial elite' developing, which 'is drawn from a small minority
of the population, is educated in the same type of, ifnot identical, institutions and
is highly interconnected through common directorship, kinship and clubs'.172 A
further study Lisle-William's173 also confirms this strong fmancial, directoral
and social ties between the network of merchant banks and the bank of England.
From 1800 to 1940 the bank was effectively dominated by merchant capitalists.
The dominance, one should be aware, does not stop with the Bank of
England/Treasury, but also manifests itself through the boards of many insurance
companies and investment trust. The fact that the latter have, throughout the
twentieth century, been so vital in the promotion of speculative mergers, and/or
the siphoning of retained profits away from domestic productive capital,
indicates the breadth of control fmance capitalists have at their disposal when
attempting to contain the threat of labour.
It would seem that Marx and Engels apparent overstated conclusion, that the
state operates as the committee to manage the affairs of the Bourgeoisie, is rather
more closer to the truth concerning finance capital and its control of the British
170 Boyce (1987), p22.
171 R. Witley (1973), Commonalities and Connections Among Directors ofLarge Financial Institutions,
in Sociological Review, 26, (2), p305-26.
172 Whitley, ibid, p368
173 M. Lisle-Williams (1984), p333-62.
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state. The Bank of England operated as the institutional hub through which
fmance capital, from its institutional power base in the City, could centralise
economic rule. Additionally the Bank and the City's intimate economic and
social ties with the Treasury, ensured its political will would prevail. The
Treasury was, (and is) after all, the effective medium through which the interests
of 'sound fmance' permeates government policy (Ingham, 1984). A policy never
more vigorously and ruthlessly pursued by the Conservative Party (post com law
repeal) in its efforts to 'out free trade' the fast waning Liberal Party and secure its
base in finance circles. It is little wonder that by the early decades of the
twentieth century, the City were willing contributors of up to three quarters of
Conservative Central Office Funds during elections.174 One reason why the
larger productive capital's switched allegiance from the Liberal to the Tory Party
at the turn of the century was so they could associate with their social superiors
and consolidate the 'balance' of interests between the two175 .
On the basis of available evidence, then, there can be little doubt that fmance
capital had the necessary institutional links at State level, to carry through its
political rule to contain the threat of labour. Its rule over important aspects of
State policy enabled finance capital at least the basis to co-ordinate the
movement towards Labourism after the frrst world war.176 Certain
intermediate institutions helped to consolidate this basis. For example, the
previously mentioned Economic League, Industrial Freedom League and the
multitude of other 'Employer Associations'. In conjunction with the systematic
interlocking of directorships, these vociferous 'free traders' provide the crucial
political support and justification for the capitalist system in Britain to gravitate
towards merchanting activity; and as a result make it easier for fmance capital, in
174 Boyce (1987), op-cit, p21. See also M. Pinto-Duschinsky (1981), British Political Finance, 1830-
1980.
175 R W. D. Boyce (1987), op-cit, p21
176 This wasaddressed earlier and will be taken up again in more detaillater.
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the face of the threat from labour, to sublate the circuit of capital further under its
influence. As Fox records, the influence of such anti-socialist organisations
persistently undermined the 'national socialist' current (Labourism). 177 On the
basis of evidence such as this, many have echoed the sentiments of John Scott
when he claims finance capitalists in Britain, for the past century, have been the
controlling power elite out of a wider power bloc consisting of large scale
industrial capitalists, commercial and landed interests.178
Of course empirical evidence in and of itself as proof of collective power is far
from unproblematic.179 Nevertheless, it does reveal beyond doubt the
existence of an intricate web of personal and institutional ties. The ties need
to be situated, as this thesis has attempted to do, within the complex network
of value relations through which fmance capital ensures its survival. Coupled
with the Marxist theory of decline put forward here, the empirical evidence
adds weight to the development of a powerful explanation of capitalist
decline and the role of finance capital in this decline. A further delineation
of fmance capital's role in decline must now be made. It is a delineation
refereed to in passing many times above. Finance capital's physical presence
on the boards of large industrial capital's, in manning State/City institutions
and their wider social and political ties, provides the basis of two forms of
control over labour and recalcitrant capita'ls - control by external means
177 Se A. Fox (1985), ch5. Labourism apart from being used here as a more profound political economy
category, is also a more specific term than 'national socialism'. The latter tends to lump the working class
with anti-working class trade union and Labour Party leaders, as well as right wing social chauvinists. As is
recognised by Pery Anderson and others, the 'Leaders' of workers may have national chauvinist designs, but
such designs were weak amongst rank and file workers. In fact the working class in general, as Fox points
out, seemed much more inclined towards 'free trade', albeit for very different ends than finance capitalist ones.
178 A. E. Musson (1977), op-cit, p 150.
179 One of the main problems of empirical research is that it can infer no causal relationship, merely a
'strong association'. This is why theory is so important. The Marxist theory of capitalism is a more than
adaquate context for transforming the strong association into a neccesary development. Another problem is
said to be the fact that empirical research is often arbitrary. Both in the selection of data it includes and/or
excludes. Finally, the various restrictions imposed on the extent of sampling and available data
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and control by internal means. We elaborate on these forms of control
below.
5.4 How Finance Capital Exerts Its Rule:
The External and Internal Control Mechanisms
Regarding external control, this takes a number of forms including speculation,
control of bank lending and merger and acquisitions. Speculation works to de
stabilise State commitment or the commitment of productive capital, to long term
fixed capital investment. State management offixed exchange rates places a limit
on the circulation of capital which fosters a stable climate for investment and
presents a basis for a potential compromise between productive capital and trade
union officialdom. If stability were allowed to continue for any length of time,
finance capital could be politically challenged leading to another accumulation
strategy which would regroup labour and run rapidly up against the problem of a
rising organic composition of capital. In addition to the orchestrated campaign
of finance capitalists within the Treasury and their presence within industrial
capital, finance capital can exert a powerful external deterrent through
speculation. Massive waves of currency speculation can undermine any
wayward accumulation strategy. Instability of foreign exchange markets, or even
the threat of it, can force Governments to deflate the accumulation process.
Whilst chronic bouts of speculation, create a systematic weakness in contractual
relations between capital's and with labour, which induces a short term approach
to accumulation and an emphasis on circulation and quick profit maximisation.
The heightened state of awareness to the 'evils' of inflation, and balance of
payments deficits, endorsed by Treasury and Bank of England 'watchdogs',
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creates a culture of accumulation very sensitive to the weapon of deflation; a fact
which makes speculation all the more potent a force.
The second external form of control issued by finance capital is control of the
scope of bank lending. By controlling the rate of return on loans charged (for
example, maintaining them at a high rate), by stipulating the loan is to be based
on present value rather than potential value, and by insisting on short payback
periods, finance capital is able to control the flow of money capital to productive
capital and, as a result, can impart a strong influence over how it is to be used.
The fundamental outcome is that finance capital is able to exert the necessary
circulation bias within productive capital's. In the 1980s, rates were on average
20% and the payback period was halved from their 1970s level from 4 years to 2
years. The concern with tight monetary policy and strict adherence to payback
conditions, led to control mechanisms which were used to pressurise productive
capital into adopting a new strategy towards labour. This meant breaking the
Labourist pact, the move towards a more disciplined management containment of
labour within production and a drastic reduction in the scope and extent of
collective bargaining regulations. Of course such control can and has been used
to encourage other options. For example, between 1870 and 1930, it was used
to distance capital from labour and so facilitate the flight of capital into
imperialist exploitation. After 1930, up until the mid 1970s, this form of control,
and others mentioned, was used to facilitate the adoption of a new containment
strategy over labour - Labourism. Later in this chapter and in more detail in the
following chapter, these strategies will be analysed. For now, however, the
important point to make, is that this form of external control has been decisive in
its effects and has a long historical lineage, as many have indicated (Ingham,
1984; Williams, 1987; Hutton, 1995).
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The third form of external control is exerted through the manipulation of capital's
merger and acquisition requirements. Merger and acquisition can be used to
discipline incumbent management to the needs of finance capital's accumulation
needs: speed of circulation and short term maximisation of profits. British
finance capital can force a spate of hostile take-overs and asset stripping, whilst
securing State impunity from restrictive legislation. Rather the opposite has been
the case; the State, through tax exemptions on dividends and corporate tax
penalties on profits retained for investment, has encouraged the process. The
culture of instability engendered and the fetishisation of speed of circulation of
capital which becomes a necessary product, provides the ideal basis for financial
management (in the form of auditing and accounting) to dominate the
management function. So called 'scientific management', which has its basis in
developing fixed capital formations and the dominance of production
management, takes a very secondary role. This latter point has implications for
internal labour process controls over labour, a crucial part of the thesis which
will be taken up in the following chapter.
Merger and acquisition also raises profit without necessarily raising the organic
composition of capital, therefore, in addition to a form of control, it also becomes
a necessary feature of accumulation, quite apart from the normal role its serves
in the processes of earning economies of scale for capital in general. Merger and
acquisition can raise profits without raising the organic composition of capital,
this occurs when the transaction raises the value ofshares above their objective
value. Merger and acquisition can also force distribution of surplus value in
favour of finance capital, due to the way in which surplus value takes the form of
high dividend payouts rather than retained profit. Take-over mania is
encouraged by the hoards of City institutions who make a quick profit from this
redistribution of capital. For example, merchant banks receive underwriting fees;
City Accountants earn massive auditing fees, the array of fund managers enjoy a
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sharp boost to the value of their shares. The only portion of capital whose
expansion is stunted is fixed and constant capital, however this is the whole point
of the exercise.
The fourth form of control is that exerted by institutional share ownership. This
form of control develops in response to the three forms mentioned above;
enabling and fostering greater precision over their effects on the economy. As
Coakely and Harris (1983) have noted, their existence was negligible before the
nineteen twenties, but has grown inexorably since. In the present era they now
account for 60% of quoted shares, whilst British Pension Funds accounted for
£220 billion by the mid 1980s and their turnover rate in one year was 41%
(approx. &110 billion! I). Moreover, Investment Trusts accounted for £40 billion
and an annual turnover rte of 85% (appox £32 billion). Their craving for fast
turnover of capital and high short term profit margins forces the same motive on
productive capital's. Thus, under the threat of a sudden dumping of shares,
which would drastically reduce their current value, corporate management are
forced to dampen down development of R&D, long term investment in fixed
capital, the rationalisation of labour process controls, and instead go for
expansion of capital through merger, fast turnovers and an emphasis on the
'bottom line'.
Merger more often than not, lead to the re-distribution of existing capital, not its
growth. This was certainly the trend in the three spates of merger of importance
this century: eg, those occurring throughout the 1920s, 1960s and 1980s. The
merger also facilitates the centralisation of capital's power, without increasing its
concentration. Thus the centralisation of capital proceeds alongside the
atomisation of fixed capital formation and so the atomisation of the working
class into smaller scale plants. In the modem era, they are known as semi-
autonomous profit centres, with overall fmancial control remaining at corporate
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level. Hutton (1995) has recently decried the fact that the British economy is
dominated by both small firms and the very large firms. As the large firm is
broken down by internal market policies, then the economy is characterised by
millions of atomised units of capital. For social democrats like Hutton, the
overarching emphasis on the market mechanism spells disaster for any likely
compromise between capital and labour. The economy, Hutton argues, is devoid
of the real powerhouse of investment - the middle size firm - and is sinking in a
sea of short termism, inherent to the closed horizons of the small firm. However,
despite the implication that this is a new phenomenon, characterised by a new
language - 'small business units'; 'internal markets'; 'profit centres' - the practice is
an old one, it is also an endemic one in the case of British capitalism (see Nichol,
1986). Capital in Britain right up until the 1980s, preferred to concentrate and
centralise using the holding form, a loose ensemble of capital which allows ease
of break up and re transfer into money capital. The negative effects on the forces
of production are often great. Witness, for example, the small ad-hoc
amalgamations which formed the English Electric and its eventual merger into
GEC; or the ad-hoc amalgamation of the British car industry leading up to its
present identity as Rover. Both are manifestations of a chequered history of
finance driven merger and acquisition and, ultimately, evidence of the lengths
finance capital will go to in an attempt to circumvent the threat of labour and the
rising organic composition of capital.
Predicated on the external forms of control mentioned above, is a vital internal
control exerted by finance capital - control through Accountancy. As Armstrong
(n) amongst others, has pointed out, the accountancy function developed
increasingly more precise methods of controlling costs and auditing techniques
during the two World Wars, in response to the partial elimination of market
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control over the allocation of resources including labour. Indeed, with the
development of municipal socialism and the public sphere and the threat this
implied to capital, the necessity to advance more precise and sophisticated
instruments of control over the money capital (siphoned off to create non value
sectors), became of paramount importance. The development of the accountancy
function was one response to this. Its relative importance to British capital and
the particular strategy adopted to circumvent labour and the problem of a rising
organic composition of capital, is evidenced by the common knowledge fact that
the accountancy function is four times as large in Britain than it is in Germany.
Of course one should not forget that the large and dominant accountancy firms
have important connections in the City of London, where interlocking
directorships ensures the necessary link with fmance capital. The fruits of the
link are never more clearly displayed than during spates of acquisitions and
mergers, when the accountancy function acts as a conduit for the rule of
circulating capital, a point we will draw on later.
Since the mid 1970s there has been a massive increase in the policing of
accountants within production. The large dominant productive capital's, both
traditional market based and recently privatised, have their centralisation of
capital, while at the same time decomposing capital concentration in terms of
fixed capital formation. As implied earlier, the large capital is an ensemble of
semi-autonomous profit centres, every one of which is rigorously controlled from
corporate head office. The form of control is fmance, ie, strict financial targets
which have to be reached. Targets so stringent that it compels line management
to become guardians of short term profit maximisation and the quick turnover,
rather than pressure groups for long term investment (Legge, 1978, 1995). This
is where the Accountancy function plays its crucial role. They are the guardians
of fmance capital's rule within the site of valorisation. They carry through the
dictate of pressures from the City to impart the necessary circulation capital bias.
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More recently, as the old Labourist containment strategy dissolves further, the
accountancy function also monitors the value of labour power and its ability to
'add value', particularly so as collective regulation of wages becomes
marginalised.
5.5 The Rise ofFinance Capital in Britain
This section considers fmance capital's developing hegemony within the British
economy. The hegemony of a small fmancial elite within the capitalist class
began to consolidate its power over the rest of capital during the latter part of the
nineteenth century, as a reaction to the dangers emanating from the valorisation
process. This may appear paradoxical as many commentators testify, that from
as early as the 17th and 18th centuries in Britain the commercial classes, and
particularly its financial fraction, ruled politically over domestic country
banking, landed capital and industrial capital.180 However in the era after the
1870s, the dominance of a fmancial elite within the capitalist class signified
something much more profound than simply their key position in the circuit of
accumulation. It signalled, not so much the hegemonic function of money
capital in converting other forms of capital into itself and facilitating the
expansion of credit in accordance with the law of value, but rather the fact that
money capital had now to block and/or monitor the development of the
accumulation of surplus value. Put more forcibly: fmancial liquidity and so the
dominance of forms of circulation capital over fixed capital had become an
absolute necessity for the survival of the system, against the twin forces of a
socially organised labour and an increasing organic composition of capital.
180 See, for example, Perry Anderson, (1964) and again in (1988).
193
Thus general fall in profit rates throughout industry, lead to a spate of country
banking crises around the period 1870-80. This in turn, lead to the
transformation and atomisation of country banking networks away from
productive capital's centre of gravity and towards the orbit of the City. Firstly,
through merger and joint stock ownership, the country banks centre of gravity
shifted to the City of London. Secondly, through their sublation by centralised
clearing banks, who were themselves interlocked with merchant banks, the Bank
of England and the Government Treasury Department.
The first reactions of productive capital to the 'problem of labour', the high
organic composition of capital and fmance capital's initial strategy of taking flight
from the site of domestic accumulation, was to reduce the rate of investment in
domestic production sites. Hence the slow retardation of productive growth and
lack of innovation which characterised this era. Such a course of action taken
by productive capital was inevitable when retained profits were either too small
or are not re-invested on a sufficient scale in fixed capital. A second reaction,
running in parallel with the first, had most important ramifications too. This was
the channelling of retained profits out of the zone of immediate class struggle
over valorisation and into increased bouts of speculation abroad. The particular
route chosen became that of international speculation in gold mining and
railways.. etc, where the organic composition of capital and hence profit rates
were higher. The network of finance capitalist institutions in the City were only
too willing to provide assistance (as long as the commission was suitable). And
only to willing to draw productive capital into their orbit of social, cultural and
political influence. Edelstein (1982) does not exaggerate when he notes that,
among the most important phenomena of British and world history in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was the dramatic increase in British
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capital exports after 1870.181 Van HeIten is quite clear about were the
majority of capital was bound: the majority of funds invested, in a series of
'frenzied booms and share manias', were bound for mining, especially to gold
.. 182
mmmg.
A large proportion of speculative capital was channelled through investment
trusts which had flourished rapidly after 1880. According to Casson, their total
nominal capital rose from £5 million in 1887 to some £50 million in 1890.
However even this belied the true extent of investment trust control over capital
invested. For investment trusts were controlled and owned by fmance capitalists
operating out of merchant and clearing banks in the City. It proved a flexible
way of siphoning commissions from small and large capital's alike and brought
the latter further under the orbit of fmance capital's world view (for example
important segments of large productive capital investors such as brewery
companies were willingly ensnared). 183 As The Bankers' Magazine 184
pointed out at the time, investment trusts were a front used and abused by City
company promoters, who acquired fortunes manipulating shares, underwriting
poorly equipped productive capital ventures and diluting stock values.
Most commentators can agree with the words of Scott, that by 1870, 'the City of
London had become the hub of an international monetary system' dominated by
'merchant bankers'; who 'formed a tightly integrated group with numerous
overlapping business activities' exerting control over the Bank of England185
Productive capital made use of, then honed and widened these institutional
181 M. Edelstein (1982), p3.
182 Jean-Jacques van Helten, Mining Share Mania and Speculation: British Investment in Overseas
Mining, 1880-1913, in Youssef Cassis (1987). According to yen Helten finance capital chanelled much of its
activities in gold mining speculation in South Africa, Australia, South America.etc, when demand for gold
rose due to both Germany and the USA adopting the gold standard afer 1870
183 J. J. venHe1ten, in Y. Cassis (1987), op-cit.
184 Bankers Magazine (1893), vo155, p563-5, cited by Y. Cassis, (1987), op-cit.
185 M. Bentley (1974), The Liberal Response To Socialism, in, K. D. Brown.
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channels and arrangements, as it moved away from the domestic labour process
and systematically pursued profits, interest, bonds..etc abroad. Empirical
evidence, noted previously, confirms this; just as it confirms that the course of
the rupture in value relations had two negative results in the long run. Firstly, it
lead to the abrupt slow down of the economy. Secondly, it lead to the
divergence of interests to become intensified between, on the one hand, the
requirements of wholly domestic based productive capital for long term cheap
loans and, on the other hand, the requirement of fmancial institutions that capital
remain fixed for as short a time as possible and so earn fmanciers as high a
return as possible.186
Of course in the 'City', there had always been a number of avenues for capital to
realise a return. The two basic distinctions of parasitic activity were between
money market activity, which lent short to domestic productive capital and long
to foreign Governments and/or high labour intensive, low wage foreign private
industries. In so far as fmance capital became involved in this activity, it is
rightly characterised as its imperialist mode of operation. As such, if not exactly
an institutional fusion of industrial and banking capital (a la Hilferding and
Lenin), it is very much a fusion of productive capitalists and financiers187
Within this configuration, however, the seeds of a more highly developed form
of fmance capital emerged, concentrated in commercial trading in currencies,
bonds, secondary share issues and bill discounting. Old mercantilist habits no
doubt, but habits in an era of developed capitalism, which became parasitic
instruments in arresting productive capitalist development.
186 See G. Ingham (1984), Capital Divided, for a detailed description of the short term commercial
orientation of the City.
187 See John Scott (1982), The Upper Classes Property and Priveledge in Britain, for a concise rendition
of the relationships between the different factions of capital as they coalesed due to the effects of various
economic and social changes.
196
This parasitism refers to a number of processes. Firstly, there is a retardation of
growth, of research and development (see Hobsbawm) and the rationalisation of
the labour process through 'scientific' management principles. Both become
manifest, when capital takes flight into circulation activity on the lines described
above. By the turn of the century the retardation had reached into the psychic of
the bourgeoisie class. Hobson, with his expose of British imperialism,
epitomised the concern expressed within social democraticlFabian circles about
the tendency to stagnation and its dangerous results. I 88 Even though he located
its causes ill the rather more superficial problem of over
saving/underconsumptionism; and was of the opinion that the object of capitalist
production was something as apparently innocuous as the production of utilities,
his work nevertheless captured the mood of the nation and the mood was that
'Britain' had frrmly entered onto the slippery root of decline. Musson neatly
summarises the distress felt by a generation of economic historians about
productive decline in this era;
What then, was wrong with Britain that she failed to
maintain her leadership?
That she was tending deplorably to lag has been demonstratedby the
declining percentage growth rates in particular industries and in the whole
economy: whereas, in the late eighteenth century and first half of the
nineteenth century, industrial production - according to Hoffman's index-
had been growing at three to four percent per annum, it began to fall in the
second half of the century and down to 1914, first to two or three percent
and then to one or two percent, while productivity or output per head
declined even more depressingly, to well below one percent per annum,
until it was almost stagnant or even declining in the years before 1914;
in overseas trade similarly, the annual rate of growth in the volume of
188 J. A Hobson (1928), Imperialism: A Study, 3rd edition, Allan & Unwin.
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manufactured exports fell from four or five percent in the third quarter of
the century to only about two per cent between the mid-1870s and the early
twentieth century. 189
Alongside the initial flight of capital a second, perhaps more insidious, aspect of
parasitism emerged - the development of an ethos of 'short termism' within
productive capital itself. At the heart of this phenomenon was the merger boom
between 1856 and 1930. Essentially this boom came in two waves, one before
the first world war and one in the interwar years. 'Between 1888 and 1914 an
average of at least sixty seven firms disappeared in mergers each year'. During
this period there were three peak years between 1898 and 1900, when 650 firms
became absorbed in 198 mergers.190 After the war the depression of 1920,
stimulated another wave of mergers; between 1919-21, 234 firms disappeared
annually to the value of £300 million.191 These increases in acquisitions and
mergers, from the 1850s to the end of the 1920s, were facilitated by the joint
stock company Act 1844 and limited liability law 1856. Although there were
technical aspects of economies of scale driving such mergers, it is the manner in
which they were conducted and the ultimate reason for their prevalence that
interests us here. In fact the merger waves completed the economic
interpenetration of productive and finance capital, with the latter sublating the
former. They opened up the large productive capital's to finance capital's sphere
of influence.192 Prior to the merger waves, the larger productive capital's were
either growing at a slower rate or stagnating, because they were increasingly
189 See V. 1.Lenin (1916), Imperialism: The Highest Stage ofCapitalism. Lenin was correct to view this
aspect of finance capital as imperialistic, however he largely ignored its other more imporant aspect - its
parasitic aspect. Although he did allure to it, he left it unexplored. See H. Tickten Critique 16, (1983), for
an enl~tening account of this.
19 L. Hannah (1976), The Rise OfThe Corporate Economy, p23.
191 H. Overbeek (1990), Global Capitalism + National Decline, p54.
192 As is often pointed out by many Historians, the merger boom during pre war years involved many of
the old staple industries such as textiles, Shipbuilding, Brewing, Tobacco..etc, (see L, Hannah, op-cit).
198
unable or unwilling to accumulate rapidly on the basis of retained profits.
Finance capital used this as a leverage to gain entry into productive capital itself
and impart a circulation capital bias vis-a-vis fixed capital.
Hilferding has shown in the case of Gennany,193 that the response of finance
capital to corporate stock floatation's and the desire for banking loans, was to
develop a long term fusion between itself (as the leading partner of course) and
productive capital. But because Hilferding concentrated on Germany, it,
unfortunately, left him with a one dimensional view of finance capital194 The
argument here, therefore, is that in the case of Britain, the collective strength of
labour, the high organic composition of capital and the easy access to a network
of remote fmancial institutions built up in the mercantilist era, served only to
produce a more parasitic fmance capitalist response. Essentially, then, fmance
capital used the opportunity of the merger waves to exert, not so much a fusion
of money capital with domestic industrial capital a la Hilferding, but rather, a
money capital bias and anti-fixed/industrial capital bias within the productive
units of capital. Whatsmore, the larger productive capital in general did not so
much fight the move but effectively encourage it. Hence although many
factional disputes surfaced between individual capital's over profit retention and
dividend payouts, as well as more fundamental ones regarding the degree to
which a Labourist containment of labour should be adopted, through national
programs of welfarism, capitalists were fundamentally united about the need to
defeat and/or head off all political challenges from labour.
193 R. Hilferding (1981), op-cit, specifically ch 7 and ch 14.
194 The reader is refered to the previous chapter for a discussion ofHilferding. His conflation of finance
capital as solely a fusion ofbanking with productive capital, comes out clearly in the following quote; An ever
increasing part of the capital of industry does not belong to the industrialists who use it. They are able to
dispose over capital only through banks, which represent the owners. On the other side, the banks have to
invest an ever increasing part of their capital in industry, and in this way become to a greater and greater
extent industrial capitalists. I call bank capital, that is, capital in money form which is actually transformed
in this way into industrial capital, finance capital.
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Thus finance capital's containment and hegemonic influence over productive
capital, is reflected in the failure of the issue of tariff reform in the late
nineteenth/early twentieth century. The overall weakness of Chamberlain's
Tariff Reform League and the eventual defeat of his Bill in 1906, symbolised a
split within productive capital between those who's accumulatory interests lay
with fixed capital formation (mostly the small to medium capital's), and those
who's interest lay in both fixed and circulating capital formation (mostly the large
capital). For example, the mainstay of tariff reformers reflected the small to
medium industrialists of areas such as Birmingham and the Midlands generally.
They sought a 'social imperialist' based tariff, which would underwrite social
welfarism to contain and appease labour (the early form of Labourism).
However, the larger productive capital's, united under the leadership of finance
capital had different ideas. What Fox refers to as, 'the larger battalions' of
industry (eg, coal, cotton, shipbuilding..etc), sided with finance capital195 on the
crucial issue of 'free trade'.
Simply stated: the accumulatory strategy of 'international free trade imperialism',
gelled large productive capital to the forces and interests of finance capital. By
choosing such a route, they effectively determined (for the moment at least) that
compromise with labour was out of the question, . When Chamberlain's attempt
to push ahead the interests of the small to mediumfaction of capital failed, Lloyd
George took up the fight on their behalf, within the realigned Liberal
Administration. From 1910 until the early 1930's, his campaign too was
continually defeated by the same forces.196 This would seem to confirm a
central point/assertion of this thesis - that only when the labour movement had
been politically defeated could any notion of Labourism endorsed by finance
capital become entertained.
195 A. Fox (1985), op-cit, p209.
196 A. Fox, ibid, p207-208.
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It follows from this that more needs to be said about the number of crucial ways
finance capital took over the reigns of control within productive capital in a
direct fashion, once mergers got off the ground. Strategic share ownership, for
example, fostered the development of the loose Holding Company's. This form
of organisation gave a free reign to rentier capital to move from one fixed capital
to another; 'holding' a unit of productive capital, only so long as it was able to
produce high, short term dividend payouts and/or access to monopoly profits, via
monopoly control of a particular sector or industry. Hannah provides a clue to
the essentially parasitic nature of Britain's merger and acquisition waves during
the period discussed, when he alludes to the fact that197 30% of the public
company's, formed in the first 30 years after the establishment of the limited
liability provision, ended in insolvency.
Of course, merchant banks and the Accountancy profession gained, whether or
not the merger extended the life of a productive unit of capital. The former
gained by underwriting the initial mergers and counter mergers; whilst the latter
gained from the lucrative business of winding up insolvent productive capital's.
Between 1885 and 1907 joint stock company firms in the manufacturing and
distribution sector grew from 60 to 600. Many of those, too small to afford the
underwriting fees of merchant capitalists, joined forces in Joint issue', this
intensified the monopoly tendencies in the economy and, according to Hannah,
created a new 'financial impetus to the merger movement by encouraging
speculative activity in the stock market'.198
In effect, fmance capitalist circles created both the supply as well as the demand
for speculatory mergers and acquisitions, in their efforts to distance themselves
197 L. Hannah (1976), op-cit, p20.
198 Hannah (1976), ibid, p21.
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from the threat of labour and a rising organic composition of capital. This
double gain was achieved, on the one hand, by encouraging productive units of
capital of the benefits of economies of scale and the potential rewards of issuing
and selling new shares with vastly inflated prices relative to present asset value.
Whilst on the other hand, it was achieved by enticing potential speculators with
promises of lucrative future monopoly profits. It was speculators that served to
fuel the rift, gaining ground within productive capital, between the production
management goals of long term fixed capital investment and internal growth, on
the one side, and finance management's mission to appease stock market
speculators desire for short term high dividend payouts, on the other.
Thus in all the above ways, fmance capital's dominance over productive capital
became an internal one. These internal mechanisms of control mean that
productive capital's mam avenue for concentration is increasingly through
acquisition and merger and less, as before, through organic growth. In other
words fmance capital in Britain plays down the concentration of capital and
plays up its centralisation in order to move flexibly against labour. This is seen
most clearly in the afore mentioned dominance of the H-form organisation of
productive capital units in Britain. Additionally, and related to this, capital's
reason for growth becomes not so much to expand fixed capital formation, but to
enhance the speculatory ground of finance capital. Hannah allures to such a
situation when he states,
The positive correlation betweenthe level of shareprices and the intensity
of merger activityis consistent with (the)hypothesis that financial factors
played an importantpart in stimulating the amalgamations of this period.
This view is also confirmed by the complaints of 'overcapitalisation' which
almostinvariablyfollowed the more unscrupulous or misguided mergerissues.
Such complaints clearly suggest that the profitswhich were made subsequently
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to an issue were insufficient to service the large amounts of capital which had
been subscribed. 199
Many commentators have drawn attention to the fact that in Britain the Holding
Companyform of organising productive capital (generated by the logic of merger
activity not organic growth), has dominated the largest units of productive
capital's. This is inspite of the evidence from the United States, which clearly
reveals the benefits for capital, in terms of relative surplus value extraction, of
the multi-divisional form200 However, the commentators (usually of the social
democratic persuasion) somewhat miss the point, in so far as they perceive this
as evidence of capital's limited development in Britain. More profoundly it is
evidence of the highly flexible nature of finance capital in its attempts to
outmanoeuvre the working class and contain labour within the bounds of a class
merely in itself.
Finance capital, therefore, eventually becomes the central focal point for the
capitalist system when it reacts to the loss of control over its productive base, as
is the case in Britain. The more the contradiction within labour became negated
and so the collective strength of labour grew, the more intensely does this form
of capital feel at home in its abstract fictitious world of M-M'. Having
suggested this however, it should be stressed that the initial thrust of fmance
capital away from productive capital, merely purchases some relief from the
contradiction at the heart of capitalism, but without being able to resolve it. In
fact by moving away from productive capital, fmance capital must face a more
heightened contradiction: they must deal with the threat from a socially
integrated labour. Thus at the very time fmance capital was taking flight and
bringing the forces of production to premature stagnation, a labour movement
199 Hannah (1976), ibid, p22.
200 T. Nichols (1986); H. Overbeek (1990); D, Sayer (1986).
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was on the advance, pressurising for the regulation, if not the overthrow, of the
capitalist system.
With labour and fmance capital pulling in the opposite direction, the already
compromised commodity relation, was fast becoming a threatened species. Use
and exchange value objectives began to substantiate themselves on different
grounds; one for the development of socialised labour, the other for the
containment and re-atomisation of labour. It is on this basis that Labourism
develops. Labourism compromises exchange value, to the bureaucratic
regulation of use value and in this way offers the potential for capital to remain
controllers of the system. It is this process that finance capital's initial thrust
away denies and the same force, under more appropriate conditions, which
eventually resecures fmance capital to the domestic economy. Below we assess
the contradictions which mount up for fmance capital, when it initially denies the
movement towards Labourism and adopts the strategy of imperialist adventure.
The next chapter will take up the conditions under which finance capital
eventually secures Labourism.
5.6 The flight offinance capital and socialisation oflabour:
a breach in commodity relations.
Perhaps the best way forward to explain the above process or conflict, is to
consider the objectives fmance capital must balance out to maintain its control.
Finance capital must achieve a number of objectives. It has to deal with the
problem of labour, deal with the problem of a rising organic composition and
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plot an alternative course of accumulation and control. The way this is achieved
by British finance capital is complex and, ultimately, contradictory. It
systematises an emphasis on circulation as opposed to fixed capital formation,
wherein control of labour occurs through deflation's and unstable employment
conditions. It also begins to enter relations with other capitalists to secure more
adequate controls over labour, which have become characterised as Labourism.
The more that Labourism becomes a system, the more finance capital contradicts
its wish to emphasise circulation over fixed capital. It requires both, but cannot
achieve both, therefore finance capital in Britain eventually gyrates from one to
the other, securing just enough success to maintain rule. Of course on various
occasions the attraction of one is greater than the other. It will, therefore, be
argued later, that the effect of Stalinism was to make Labourism the more
attractive for some decades after 1940. The point to be make here, however, is
that this unstable gyration between freedom of capital circulation and capital
containment by Labourism, provides the key context for making sense of finance
capital's use and abuse of their external and internal forms of rule. Thus it is
worth reflecting briefly on the ambiguity of the era between 1870 and the late
1930s, as it highlights the tendential nature of the rise of Labourism.
The empirical and institutional processes outlined above, of finance capital's rise
to hegemony, should fundamentally to be viewed as evidence of tendential
reactions to the decomposition of capital taking in production (due to the
socialisation of labour previously discussed). By the same token, it is also due to
the flight of capital into its highest, yet most parasitic form - the fictitious world
of credit creation with little basis in surplus value extraction. Hence the goal of
accumulating surplus value in Britain post 1880, had increasingly to take second
place to international investments, trading and commerce. Use values, needs,
skills and precious employment are, for capital, merely the mediums through
205
which surplus value is extracted. Therefore whenever the compulsion for the
latter weakens, then logically the need to realise the former will also weaken.
In an ideal capitalist world of course, the rupture between use and exchange
value implied by the above would leave use value and needs stagnant amidst
high long term unemployment. Capital, having dispensed with large sections of
domestic labour, could take flight to more conducive climes. But, unfortunately,
for capital, it does not live in an ideal world. As a result, although British
capital did initially take flight abroad and into the monetary matrix of the City , it
could never in the long term simply leave its' original site of exploitation, without
risking potential revolutionary confrontations with the working class. The
problem for fmance capital was that it was confronted by a socialised and
increasingly assertive working class, prepared to challenge the 'naturalness' of
exchange values hold on the production of use values and fulfilment of social
need. The more capital took flight and sacrificed advances to be had in the
forces of production for speculative escapades abroad, the more labour became
compelled to act as a class in an attempt to ensure their expanding needs would
be met outside that of the controlling orbit of valorisation. Thus capital's initial
flight into circulation, became a response to decline, and actually intensified the
decline, by making clearer the choice which was open to workers: either accept
the law of value and structural long term unemployment or reject it. It was a
choice that served to radicalise labour and force it to take decisive steps towards
its ontological destiny of becoming a class for itself. The restrictions placed on
international capital movements in the inter-war era, merely accelerated fmance
capital's eventual need to compromise with those who favoured a Labourist
solution.
The rising tide of collective labour resistance and socialistic expectations
(whether expressed as Ricardian socialism, Fabian, or Syndicalist), in the context
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of the flight of capital out of Britain and hence the retardation of the very
productive forces necessary to realise the growing expectations of labour,
intensified the social process already afoot: the breaking down of commodity
fetishism. Effectively, the objective conditions for a transition to socialism
were being constructed, regardless of any subjective conclusions otherwise by
the actors involved. Conditions which were objective in the sense that when
commodity fetishishism began to breakdown (pulled apart by the actions of
labour and the reactions of financiers and productive capital's), workers are
necessarily drawn together as a social body wanting to fight consciously for
collective use values and need.201 Hence capitalists increasingly tended to be
seen as superfluous, while managers are seen more as unproductive controllers,
whilst the market was seen more and more as a historically limited hindrance to
more fundamental aspirations.
As argued in the previous chapter, most waves of class struggles in the era 1911-
1926 reflected this process. By the same token decline, the initial flight of
capital and the subsequent intensificationof class conflict, served to impose upon
finance capitalists the necessity to act as a class for themselves. Thus finance
capitalists, in their quest to save the system, were themselves compelled to act
together as a conscious force overseeing the process of decline: arresting it,
blocking it, slowing it down and accelerating it, in an effort to outmanoeuvre the
working class. Hence, in an era of capitalist decline the 'neutrality' and so
'universality' of the commodity form of social productive life, becomes the
subject of class struggle.
As argued earlier, the breakdown of commodity fetishism leads to a direct
dependency of capitalists upon each other for their continued rule. But more
than this, their rule is no longer based upon abstract labour and, therefore, the
201 The reader is refered back to chapter three's dicussion oflabour.
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appearance of equality between abstract juridical individuals. Rule has to
become more arbitrary. For example, the State is required to intervene arbitrarily
into the economy. The policies it pursues, becomes the subject of political
debate, non more heated than that over the issue of 'planning or the market',
which gripped the class struggle in the early part of this century. Amidst the
political confrontations, classes are forced to start to act as classes in order to
survive. This has been the nature of the epoch from the 1870's onward, although
its true extent was concealed and constrained by the stubborn adherence to the
discipline of gold. Pre-empting the next chapter, it can be said that Stalinism
would eventually underwrite Labourism's earlier consolidation in the 1930s and
allow the capitalist class to act as a class : administering and slowing down the
era of capitalist decline by blocking labour's political emergence as a self acting
class.
\Thus, from 1870s onwards, finance capital and labour entered a transitory
world. On this transition, a whole epoch offinance capital's conscious rule was
predicated. That is, an epoch of finance capitalist rule emerged when the
capitalist mode of production was in the nether world of decay. The
contradiction between exchange and use value and the contradiction between
fixed and circulating capital (see chapter three), plays the central part in this and
becomes essential to an understanding of the epoch. As the contradiction
increases between greater levels of fixed capital formation and an intensification
of the moral depreciation of its value holding capacity develops on the one hand,
and the negation of commodity fetishism (the contradiction within labour),
develops on the other, the ruling elements within capital ensure the easy passage
for capital to reverts to its essential mode of existence - circulation. Left to its
own logic, finance capital opposes labour and labour opposes finance capital -
use value and exchange value begin to stand in outright opposition to each other.
The forces of interpenetration become increasingly weaker and the system
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becomes threatened with disintegration as class struggle intensifies and classes
become classes for themselves: workers for use and need; finance for the shell of
the value form. Given such a situation, it becomes necessary that Labourist
forces, which had developed between the classes, be allowed by fmance capital
(often against its immediate will and interests) to pull capitalism back from the
abyss of disintegration. Below the chapter draws to a close by briefly
explaining the ebbs and flows of the movement towards Labourism.
5.7 The Ebbs and Flows ofLabourism: 1914-1939
Within the space of 16 years (1914-1931), the ruling class first came offthe gold
standard, edged toward a Labourist system of control, ebbed a retreat from
Labourism, then moved back on to the gold standard again, only to jettison it
again later, before, finally, embarking, in the 1930s, along the inexorable road
towards the Labourist containment of labour. This persistent ebbing and
flowing was fmance capital's response to the militancy of labour.
Manoeuvres against the working class and the adverse balance of class forces,
meant that the construction of Labourism was a protracted affair. In many
instances, fmance capitalists looked as though they would never be drawn along
such a path. Particularly when false dawns of international free trade reared
during the course of the 1920s. They seemed to beckon the easier option of
capital flight and the short term containment of labour through the fear of
unemployment. These necessary and circumstantial aspects, were another
reason why the interlocking of social and economic bonds amongst finance
capitalists at State level became so vital. The State became the main conduit,
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through which finance capitalists schizophrenic desires toward unrestrained
parasitism on the one hand and long term survival on the other, could be
channelled and, prevented from inducing anarchy. This could be transformed into
some sort of coherent policy.
Of course the State was a more complex political instrument than this, and was
both respondent to, and constituted by, other class forces. The State was the
repository of finance capital's long term interests and the repository of the
growing left and right Labourist social movements. The essential purpose of
State action was to, firstly, contain the labour movements political advances,
then, to incorporate and control the labour movement within a Labourist system.
5.8 State Policy To Crush the Political Advance ofLabour.
One State policy which stood out as of crucial importance to the Labourist
project was the crushing of the political strength of the rank and file. In the
concrete terms of the time, this meant diminishing syndicalist and Bolshevik
influence at rank and file level. Syndicalism for all its weaknesses had
provided socialist credence and cohesiveness to the labour movements collective
solidarity. The effects of syndicalism, alongside Bolshevist influence, propelled
finance capital away from Labourism and compelled the pro Labourist right
(liberal social chauvinists) to align itself with finance capitalists in an attempt to
neutralise the political influence. Essentially the ruling class were worried about
the potential extent that Bolshevism, in particular, might have had on the labour
movement. Its influence had already turned sour any developing relationship
with the Labourist left (TUC and Labour Party), that finance capital may have
harboured. George Lansbury's call 'for a central body capable of giving orders
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and directions to the new forces which are abroad in the world of labour " was
not to be an isolated one.202
With this in mind, there were two main ways of achieving the neutralisation of
labour. Firstly, through the deflation's inherent in the (ab)use of the gold
standard which could conjure up the discipline of unemployment.
Unemployment invariably followed the movement back to gold from 1921 to
1925, because British labour resisted the reduction of wages to those of world
socially necessary average labour values reflected by gold. As Checkland
observed, the gold standard enhanced the power of two other 'pillars of an anti-
collectivist temple' - free trade, low and balanced budgets.203 Which together,
proved powerful antidotes against the political advances of labour.
Secondly, and more profoundly, in so far as the aim was to control the labour
movement over the long term, the State manoeuvred to foster the growth of
reformist elements within the labour movement and productive capital. The
TUC and the Labour Party became central institutional features. Their
respective members were selected to Royal Commissions, to discuss the 'labour
problem' and sat on local and central government boards concerned with social
welfare issues alongside Liberal reformers. The first world war years also
introduced the Labourist left to the institutional means of their future rule -
Whitley industrial bargaining Committees204 and nationalisation.
202 Lansbury, cited in C. Wrigley (1980), p14. For a good appraisal of the radicalism of both labour and
capital the reader is refered to Wrigley's pamphlet.
203 Checkland (1983), Public Policy and the Economy Since 1750, cited by 1. Tomlinson, (1990), Public
Poli~ and the Economy Since 1900, p14.
04 Whitley Councils came into being in 1917 promising but only partially delivering some of the main
props of Labourism such as the joint national and local bureaucratic representaion of labour within employer
and union run committees. Issues covered were not simply wages, but education, job security, training..etc.
See K. Middlemass (1979) for a concise descrition of the context within which they arose.
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Middlemass intimates the reason behind this movement towards Labourism,
when he states, 'In reacting against the threat of revolution, to the extent of
modifying ancient preoccupation's with the political system, Britain developed its
own distinctive form of triangular collaboration in the industrial sphere, between
Government, trade unions and the business class,.205 Unfortunately
Middlemass does not make an important distinction: the capitalist class is
divided as representatives of either fixed or circulating capital. Apparently
Middlemass is content to treat any distinctions at the level of the individual
and/or institution. However, subsumed within Middlemass's innocuous
sounding 'business class' are the divergent short run interests of finance capital
and productive capital which are given little significance by Middlemass. This
has profound implications for the analysis he offers of the conflicts of interest
between capital's. Before the containment of labour had been successfully
achieved, finance capital's interests would always be paramount and, on many
occasions, would draw the State back from the full policy implications of
Labour's. It is this which Middlemass fails to grasp. Because of this, he also
fails to see that when the National Confederation of Employers Organisation
(NCEO) was established in 1917, as a counterweight to the more radical
Labourist overtures of the FBI, it was essentially the organised expression of
finance capital's interests.
Of course, as Middlemass points out, the NCEO also represented the will of
capital in Engineering (the Engineering Employers Federation, EEF). The EEF
were radicalised by the militancy of their own rank and [lie and, as a
consequence, became very hostile to any notion of incorporation. But the EEF
group could never, under its own steam, have held sway against the triple force
of the FBI,206 the wishes of the State and the TUC. The EEF's interests
205 K. Middlemass (1979), p123.
206 As Hume argues, the FBI fought a long campaign against deflationary policies, the findings of the
Cuncliffe Committee and the eventaul move back to a gold standard, as such they do earn their reputation as
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remained subordinated to finance capitalists within the NCEO. Finance capital
made use of this institution, to weaken and, on occasions block, any left-wing
movement to Labourism. How else can one explain the muted reactions of the
powerful group of Engineering capitalists to, for example, the Cuncliffe Report
of 1919?07 which called for deflation and the discipline of gold. Moreover,
how else can one explain the incessant deflation's throughout the 1920s; or the
eventual move back on to the gold standard in 1925. All of these policies were
devastating to industrial capital. The fact is the EEF remained grudgingly loyal to
the policy of 'sound finance'; a policy which bore the hallmark of the NCEO just
as much as the Treasury, because the NCEO were dominated by the needs of
fmance capital. Hence the NCEO became the watchdog over issues such as no
compromise with labour over nationalisation and with State interference in
industry generally.
Whilst working within the institutions of rightwing Labourism, finance capital
also made use of their old power base in the Treasury and Bank of England.
Through the control of exchange rates and enough control of the money supply,
deflation could and was used as a powerful tool, to altering the balance of class
forces within the Labourist compromise developing between left and right in
favour of the right. Thus the control of the exchange rate, from 1914, when the
British economy came off the gold standard, became increasing important to
fmance capital and its enduring concern with inflationary pressures. Inflation
became an imminent problem, devaluing shares and threatening the substance of
money. Nevertheless, the flexibility of a floating exchange rate, further enabled
finance capital's manipulation over the economy - reflating to encourage the
being prominant fighters for Labourism from the rightwing. See L. 1. Hume, The Gold Standard and
Deflation: Issues and Attitudes in the 1920s, in S. Pollard (1970), Gold Standard and Employment Policies
Between The Wars, p122-146, Methuen and Co.
207 A Govermnent policy 'think tank' which provided the academic and political credibility for a move
back to the pre-war gold standard, at its pre-war parity.
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forces of right wing Labourism; deflating with the first sign that left wing forces,
or even worse labour, were getting the better.
The problem which faced finance capital became clear enough: in the years
between 1919-1926 when class militancy was at a premium, the move toward
Labourism became too dangerous and fmance capital continually backed off
from allowing it to be systematised. The danger was that Labourism would not
be able to do what is was supposed to: contain labour. Specifically, the fear was
that the Labourist left, who had gained social status on the backs of a militant
labour movement, would hold the upper hand in dictating the whole tenor of
Labourism. Thus as a potentially dominating force, the danger was that their
organic connection with labour, would effectively lead them to decommodify the
use and supply of labour more than fmance capital were willing or able to
tolerate. This factor compelled finance capital to act more strategically to get
the best possible balance of class forces within the Labourist compromise. The
initial booms and slumps, followed by prolonged recession during the period
1919 to 1939, was the outcome of fmance capital's strategic manipulations. As
many studies of the period intimate,2°8 the ruling class of Britain inflated the
economy in 1919 to appease labour militancy and then proceeded to deflate the
economy between 1920 and 26 to contain and weaken the labour movement. In
doing so, it succeeded in considerably weakening the syndicalist influence that
had built up amongst the working class leadership. A further crucial outcome of
this was the creation of a political vacuum, which drew labour closer into the
snare of the Labourist left. Simultaneously, the economic downturn successfully
shifted the left wing of Labourism even further to the right, and, as a result,
seriously weakening labour politically. The effect of the shift was to re-orientate
left Labourism to an acceptance of ever more limited transgressions of
208 See, for example, C. Wrigley (1980), op-cit.
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commodity production relations: before they wanted 'the planned economy'; after
they became content with 'the mixed economy'.
The threat of recession, structural unemployment and the swift evacuation of
capital, then, were still powerful weapons upon which capital continued to draw
throughout the so called 'depression years' of the 1920s and 1930s. The Cabinet,
in Parliamentary debates between 1920-23, of course, chose to blame deflation
and unemployment on the slow rate of international recovery especially in
Europe. When this appeared too lame an excuse, the problem was then said to
be the German occupation of the Ruhr and the high price of coal. However, the
true source of economic depression, was the containment of labour. By 1925, as
one source noted, 'the stabilisation of European relations was within reach, but
the return to prosperity in Britain seemed more remote than ever,.209 Churchill
was more candid in pinpointing the main problem, he blamed the failure of trade
to revive on working class militancy. Although we have every reason not to
doubt him on this occasion, Churchill was wily enough to invert reality, by
making it seem as if militancy restricted an otherwise healthy capitalism
rearing to invest. 210
5.9 Class struggle and the emerging institutions ofLabourism
Finance capital, then, used the State to resist the move to Labourism until it
could be undertaken on its terms. By the same token, it also used the
institutions of an emerging 'industrial relations' system of containment. To grasp
the ramifications of this point, one must refer back to finance capital's
209 K. 1. Hancock (1970), The Reduction ofUnemployment As A Problem ofPublic Policy, in S. Pollard,
(197010op-cit.
2 Parliamentary Debates, (1928-9) 222, co1258.
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manipulation of the NCEO. The NCEO was being carefully nurtured by
Governments, with an eye to what Middlemass refers to as the 'long cycle'
toward the generation of a common ground between the TUC and FBIINCEO
and Government.211 Although a common ground was needed, productive capital
also had to be disciplined into exerting the utmost pressure to break the militancy
of labour, wherever it revealed itself at labour process level. This was a
particularly acute need during the unrest of 1919-26, when the NCEO was a
convenient forum through which frnance capital could lever such a control on
productive capital.212 The interests of frnance capital were represented on the
internal committees of the NCEO were they established enough hegemony of
opinion to ensure the Bank of England, the Treasury and the Cuncliffe Enquiry,
carried out deflationary policies, with the aim of facilitating a future move back
onto the gold standard. The move caused great frnancial damage to the short
term profitability of the large capital's and bankrupted many of the smaller
capitalists; hence there where objections from all political sides of Labourism.
As it would save the capitalist system, however, the objections remained muted
and frnance capital, as guardians of the capitalist system, forced British capital
back to gold. The bourgeois's acute awareness of the danger they faced, is
evident in the political manoeuvres and the about turns in policy they were
forced to take; particularly in the two years after World War one, when militancy
reached almost insurrectionary status.213 Wrigley captures the urgency of the
time well,
In Britainpeoplein high places feared revolution at home as well
as abroad in the months afterthe signing of the Armistice in November
211 K. Middlemass (1979) refers to this as 'ajoumey to the centre' ground of mutual interest which exists
in and through the short term cycle of volatile wage bargaining and class struggle.
212 A view supported by Boyce (1987) only for him finance capital refers to the 'mercantile-financial
community' who are, he argues, completely separate from productive capital. Implicit is the belief that capital
is essentially a healthy social relation, only compromised by the intrusion of the unwanted institutions of
mercantilism.
213 See C. Wrigley (1980), op-cit.
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1919. This fear was expressed by several leading members
of the Government. In late December Milner was feeling that
'the Bolshevist position' was 'very menacing'. In January Curzon
expressed his concern in the war cabinet that no concerted action
was being taken by the various departments to combat the
spread of Bolshevism in Britain. Within a week of the Armistice Walter
Long began sending Lloyd George alarmist memoranda about revolutionary
activity in Britain...One memorandumhe forwarded include claims that
there were more Bolsheviks per head of population in the UK than there
had been in Russia in 1917 and warned that if the Government
failed to take firm steps 'there will be some sort of revolution
in this country...before twelve months are past'. Long endorsed it with the
comment 'I am confident that the danger is real'.214
Whether one believes the situation was a revolutionary situation or not however,
is a rather mute point. The ruling class did, and they acted with some urgency
upon this belief. Lloyd George's Government, in a desperate attempt to head off
labour's political mobilisation, used the tripartite institutions of TUC, FBI and
NCEO, to endorse economic intervention, house building plans and employment
guarantees under the rubric of the National Industrial Conference (NIC). Of
course there was little real intention to carry them out, they proved to be a tactic
which enabled them, not only to head off working class revolt, but also to drive
the working class into the arms of left Labourism, however, it was a great
success. During this period the NIC established a Provisional Joint Committee
(pJC) to oversee reforms, however, the reforms were never intended to go
further than the paper they were written on. As far as the
Government/City/Bank of England fmancial nexus were concerned, they were
little more than a holding operation. The NCEO, under the influence of
214 C. Wrigley (1980), op-cit, pl.
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economic orthodoxy and so finance capital's interests, spent most of their time
diluting any commitment to a left Labourism, which the NIC may have
feigned.215 The TUC felt their authority, as representatives of labour, was
undermined by this scurrilous activity. Their frustrations at the counter reform
attitude of the NCEO was evident in Walter Citrine's many accusations, that the
wider purpose of the NCEO was to block productive capitalist opinion, gaining
ascendancy over the issue of reform.216 A claim that leads one to conclude that
the leaders of the TUC, although implicit in the proceedings, somewhat missed
the point of the epoch they were supposed to be involved in creating.
Once the danger period of immediate post war militancy for capital had passed,
finance capital, acting through the Government, the Treasury and the Bank of
England, proceeded to renege on the NIC proposals, deflate the economy and
begin the arduous task of disciplining labour. The NCEO in this period, up until
the full ramifications of the defeat of labour in the 1926 General Strike,
continued to block any development towards Labourism, whilst the working
class held vestiges of political independence and were able to force the TUC and
the Labour Party leftwards. The TUC for its part, attempted to severe this
political independence and so prove its fitness for Labourist office.217 Until the
TUC could prove their worth to capital, the NCEO remained an important ally
of finance capitalist interest; preventing the nationalisation of the mines,
215 According to Booth & Pack (1985), p79, the NCEO's leader, Sir Allen Smith (who had many shared
social and economic interests with f'inace capitalists), worked long and hard to reassure the other membes of
the NCEO that 1919 was merely a temporary aberation on the part of workers and normality would restore
itselfvery shortly. Hence, for Smith, there was little real need for long term state involvement. In fact
man~erial prerogative should be restored at the earliest possible opportunity.
2 0 Booth & Pack (1985), op-cit, p79.
217 As Middlemass (1979), op-cit, p163-68, attests, the rank and file commitment to councils of action,
combining community and workplace across Britain and its later commitment to a national council of action,
was at all times undermined by the offical union movement as devisive and anti-parlimentarian action. On
the last point of course they were right. The TUC wished to eradicate from the politcal agenda any notion of
direct action, particularly in the labour process. Of importance in respect to the latter was the TUCs
formation of a General Council to act as a national vehicle for centralising industrial strategy. Endorsed by
the TUC in 1920, it was their way of undermining both the Triple Alliance and notions of any national council
of action committees. The formation of the General Council was the TUC's way of asserting its right to
manage labour within a Labourist system in status nascendi.
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financing and encouragmg strike breaking committees and weakening any
attempts the PJC made to establish Labourism, before the working class had
been politically smashed.218 Booth & Pack's claim that, 'Ministers and
Employers appeared to be conspiring to destroy the working class movement,
especially its better organised, more radical elements219, is, if anything, an
understatement.
It has been correctly observed220 that, given the anti-productivist nature of the
NCEO in this period, and (to all intents and purposes) the FBI (in so far as they
weakened productive capital's resolve towards Labourism), many leading
individual members of the large productive capital, felt obliged to work outside
of their anodyne influence; in an effort to pursued Government directly, by deed
and word, that labour could be contained only in and through Labourism. One
example of this(Booth and Pack, 1985) was Alfred Mond who made a
substantial impact in Government quangos such as the Balfour Committee (set up
to establish institutional links between unions, productive capital and state
administration committees); and within various committees concerned with the
'unemployment problem'. Nevertheless the NCEO, FBI and TUC were of vital
importance to the ascendancy of Labourist tendencies and individual capitalists
could achieve comparatively little outside of them.
Associations of capitalists like the FBI and NCEO were caught between to
horns of a dilemma: both were vehicles for right wing elements of the Labourist
tendency and both were vehicles for expressing the wishes of fmance capital to
manoeuvre against Labourism. Therefore, the fact that, after the miners strike of
218 Strike breaking committees were initially established at Cabinet Office level during the first world war
and thereafter under the pseudonym of the Supply and Transport Committee (STC). Leading members of
Government, high civil service and the financial community were prorninant in the workings and
subcommittees of the STC. It does not take much imagination to work out that bodies such as the NCEO had
intimate relations with the STC also.
219 Booth & Pack (1985), op-cit, p80.
220 Booth & Pack (1985).
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1926, the NCEO and especially the FBI began to have more success in asserting
their Labourist pretensions, indicates two possible propositions: firstly, that
fmance capitalist forces had become more confident about the situation and had
thus allowed the movement towards Labourism some leeway to develop;
secondly, that finance capital's hegemony over productive capital had
deteriorated and, against their will, they had no option, but to move towards
Labourism. The continued strong grip on State power enjoyed by finance
capital throughout the 1930s, and evidenced by the Treasury's stringent control
of money and fetish for balancing budgets, tends to rule out the latter as a
decisive reason. The former proposition has more substance to it. By 1926
Labour had been effectively contained and the reformist influence of the TUC
had begun to fill the political vacuum. Labour's power base of rank and file shop
stewards, had been decimated by the negative results of the strike and its Council
of Action Committees abandoned. Hence the confidence of finance capital and
its renewed dominance over labour, was the cause of the strengthened
commitment to Labourism. But, there was also negative reasons for finance
capital's endorsement of Labourism, because, eventually, it had to succumb to
the realities of the new world order of restrictive world trade in capital and
commodities. Finance capital began to realise that free international trade in
capital, guided by gold as the universal equivalent, was not to be (or for some
decades at any rate).
Hence the conditions, from the late 1920s onward, appeared to be conducive to
the return of fmance capital, to a more pronounced scale of domestic investment.
In short, there appeared to be a window of opportunity for a new accumulation
strategy policed by a system of Labourism, to become established. Thus far
disparate elements of Labourism - State intervention, social welfarism, full
employment and a national network of collective bargaining - could, apparently,
from this moment, interrelate as systemic pillars of the Labourist containment of
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labour. Yet the moment came and went without Labourism taking systemic
shape. The elements of Labourism remained as weakly formed and as disparate
as before. During the late 1920s, labour had not revived politically. British
capital by 1931 had even 'nationalised' sterling by taking it out of the
international gold standard rankings. The initial cause may have been due to
international liquidity problems, but, more fundamentally, the removal of
sterling's from the discipline of the gold standard, had allowed the ground for the
necessary breach between use and exchange value, to surface. However, little
was to change in any fundamental sense, until the beginning of the second World
War. Labourism and the new accumulation strategy, which it promised to
underwrite, never materialised. The 1930s have gone down in British history as
the 'years of depression'; 'the wasted years'. Why, when the conditions appeared
so favourable, had Labourism not materialised? Was there another more
fundamental condition still to be fulfilled, before fmance capital would allow the
necessary compromises to the commodityform?
This chapter, then, has developed an understanding of who finance capital are,
why they need to rule other capital's and how, they go about doing this. The
chapter has also briefly described the trials and tribulations of the class struggle,
as it unfolded around the issue of the containment of labour within systemic
Labourism. The next chapter seeks to explain in more detail the central pillars of
Labourism, both in how they develop and how they interrelate to create a system
of containment over labour. It will also explain the essential role played by
Stalinism in the controversial resolution of physical and fiscal 'planning', which
was central to interrelating the disparate pillars of Labourism. In doing so I
attempt to answer the important questions raised above.
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CH 6: THE CONSOLIDATION OF SYSTEMIC LABOURISM.
On the basis of the theory propounded in previous chapters, the task of this
chapter is to analyse under what circumstances Labourism eventually became the
systemic form of control adopted by British capital over labour. Of special
interest in this respect is Labourism's identity as a political economy category
based on the realignment of use and exchange value. Labourism, although
diverse and complex, has four crucial instruments of control over labour, which
assist the diminishing capacity of commodity fetishism. The four instruments of
control are as follows: bureaucratic atomisation of the labour process,
nationalised and so managed money capital, the decommodification of labour
supply and labour power, and the concept of 'planning' which embodies an
undemocratic administration of the surplus product.
Taken individually, it is clear that their proto developments within capitalism
have undergone a long history. As explained earlier, while capitalism has a
workable control mechanism in commodityfetishism, which is simultaneously its
mode of surplus extraction, then the individual parts of Labourism remain only
weakly formed and accidentally related. Once commodity fetishism weakens,
in response to capitalist decline, then control over labour begins to become
distinct from that of surplus value extraction. When this tendency occurs,
capital must increasingly make a choice between maintaining control of labour or
maximum surplus value extraction. Whilst it is still possibile, that the two may
exist together, this has more to do with accident than that of necessity. Hence
capital's quest to control labour, forces it to intemally relate the individual parts
of Labourism into a power bloc. Once united, the parts become more than their
sum and consolidate capital's ability control labour. There is a heavy price to
pay however: surplus value extraction becomes systematically compromised.
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Nevertheless, as has been argued, this is seen as a small price to pay for capital's
overall survival. The latter part of the last chapter made clear capital's
resistance to internally relating the parts of Labourism. Below the development
from external accidental relations to the eventual internal holistic one, is
examined in more detail. First, however, and by way of introduction, something
must be said about the more orthodox theories of why Labourism emerged.
Such theories often leave much unexplained, therefore deliberation on their
superficiality helps to lay the foundations for the concerns of the major part of
the chapter.
6.1 Orthodox Theories Surrounding the Emergence ofLabourism
In mid September 1931 British capitalism had been forced off the gold standard
for the fmal time. It was an act that was fundamental for capital and for the
emergent Labourist forces, because sterling's fall from grace, effectively
eliminatedthe discipline of socially necessary abstract labour formation imposed
on the British economy (an issue to which we return shortly). But although it
prooved fundamental for both left and right Labourist forces, because it
weakened the dominating sublation of use value by exchange value, it also
extended the material possibilities for the development of the Labourist
containment and appeasement of the working class and fmance capital
respectively.
Thus by 1945 the realignment of use and exchange value had taken place and the
material possibilities had now become actualities. The social welfare state was
born; a policy of full employment guaranteed; deficit budgeting and demand
management endorsed (even by the holy grail of sound money - the Treasury!); a
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national system of collective bargaining was agreed, and a commitment to a
general ethos of bureaucratic planning and moral repulsion from 'free markets'.
Yet, these were Labourist tendencies which took 15 years after the fall from gold
and almost 20 years after the defeat of the political defeat of the working class in
1926 to bear their fruit as systemic, holistic controls over labour. Hence the
difference between the sombre decade of the 1930s, when most apologists for
capital agreed it was in decline, and the decade of the 1950s, which culminated
in the ruling class belief that 'we had never had it so good', could not have been
starker. Therefore, one must ask, which factors were decisive in the
transformation, when all the ingredients of the transformation were there during
the 1930s. As Winch notes,
In contrast with the accepted picture of the thirties as one dominated
by extremism, division and disagreement, attention has been drawn
to important elements of consensus from which there arose the
ideological structure which took Britain safely through the forties
and brought her to rest in the fifties. That is to say the mixed
economy, "Butskellism" (in all but name), All Party acceptance
for the welfare state, all Party rejection of the nineteenth century
vision of state planning as a horrible evil, were concepts which
received their vital nurture in the nineteen thirties.221
In the 1930s, ideas of 'planning' and 'welfarism' were merely 'nurtured', whilst
in the 1940s and 1950s they were acted upon. Thus, the question begs, why the
sudden breakthrough in the forties? And, following this, what took Labourism
so long to develop systematically? It appears Winch is concerned witht he same
questions when she too queried just, 'What was the relationship of the planning
221 Donald Winch, Britain in the Thirties, a Managed Economy?, in C Feinstein, (1983) The Managed
Economy: Essays in British Economic Policy & Performance Since 1929, p48.
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movement to Keynesian ideas' in this period?222 Unfortunately her answer
remains descriptive, despite the detailed and painstaking enquiry undertaken by
her.
Of course, the tendencies or pillars of Labourism, may well have remained just
as they were - tendencies; although necessary, they need not have actualised
into a system. Before the onset of war, for example, the tendency toward full
employment policy and social welfarism remained atomised and separated from
other, conjuncturally related tendencies, such as demand management. After the
onset of war they became internally related or systematised, producing what
amounted to a new accumulation strategy for capital in Britain. Again, why
should Labourism have moved from a necessary tendency (given capital's
decline) to an actual system ofcontrol over the working class? It seems most
answers to this question leave out the dynamic interaction between fmance
capital and labour. Yet it is clear, as the previous chapter attempted to indicate,
that the historical contours of class struggle in and through the declining genesis
of capitalism, persistently either blocked, or else controlled the advance of, any
such move toward systemic Labourism prior to 1940. Arguably, the questions
asked of the thirties and forties can only begin to be fully resolved if one answers
the vital question of the epoch: with the working class effectively de politicised
post 1926, what other factor(s) eventually persuaded fmance capitalist forces to
risk the transition of a declining capitalism towards the adoption of systemic
Labourism?
One obvious first answer, has been to point to the 'war effort' in promoting
collectivism. One can hardly underestimate the ideological, political and
economic effects of war on the commitment by the state to intervene, as never
before, to consciously regulate capital, labour and commodity markets. Nor can
222 D Winch (1983), ibid, p48.
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one underestimate the moralising strength of those advocating a new, more
equitable, distribution of the results of such collaboration. The ideological grip
that a new consensus was being created out of (unattainable) bourgeoisie notions
of equity and justice, which amounted to nothing short of a 'new Jerusalem', had
transfixed Labourist forces. In retrospect the claim that this vision of distributive
utopia had deep foundations in society, has been viewed with justified cynicism.
Nevertheless, one cannot discard it totally as simply groundless propaganda.
The 'new Jerusalem' effect did account for some of the necessary groundwork, so
to speak, upon which systemic Labourism was to be built. Explanations such as
these may provide the superstructure (or at least some of it) for Labourism,
however, every superstructure must have its infrastructure, the nature of which
escapes the aforementioned explanation.
Clearly The 'war effort' explanation is inadequate as it stands. If the
culmination of World War Two acted as the catalyst for Labourism, then why
did World War One fail? The outcome of world war one also brought Labourist
forces to centre stage. The conception of planning and derision of market
anarchy, were also strong features of the time, whilst the war effort brought its
own ground swell of ideological commitments to 'live in harmony', in 'a home fit
for heroes', no less. Yet history attests to the fact that such Labourist
pretensions were quickly overturned and suppressed by capitalist forces, during a
counter-offensive period against labour lasting from late 1919 to 1927. The
swift recourse to deflation's and unwillingness/inability to compromise on the
part of the TUC, FBI, NCEO, provides evidence of the continuing hostility
between capital and labour. More specifically, it points to the intense unease
and hostility with which finance capital reacted to any attempted move toward
Labourism.223 Clearly, the war effort, in and of itself, may be a necessary, but
not a sufficient cause promoting the transition towards Labourism.
223 The reader is referred to the previous chapter for a more detailed discussion of this conflict.
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Another reason often proffered as to why Labourism prevailed after World War
Two and not after World War One, is a supposed shortfall in economic theory
and policy. Here it is claimed that technical knowledge surrounding the
management of fiscal planning, had not evolved sufficiently. The Keynesian
versus Treasury debate is a good example of this view. The essence of the
argument suggests that not until Keynes had formulated the 'General Theory of
Interest and Money', was there a systematic economic theory of Government
fiscal and monetary intervention in the economy to shake the commitment to
laissez faire expressed by the traditional rulers of policy. Once fiscal planning
became theoretically consistent, the old 'Treasury orthodoxy's' grip on policy
gave way to demand management policies, which in tum facilitated the
consolidation of Labourism. Undoubtedly, Keynes was vital to the overall cause
of Labourism and its adoption. To suggest the problem was one of inadequate
theoretical expertise, is clearly preposterous and gross idealism. However, even
assuming this idealism had some credibility, it still falls short as an explanation.
Keynes, and many before him such as Hobson, argued long before 1936 for
budget deficits and explained theoretically, the positive multiplier effect that
Government spending would have on aggregate demand and the positive effect
the accelerator principle would have on the subsequent capital investment
outlays.224 Nevertheless before the mid 1930s, such arguments where met
with some hostility by the Treasury, the Bank of England and the City. The
Keynesian prognosis and cure was there in all but name, but capital refused to
give it the time of day for many decades to come. Yet, as the 1930s gave way to
the 1940s, Treasury orthodoxy, for all intents and purposes, had been
overturned, and every pro capital commentator on the issue could speak of the
benevolent effects of 'a Keynesian revolution'.
224 For example, Hobson is implying much the same belief in the multiplied effects of state action on the
economy when calling for redistribution through state ownership, increased taxation of monolpolies, the
progresive taxation of excess savings, higher working class wages ..etc.
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Why expansionist theory and policy remained in the wilderness during most of
the thirties before its sudden adoption in the forties, is still to be explained by
such a theory. The problem with this conception of events is that it falls foul of
what E.P.Thompson referred to as the 'history from above' fallacy: 'great men'
performing 'great deeds', apparently free from any significant structural,
institutional and/or class constraints to transform the historical landscape by dint
of their will alone. This view often overlays an atomistic ontology of society
and as a result overplays the role of accidents in shaping the major contours of
history. The over emphasis by some economic historians of the thirties on the
ideological battle between Keynes and individuals within the Treasury such as
Hawtrey, Niemeyer, Leith-Ross..etc, can only be explained by the belief (almost
always implicit) that individuals and their face value rationale and motives are
the primary building blocks of social change. Concentration on individuals often
compels the need to fall back on unreal abstractions. For example, the thirties
becomes depicted as an era when one group of individuals - the 'orthodoxy' -
dominated another - the interventionists - over the most 'rational policy' . Hence
in this view Say's Law and the first economic commandment of the classical
quantity theory of money (QTM) reigned supreme, against the heresy of those
who depicted market rigidities and deficient demand conditions. However, as
Booth and Pack (1985) indicate, there were no such clear, black and white,
ideological or policy divides. This was an era of stalemate. Policy was ad hoc
and contradictory. For example, a commitment to cheap money and some short
term expansionism, was often juxtaposed alongside re commitments to balanced
budgets and free trade. A more important ramification of the 'history from
above' approach is that, by eliminating or at least downgrading class imperatives
and its constraints on action, the view had failed to explain why Labourist trends
could be rejected wholesale in one period, as a system underwriting a new
accumulation strategy, only to be endorsed in another period. Such theory fmds
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it difficult to explain why British capitalism was in a cul-de-sac during the
thirties, when consequently, the real reasons surrounding the sudden acceptance
of Labourism also escape it too.
There are those who do seek to situate the development, or otherwise, of
Labourist trends such as demand management, during the 1930s more
structurally. For example, Middleton (1985) and Skidelsky (1975), emphasise
technical constraints, such as the problem of how central Government, given the
commitment to intervention, was to administer local Government spending; and
the cultural constraints within Whitehall to interventionist philosophy.
Tomlinson (1990) amplifies this, by making the point that one major factor in the
failure of 'economic management' to establish itself in this period, was the
failure of government to generate confidence within the capitalist community for
such 'management'. As he argues, 'The confidence issue remains vital to the
debate about the possibility of more expansionary macroeconomics policies in
the 1930s' .225
Booth and Pack (1985) go furthest down the line of the structural constraint
argument. For them the important variable in impeding or accelerating the
trends towards Labourism (which they refer to as 'progressive policy') during
the 1930s were recalcitrant social forces. Apart from the usual Adversarial
politics engaged in by the Tory, Liberal and Labour Party's, and the limiting
effects of civil service conservatism, their analysis of 'social forces' makes little
more than oblique reference to 'class domination and confrontation' . This latter
observation, unfortunately, remains largely unclarified, except to mention that it
has something to do with the defeat of organised labour during the period 1918-
21 and the victory of finance capital and industrial capital thereafter. One can
detect that Implicit to Booth and Pack's argument is the belief that the social
225 Tomlinson, (1990), p132.
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forces they mention effectivelyheld hegemonic sway over the pace and direction
of change in the 1930s. Beyond these remarks they appear not to venture. It is
a pity Booth and Pack did not feel the need to extend their analysis. Perhaps
the essential problem is their starting point. For them the era was not
fundamentally the era of a declining capitalist social production relation and a
desperate attempt by reactionary Labourist forces to halt such a decline.
Instead Labourist forces are perceived by Booth and Pack to be the progressive
vanguard. For them, in the context of unemployment, class conflict and chronic
slump, it was the era when Labourist forces fought to secure the regulating
effects of 'the rational plan' as opposed to the anarchy of the market.
For Booth and Pack, 'progressive' advocates of the planning and management of
a failing market system ranged from Mosley to Macmillan. Clearly, then, the
profoundly undemocratic nature of planning has been ignored in their
contribution. The technical aspects and problems of planning are emphasised
and uncritically treated as rational in core, despite the numerous contradictions of
those like Mosley, who groped towards a coherent policy in the early 1930s.
Their 'deep social forces' explanation about the eventual emergence of
Labourism in the 1940s, amounts to institutional group politics, technologically
determined and shorn from the value relation and its decline. It is hardly a
surprise when Booth and Pack too, eventually have to fall back on explanations
such as Whitehall conservatism, the 'war effort' syndrome and the claimed
society wide conversion to the application of science to the planning and
management of industry, in answering the question as to why the sudden
convergence to Labourism post 1940 should have occurred. Although they had
some influence, they hardly accounted for such a dramatic change. There is no
empirical basis for the claim that science had gripped the nation any more by
1940 than it had in earlier decades. Thus the question still needs to be
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answered: why did Labourism come into being during and after World War Two
and not World War One?
Whilst not denying some validity to all the above factors, they ignore the more
fundamental social factors at work. The defeat of the mine workers and of the
General Strike after 1926, was a watershed period in the capitalist campaign to
effectively depoliticise the working class. Five years later in 1931 fmance
capital whilst not de politicised, felt a loss of identity too; in the sense that the
fall from gold, and with it their international orientation, had taken away a
particular accumulation strategy which had underpinned their hegemonic grip on
domestic policy. This is one reason why, despite the defeat of labour politically,
stalemate existed between the working class and finance capital throughout most
of the 1930s. The socialisation of productive forces was the an irreducible
objective ground through which the working class could always potentially
regroup and express themselves as a class. Finance capital's initial response was
to subject the working class to market forces and high unemployment as the
major method to circumvent this in the short term. Nevertheless, the
international constraints on fmance capital, objectified by sterling's withdrawal
from the gold standard, did leave it vulnerable to such a strategy of containment
and did, therefore, create the necessary political vacuum within which Labourist
forces both 'left' and right,' could establish their respective programmes for
arresting capitalism's decline in Britain.
The political vacuum by its very nature, could not last very long, therefore a
degree of urgency characterises the era. Essentially, Labourist forces had to
circumvent the working class and finance capital by forcing both to accept
another politics. Left Labourism strove to achieve this within labour, with
pronouncements of 'socialist planning from above', supported by the regulation
of the labour process and labour market via national collective bargaining
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agreement. Right Labourism, on the other hand, flirted with Fascism and
Keynesianism to entice fmance capital into accepting a combination of physical
and fiscal planning, which would also secure capital's continued rule. However
fmance capital was highly averse to both programmes. For finance capitalists
and their representatives, the Left solution would almost certainly lead to the re
politicisation of the working class; whilst the right solution, although it could
deal with the working class threat more effectively, would only do so by
emasculating sacred fmancial institutions that British finance capitalist had
erected to ensure the dominance of circulation capital. It is in this context - the
context of class stalemate - that one can begin to understand the 1930s and its
apparent schizophrenic policies: persistent high unemployment and piecemeal
attempts at expansionist policy (which remained committed to balancing the
budget); abortive rationalising of industries, which became transformed into
vehicles for cartelisations and monopoly practices; and the surge towards the
goal of 'scientifically managing labour', which withered back to the
accomodationism of paternalist welfare strategies. Towards the end of the
1930s, however, all such ambiguities were placed to one side as a new
commitment to accumulationmanifested.
It will be argued below that the crucial catalyst was the combination of Stalinism
and Keynesian as controls over labour. Together they offered capital a mode of
physical and fiscal planning, which de politicised labour and stabilised
commodity production and consumption. Specifically, Keynesianism offered
finance capital a means of asserting its rule through the money form (Keynesian
fiscal planning). Stalinism, on the other hand, offered the security that any
resultant necessity to move towards greater physical planning, would not now re
politicise labour, but on the contrary depoliticiuse it even further. In this sense
for Stalinism was a phenomena which could, apparently, commensurate the
incommensurable: proclaim undemocratic planning of capitalist decline to be
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evidence of 'socialism'. Thus Stalinism offered the left a vital political ideology
it had been lacking. Whilst Keynesianism provided the vital fiscal and
monetary planning levers which finance capitalists felt at home with; in the sense
that such levers could direct, and ultimately control (the pace of development in
physical planning, slowing its development and scope as necessary), to keep the
working class under control.
The 'stop go' economic surges which became infamous in the post war decades,
whilst surfacing as the disjuncture between domestic demand and international
trade, were in fact expressions of this deeper underlying 'consensus'. It is on the
basis, then, of the interlocking of Stalinist and Keynesian doctrine that both the
working class and finance capitalists could be contained and appeased within a
Labourist system. Once the interlocking was established the war effort merely
speeded the transition towards systemic Labourism, but it was not the vital
causal mechanism. This interlocking of Stalinism and Keynesian doctrines of
planning - undemocratic physical control of use values guided and adulterated
even further by the indirect control of exchange value through fiscal and
monetary planning, provided the basis for the uniting of left and right Labourist
forces. For example, from the mid 1930s onwards the difference between
Keynes, the TUC, Fabian reformers, official Communists, the Labour Party
leaders such as Strachey and Bevan, and Tories such as Macmillan etc, were
negligible. Most were transformed Keynesianist's. Most, also, were advocates,
to one degree or another, of the benefits of Soviet physical planning (without the
associated purges of course). despite the good will of many who may have been
unconscious of the deeper significance of the era, this is the essence of the so
called 'post war consensus'.
It is important to stress that neither finance capital nor the working class
expressed any long term commitment to systemic Labourism, after all Labourism
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was about containment and appeasement. The problem was that working class
appeasement was based on fmance capital's containment. That is, the greater
the containment of circulation capital to fixed capital formation, the more
successfully could the working class be appeased and so controlled. However,
advancing too far along such a route held little or no advantage for fmance
capital. Hence they would go so far then back off, searching for outlets more
conducive to circulation capital and speed of turnover. The result was that
Labourism was no fixed compromise but had a fluidity born of class struggle and
counter struggle over the fmer points of the realignment of use and exchange
value. For example, the appeasement of labour through full employment policy
(partial decommodification) and demand management, could only operate if
heavy restrictions were placed on the movement of capital. Alternatively, the
appeasement of fmance capital, to allow monetary planning to dominate physical
planning, and so allow its representatives overwhelming influence at boardroom
level within nationalised industries, could only operate if the working class were
effectively barred from any fundamental democratic influence over the national
decision making process concerning use value and need provision.
It is little wonder, then, that neither the working class nor fmance capital
expressed any lasting commitment to Labourism. The reality suggests that in
the short run, bereft of working class politics and no international solution for
fmance capital, Labourist forces had won by default. The overwhelming
emprical evidence suggests that by as early as 1951 the Labourist compromise
had already begun to uncoil. Hindsight suggests the termination of the uncoiling
process to be around the mid 1970s.226 Between 1940-51 Labourist forces
were able to consolidate some kind of unstable victory. However, once
international capital flow restrictions weakened, culminating in the reconvert
226 For example, see John Saville's historical overture ofLabourism's history and decline, in, Fyrth
(1994), introduction.
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ability of sterling in 1958, and a working class who had once again found their
rank and file voice within the context of boom and full employment, the
Labourist system of containment began to dismantle under the force of its own
internal contradictions.
Having made this claim however, a more detailed argument is required in order
to reject any notion that some all embracing logic of the inevitability of
Labourism exists. It is therefore important to detail the argument in such a way
that one understands both the necessary and the accidental processes at work. A
task which is far from easy, given the complexity of social relations which are in
their transitionary period. One way of proceeding would be to explain the
developments of each central pillar of Labourism on its own merits. Then,
having done this, attempt to explain the significance of Stalinism and
Keynesianism in their eventual culmination as systemic Labourism. It is this
method which, therefore, will be adopted. Firstly, from the Marxist
understanding of gold as the universal equivalent form of value, this chapter
assesses the full significance of sterling's fall from gold and the options this
opens up for Labourist forces. Secondly, the development of the central
tendencies of Labourism are considered; namely, the decommodification of
labour; the management of national money; the development of bureaucratic
atomisation of labour at the point of valorisation. A third consideration will be to
uncover the nature of the split between the right wing and left wing Labourist's,
regarding the political and economic programme that would be required to
contain labour, appease finance capital and advance toward Labourism.
Fourthly, an explanation is given of how and why Labourist elements become
unified on the basis of the interlocking doctrines of Stalinism and Keynesianism
to establish the Labourist system.
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The crucial argument in an earlier chapter was that the social organisation of
labour substantiates politically the objective social productive powers of labour.
Or as Marx sometimes expressed it, 'the increasing integration of modem society
through the ever more complex division of labour has made every individual
more dependent both on every other individual and on that society as a
whole'..227 On this basis, labour begins to exert a political organisational
response to match its objective socialisation. Capital must attempt to live with
this, because it does not have the option to move the forces of production
backwards in history to a time when labour had not socialised enough to
politically challenge it. The initial reaction from British capitalism is twofold:
parasitism (see earlier chapter for explanation) and prolonged systematic
unemployment of labour. Capital's reaction is a reflection of a deeper
ontological crisis of, on the one hand, labour which no recognises the power of
capital less and less - dilution of commodity fetishism; and on the other hand,
capital which begins to reject its substantive ground - labour - as a result the
commitment towards abstract labour formation on British soil becomes seriously
weakened.
It has been explained in an earlier chapter how the socialisation of labour and the
rising organic composition of capital, was the basis for the consolidation of
finance capital. It was also pointed out how these problems are the real basis of
the increasing inability to fix sterling to gold. Gold becomes increasingly,
although by no means wholly, symbolic. It was also pointed out how finance
capital, in attempting to deal with these problem, is forced to choose between
two strategies of decline: outright parasitism and Labourism. Parasitism was the
preferred initial option and therefore finance capital disengaged from the labour
process during the period 1870 to around the late 1930s, despite fluctuations.
Indeed the fluctuations, it has been argued, are explained by the long drawn out
227 Hillel Ticktin, quoted in, The Times Education Supplement, 11 Aug 1994.
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battle to tie frnance capital to a new accumulation process based on Labourism.
British frnance capital was forced to disengage with the British working class for
another reason too, which bears heavily on ones comprehension of the epoch.
British frnance capital was compelled to safeguard gold backed sterling's role as
guarantor of abstract labour formation globally. In other words, British frnance
capital had two contradictory roles to play in its declining epoch. Firstly,
secure the containment of labour in Britain; secondly, as personified world
capital, to safeguard sterling and the gold standard in order to make secure
capital internationally. Thus, it was absolutely essential that a sterling backed
gold standard remained, because it was British capital and international capital's
substantive ground, which guided and dominated the interpenetration of use and
exchange value and the rate and distribution of value expansion globally. In a
word, the globalisation of commodity fetishism depended upon it. This needs to
be stressed, as it emphasises even more, the true transformational nature of the
1930s when one capitalist nation after another, followed Britain in rejecting the
restrictions of the universal equivalent.
Of course for external reasons, by the late 1920s an adherence to the gold
standard became an insurmountable problem. Firstly, the bankruptcy of major
debtors such as the Viennese bank Creditanstalt and the German Reichsbank,
caused immense damage to confidence in sterling. Secondly, massive
speculatory arbitrage set in motion by the return to gold after 1925 and
intensified by technological advances in communication, had made it impossible
to stabilise the movement of gold on the basis of socially necessary labour times.
The speculative arbitrage of course, was largely the result of the profound
unconfidence of western capital per-se in their ability to extract profit and control
labour.228
228 See P. Einzig, Some New Features ofGold Movements, in Economic Journal, Vol xL 1930. Einzig
observed how seculation on interest rate arbitrage between international banks and the massive increase in
speculative secondary share issues, had caused chaos in the movement of gold. No longer did gold flow
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It is this contradiction that is evident in the Bankers Ramp scenario in 1931.
Whereby a cohort of international banks from London, New York and Paris..etc,
offered the Bank of England a loan only on the basis that the Government cut
expenditure on social security and unemployment assistance. That is, only if
Britain would desist from spending on anything other than that which assisted
value creation. Thus, in an effort to save the universal equivalent, the
international community of finance capitalists united to force concessions from
the British Government of the day. Despite the fact that, according to one
source, the Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald was little more than the head of
a 'bankers Government,229, whatever way, British capital simply could not
guarantee its compliance with international capital for any length of time. The
internal domestic contradiction between the classes over the commodity form of
production was too intense. Inevitably, the gold standard had to be removed in
order that the British capitalist class could deal with its own 'labour problem' as
best it could. The fact that the gold standard eventually broke down for most
western powers by the mid 1930s is testament to the international stagnation of
capitalism.
British finance capital was, therefore, caught in the closing vice of a vicious
contradiction. The contradiction lay in the fact that the attempt to stay on gold
had exacerbated internal confrontations with labour, which in tum further
exacerbated the ability of British finance capital to stay on gold. Yet the gold
standard was of vital importance because it ensured the adequate functioning of
commodity fetishism: the capitalist control over labour. This of course is a
problem for capital in general and not just for British capital. When national
acording to traded commodities and balance each country on the basis of socially necessary divisions of labour.
This itself signifies that gold, as abstract labour incarnate was no longer requried by a capitalist system in
decline which wasbent more on speculation than advancing the forces of production.
229 H. N. Brailford (1931), The City or the Nation.
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capital's come off gold they may ease the pressure of any internal conflicts with
labour, but only at the expense of embroiling themselves in a more serious
contradiction: the advancement of labour on the basis of needs over exchange
value.
Hence the problem is an intractable one for any national capital, but is especially
so for the first capitalist nation - British capital and specifically its ruling elite -
fmance capital. British capital's dogged and determined fight to remain on gold,
is often seen as irrational, because it becomes, from this angle, the most rational
of wishes, relative to the needs of capital. To illuminate this rationale, it is vital
to consider the ontological signiftcance of gold in more detail.
6.2 The Ontological Significance ofGold: A Further Consideration
It would appear that the usual discussions which surround the gold standard
rarely skims the surface of the issue. Apart from description of the institutions
involved in its maintenance, one is, invariably, provided with a running
commentary of its empirical effects upon the sterling/gold parity, caused by the
movement of internal and external balances of trade. Yet even such empiricism
allows one more than a glimpse of the true signiftcance of gold for capitalism.
For example, Prior to WWl when speculation had not as yet become so severe
as to cause gold to dysfunction, sterling was instantly convertible to gold at a
fixed ratio of £3.17s.10d per ounce; and vice-versa at £3.17s.9d. Individuals
were free to export and import gold according to the contours of their trade and
the Government was bound to inflow and outflow gold according to these ratios.
If the external balances were negative, then gold would flow out. As sterling
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was 'as good as gold', then it contracted in line with the withdrawal of gold.
Thus the gold standard meant that monetary restriction and, by implication,
domestic capital accumulation became necessary. Restrictions being enforced
mainly via a rise in the bank rate and/or cuts in public spending. Adherence to
gold meant reflating and deflating the economy in line with the balance of world
commodity production and more specifically with world socially necessary
labour time. For this to occur, as it normally did, despite outcries from the
losers, the classes in general would have had to accept this process as a more or
less 'natural law' of industry. Thus, under the gold standard commodity fetishism
reaches its highest form. This is empirically verified by the obdurance of even
the trade unions to break with 'free trade' and the 'natural discipline' of gold upon
which free trade rests. For many years after objective capitalist decline in Britain
had set, the subjective adherence to gold and so commodity fetishism remained
strong. Free trade and free collective bargaining were, after all is said and done,
the watchwords of both Walter Citrine and Ernest Bevin, leaders of the official
labour movement. Alfred Marshall sums up the ideal world of a capitalist
society on gold;
All resources are employed because markets clear - every
willing seller finds a buyer. So that everything for sale or
hire is in fact sold or hired, or, if it is not, it is because of
some obstruction which prevents these transactions from
taking place. This is achieved through flexibility of prices.
The higgling of the market is axiomatically capable of finding
a point at which supply and demand are brought into
equilibrium....Thus unemployment is a signal that the
price of labour is too high: it is axiomatic that at lower
wages the market will clear. If the reward of labour is
constrained by the current level of productivity, so is the
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reward of capital. Investment depends on saving. It
is the job of interest rates to
fmd a level which offers sufficient stimulus to each of
them so as to bring their levels into equilibrium..
Such, then, is the ideal world of capital from the pen of Alfred Marshall. He
merely reflects in theory what capital would like to achieve in practice. One
could say that, from Ricardo's theoretical confirmation of the central importance
to capital of a gold standard, in the 1820s, right up until the 1870s, some
semblance of the ideal was born out in practice. But it may not have been as
clear cut an 'axiom of the market' as Marshall would have liked. Nevertheless,
the gold standard did operate to re-adjust prices and quantities (especially those
of the commodity labour power) within the British economy on a cyclical basis.
However, once the socialisation of labour had gained ground and the organic
composition of capital had become a chronic problem, then adherence to gold
meant resistance to price changes from both labour and capital, rather than an
adjustment to price change. From then on, adherence to gold produced only the
stagnation of domestic accumulation.
For Marx, gold was the 'material symbol of physical wealth', 'the epitome of all
things', 'the compendium of social wealth; and 'As regards its form, it is the direct
incarnation of universal labour, whilst its content was the quintessence of all
concrete labour'. It is capitalism's measuring rod of universal wealth in an
individual form. Functioning as money capital, it converts merely ideal prices
attached to particular isolated commodities, into aliquot expressions of socially
necessary world abstract labour. For Marx gold is real world money while
currencies and prices are only ever notional money. Gold as world money
breaks down the barriers of parochial exchange values and outstrips silvers claim
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to do SO. The development of gold as world money allows the system of
capitalism to reach its peak in as much as the development of an independent
exchange value now opposes and dominates use value: the alienation of labour is
complete. 230 For Marx gold came to embody the substantive heart of the
capitalist social relation. In many crucial ways 'the servant' of capitalists - gold -
'became their master,231 : maintaining the discipline of commodity fetishism
over capitalist and labour, in as much as use value and need where persistently
sacrificed on the alter of 'competition', profit and 'free trade' - all 'natural
endeavours' of course.
Given the ontological significance of gold as the substantive ground of the value
form, what should one make of a world capitalist system, and Britain in
particular, that had, by 1931, conclusively rejected it? And further, what
significance does this rejection have for the further necessary establishment of
Labourism into the social fabric of capitalist decline? Some incite may be given
if one reverses the following quote from Marx; 'At the same rate..as the
conversion of products into a commodities is being accomplished, so also is the
conversion of one special commodity (gold) into money,232 The reverse aptly
describes the nature of the epoch of decline; 'at the same rate as the re-
conversion of commodities into direct use values is being accomplished, so also
is the re-conversion of the universal money commodity (gold) into a degraded
particular commodity.
In Fundamentals then, the post 1931 world is one which has rejected the
immanent form through which socially necessary abstract labour could be
harnessed. There is no longer a real material ground through and in which
exchange value can stand independently from use value to oppose and dominate
230 K. Marx, A Contribution to thev Critique ofPolitical Economy, (1973) p122-25, Progress Pub.
231 K. Marx, ibid, p125.
232 K. Marx, Capital Vol 1 (1983), p90. The word gold is inserted by me.
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human needs. The capitalist system based on gold has finally come into absolute
conflict with the forces of production: the gold standard had to go. Coming of
gold allowed the potential for the forces of production, not simply to advance,
but more essentially, to be harnessed more and more to the requirement of
blocking labour from moving from a class in itself into a class for itself.
Thus in so far as this gives manifestation to capitalism's decline, it counterpoises
with ever greater clarity two opposing choices for capital: the choice between
control or profit. In essence, the former now becomes the greater necessity. In
the past, control via commodity fetishism and bureaucracy, facilitated more than
hindered profitability. Now control increasingly has to be endorsed regardless
of its negative effects on profitability. For example, alongside the craving for
surplus value (which continues), there develops monopoly restrictions on
valorisation and political compromises with the 'representatives' of labour which
clearly have the same effect, for example, collective bargaining (see below).
Before only latent, but trends which now begin to dominate the political
economy of capitalism: the true era of Labourism can begin.
To reemphaise the point made in an earlier chapter, the end of the era of gold is a
central manifestation of the latent decline of capitalism. A decline which had
been gaining pace for half a century. Gold was the anchor for a healthy
interpenetration of use and exchange value. When the two forms of labour no
longer interpenetrate due to rising organic compositions of capital and a
socialised workforce, the forces of production become increasingly retarded.
Hence gold, the pivotal social ground forcing the interpenetration of use and
exchange value, must be removed to allow an interpenetration of use and
exchange value on new terms. The new terms must allow use value to dominate
exchange value in large areas of the economy and in such a way that allows
labour to continue to be exploited and suppressed and allow existing private
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capital to benefit. For example, the eventual Nationalisation Programme of the
1940s secured the political subordination of workers to the principles of the
bureaucratic provision of needs; secured the administrative rule of finance
capitalists; and secured a lucrative spin of contracts for capital in the private
sector (I return to this later) By transforming the interpenetrative relationship
between use and exchange value in this way, the system survives, but in a
weakened form. This becomes the true context (necessary ground) within
which the emergence of Labourism, in status nascendi for many decades,
eventually secures its systemic existence and hegemonic control. The fall from
gold could have lead directly to Labourism in the sense that the economic
vacuum it opens allows the potential for the full development of latent
tendencies such as, the management of money, social welfarism, industrial
relations compromise and paternalist management strategies. However, as
argued, they did not. Chance, accident and pragmatism ruled finance capital and
the forces of Labourism. These interweaved with the necessary context and
promoted, but did not guarantee Labourism.
Without gold, national currencies set adrift from the incarnation of world money
and therefore socially necessary abstract labour. The management of a national
money became decisive in allowing the rift between exchange value and use
value to develop within a national system of exploitation. The cost to capital
was that certain essential use values must now be bureaucratically regulated to
meet social needs directly, or at least without recourse to valorisation on the
criteria of strict socially necessary abstract labour times. The form which this
necessary development takes, depends on accidental factors emanating from the
balance of class forces at the particular point in time. The particular balance of
class forces in Britain meant that nationalised money capital opened the way for
a central plank of Labourism: social welfarism. Beveridge's vision of a social
welfare system was to become a central feature in the bureaucratic containment
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of labour. Social welfarism opened the way for the establishment of the 'divided
wage': a social wage which guaranteed labour outwith the self reproduction wage
for expanding capital. This, coupled with another development - full
employment - effectively decommodified labour supply. As Dixon puts it, the
'divided wage' symbolises the 'suspension of value'.233
The new interpenetration of use and exchange value also opens the way for a
systematic approach to the commodity, labour power: The productive activity of
workers becomes decommodified and then bureaucratically atomised into
abstract collectivities. For example, a bureaucratic network of 'collective
bargaining', embraces the workplace, intertwines throughout the economy and
interpenetrates with the capitalist state, which envelops society and
decommodifies essential elements of labour activity and supply. This new
interpenetration of use and exchange value in terms favourable to the former,
allows the labour market to incorporate as central tendencies what were before
only peripheral to the exploitation of labour. For example, there is the
development of internal labour markets. These become an essential mode of
bureaucratically administrating the supply of and demand for labour after 1930
(Gospel, 1983, in Thurlow & Wood). This balkanisation of labour serves to
divide workers between a core stable employed and a periphery, who suffer
instability of employment, inferior conditions of work and more intense
exploitation (A. Friedman, 1977). This type of decommodification facilitates the
de politicisation of workers and the re channelling of working class agitation
and demands against the system of capital, into bureaucratic non substantial
collective agitation's within the system of capita1.234
233 See William Dixon for an interesting and revealing disection of the universal and divided wage forms
which have characterised 20th century capitalism, in Radical Chains, No 4, 1993.
234 This is brought out clearly in Friedman (1977); he employs the concepts of 'direct control' as opposed
to 'responsible autonomy', to explain how managment use this bureaucratic atornisation of workers as a control
strategy within the site of valorisation and the labour market.
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Collective bargaining introduces the same forces of bureaucratic atomisation into
the commodity sale of labour power and builds on those adopted within the
labour process. In tandem with the atomisation of workers within production,
collective bargaining substantially adds to the decommodification of the sale of
labour power, and the wholesale political atomisation of the working class. In
essence, therefore, we can say that national collective bargaining frameworks
and internal labour markets, block the development of a working class from a
class in itself, to becoming a class for itself. Viewed in this light, national
collective bargaining frames of reference, become a central backbone of
Labourism; without which the various strands of Labourism would never reach
their true potential.
The economic vacuum left by the fall from gold also provided Trade unions and
the growing network of 'personnel functions' within the site of valorisation, with
an essential function: policing workers at the interface of production and
exchange. In this sense, demarcation lines and the plethora of job descriptions
and pay grades become a virtue to be fetishised in the era of Labourism. Proof
of such a tendency, if any is seriously needed and overwhelmingly provided by
academics of 'Business History". The academic archaeology of 'Business'
practice has unearthed an uncontentious fact: dominant productive capital's since
the 1930s, have become swamped with codified job descriptions and demarcated
tasks between and within trades. In addition to which, a whole plethora of
management strategies/organisational experiments have developed. Hannah
indicates that 'managerial overheads' almost tripled between 1907-48, from 7.6%
of employees to 19.7%.235 Although there has been residual conflict within the
Labourist system between management hierarchies and trade union
bureaucracies, they are, more essentially, functional complements of each other,
ill the goal of atomising the working class. The effect of bureaucratic
235 L. Hannah (1976), p72 ..
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atomisation within the workplace, is to channel any potential class discontent
into reformist collective actions. These are then taken up at the level of the
economy to be policed by the trade union leadership and then given ultimate
sanction by the Labour Party. The sponsorship of a social welfare state, is the
[mal buffer against working class formation and the final logical development of
bureaucratic atomisation within the workplace. Therefore tendencies which
have been in existence for a long period of time, begin, necessarily to draw
together as powerful instruments of control over labour, once the basis of a
realignment between use and exchange value has been established.
It is in this situation of an attenuation of capitalist decline and trend towards
Labourism's that the reactionary side of trade unionism, so well depicted by
Marx, Trotsky and Lenin, truly develop their reactionary potential, to dominate
and emasculate the progressive aspects of trade unions. The more Labourism
develops, the less Unions are organisers of a class effecting a bulwark against
advancing capital and instead become 'Lieutenants of capital'; policing the
collective supply of labour, in the overall interests of sustaining a failing system
of exploitation. Trotsky puts the position of trade union bureaucracy in the
'epoch of imperialist decay' succinctly, when stating:
There is one common feature in the development, or more
correctly the degeneration, of modern trade union organisations
throughout the world: it is their growing closely to and
growing together with state power..236
Such, then, are the main tendential social pillar of Labourism, unleashed by a
realignment of use and exchange value, given impetus by the decline of gold, the
236 Leon Trotsky, Marxism and Trade Unionism, cited in Tome Clarke & Laurie Clements (1977), Trade
Unions Under Capitalism, p85, Fontana.
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universal equivalent. The loss of capitalism's substantive ground, leaves an
economic vacuum for the tendencies to either gain ground or stagnate in hybrid
forms. Within a declining capital, especially one in the transition between a fall
form gold and established systemic Labourism, all such tendencies are in a state
of flux. It is a world where the old and the new interpenetrate and pragmatism
rules the day. Pragmatism and what can only be described as transitionary
potential, characterised the world of the 1920s and especially the 1930s in
Britain. It is in the context of this pragmatic transitory potentiality, that the
sections which follow describe and explain the contradictory development of
each of these tendencies to actuality.
6.3 Managing the Labour Process in the Years ofTransition
There is an immense amount of literature on the emergence and meaning of
scientific management.237 Especially literature in response to Braverman's
seminal work. Specialist have either rebuked or rejected (S Wood, 1982)
Braverman's claims; or else revised them (Salaman, 1983; Thompson, 1990).
However, the critique has taken place outside of the context of a declining
capitalism. Which is a pity because the context of a declining capitalism is
fundamental to an understanding of why some forms of 'scientific management'
become adopted in one environment, whilst others are rejected or else only
partially deployed. The context also helps one understand more deeply, why the
'consent of labour' is 'manufactured' more successfully in some environments than
in others.238 For example, the requirement that management share the control
237 A good overview of the debate surrounding management strategy and the labour process is that of
Kni~t & Wilmott (1990).
38 See M, Burawoy (1979) for some interesting and incisive observations on the 'politics of production',
generated by class conflict and compromise. He correctly points out that conscent and conflict interact in very
complex ways, ways which Braverman tended to overlook. The problem remains, however, that, like most
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of labour with trade unions in the context ofa declining capitalism, had unique
ramifications in Britain. Because of this duality of control, management
practices, adopted to control labour, were unique to Britain, in as much as they
did not contain Taylorism as a dominant strategy. Instead 'management
welfarism' dominated, eventually laying the seeds for the easier adoption of a
wider commitment to 'social welfarism' (a point we raise later in more detail).
It is this, which labour process theorists fail to contextualise. Their dispute with
each other, divorced from a political economy of a declining capitalism, takes the
form of empiricism: one group fmding evidence to deny there was/is, or ever
was, 'one best way to manage' the labour process; another group providing
evidence there was/is a 'best way' and its name is Taylorism. Whilst one rejects
abstract universalism, only to embrace empiricism; the other rejects empiricism
to embrace abstract universalism. Thus the essential reason for Taylorism's
weak adoption by British capital, becomes lost in this false dichotomy. Within
the context of a declining capital, the reason is simple, yet profound. Taylorism
furthered the tendency to intensify abstract labour in production and with it the
socialisation of labour and so its potential political socialisation (see earlier
chapter). Therefore, Taylorism can only be used safely by a capitalism able to
effectively integrate and so control the working class to the needs of capital.
In an era of increasingly socialised labour, this can be done in one of two ways :
Firstly, by brute force, engendering a deep political atomisation (the counter
revolution in Germany 1933, the counter insurgency against the US working
class in the 1930s, and of course Stalinism in the Soviet Union)).239 Secondly,
by appeasing the working class with stable and growing living standards (eg post
war W. Germany and USA). This latter kind of worker integration required a
labour process theory, it is largely descriptive and lacks contextualisation within the genesis of capitalist
decline.
239 See Hillel Ticktin, (1991), Origins ofthe Crisis in the USSR, for a detailed discussion of this.
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dominating presence in the world market to offset the potential unemployment
effects of a high growth in the organic composition of capital which is implied by
Taylorism. It also requires strong unity of purpose between productive and
money capital's.240 All of these conditions where never adequate in Britain: the
classes remained polarised to a degree unique to western capitalism. During the
1930s, after the fall from gold, the polar opposition weakened and to some
degree, integration occurred. However, class opposition still remained an
important obstacle to Taylorism. In this context, any implementation of
Taylorism leading to the greater abstraction of labour, could well have ignited,
not diffused, the conflict between capital and labour in Britain.
This is the main reason why management strategy in Britain remained ad-hoc,
and so pragmatic. Weiner's cultural explanation of decline, in so far as it
situates amateurish management as a vital ingredient is, if in a somewhat
overstated fashion, quite correct. However, it deals only with the effects, of
why there was no consistent 'scientific management' approach, to the problem of
labour, developed in Britain. British management pragmatism and short
termism, with regard to the control of labour, was no accident. Nor was it the
outcome of a declining 'entrepreneurial spirit'. Rather, it was an necessary means
of capitalism's survival in Britain. In fact one could even claim that it was a sign
of British capitalism's rising 'entrepreneurial spirit'. That the lack of systematic
'Taylorism' was evidence, not of British capital's backwardness, but of British
fmance capital's advanced manoeuvring in securing profits globally, whilst
controlling the advances of labour 'back home. One must not forget that in this
respect, the apparent anti-entrepreneurial nature of British capitalists rarely
stretched further than the shores of Britain. In a global context British capitalists
240See previous chapter for this and related points concerning the problems posed for capital by a rising
organic composition of capital.
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where still profit maximisers, and, more often than not, insisted on exploiting
labour with the best 'scientific management techniques' then available.
British management had to work within uncertain structures, created by British
finance capital's unwillingness to commit itself fully to Labourism. A facter
which meant that management in Britain, unlike, for example, the USA, rejected
the 'direct control' epitomised by Taylorism and what some refer to as, 'Fordism',
for more indirect methods. As Lewchuk observes;
Perceptions of class relations were such that payment by
results and the cultivation ofcommon interests between
capital and labour, both nationally and within the firm,
were seen to be potentially more profitable than direct
control through mechanisation.241
Given the irresolvable contradiction between capital and labour, there is always
an intense conflict within management. On the one hand, management need to
provide workers with legitimation of their existence, as being necessary to the
labour process. On the other hand, management must ruthlessly pursue the most
technically efficient methods of maximising, surplus value extraction. This
contradiction manifests itself differently, within different economies, with the
dependent variable being the balance of class forces. In Britain's case, the need
to legitimate was stronger before the defeat of the workers in 1926 and weaker
once the de politicisation of workers became affective.242 After the defeat, the
objective conditions were set for management rationalisation of the labour
process and the goal of maximum surplus value extraction, which overwhelmed
any need for management to legitimate their presence to workers. However,
241 w. Lewchuk, Fordism and British Motor Car Employers 1896-1932, cited in, Gospel & Littler (1984),
p82. Mv emphasis.
24:4J. Child (1969), p70-71.
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rationalisation, which implies high levels of fixed capital investment, was not to
be. Finance capitalists held the upper hand and restricted and policed
developments within productive capital, leaving management, despite the defeat
of labour, in a precarious position. The complaints often aired concerning the
problem of amateurish management, find their basis in this assertion.
Thus, management of labour in the interests of capital always requires both a
legitimation and a rationale for its existence, but the manoeuvrings of finance
capital in Britain cut away their material requisite. The rationale at the turn of
the 20th century had based itself on the ideology that 'scientific' forms of
management alone could achieve technical efficiency. A class neutered concept
which provided the basis for class harmony of purpose: rising living standards
for workers and maximum profits for owners of capital. The problem for
management in Britain was that the labour movement and finance capital were in
far too an antagonistic a mood to reciprocate the required compromises. A
reality which meant that the technical rationalisations (Fordism) underwriting
Taylorism were inconceivable in the Britain of the 1920s and 1930s. In short,
the opposition between capital and labour, fragmented the development of a
management function and obstructed the development of technical expertise in
the extraction of surplus value. British management in general, could never
generate enough control over the labour process to gather themselves together as
a coherent group. The movement away from gold may have provided the
economic vacuum, but the political dominance of finance capital blocked any
concerted fixed capital investment. Thus British management were forced to
ditch any faith they may have harboured in Taylorism and adopt the faith of what
may be described as 'Quakerism'; that crude mixture of paternalism, industrial
'welfarism' and 'human relations practice'. In reality anything that was
pragmatic, easily discarded, market based and did not rely on major structural
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change within production, was adopted: in short a 'minimum intervention
strategy', characterised the era between the wars for management.243
Because finance capital's willingness to accumulate was so shaky, then the
necessary relative surplus value extraction and increased fixed capital formation
was never forthcoming, at least on a sufficient scale to underwrite Taylorism and
set the management function on more conducive ground. Instead emphasis
shifted to other ways of pumping out relative surplus value and other forms of
management control designed to achieve it. Child, for example, argues that the
'human relations' approach, first 'discovered' by Elton Mayo in the mid
twenties,244 eventually dominated as a mode of worker containment. Some
characterise this management practice as 'inhuman relations'. It has a more
sophisticated psychological basis than Taylorism, which lays greater emphasis
on commodity fetishism for its psychic controls. The human relations approach
is more suitable for social relations where commodity fetishism is in decline and
capital wants to keep a distance from labour. It emphasises mans social nature
and exemplifies the view that in the modem world it takes more than the cash
nexus to control labour. The goal is to reroute the necessary collectivity of
labour away from confrontation with capital and towards accepting its rule.
Much play is made on community spirit and Job enrichment'. Concepts which
foster the belief that the site of exploitation is an enriching experience; a location
where all sides gain material and spiritual benefit. In contrast to Taylorism's
avocation of strict commodity fetishism ('rational economic man'), Justice'
243 C.R. Littler (1982), The Development ofthe Labour Process in Capitalist Societies, p55-58.
244 Elton Mayo's study of work groups at a large US company (Western Electric Company) has gone down
in the annuls of management discourse as that moment when 'scientific management' began to realise workers
were more than commodities. His study furthered the acceptance of the so called 'human relations' school of
managment: a social psychological approach to workers control, which suggests, unsurprisingly, that social
bonds between workers, are, in most cases, a powerful constraining force upon surplus value extraction, that
the 'carrot' of individual incentive pay and bonus payments can only go so far in breaking down.. Over the
years the school has spawned many strategies to direct the social motivations of workers towards the interests
of productive capital and valorisation. Strategies such as, Job enlargement, job rotation, job enrichment.
Most sociological textbooks provide a breakdown of the ab(use) and manipulative essence of this
phenomeneon.
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'fairness' and 'equity', are claimed to be the fundamental goals and objectives of
labour; whilst wage and profit maximisationgoals are played down.
Gross and manipulative they may have been, however, such management
strategies were part of the ideological manifestations of the class compromise
being effected in Britain. The real process is much more simple and brutal.
Behind the ideology of the human relations approach, lies the intensification of
exploitation through the intensification of work. This drive to intensify work,
lessens the need for fixed capital investment. Valorisation is still predominantly
achieved through relative surplus value extraction. However, it is now less the
product of the advances in the forces of production through increased fixed
capital formation. Thus the influence of human relations practice within British
capitalism, is a response to the deadlock between finance capital and labour,
which vitiates against large scale fixed capital investment. This secret - of
human relations management's attempt to squeeze out relative surplus value
against a background of low fixed capital formation - whilst appeasing labour
with lip service to notions of 'harmony and social justice', is adequately
expressed by manager's of the era themselves. For example, as one source
comments,
the effect on the rate of output in a department, ie, its
efficiency, of substituting a foreman who leads his
men for one who drives may be as great as that of the
installation of a new labour saving machine...245
245 E.T. Kelly, Welfare, in J. Lee,edt, (1929),The Principles ofIndustrial Welfare, cited in 1. Child
(1969), p79, op-cit.
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Direct control (offsprings of Taylorism and Fordism) remained very weakly
established in Britain. For Lewchuk246 they symbolise manifestations of labour
force passivity. Hence the logical conclusion of Lewchuk's argument is to
suggest that the reason direct control was only partially successful in Britain was
due to the intensity of the class struggle between capital and labour. A
conclusion completely in step with the argument of this thesis.
Luwchuk's study of the inter war years, confirms that no management strategy
dominated. Instead there existed a pragmatic combination of human relations
management and 'industrial welfarism', which controlled labour via the direct
dependency generated by paternalism. Such a claim appears at first, to be at
odds with Childs belief that human relations practice dominated. This is only
apparent however, for it depends on how broad a stroke one uses to defme
'human relations'. A broad defmition, which combines the two as essentially
identical attempts to go beyond the 'cash nexus' to control labour, is a
reasonable propposition. Taken together, they do constitute the main managerial
response to labour in Britain. Therefore, one can say that, as a compliment to
class containment by 'human relations practice, classical British paternalism, in
the form of 'industrial welfarism', became a central feature of managerial control
over labour.
The essence of the matter is that industrial welfarism induces compliance via use
value 'gifts' to labour. 'Gifts' such as the paternalistic provision of housing,
workplace shop clubs, company pensions..etc. In effect industrial welfarism
becomes the material basis for the ideology of 'human relations'. Like human
relations practice, industrial welfarism has a lineage longer than the decline of
the commodity form of social relations. However, as with human relations
practice, it comes of age once the material conditions for a new alignment
246Lewchuk, op-cit
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between bureaucratic control of use values and exchange value become
substantiated. This is because, as was earlier indicated, a systematic
application of industrial welfarism relies on management's ability to go beyond
the 'cash nexus' to harness control over labour. One could, therefore, deduce,
that the closer to Labourism British capitalist society got to full employment
conditions and coherent national collective bargaining institutions and such like,
the more important did bureaucratic non-market forms of control become. Craig
Littler puts the essential function of industrial welfarism in stark terms:
The supply, efficiency and discipline of labour were
continuing themes in welfare administration...Services
are provided where wage contracts cannot accomplish
this formal and immediate subordination to the employer. (P57)
Clearly, in the absence of a decisive continuation of the real subordination of
labour to capital, the formal subordination, presupposed by the 'cash nexus', is
an inadequate objective basis for commodity fetishism to control labour.
Industrial welfarism and human relations practice is an attempt to strengthen or
buttress the formal subordination. But surely, it could be argued, the real
subordination of labour had occurred in Britain and was the basis of labour's
socialisation and negation of capitalism? This is an argument which has been
fundamental to this thesis. However the point is, once the real subordination of
labour had gotten under way and had produced the socialisation of labour, the
response of fmance capital was to limit the further development of the real
subordination of labour, by limiting the development of fixed capital formation
and imparting the circulation capital bias spoken of in a previous chapter. The
main aim being to stop the working class becoming a class in its self. From this
decisive moment onwards, the real subordination of labour is continued, but
never decisively continued.
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Thus, given the weak advancement of real forms of subordination during the
twentieth century, bureaucratic forms of control such as 'industrial welfarism',
combined with human relations practice to buttress capitalist control
mechanisms. As Labourist institutions consolidated themselves throughout the
1930s, these types of control become intrinsic to the social fabric. In fact they
alter even more dramatically the form of the dialectical interpenetration of use
and exchange value. As forms of control, they emphasise the bureaucratic
manipulation of needs. As such the strict adherence to the ergon of exchange
value criteria became increasingly subordinated to use value. Which of course
manifested, itself from the point of view of industrial capital and its apologists, as
'amateurishmanagement'.
Melling appears to empirically endorse these theoretical points made above,
stating that,247 the dominance of control mechanisms such as industrial
welfarism, suggested a system of class containment that would, as a general
principle, sacrifice profits for the overall control of the labour movement. This
of course is the essence of the developing system of Labourism. Lewchuk
confirms this, again empirically, when pointing out how one car plant after
another in Britain between the wars - from Rolls Royce to Vauxhall Motors -
refused to implement Fordist and Taylorite direct controls over labour. Instead
they chose a pragmatic mixture of piece rate incentives and 'industrial welfarism',
both of which hindered the maximisation of profits. For example, the piece rate
system became a battle ground between capital and labour over the distribution
of the relative surplus value accruing out of the intensification of work. In many
cases piece rate bonuses went wholly to workers. Capitalists were then forced
to cut rates in an effort to redistribute the relative surplus value created back into
247Melling, in Gospel and Littler (1986), op-cit.
257
their own pockets. The whole process maximised confrontation rather than
profits.
Yet despite this, according to Lewchuk, employers and management would not
countenance a move towards a day rate wage system and control through
mechanisation (real subordination). Instead, associations of capitalists, such as
the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF), tinkered with the piece rate
system. In this respect 'premium' piece rate systems were conceived. These
gave both capital and labour a share of any increases in relative surplus value
extracted from labour. The piece rate is said to be an attempt to foster common
interests between capital and labour. However, because its basis was the
exploitation of labour and because the actual fixing of 'rates' were themselves a
component of the class struggle over valorisation, then the reverse was the case:
they consistently widened the gulf between capital and labour.
Obviously piece rates are a universal phenomenon of capitalism. Capitalists in
the USA had also used such incentives extensively. Indeed piece rates are one
of the principles of Taylorism, alongside day rates, direct management control,
the real subordination of labour to capital and increased abstraction of labour.
In other words, what is predominantly a market based control over labour,
alongside 'industrial welfarism', is a necessary part of capitalist control over
valorisation rates and over labour per-se. However, as British class struggle
testifies, although necessary, it is not a sufficient mode of control: production
based controls (the direct controls of Fordism and Taylorism) are; yet these were
institutionalised only very weakly and with great reluctance on the part of British
capital. Such peculiarities are perfectly logical within the context of a declining
capitalist social relationship and rising Labourist forms of containment.
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The partial decommodification of the universal equivalent (nationally regulated
money capital) and growing consensus of physical and fiscal planning after
1940, eventually transformed the methods of control. As history now attests, the
transition towards systemic Labourism after 1940, propelled these bureaucratic
forms of control over labour into a new dimension. The narrow confines of
industrial welfarism, extended through the economy and into the State and
became sublated within the wider orbit of the social welfare state.
By the early 1940s, aided by The Essential Works Order Act of 1941, the
establishment of joint production committees (JPC's) had become widespread.
The Act, amongst other things, restricted the flow of capital to the will of the
State; outlawed strikes; and set in motion the decommodification of labour
supply by regulating the minimum wage. In doing so it reinforced the trend set
in motion in 1939 when the TUC and British Employers Federation signed a pact
(National Joint Advisory Council) to control labour and capital. By 1944
average wages were 35% higher than in 1938.248 as one commentator noted,
'full employment and the greatly strengthened trade union movement presented
powerful inducements for managers to find a more powerful philosophy towards
labour than domination or indifference,.249 It was within this atmosphere that
human relations/industrial welfarism (Labourism at the point of valorisation)
attained its 'greatest influence between 1940 and 1955,250. Its essential task of
bureaucratically policing labour in production, was carried out by British
management 'on a considerably wider scale and with more force than during the
1930s,.251
248 M.M. Niven (1967), Personnel Management, p91-93, Institute of Personnel Management London.
249 1. Child (1969), p1l2, op-cit.
2501. Child (1969), ibid, plll.
251 1. Child, ibid, p1l4.
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Some indication of the sudden enthusiasm for a more rigorous management
approach to the control of labour, can be gleaned from the rise in membership of
management associations. By 1941 personnel officers became compulsory in all
but the smallest of factories. Membership of the Institute of Industrial
Administration rose almost 500% between 1939 and 1945 (517 to 2508).
Membership of The Institute of Personnel Management rose from 760 in 1939 to
5730 by 1960?52 and systemic Labourism embroils the State in the
management of labour at the point of valorisation, or, in the context of the public
sector, at the site of general exploitation. Thus the Post 1945 Labour
Government created the British Institute of Management (EIM). Stafford Cripps
and Hugh Dalton, worried about the quality of British management, were
committed to providing public money to finance the creation of the BIM.
The State developed and encouraged many other management quangos, for
example, Production Efficiency Board (PES) were created in an attempt to
introduce Taylorist control of labour to British valorisation processes. In the
words of the Board of Trade of the time,
..In the long term it aims at making industry aware
of the possibility of increasing efficiency by the
study and application of up to date methods.253
However it is the 'welfare' and human relations approach, so complimentary to
The TUC and Labour Party's paternalistic control over labour, and so to the
whole bureaucratic nexus of social welfarism, which gained precedence once
Labourism came into being. For example, Tomlinson points out that,
252 1. Child, ibid, p113.
253 PRO, BT 64/2324, Board of Trade, The production Efficiency Service, 30th Nov 1945, cited in 1.
Tomlinson, (1993), Mr Atlee's Supply Side Socialism, article in, Econ Hist Rev, xLVI, 1.
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The central role of human relations in Labour's254 attitudes
to the enterprise is evident in the focal position given to
'human factors' in the setting up of the Committee on
Industrial Productivity. It is also evident in the campaign
by the Labour government to revive workplace Joint Production
Committees on the model of those widespread during the
war. The JPC campaign....was not a drive for industrial
democracy...but..part of a programme to encourage worker
co-operation and involvement without infringing on managerial
prerogative.255
Between 1945-55, according to one noted expert,256 human relations
management reached its peak. This was the same decade that Labourism came
into being and just as dramatically began to decline. During the 1960s various
'rationalisation' drives characterised relations between capital and labour at the
point of valorisation. Human relations and industrial welfarism weakened, while
the commitment, if nothing more substantial, to the direct controls characterised
by Taylorism increased. The Labour Party's commitment to the 'white hot heat
of the technological revolution' (Ley, 1984; Coates, 1986), and growing
productivity drives enforced by British management, (Nightingale, 1980) are
testimony to this. Thus one could argue that human relations/industrial welfarism
were given life by the tendencies developing towards Labourism and were
peculiarly fitted to the requirements of Labourism, as it eventually became
systematised. Their development as a conscious state strategy post 1945, goes
hand in glove with the development of Labourism. When Labourism began to
breakdown in the late 1950s, it developed a split between left and right wings.
254
*Labour refers to the Labour Party.
255 1. Tomlinson, (1993), p5, op-cit.
2561. Child, (1969), op-cit.
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The right wing sought to stabilise work relations on the basis of the traditional
managementpractices spoken of above (allowingfinance capital greater freedom
to exploit new international forms of circulation). The left, on the other hand,
sought to revamp and systematise management labour relations (restricting the
international mobility of sterling). The development of Labour Party visions of
'technological revolution' in the mid 1960s, was an affront to finance capital and
lead directly to its defeat with the Wilson Government move to devalue sterling
in 1967. Thus Labourism after its establishment in the 1940s, soon became tom
asunder from the late 1950s onwards. The split between left and right
Labourist's, reflecting the polar opposition of finance capital to the growing
strength of the rank and file labour movement. The Royal Commission on the
'problem' of industrial relations (Donovan Report, 1966), captures the heart, if
not the sense, of this contradiction. Thus the decline of Labourism will be the
subject of more detailed discussion in the concluding chapter. The point to be
drawn out here, however, is this: human relations/industrial welfarism were
tendencies which found their full expression in Labourismthroughout the broader
category of social welfarism.
Why, then, did Labourism eventually become a system, advancing these
management practice, when for so long its tendencies, including human
relations/welfarism, remained only weakly formed? At this point one could state
the answer simply: Labourism became a system of working class containment
. because of the vital reactionary influence of Stalinism upon the ideas and
practice of 'socialism' endorsed by the Soviet Union and its practitioners and
fellow travellers within the British left. This claim will be taken up in more
detail in the [mal section. Before doing so, it is necessary to explain the
developing tendency to manage and nationalise money capital. Again, as with
management controls over labour, it was a tendency which had first to be
grounded in conditions where labour was safely de-politicised. It is explained
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later how Stalinism provided the basis of this condition for capital and secured
the management of nationalised money under the rubric of Keynesianism.
6.4 The Management ofNational Money and the Development ofLabourism
When sterling, as national money, became cast adrift from the social anchor of
the international universal equivalent - gold, one of two processes could have
occurred; the state could use its' powers of discretion over national money
creation or borrowing, to increase economic interventions by widening the public
sector, subsidising capital's and increasing the demand for commodities. The
logical conclusion of this would be to refloat the economy by realigning what is
produced as use value and what is produced primarily for exchange value. The
danger being that the former may well overrun the latter, hence a coherent
method of indirect control of use value provision through the money form itself is
necessary. Such a method did emerge and became known as Keynesianism,
largely in gratitude to a figure who, more than anyone else in this epoch, fought
for the extended life of capitalism. Alternatively the state could bureaucratically
police the uses and perceived abuses to which national money is subject. The
goal of the latter would be to shadow the universal equivalent as much as
possible (for example by aligning national currency to the average value of a
basket of international currencies). This option leaves the door open (in vain it
must be said) to a return to the universal equivalent. The one would allow the
advancement of Labourism, the other would restrain it.
The National Govt of the 1930s, despite minor lapses, chose the latter course of
action, before their sudden conversion to Keynesianism in the late 30s early 40s.
Of course whilst the State and Government of the day were no mere conduits of
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the dominant class, it is likewise just as true to say that they did not act as some
politically independent force. The basis of capital's rule through the State is
ultimatelyrelated to private property in capital. As capital is founded on abstract
labour, then the basis of the State's systematic representation of the interests of
capital depends on the continued health of abstract labour formation. The
argument here has been that abstract labour formation has become negated and
in the process classes have had to develop their own collective powers to rule.
Therefore, the State becomes a battle ground of class collectivity and policies to
counteract collectivity through de-politicisation strategies. Hence one has to
understand the States often pragmatic short term lapses into interventionism and
its simultaneously stubborn and persistent underlying resistance to unbalanced
internal and external budgets, as a result of a class struggle being forged in and
through the State over the issue of the partial decommodification of national
currency. Capital is aware that under the wrong conditions, decommodification
of money capital will enhance the collective strength of labour and so risk the re-
politicisation of labour. Hence finance capital, as guardians of the system (albeit
through vampire like greed), must continually wait for and also foster the right
conditions, before any movement towards Keynesianism can occur.
Of course the tendency to decommodify sterling goes beyond the era of the
1930's and back to 1913 when British capital went off gold for the first time.
Once sterling had conceded the gold standard, British finance capital lost the
substantive ground upon which its political hegemony was based. This
economic vacuum left a political vacuum around which Labourist forces fought
to establish their substantive ground over the Fiscal and monetary policies of the
state They required a nationalised currency, cut adrift from the impulses of
world capitalisms division of labour; that was relatively unhindered by strict
adherence to domestic capital's 'measuringrod' of social and productive activity -
value expansion. Success here meant the economy became amenable to
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unbalanced budgets and public works. Whilst full nationalisation of money spelt
inconvertibility, domestic confinement and ultimate decline for finance
capitalists. Hence there was little chance that finance capital would allow any
Government to impose such a deal while it still had ultimate authority.
Nevertheless, adrift from the anchor of gold and beset by the inability to deal
with the 'labour problem', then some compromise in this area had eventually to
be made by finance capital. Within strict constraints and in accordance with the
prevailing balance of class forces, finance capital, through the institutions of the
Treasury and Bank of England, developed the ad-hoc response of guiding and
controlling the degree of its inevitable drift into the capital restricting world of
nationalised money. Although finance capital pulled the plug on the process as
soon as it was safe to do so, against the rising tide of working class revolt in
1919, the rational kernel of fiscal control inherent in the more interventionist
management of money was not lost on them.
It is in the above context - the inevitable recognition that gold must eventually
lose its powers as universal measure of value and discipliner of labour and the
resistance to the full imposition of national money, until the conditions were
more conducive - that one can understand the ambiguous monetary policy
adopted. It is in this context also that one can understand the significance of the
increasing assimilation of economic specialists, statisticians and unelected
quangos to the organs of the state, especially from the second decade of the 20th
century. From the moment of the frrst movement of sterling off gold between
1913-1926, bodies such as the Haldane Committee on the Machinery of
Government were established. Their stated task being to 'anticipate, watch and
suggest means of dealing with important questions and movements likely to arise
in commerce and industry,.257 Given the mobilisationfor war and economically
favourable condition of labour, in the face of the lack of a universal equivalent
257 S. Howson & D. Winch, (1977), The Economic Advisory Council 1930 -39, p7, CUP.
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with which to discipline the demands of labour and curb inflationary pressures,
then it would be more precise to say that such Committees are in essence the
guardians of 'sound fmance' in an era when money capital becomes de-
commodified. These unelected guardians create accounting technics to control
fiscal and monetary policy. During the first world war, committees of
economists, statisticians and accountants were used primarily to manage the
currency, the allocation of money capital and the rate and distribution of
exchange value in accordance with the needs of the war machine. Of course at
the same time they revealed to capital their latent potential for planning
capitalisms objective decline in its own subjective interest. In other words, the
many persona and institutions assembled by the state increasingly after 1913,
herald the first consistent movements towards 'fiscal planning' as a potential
control mechanism over labour. The universal equivalent was losing its capacity
as an internal control over labour, hence fiscal planning had to achieve the same
outcome by conscious fiat.
In conjunction with the rise of these economic committees, there also arose the
first systematic attempts at physical planning as a method of controlling labour
and the rate and allocation of surplus value extracted from it. The social process
of cost accountancy is vital to the viability of both forms of planning. In this
respect it is no accident that the institutions of accountancy should assimilate
themselves into the class structure in a more marked fashion from WW1 onward.
In fact some have noted how the sudden incorporation of cost accounting
methods by productive capital, represented a move by capitalists to ensure that
accountants could adopt the role of fmancial guardians within production in and
against any line management's resistance to the strict management of short term
valorisation strategies258
258 See P. Armstrong (1984) who identifies the crucial role of the development of cost accounting after
this period as a systematic devise used by the state and capitalists.
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The mobilisation for war; the threat of scarcity of labour and capital; and the
inherent instability of a capitalism without a universal equivalent base in gold,
were all factors advancing the management ofmoney capital in Britain. As was
observed in the last chapter however, the working class were far to militant and
threatening for capital to countenance managing money capital to reflate the
economy long term. One would not have expected finance capital to choose this
period for a Keynesian experiment, and indeed they did not. Once the war ended
so too did finance capital's commitment to fiscal and physical planning, whilst
the threat from labour was still strong, along with the possibilities of an
international role for sterling once again.259 As Howson & Winch note,
The origins of the case for an economic general staff...
can be traced back to the reconstruction movement
(Labourism in statu nascendi) which flourished briefly
toward the end of the war: and its fate during the first
half of the 1920s follows that of the movement generally.
the mood of optimism concerning the possibilities of
economic planning & natural cooperation which prevailed
at the end of the war soon evaporated in the
face of pressures for dismantling war time controls.260
This mood of optimism referred to by Howson & Winch belonged to Labourist
forces. Generated in large part by the practical proof provided by the war
economy that mechanisms of 'planning' existed, which could administer a boom
and, potentially, control labour via institutionalised collective bargaining.
However finance capitalist forces remained unconvinced of Labourism's ability
259 See previous chapter where this is discussed in more detail.
260 S. Howson & D. Winch (1977) op-cit, p7. The bracketed words are mine.
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to contain labour. Their resolve in this matter was also weakened by their
unwillingness to suffer the restrictions on capital flows whilst even the remotest
of chances remained for a re-establishment of international finance markets.
Thus the the First World War may have forced the classes together, however,
once it was at an end, fmance capital felt compelled to call off all movements
towards Labourism. Whittleyism, the heart of the national industrial relations
system, became still born. Whilst the movement towards expansionary fiscal
management was axed.
To be more specific, fiscal planning agencies had proved their worth to capital
and so were to a degree continued. However, continued in order to plot a
deflationary move back to gold. Economic committees, professional
economists and statisticians were welcome at Government level, so long as they
were willing to act as bureaucratic policemen, endorsing balanced budgets and
the discipline of money capital. In this respect one can point to the Geddes
Committee on National Expenditure as in essence the guardians of fmance
capital. Geddes 'axe' was directed at both the working class and an ascendant
Labourist solution to the problem of how to contain the working class. Once the
working class had been politically defeated in 1926 and once British capital
could no longer resist the inevitable fall from gold for the last time in 1931, the
necessary economic and political vacuum had been created and pressures for
expansionary fiscal and physical planning, again began to resound through the
archaic state structures of British capitalism once more (Tomlinson 1990, Booth
& Pack 1986, Howson & Winch 1977).
Finance capital had, by the 1930s, become circumscribed by international
depression and debt, restrictions on capital movements, the mounting pressure at
home from the Labourist forces and the inability to maintain confidence in
sterling as an international depository of abstract labour. Its long term survival
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lay in a new accumulation strategy within the orbit of its ex colonies and
dominions. The new accumulation strategy required finance capital to itself
align with key dominant productive capital's in Britain to create a sterling bloc
which both factions of capital could benefit from.
However such an alignment weakened their hegemonic grip on State policy and
propelled the forces of Labourist intervention domestically too far and too
quickly. It did so for two reasons. Firstly, because one of the bedrocks of
Labourism from the right had been those very same old large and dominant
industries who were now so crucial to the establishment of the sterling era. Too
much of an alignment with this faction would lead to the possible imposition of
strong corporatist policies, advocated by Mond (an industrial leader of
Labourism from the right). This would take Labourism's advance out of the orbit
of finance capitalists control. The danger was that such a move may lead to the
effective negation of the unique institutions British finance capital had erected to
purify its rule through the money form. Secondly, because the potential
regeneration and restructuring of the economy which would result from such an
alignment, implied the movement towards full employment and the possible re-
politicisation of labour. Such a possibility was fraught with danger because it
could lead to the re-politicisation of labour. Therefore, despite all such logical
reasons for finance capital to accept the Labourist compromise in the 1930s, it
stubbornly refused to do so. One result was that the potential value accruing
benefits of the sterling era were never fully actualised until after the post war
settlement (Coakely & Harris, 1983). Another result was the Mond-Turner
conference,261 the Liberal Party dash towards economic intervention between
the classes, and the move by 'left wing' Labourites such as Mosley to steer the
261 National Conference in 1927 set up by the TUC and employers associations such as the FBI. Its
project was to establish the basis of a future Labourist compromise after the neutralisation of syndicalism.
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Labour Party towards corporatism, all failed. The context of their failure being
the latent, but as yet unrealised, acquiescence of finance capital.
Understanding the above contradictions, then, helps one to illuminate the real
importance of Keynesianism. Long misinterpreted by Marxists, and long since a
central feature in the adulteration of Marxist theory, Keynesianism developed on
the basis of the new alignment of use and exchange and extended the tendency
towards the management of money, to its logical conclusion within capitalism.
Many have, quite correctly, argued that textbook Keynesianism was never
applied to the British economy in any systematic fashio~62 . Indeed still others
have argued persuasively, that even the ad-hoc Keynesianism which was
eventually put into practice after 1940 was never a fundamental causal factor in
the eventual post war economic boom. The boom was, to a large extent,
sustained by private investment; public investment did play a part, but not nearly
as great a part as the commonsense view suggests. One does not have to look
too far to fmd the major impetus for private capital investment after 1945: the
reduction of the organic composition of capital, coupled with a favourable
international export market. If this is the case, and there is little reason to doubt
it, then one can conclude that the importance of Keynesianism has little to do
with any practical ability to resolve the contradictions of capital. Rather its
central importance was two-fold; on the one hand, it had immense ideological
importance (pilling, 1986), offering the appearance of a coherent 'rational'
economic alternative to 'sound money and free markets'. One the other hand, in
emphasising the importance of monetary and fiscal policy in moves to regulate
the failing law of value, it offered finance capital ideal (monetary) instruments
through which it could continue to chart the pace, scope and nature of its own
necessary containment. For example, the inevitable constraints on money
262 See, form example, A Caimcross, in R. F10ud& D. McCloskey (edt) (1981), The Economic History of
Britain Since 1700, vol2, CUP
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capital movements; political control of interest and exchange rates; creation of
state credit through the distribution of surplus value; and the use of credit for
social needs largely unrelated to valorisation for capital, could at least be
controlled, monitored or even blocked by fmance capitalists interests via the
institutional triad of Treasury-Bank of England-City of London.
The epoch was one of conflict between planning and the decline of the law of
value, therefore the issue of planning could not be ignored by fmance capital.
They were compelled by events to adopt some stance to Labourism. In this
sense, they naturally turned to Keynesianism. If any planning was envisaged in
Britain, no matter how undemocratic and apparently strong on safeguards against
the working class, it was in fmance capital's interests to ensure the eventual
development of a 'planning' through the manipulation of national money
(Keynesianism), over and above any notions of physical planning. It is in this
sense that the demand management project through fiscal planning at the heart of
Keynesianism held some potential to cement the ground of the realignment
between capital and labour in such a way as to allow finance capital to continue
its hegemony.
Keynes and Keynesianism were the policy broker between the right wing
elements of Labourism and finance capital. In this sense it is simply misplaced
loyalty, expressed by the Labour movement, to see Keynes and his fellow
travellers do battle for the unemployed. His task was to see capitalism survive
without giving to much ground to labour in the inevitable realignment between
use and exchange value. In his General Theory of Interest & Money (1936)
Keynes made it clear that the sphere of valorisation should be impinged upon as
little as possible. The States job was to facilitate the process of exchange value
expansion, whilst taking care of the provision of use value and social needs. For
Keynesians, individualism is the basis of the capitalist market system, for
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Marxists it is abstract labour, the expansion of the value form and so capital that
forms the basis of capitalism. In this sense Keynes had a soothing message for
capitalists:
..the traditional advantages of individualism will still
hold good.....individualism, if it can be purged of its defects
and its abuses, is the safeguard of personal liberty in the sense
that, compared with any other system, it greatly widens the
field for the exercise of personal choice. It is also the best
safeguard of the variety of life, which emerges precisely
from this field of extended choice, and the loss of which is
the greatest of all the losses of the homogeneous or totalitarian
state....Whilst, therefore, the enlargement of the functions of
government...would seem to a nineteenth-century publicist
or to a contemporary American financier to be a terrific
encroachment on individualism, I defend it, on the contrary,
both as the only practical means of avoiding the destruction
of the existing economic forms in their entirety and as the
condition of the successful functioning of individual
initiative.OZeynes, 1936,p380)
This statement and others made by Keynes in the General Theory, which suggest
the need to 'liquidate the rentier', have long since become infamous. They
allowed forces on the left and on the right the convenience of a 'principled
divide'. However the divide is only apparent. Keynes's digressions about
'liquidating the rentier class' were little more than rhetoric. They never
developed much further than another piece of related rhetoric, the 'socialisation
of investment'; which again sounded radical, but remained frrmly within the
realms of ideological propaganda. In practice his words eventually manifested as
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a simple commitment to adjust fiscal and monetary instruments according to the
logic of national class collaboration and against the imperative of international
valorisation. Such phrases are also rhetoric because they were completely at
odds with Keynes's own class interests, which manifested themselves clearly
over the fight for the sterling area during the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.
Salvaging a role for sterling was hardly the practice of someone committed to the
destruction of circulation biased capital. Eliminating rentier capital sunk to the
same illogical depths as Proudon's declaration that one can have socialism and
retain money capital. Skidelsky's claim that the emergence of Keynesianism
meant 'henceforth the producers state would be the goal; and fmance the enemy',
overstated the divide and, arguably, said more about the needs of social
democracy to create a sharp divide within capital between 'industrial and 'rentier'
around which the working class could be divided. This had the effect of
disguising the essential contradiction between capital and labour and so laying
further social barriers to block the development of a working class for itself. The
most one could say about Keynes and Keynesianism, is that he/it wished to
create instruments in and through which the State could, frrstly, ensure
circulation capital met the minimum requirements of production capital; and
secondly, encouraged more money capital to become converted into fixed capital
formation than otherwise would have occurred.263 All this, of course, meant
certain restrictions on money capital, but certainly not the liquidation of its long
established institutional representatives in the City. Keynesianism, therefore,
although an implicit danger to fmance capital in the 1930s (because the
Keynesian institutions, once erected, could well be operated in favour of labour),
was also a necessary condition for its long term survival.
263 Of course by the 1970s it had become obvious to many that this had become untenable to finance
capital, due to the fact that it had lead to increased labour militancy and the breakdown ofvalue regulation
implied by spiralling inflation. In this decade Keynesianism really was 'swinging the tiger by the tail' .
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Keynes was quite blunt about the reactionary clamour for a re-alignment of
sterling to gold: it was a 'barbarous relic' of the the century, bringing deflation
and ruin to British capitalism (pilling, 1986, p54). As Keynes observed in the
General Theory;
under the system of domestic laissez-faire and an international
gold standard...there was no means open to a government
whereby to mitigate economic distress at home except through
the competitive struggle for markets. For all measures helpful
to a state of chronic or intermittent under-employment were
ruled out, except measures to improve the balance of trade
on income account.
The problem, as Keynes was quick to point out, was that the latter option usually
meant deflation, unemployment and reduced fixed capital formation, as a result
of the two classes coming to loggerheads over who was to pay the price of
British capital's inability to exploit British labour power efficiently. Keynes
pointed out two important manifestations of the problem confronting capital
which Labourism must address if it was to seize the political initiative: firstly,
capitalists did not have the confidence in profit rates to invest nor the ability to
do the next obvious thing - reduce the absolute wage bill by tackling the working
class head on; secondly, his theory of liquidity preference, revealed that
speculative transactions motives (primarily finance capital's) hindered previously
accumulated idle capital from being converted into future investment capital. As
a result, the system was in danger of sinking into chronic stagnation. The stand
off between capital and labour, meant that savings no longer equated with
investment, no matter what the interest rate. Finance capital ensured that capital
savings were increasingly re-routed towards speculation or else hoarded. The
Keynesian solution was to reroute this capital and use it to underwrite use value
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provisions and capital subsidies. Keynesianism placed emphasis on increasing
consumption regardless of the extent of short term valorisation patterns. Thus
Keynes embraced the concept of managing national money. The State, then,
had to take responsibility for the injection of a fiscal stimulus to the economy.
The State could control and administer a decommodified sterling to generate
national economic activity on the basis of the direct provision of use value needs.
Additionally, the inflationary bias implied, would boost nominal wages, whilst
depressing real wages; boost capital investment by stimulating demand; and
(most importantly for finance capital) allow, via the Treasury's control of fiscal
and monetary planning, finance capital to maintain overall control of the
declining capitalist system.
Such was the promise of Keynesianism. The essence of control lay in the
potential to manipulate the relationship between use and exchange value; if the
State erred on the side of use value and need (due to working class pressure),
then the discipline of exchange value could be used. Thus there were many
ways this control could be applied. For example, if full employment tipped the
balance of class forces in favour of labour, who, on the basis of this, successfully
advanced commitments to the public provision of health, education, greater
levels of social welfare..etc, then fiscal spending reductions could be imposed to
reduce demand and so employment. This could, then, diffuse the strength of
labour and alter the balance of class forces in favour of capital once again. The
outcome is that use value is brought back under the controlling orbit of exchange
value. Likewise, if Governments, particularly those fronted by the Labour Party,
became reluctant to deflate and hence slow the rate of growth down, due to the
pressure exerted by their organic link with the working class, then a financial
'strike', or a run on sterling, would soon bring discipline back to the Labourist
system. Whether Keynes envisaged his General Theory would be manipulated
in such a way is beside the point, what is the point is that Keynesianism only
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makes sense if used this way. In point of fact, Keynes was very sensitive to the
need for deflationary policy when unemployment went below as much as
5%.264
Newton has a point when arguing that much of the extensive research on the
Treasury/Keynesian debate has degenerated into 'what one clerk said to another'
and informs one of very little beyond 'the unsurprising fact that some Treasury
officials were Keynesian whilst others may not have been'. Of real importance,
he correctly reflects, is the answer to questions such as, why Keynesianism was
eventually accepted as the principles of sound government? An answer which
can only be found, he contends, by unearthing the social forces underlying the
surface debate. The argument here has been that the underlying social forces
are the breakdown of commodity production which left a seizure between
exchange and use value, reflecting a seizure between the classes, which in turn,
had retarded the development of productive forces, causing mass unemployment
and stagnation. On the one side, the 'Treasury view' (finance capitalist in
essence) initially sought the discipline of exchange value and unemployment as a
method of controlling labour, whilst the Keynesian view sought are-alignment
of exchange value and use value, with the latter bureaucratically dominant.
The eventual conversion of the Treasury to Keynesianism reflects a compromise
- the realignment could be controlled by the money form via capital's control of
fiscal planning. Looked at in these terms one can read the contemporary
Treasury debates with Keynes and his followers in fascination. The traditional
view that Keynes remained an outcast until a rapid conversion of the Treasury
view during war time, is now cast in some doubt. The more realistic appraisal
264 According to one source, in 1937, Keynes advised the Treasury to cut back on public spending to
reduce aggregate demand in order to counteract inflation, at a time when unemployment was still at 10%. -
hardly the sign of 'socialist' leanings, by anyones description - see Peter Clarke, (1988), The Keynesian
Revoltion in the Making -1924-26, p316, Clarendon Press Oxford.
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appears to suggest one of gradual acceptance by the Treasury, throughout the
1930s, as to the rationality of what Keynes had to say for capital. As Clarke
observes, 'There is now a fair measure of agreement that the Treasury had
become more open minded in what it was prepared to consider'.265
The Treasury, for its part, began to realise very quickly both the advantages in
Keynesianism and its dangers. The latter resolved itself to this: fmance capital
remained unconfident about the prospects of controlling a working class fully
employed and in a strong economic position (implied by a Keynesian
regeneration of the economy). The danger was that the struggle over any
deflation, which may, under given circumstances, be thought appropriate by
capital, would erupt into open class warfare, as it had done in 1918-19. The
split within Conservative Party ranks over the issue of 'planning or the market',
gives one some insight into how seriously the era was for capital. It seems
logical that they should remain suspicious of Keynesianism, believing, as they
must have, that for all its potential, it would lead to physical planning, which
could lead to notions of communism. The exchange between Keynes and the
Treasury during the 1930s suggests that, on the point of fiscal planning, the
latter had increasingly acceded ground. What was still required was some form
of institutional containment of labour, upon which Keynesian monetary controls
could be effectively overlaid.
The stumbling block, then, so far as fmance capital was concerned, was that
Keynesian fiscal planning was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
securing their continued control over a declining social relationship. This was
the major divide in the Conservative ranks between the 'planners' and the 'free
marketeers. Finance capital is the abstract form of capital. The persona
involved are capitalists in general and not of any particular location. They
265 Peter Clarke (1988), ibid, p318.
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become the conscious regulators of the system in general and, hence, are that
much more aware than most capitalists of the real contradictions within the
system during anyone period or epoch.266 Keynes had little understanding of
the profound aspect of capitalism in decline. He may have thought capitalism
merely to have 'stalled due to engine trouble'. However, the more observant
members of fmance capital, were aware that its 'combustion chamber' had
cracked beyond repair and would suffer chronic overheating without a more
comprehensive form of control over the working class. It is this stark and
important fact which held them back from implementing Keynesianism in a
systematic and strategic form during the 1930s.
In retrospect by the late 1930s and early 1940s we know that the Keynesian
orthodoxy had won over Labourist forces and the Treasury. This victory was to
such an extent that continued talk of balanced budgets was looked on as the
eccentric utterances of nineteenth century idealogues trapped in the modem
world. All pro capitalist forces (in public at least) were committed to demand
management, deficit budgeting, full employment and a new upswing in capital
accumulation. One must conclude, given this sudden acceptance of a
Keynesianism strategy and programme, that an additional mechanism for
controlling labour had gained the favour of capitalists. The White Paper on
Employment Policy (1944), embodies the spirit of the conversion to
Keynesianism.
The Government accepts as one of their primary aims
and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable
level of employment after the war..Total expenditure on
goods and services must be prevented from falling to a
266 See Hillel Ticktin's analysis of abstract capital's potential for conscious action across the system of
capitalism as a whole, in Critique No 16-17.
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level where general unemployment appears.267
As Pilling observes:
Not only did post war Governments in this and other
declarations publicly pledge themselves to a policy of
full employment, but they now had available a state
budget which was much larger than before the war.268
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the influence of Stalinism in
forging a hegemonic bloc between left and right Labourists and fmance capital,
is arguably the crucial extra control mechanism spoken of. This claim will be
taken up and exlained in the final section. Before doing so we complete the
investigation into the movement from tendency to actuality of the central tenets
of Labourism, by observing the evolutionary trend towards the
decommodification of labour.
6.5 The De-Commodification ofLabour: from Tendency to Actuality
The unwillingness to advance towards the strategic implementation of
Keynesianism, which characterised the 1930s, blocked the development toward
the decommodification of labour supply which is inherent in the principles of
national social insurance provision, social welfarism and policies of full
employment. This era has been characterised as schitzophrenic with regard to
movements toward the development of the social wage - national social benefit
267 Extract taken from Pilling (1986), p48, op-cit.
268 G. Pilling (1986), ibid, p48.
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and welfare - which decommodified labour, in the sense that it guaranteed to
labour basic needs, outwith the necessity that it first valorises for capital in order
to socially reproduce itself. The stalemate within pro capitalist forces over the
issue of adopting fiscal and physical planning is essentially the reason why
related parts to Labourism such as a national social insurance scheme and full
employment policy (national decommodification of labour supply) never
emerged in the 1930s.
For example, unemployment rose to a peak of 3 million by 1933 only dipping
slightly in 1937, before once more rising just before the sudden drive toward
rearmament in 1938.269 Labourist forces had persistently revealed themselves,
throughout the better part of the thirties, unable to advance a policy of anything
near full employment provision. In fact, as regards this Labourist tendency,
little had changed from the days of the post World War One capitalist offensive
against the working class. Even though the political battle with labour had been
won by finance capitalists by the late 1920s, unemployment remained at just as
high a level in the thirties as it had been in the twenties, in fact even higher:
approximately 17.5% as opposed to approximately 14% of the insured
population respectively.
Obviously there is the late nineteen twenties/early nineteen thirties world
recession on unemployment, reducing domestic demand and foreign exports, to
take into account. Yet the recession cannot explain fully why high structural
levels of unemployment remained a fact of life throughout the thirties, even
when world trade had improved. Of course, its structural nature implies the
persistent unwillingness to invest capital on a sufficient scale, despite the policy
of cheap available loans established after the fall from gold. The cause of this
unwillingness lay in the fact that capitalism was losing the power of its own
269 D Winch (1983), op-cit, p49.
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control mechanism over labour power - commodity fetishism - and had not yet
forged another. During the stalemate the obdurant rule of finance capital ensured
that capital in general had to rely on systemic unemployment to control labour
and keep it politically atomised. Thus an overarching emphasis on the formal
subsumption of labour relative to real subsumption, coupled with a large reserve
army, became crucial to class containment in the post universal equivalent world
of the 1930s. However, pressure from Labourists mounted during this time did
secure a social wage under the administration of capital - born out of a fear of
labour not philanthropic concern. This, then, is the background to the
developments in the decommodification of labour supply which will be
concidered from a more theoretical point of view below.
The stagnation and hence high unemployment orchestrated by finance capitalists
throughout most of the thirties, was both bolstered and endorsed by the States
policy towards the status of the unemployed. Social insurance provision found
increasing acceptance into the system, as the amended Poor Law (1834) became
increasingly outmoded. Outmoded on the basis that the poor law operated for a
capitalism in its prime, with a functioning labour market complete with frictional
unemployed and little structural unemployment. In this situation the amended
Poor Law served a capitalism at the peak of its exploitative powers very well;
disciplining the reserve army of labour, and those in work, with the choice of
valorising for capital or the workhouse. In an era when capitalism was in visible
stagnation; when even the labour movements demands to be exploited fell on
deaf ears (involuntary unemployment), the poor law's threat of the workhouse
and its minuscule provision of sustenance, became an outmoded abhorrence.
Not surprisingly, the Poor Law was the subject of persistent attacks from the
working class. As Campbell (1981, p103) explains;
Reliance on the poor Law as the sole means used by the state
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to deal with the unemployed came under challenge in the 1880s.
In February 1886, major rioting broke out as a result of the
severe unemployment in London...In March of the same year
the President of the Local Government Board allowed local
authorities to provide relief work for the 'exceptional' unemployed
outside of the Poor Law administration. This policy was later
formalised in the Unemployed Workman's Act 1905,
which allowed local authorities to set up 'Distress Committees'
to provide relief work, but not financial assistance alone.
Following hard on the heals of these reforms, pressure mounted for capital to
compromise itself by instigating the provision of a national social wage. 270
From Beveridge's 1909 Report to the 1934 Unemployment Act, this urgency can
be clearly detected. It is a social wage in the sense that it is the slow guarantor
of material existence and reproduction outwith the confmes of first valorising for
capital. The stronger that the forces of Labourism exert themselves, the more a
clear distinction between wages for valorisation and the social wage develops.
When it is in decline, capitalism cannot do without this development. Yet it must
also resist it because it decommodifies labour supply and creates the potential
for greater working class collective resistence to capital. This is why, before the
1940s, the commitment to commodity fetishism, not to Labourism, still
provided, for the most part, capital's rationale. For example, even the supposedly
more radical proposals of the Fabian inspired 'Minority Report' of the 1905
Royal Commission on unemployment, was careful not to transgress the
commodity status of labour. They may well have noted the fact that the Poor
Law was 'intellectually bankrupt' in its handling of the unemployed. However,
the Minority Reports pleading for a Ministry of Labour with a remit to provide
270 See P. Gregg (1967), The Welfare State, (George G Harrap & Co ltd), for a concise history of social
insurance provision before and after the 1930s.
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little more than the national organisation of retraining (workfare) and State
assistance for trade union subscribed insurance, was far removed from the
eventual decommodification of labour, sanctioned by the Social Insurance Act of
1943. If any proof were still required of the reactionary anti-working class
nature of Fabian socialism, one need look no further than the Webb's
pronouncement to the Royal Commission that, to provide labour with
unconditional unemployment benefit and social provision, would 'constitute a
grave error,.271 In the context of working class hostilities towards capital which
reached their culmination in the mid 1920s, British rulers required little
encouragement on this score from their left wing lieutenants. However, the
political defeat of labour in the late 1920s, provided the British ruling class with
some breathing space to implement some of the demand for a gradual deepening
of unemployment relief, which had been proggressively forced on them by
Labourist's. The demand became unassailable after sterlings demise from the
universal equivalent. Thus the years between 1932-38 witnessed an overall rise
in social insurance payments to the unemployed and more widespread
entitlement to a social wage.
In addition to this, the tendency to allow the insurance fund to accrue a deficit
became a permanent fixture. Nevertheless, inspite of capitalisms stagnation and
despite the advances made along the path of decommodifying labour supply and
substantiating the national provision of a social wage, Britain's National
Government continued to treat unemployment as necessary, that is, as a 'healthy'
reserve army of labour. For example, the Beveridge philosophy (by all accounts
the architect of capital's pragmatic response to the impulses towards labour
decommodification) throughout the 1930s, remained unambiguous on the matter:
271 Specifically, see Maurice Bruce, (1968), The Coming ofthe Welfare State, p206-207. This book
provides a thorough chronology of the development of the welfare state. Unfortunately it suffers from being
ahistoric - misunderstanding the relationship between the development of welfare and the genesis of capital
through its peak and decline.
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labour was a commodity the same as any other and the unemployed were a
natural reserve army. Beveridge adhered strictly to the view that unemployment
benefit in its essence should not steer too far from its role as a fund derived from
wages and used to collectivise the risk of frictional, cyclical and structural
unemployment of the commodity labour power.
Obviously such an ideology went only so far in its description of the reality of a
declining capitalism. The stand off situation between capital and labour, meant
that (as referred to earlier), fmance capital had orchestrated a policy of
controlling labour over and above long term fixed capital investment (witness the
superficial Bank of England 'governance' of strategic investment during the early
to mid 1930s). The stand off meant structural long term unemployment. Because
of this the Treasury was forced to succumb to labour and acquire debt to keep
the growing social insurance fund afloat. The grudging acquisition of such a debt
was not so much a product of the philanthropic concerns of Fabians or
Beveridge, or even finance capital, but a product of the need to offset the
militancy of the unemployed and to keep them atomised from the employed.
Testimony to the potential power of disruption the organised unemployed were
capable of generating was 1934 Unemployment Act, the punitive effects of
which were weakened by the combined resistance of employed and unemployed.
The Act created the Unemployment Assistance Board (DAB) which instigated a
transformation of the standard of insurance payments. Broadly, the old
regionally based payments, which in many areas had experienced real gains in
benefit during the depression due to worker militancy, were to be replaced by a
single nation wide scale of payments. It was hoped the move would lower the
total level of insurance, by forcing down those rates that had drifted higher in
some regions to the lower averages of other regions. However, 'when it became
apparent that this would involve cuts in many areas, the anger of both
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unemployed and employed workers was intense and demonstrative'. Workers,
joined by a popular front of MPs, Clerics, local authorities and the CPGB (who,
unfortunately, were able to police the militancy) won a largely defensive victory.
'Within a month the Government backed down, suspending the implementation
of the new scales for two years'. 272
Labourist forces were of course keen to establish and control unemployment
benefit and other manifestations of the developing social wage (eg, State
provision of housing, education, health care..etc) because they served the interest
of a stagnant productive capital too. Apart from keeping capital's wage bill
down, the emerging social wage also weakened still further the organic
connection between the rank and file worker and their trade unions, which had
already received irreparable damage after the sell out by trade union leaders
during the General Strike (Trotsky, 1973; Bevan, 1952). Originally unions had
been the sole providers of welfare for the working class. A portion of members
subscriptions were given over toward an unemployment wage fund. A tradition
which had the effect of ensuring a more wage militant workforce and a union
more directly responsive to its members. The gradual provision of state welfare
undermined this militancy and pulled union bureaucracies away from the organic
influence of workers and towards the corruptive influence of Labourist forces,
the state and its capitalist paymasters.273
This last point provides a measure of the degree of importance disinvestment and
structural unemployment had been as a ruling class containment strategy.
Despite the benefits of a national insurance scheme in weakening the organic link
between labour and unions and taking the wage strain from productive capital,
272 See J. Hinton (1983), op-cit, p151-2.
273 On this point and others concerned with the dynamic between worker union and the emergence of
social welfare provision, the reader is refered to Noel Whiteside, Social Welfare & Industrial Relations, in, C.
J. Wrigley (1987),A History ofBritish Industrial Relations, vo12, 1914-39, Harvester Press.
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the slow evolution towards national provision of a social wage was fiercely
resisted by the ruling class. The 1920s and 30s provided a choice between
breaking decisively the organic link between worker and union, which leads
inexorably to the decommodification of labour; or unemployment of capital and
labour. As the lived experience of 'the decade of depression' testifies, frnance
dominated British capital steadfastly resisted the decommodification of labour
inherent in the move to place on a national footing universal unemployment
benefit and social welfarism. Stagnation and unemployment, in the context of
social insecurity, was to remain the safety net for declining capitalism.
The resistance to the mounting Labourist cry for a social welfare system was to
last 10 years after coming off the gold standard. That is 10 years after the
material circumstances for its realisation came into existence. As above
argued, frnance capital could not countenance a move of this nature because
unemployment on the scale witnessed during the 1930s was their only method of
controlling those in work. To decommodify labour in this situation would
undermine control. This is yet another confirmation of the character of an era
which sacrifices profit for control over labour.
The reason why unemployment became the primary strategy number one was, in
turn, due to the fact that capital could not countenance a move towards
Keynesian inspired fiscal planning, which is at the heart of social welfarism and
was also making its impact felt on the State as the ultimate guardian of frnance
capital's interests. Again, the reason for resistance to Keynesianism (which in
essence is the political economy of managing corrupted forms of national money
capital in the era of capital's decline) is predicated upon the fact that it may
further in pushing for physical planning. The danger of this is that it may in turn
lead to the inevitable calls from the labour movement itself for physical planning
to become worker self management. Thus social welfarism furthered capital's
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control over labour, but the pnce was decommodifying labour supply and
potentially laying the door open to aspirations for workers control. Hence the
profound hesitation characteristic of the era.
Despite such hesitations there remained no real long term future in control of the
working class through stagnation and slump economics. Therefore the move
towards some form of welfare state was a necessary one, but one the ruling class
felt unable to meet without a more substantive control over labour. Social
welfarism (decommodification of labour) combined with Keynesianism
(nationalisation of the money form) were powerful forces in the promotion of use
value and need and demotion of strict adherence to exchange value. This was a
move which would undoubtably repoliticise the labour movement; at a time when
international accumulation (the traditional escape route) had been effectively cut
off from British finance capitalists - the dangers of this were obvious. In such
circumstances finance capital was truly boxed in to a comer throughout the
1930s, having no desire to take on the working class in anything approaching full
employment conditions, which the movement to social welfarism implied.
As a result most of the 1930s remained an era of stalemate: finance capital
allowing just enough investment capital to filter through the City-Treasury-Bank
of England network to fend off a complete regression in the forces of production.
Labourist forces may have had much to do with forcing these institutions to set
up closer ties with industrial capital (eg, the Securities Management Trust, SMT;
the Bankers Industrial Development Company, BIDCo, both of which where
established by the Bank of England). Nevertheless the fusion remained guarded
and weak, lacking in any real commitment to the massive increases in fixed
capital investment required to end the slump. As one specialist on the subject
explains, with the introduction of the SMT and BIDCo;
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..it looked as though the City might be on the brink of a new
era in the finance of British industry. In the event these
agencies proved not to be the engines of rationalisation
through a great array of industries; their principle task
was rather to oversee the unwinding of commitments into
which the Bank had ventured, or into which it was about to
be driven by political pressures. There were ..many appeals
for help, much advice was given, and much education of
industrialists was attempted by a paternalistic Bank, but
little emerged in the way of firm schemes of substance.274
The vascilations of finance capital were matched by those of the National
Government. The National Government administered just enough social welfare
to maintain the divide between employed and unemployed and manipulate/foster
the growing bureaucratisation of trade unions.
This stalemate became a fixture of the 1930s and to contemporaries involved at
State level, it was to prove to be a fixture for many decades to come ( Howson
1977; Clarke, 1990). With the benefit of hindsight the period has been analysed
uncritically as that 'period of transition' towards the new enlightenment of
Keynesianism, guided by the moral suasion of the 'New Jerusalemers', post 1940.
To historians enjoying the vantage of such hindsight, the transitory appearance
(if not the nature) of the epoch may be clearly discerned. However for many of
those actually embroiled in the class struggle of the 1930s, a long term stagnation
of social relations and forces of production in order to arrest capitalisms decline
seemed the only real option. Of course we now know that within a matter of
years, during the early part of the 1940s, there occurred a dramatic vault face.
274 Bank of England biography, p546-547.
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Capitalism eventually committing itself to full employment; Keynesian fiscal
planning; Labourite physical planning; and a social welfare network.
This about turn of capital is perhaps, never more starkly revealed than in
Beveridge's philosophical reversal concerning social welfare reform. In 1909
Beveridge275 the Liberal deemed with 'inventing' the social welfare state, was
adamant that, although unemployment was a mounting problem which capitalists
denied the existence of only at their peril, it was still in large part a natural
function of the market system that one could, therefore, do little to remedy
beyond some minimal State social insurance provision which should never
transgress the laws of the labour market. As William & Williams (1987) point
out, in this period, and for much of the 1920s and 30s, Beveridge held to a
classical commodity view of labour power; ie, it was either being valorised
and/or held in 'stock' as a 'reserve army'. The only problem Beveridge was
willing to publically recognise, lay in the fact that the forces of supply and
demand in the labour market were more often than not in need of stimulation - if '
it was to keep the 'reserve' at a minimum:
In the Marxist concept of the 'reserve army of labour', the
reserve was seen as a necessary and irremediable feature
of capitalism. In Beveridge's concept of the 'reserve army'
it was argued that the size of the reserve could be very
much reduced to an 'irreducible minimum' through
improvements in industrial organisation.276
To facilitate better industrial organisation, Beveridge envisaged the wide
dispersal of 'labour exchanges'. Their systematic use by capital and labour
275 See his Unemployment A Problem ofIndustry,
276 Karel Williams & John Williams (1987),A Beveridge Reader, p104, Allen & Unwin.
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would, apprantly, cut down frictional unemployment
demand in the 'labour market' adjust more efficiently.
insurance benefit would be administered.
and allow supply and
Alongside this, limited
However by 1943, as the introduction of the Social Insurance Act bears witness,
there had been a transformation in Beveridge's conceptualisation of employment
and welfare, which reflected the changing attitudes of his class towards
Labourism. For example, in Beveridge's work, Full Employment in a Free
Society (1944), the decommodification of labour supply, given the statute of law
in the 1943 Act, was bolstered by the belief that the social need to be employed
should take precedent over profitability. Definite confirmation, if any were
needed that the coming 'post war settlement' was to be founded upon a
realignment between use and exchange value.
As Beveridge, the new convert to Labourism, explains, society must guarantee
that demand for labour is always greater than supply, due to the fact that:
A person who has difficulty in buying the labour that he wants
suffers inconvenience or reduction in profits. (Whereas) a person
who cannot sell his labour is in effect told that he is of no use.
The first causes annoyance or loss. The other is a personal
catastrophe.277
So the expansion of capital takes secondary place to the right to work; anything
less is nothing short of a personal catastrophe. What was before seen as an iron
law of nature, now becomes a social misdemeanour capitalism is now willing to
reform out of existence. But why this sudden transformation? The reason for
277 W. Beveridge (1944), Full Employment in a Free Society, p18-19 (bracketed word and words
emphaisised are mine).
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the vault-face must be a profound one, because alongside this commitment to
labour, the sanctity of money capital was to be sacrificed on the alter of demand
management, state intervention and a commitment to full employment. As
Beveridge again explains, three rules of national finance were to be recognised
and inscribed in the new settlement:
The first rule is that total outlay at all times must be sufficient
for full employment. This is a categorical imperative taking
precedence over all other rules, and overriding them if they
are in conflict with it. The second rule is that...outlay should
be directed by regard to social priorities. The third rule is that,
subject to the first and second rule, it is better to provide the
means of outlay by taxing not borrowing.278
For Beveridge, then, the important issues were full employment and social
welfare. Profitability, markets and balanced budgets were very much secondary
considerations. As Beveridge goes on to stress, the third criteria (balanced
budgets) 'is of an altogether minor order of importance'. In fact the 'transition
period' after the war required Governments to plan a national debt for the
foreseeable future - at least 'twenty years', to ensure provision of education,
health..etc. Beveridge's procrastinations on social welfarism reflected impulses
from the same phenomenal force from which caim the simultaneous acceptance
after 1940 of Keynesian orthodoxy and (within the site of valorisation) industrial
welfarism; namely, a willingness to realign use and exchange value in favour of
the former.
So why the dramatic about turn? Put more precisely concretely, what conditions
or guarantees had been met regarding the containment and political atomisation
278 W. Beveridge (1944), ibid, p147 (my emphasis).
291
of the working class? For clearly such a transformation would not have taken
place unless finance capitalists were convinced that a viable form of containment
had been established. As argued in the introduction to this present chapter, such
an about turn, especially the extent and deepness of it, cannot be answered solely
by the spirit of the so called 'New Jerusalem', which had swept over a Nation
embroiled in imperialist world war. Up until this point it had been intimated that
the vital key to the transformation, was the forging of a political hegemony
around the ideology of 'planning' by Labourist forces.
The ideological and practical effects of Stalinism in controlling the working
class, was fundamental in shaping a Labourist political hegemony. A hegemony
which gained the acceptance (if grudgingly and fleetingly) by finance capital. In
conjunction with the fiscal instruments of Keynesianism, which allowed finance
capital to direct national money in the interests of self preservation (see above),
the practical and ideological influence of Stalinism proved to be potent, if
ultimately contradictory, as the all important additional method of control over
labour. Taken together, Keynesianism and Stalinism allowed the realignment
between exchange and use value, so vital to renewed accumulation (see above),
to occur without too great a fear of re-politicising labour. The battle for a
Labourist political hegemony to initiate the planning of capital's decline, raged
throughout the late 1920s and 30s. The politcal battle intertwined with the
tendencies of Labourism outlined here: accelerating them and/or retarding their
development as the balance of class forces changed. The key issue around
which hegemonic battle manifested became, as mentioned, the problem of
'planning' declining capitalism. To this end the problem of the logic of
'planning' per-se initially takes central place in the thoughts of capitalists. This is
soon followed by the problem of an appropriate ideology to endorse 'planning'
and contain the classes (primarily labour). To this end first the strategy of
Fascism was pursued and then eventually rejected, before Stalinism became
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accepted as the natural gelling agent for a fragmenting capitalist system in need
of regeneration.
Taken as a whole, therefore, (and this point will form the basis of the next
section) the eventual post war compromise which actualised the tendencies of
Labourism into a system of containment of labour, is predicated upon the
existence of Stalinism. In this respect the post war settlement is in no way shape
or form evidence of the advancement of the working class. Rather it is settled
firmly on the basis contructed out of the political defeat of the working class. A
culmination of the defeat, not just of the 1926 General Strike, but, more
fundamentally, the defeat inflicted by the degeneration of the Russian revolution
which had occurred so rapidly after October 1917. It was also predicated on the
failure of other European revolutionary movements which followed in the wake
of the Bolshevik Revolution. Stalinism was the price of that failure, to be paid
for in full by the global working class. The form that this 'payback' took in
Britain, it will be argued below, was capital's search to secure a politcal
hegemony around the issue of 'planning'.
6.6 Planning for Labourism: The Role OfFascism and Stalinism
The realisation of systemic Labourism is crucially dependent on a viable
ideology of 'planning' the decline in the law of value. Specifically, 'planning' had
to be politically contextualised in such a way as to ensure that little democratic
rights in, or over, production would/could trickle down to the working class. It
is the contradiction surrounding the movement towards planning declining
capitalism without it being a simultaneous movement towards socialist planning
- which informs the character of movement and debate within capita1. It also
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forms the basis for the growing acceptance of Stalinistplanning ideology and the
ultimate failure/rejection of Fascist/Corporatist planning ideology. The fall
from gold and the role Stalinism played in depoliticising planning, became the
fulcrum around which the other dimensions of Labourism actualised (eg,
decommodification of labour supply, management versus labour relations, the
management of national money). The drift from a universal equivalent and the
institutions of Stalinism, together, not only allowed the decommodification of
labour, but also labour's bureaucratic atomisation; and not only the
decommodification of money capital, but also its bureaucratic regulation. These
acts of decommodificationset the basis of the Labourist era.
Finance capital had a choice between two broadly based movements towards
'planning', each reflecting the preferences of right and left wing elements of
labourism: one driven by Fascism; the other by Stalinism respectively. As both
these social phenomena have an intimate connection - to crush labour
collectivities and atomise working class forces - there were inevitably
movements of individuals and groups of right and left wing Labourists who
moved from one of these modes of worker oppression and exploitation to the
other. Indeed this was certainly the case in so far as a conversion from Fascism
to the endorsements ( if indirect) of 'socialist planning' was concerned. For
example, an influential minority in the Tory Party during the 1930's, which
included Harold MacMillan, John Buchan and Oliver Stanley amongst others,
were favourably disposed to the Fascist extra-parliamentary alternative
advocated by Mosley. The lack of faith in Fascism lead to their sudden
conversion to Keynesianism and a detectable softening towards the notion of
'socialist planning', as endorsed by the middle ground of the Labour Party. It was
a planning which increasingly bore the hallmarks of Stalinism. Likewise, Bevan
and Strachey amongst others in the Labour Party ranks, endorsed the essence of
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Mosley's Nationalist/Commonwealth economic programme. whilst giving it that
vital 'socialist' twist to aid proletarian consumption.279
Nevertheless, despite this cross fertilisation, and the essential unity of Fascism
and Stalinism over the issue of controlling labour, there remained distinct
solutions and ideological banners around which right wing Labourists and left
wing Labourists could rally (below I address firstly, how the right wing (namely
Liberals and Tories) grappled with the problem of planning and why the Fascist
alternative failed. After which analysis shifts to how and why Stalinism provided
the basis for left Labourism's eventual political hegemonic victory).
6.7 Right Wing Labourism & The Problem ofPlanning
The first substantial initiative in the planning movement was The Liberal
reformist document - The Yellow Book (1928). The political programme
contained in the book was the outcome of long debate between a cross sections
of liberal reformists from Keynes, to Lloyd George. In the classless language of
the reformist liberal, the choice confronting a declining capitalism was no longer
simply reducible to the choice between 'Individualism' and 'Socialism' (ie labour
versus capitalism). In the 'modern age', the argument ran, this represented a
distorted, and indeed an obsolete, image of the issue, based on a picture of the
financial and industrial world of England as it was fifty or more years ago. For
the Liberals 'Change has been going on at a great rate...it is only the ideas of the
Conservatives and Socialists which remain where they where'. According to
279 See, for example, R. Skidelsky's account of the intermingling of support between Tory, Labour and
Liberal politicians and spokesmen for Mosely's political and economic programme; Oswald Mosely, (1975),
p22l-262, Papermac. Essentially it was the same programme before and after Mosley entered the political
fray publicly as a Fascist with his creation - the British Union of Fascists.
295
Liberal (wishfull) thinking, class struggle between capital and labour had
brought society to a state of stagnation, but was no longer the central issue.
Class warfare was now a thing of the past. A new task lay before society; 'one
of guiding existing tendencies into (the) right direction and getting the best of all
worlds, harmonising individual liberty with the general good, and personal
initiativewith a common plan,.280
In class parlance, the Liberal reformers felt themselves to be free from the fear of
a politically organised working class. Also their political acumen had been
sharpened by the battle Labourist forces, of which they were a part, had had to
wage with finance capital over the gold standard and economic orthodoxy
throughout the 1920s. Finally, they sensed a political vacuum within the stagnant
capitalist social relations of Britain. They were swept along by the full force of
the air of legitimacy fast gaining ground for a re-alignment of class forces that the
breakdown of commodity relations brought forth. The boldness of the 'common
plan', which they set out in the Yellow Book, expressed the full force of a
Labourist containment strategy over labour and capital, and reflected a new
found confidence that capitalism was ripe for change.
This right wing 'blue print' sought to remove many of the shackles exchange
value had exerted over the provision of use values and need. The bureaucratic
regulation of exchange value was to be the basis of their rule over society.
Proposals were made concerning market regulation. The essence of which was
to implement the rule of the plan over the rule of value relations in the interests
of preserving the overall rule of capital. The Liberal gambit was large,
addressing every sphere of society. for example, with respect to the
organisation of the large joint stock companies, which dominated surplus value
extraction in Britain, these were to be subject to greater public regulation, a wide
280 Britains Industrial Future, the Yellow Book, (1928), p63.
296
ranging public scrutiny of their auditing and accounting procedures, and rigorous
control of their monopoly practices This was a direct assault on the dominance of
finance capital on two counts. Firstly, the control they exerted within the large
productive capital ( their stringent control auditing via fmancial management)
would be undermined. Secondly, the control fmance capital exerted outside the
productive capital, within the City, for example, would be seriously undermined,
mainly because control of monopoly practices meant blocking high price/low
quantity strategies and the culture of short termism with regard to investment.
To compound this attack on finance capital direct control of capital markets were
envisaged. Specifically, investment was to be orchestrated by state sponsored
public bodies which would have the power to issue bonds and take control of
fmance capital expenditure deemed to be of 'national importance'. Finally, a
rationalisation programme to dispel the problems of over-capacity, over-
production and lack of mass production technique, would be effected.
In total these measures, if enacted, would deal a serious blow to fmance capital.
The Liberals had not of course forgotten the main agenda of the day: controlling
the working class. Therefore, in the field of 'industrial relations', a new worker
management compromise and the creation of institutional structures appropriate
to the compromise, was deemed absolutely vital in order to suppress any
occurence of the massive waves of discontent that had been common practice
during the 1920s. To this end the extension of the Whitley Committees and
Trade Boards, which had lain dormant since 1919, were to be revamped in order
to oversee the regulation of the 'wage contract'. These institutions were to be
buttressed by compulsory Works Councils at the point of valorisation, and a
Council of Industry at the national level, answerable to a more powerful
Ministry ofLabour and, ultimately, Parliament. This institutional network was
to serve as an effective bureaucratic atomisation of labour, suppressing any
collective threat from workers. Worker compliance with the new rules of
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valorisation, on the other hand, was to be encouraged by securing a larger share
from the potential spoils born of the intensification of their own exploitation. A
share in surplus value (profit sharing schemes) was to be developed ill
conjunction with a commitment that labour power would not systematically fall
below its value (the guarantee of fixed floor wage rates).
As for the problem of unemployment, this was to be drastically reduced through
the implementation of a massive public expenditure campaign on road and
housing construction; in combination with a public reorganisation and partial
nationalisation of areas of the economy such as the mines. All of this was to be
orchestrated by a Committee ofNational Development. Finally, there was to be
the provision of more substantial pensions and social insurance arrangements.
The latter was an important element in decommodifying workers and
recollectivising them on the basis of abstract collective 'consumer groups'. All
in all, then, the Liberal programme represented the first systematic political
expression of the new realignment of use and exchange value, amidst the
breakdown of the commodityform of production and exchange.
Right wing Labourists within the Tory ranks were never far behind this lead
given to bolster ailing capitalism and so join the ranks of an ascending
hegemonic bloc to contain labour and finance capital. The Conservative
document Industry and the State which appeared in 1927, penned by Harold
MacMillan and Robert Boothby et al, was yet another outline of a strategy which
strove to contain finance capital and labour. Their stated task, as with the
Liberals, was to 'plead for a middle course between socialism and laissez-faire in
an attempt to define a 'national interest' ,281
281 Booth & Pack, (1985), op-cit, p56. Skidelsky (1975), op-cit, p224.
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Tory Labourists, had ideas essentially similar to the Liberals: to effect an orderly
retreat of the weakening rule of value relations and take control of use value and
need provision. The one major difference was that unlike Liberals they were
more concerned with colluding with the requirements of fmance capital. In this
respect the right wing Labourist, closer to the hegemonic power of fmance
capital, had a more circumspect and cautious attitude to the realignment of use
and exchange value. As a result the Tory faction were compelled to intiailly plot
a course wherein equal ontological status was to be given to use and exchange
value motives of production. Effectively, their early commitment to 'balancing
the budget' determined that massive public investment schemes were out of the
question.
Because the use of the public sector to stimulate accumulation was deemed to be
out of the question, Tory Labourists were more explicit in their adoption of the
ideology of 'industrial self management' to achieve the same goal. It was of
course made clear that 'self-management' was to be restricted to 'capitalist self
management' and, therefore, to the right of leading capitalists in each industry to
fix cartel arrangements, liquidate inefficient plants, rationalise commodity
production and administer the rate of output and prices to be charged. In effect it
was a kind of capitalist version of guild socialism. Booth & Pack comment that
the 'progressive Conservative opinion had great faith in the ability of business
men to conduct their own affairs and, by extension, the industrial life of the
whole nation'.282
Why the Conservatives should have this apparent confidence in business, when
clearly the reason for their document in the first place was to arrest the
degeneration wrought by business, is passed over in silence by Booth and Pack.
In the context of the argument here, however, it is little wonder that 'industrial
282 Booth & Pack, (1985), op-cit, p57.
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self management' of this kind should gain voice in the Tory ranks. Not least
because it fitted in very well with the parasitic manoeuvrings of fmance capital
within industry. The ideology of self-management could be used as a smoke
screen beyond which the very real process of monopoly price fixing, asset
stripping and under investment, could continue unabridged. Indeed, during this
period, in the environment created by the Bank of England's failed
'rationalisation' programme and supposed forging of greater relations between
'fmance and industry',283 fmance capital was able to do just this.
Macmillan personifies the attempt by Tory Labourists to persuade finance capital
of right wing Labourists ability to administer the decline of capitalism in Britain
successfully. He was favourably disposed to the views of Keynes ( a member
of the Liberal Summer School which produced the Liberal Yellow Book). He
was also prime orchestrator of Tory reform movements heading in the direction
of the Labourist settlement. The onset of the economic slump in 1929 and the
eventual fall from gold in 1931, propelled the issue of planning to centre stage.
With the substantive ground of capital set adrift, rapid movements in the political
sphere pulled the right wing of Labourism (mostly Tories) towards the
Corporatism of Mosley and weakened their commitment to Parliamentary
democracy. Thus there was a movement away from the orbit of fmance capital
as reflected in the 'Treasury view' (sound money, free markets and balanced
budgets) Macmillan, for example, was heavily influenced by Mosley's Fascist
doctrine, which emphasised the establishment of economic and political planning
institutions outwith Parliament to oversee a reorientation of industry towards the
home market and the Commonwealth and away from other foreign trade (Booth
& Pack, 1986). On the other hand, and this is why he is such a good
personification of the transitionary and pragmatic nature of the era, he draws
back from Mosley's emphasis on underconsumption as the major reason for
283 See the MacMillan Report., 1931. See also S Tolliday in Elbaum and Lazonick (1986), op-cit.
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stagnation. The re-distributive implications for his class meant that such an
endorsement would isolate him from any influence upon 'Treasury orthodoxy'.
No doubt with an eye to orthodoxy, Macmillan was careful to stress that over
production was the problem to be solved, hence rationalisation, output restriction
and price fixing was to be the remedy, not redistribution of surplus value. A
conclusion which fmance capital would be happy to endorse.
During the early to mid 1930s, with the recognition that the demise of the
universal equivalent was to be a permanent fixture, the 'planners' of the
Labourist movement became ever more forceful. The view that the stagnation
of capitalism was more than a temporary aberration and in fact signalled the need
for a 'transition' towards another mode of 'economic regulation', became an ever
more common sentiment amongst Labourists. Harold Macmillan expresses the
general sentiments of the right wing Labourist faction. In 1933 he came to this
conclusion:
Ifwe can assume that Britain will escape the catastrophe of
war or civil disturbance, then it is probable that when the
history of the present period comes to be written, it will be
seen as a hiatus between the old economic system and the
new. It is a period which cannot yet be dignified by the
name transition. For to visualise a transition it is necessary
to see more or less clearly both the beginning and the end of
the process. The history of events has made us familiar
with the framework of the system which we are leaving
behind. Unfortunately there is no such clarity about our
destination....The great need of the moment is not only for
a policy of action to deal with a pressing situation, but for
a new theory of social and economic organisation which will
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facilitate the evolution towards a new economic system
suitable to change the circumstances of the modem world.284
Breaking this down into class language, the anxiety of the capitalist class is clear.
Firstly, one notes how internal civil disorder (against capital) is viewed of equal
importance to the catastrophe of world war. Macmillan puts the matter bluntly
for capitalism: if capitalism cannot arrest its decay by securing some other means
of control over labour (in 'political speak', 'a new theory of social and economic
organisation'), then civil unrest will result. As Macmillan later warns,
'Revolutionary movements can only grow with the development of a
revolutionary situation'. As yet, he argued, this did not exist, due to the 'buffers
which have wisely been created between the worker and destitution' (the
tendency towards systemic Labourism). As MacMillan was at pains to point
out, however, unless capitalism in Britain could overcome its short sighted
pragmatism and evolve towards a new system, a revolution might well have to be
faced.
Macmillan, although he misses the essence of the problem, is well aware of its
presence and at least profers a tentative solution. In this he is representative of
productive capital rather than finance capital, who betray a greater recognition of
the essence of the problem and so are very reluctant to endorse interventions of
any kind. MacMillan, amplifying the interests of productive capitalists)need to
generate surplus value, exemplifies the central tenets of their argument. The free
market system had past its sell by date: the productive powers it had unleashed
had eventually lead to world over production and national rivalry based on tariffs
quotas and subsidies. These factors had set in motion a world deflationary
trend, which in tum had forced capitalists to attack the working classes of the
284H. MacMillan (1931), Reconstruction: A Plea For National Policy, pl.
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industrialised nations. The inability (especially pronounced in Britain) to
successfully reduce labour costs and assert control over labour, had lead capital's
disengagement with labour and subsequently, falling investment, unemployment
and output - in a word, stagnation. The 'solution', echoed faithfully by
MacMillan, was a transition to a 'planned economy', and not yet more doses of
the same poison - 'free market'.
In this respect the 1932 World Economic Conference - arranged expressly to
rehabilitate a 'free market system' around a new world universal equivalent - as
far as MacMillan was concerned, simply ignored the essential problem and dealt
only with the effects. The conference was positive, argued MacMillan, in only
one thing: its clear demonstration of the impossibility of 'putting back the clock'.
MacMillan might well have been addressing the finance capitalist operating out
of the major boardrooms of industry and finance and determining the bulk of
policy adopted in the Treasury-Bank of England-City nexus, when proclaiming;
The conference is now ended. It has failed in its purpose.
And it is vitally necessary that the failure should be
recognised and proclaimed. For while there remains a
lingering hope that everything will come right of its own
accord, or any basis for the belief that a return to the old
system is possible, as a result of the passing of resolutions
or the signing of conventions, no definite, determined and
realistic plan of action will be adopted....(p 11, ibid)
.....The reply which must be made to those who dream of a
return to the old days and rebel against any suggestion of
organisation - of controL.. is simply that the world has
changed, and that such a return is technically, politically
and economically impossible (p16, ibid).
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Macmillan, appeared to be informing finance capitalists, in no uncertain terms,
that there was no international escape clause and no way of putting off, for very
much longer, a realignment of classes in Britain. As far as Macmillan was
concerned, tariff reductions, price policies and debt modifications, were merely
policies which dealt with the effects of a deeper malaise which could only be
resolved by a concerted movement towards 'economic and social planning' on a
national scale. The failure of the World Economic Conference simply
confirmed that the abolishment of a substantive ground for a universal
equivalent form of abstract labour in September 1931 was no short term flash in
the pan, but rather the beginning of a new epoch. A new epoch in the sense that
the real decline of commodity fetishism and the subsequent emergence of
Labourist tendencies of control, which began in the late nineteenth century, now
received, with the movement away from gold, their substantive confirmation.
For in essence, as has been emphasised above, Labourism's substantive ground
can only come into being by abolishing capital's substantive ground. It is only
then that a new alignment of use and exchange value can be attempted. It is this
new alignment which is at the heart of Macmillan's and his supporters urge to
'plan' the capitalist system.
Planning, for the Tory Labourist required 'central direction' capable of
determining the supply needed to satisfy an aggregate demand. The method of
achieving this was in essence, if not form, very similar to the undemocratic mode
of administration known as 'planning' in the Soviet Union. This is hardly a
surprise, as the goal is the same: bureaucratic control of use values and social
needs. MacMillan explains,
The method of achieving it (the 'plan') over the whole range
of the commodities is through the integration of industry
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and the intelligent (read - non-working class) direction of
production by a central authority for each industry guaranteed
against redundancy, duplication and disorderly competition
by the grant of monopoly powers in return for the acceptance
of certain social responsibilities. (P24).
One should not preoccupy ourselves with the idea that this was a blue print for
'capitalist syndicalism'. Clearly, for the centralised authorities in each industry
to maintain and regulate the flow of capital, labour and materials, would require
that they in turn form a central authority at the level of the State. In
fundamentals they were at one with left Labourists on this issue. The difference
between the two was one of form not content. Left Labourism, drawing more
heavily on Stalinist ideological forms, the right drawing more on Fascist
ideology. The content however, was the same: top down bureaucratic control
over labour power, production, distribution and exchange. The main problem
was that both Stalinism and Fascism were, intially, repugnant to finance capital.
Both forms of control over labour would necessitate not only serious restriction
on the circulation of money capital, but would take the comption of money
capital too far. As argued earlier however, conditions were not of fmance
capital's choosing. They may have been repulsed by ideologies of 'planning', but
in practice they knew that some form of it must come into being.
Initially they sided with the right wing of Labourism. Its emphasis on over
production as opposed to underconsumption, and the subsequent need for
'rationalisation' were acceptable to financial interests. Mainly because they
offered the type of accumulation with the most potential benefits: stable profits
and a slump to contain the threat of labour. In so far as this was emphasised by
right wing Labourism, finance capitalists were naturally drawn to their solution.
However, as a long term solution it had no credit without a supporting ideology.
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Fascism could, perhaps, have provided the political hegemony for this long term
solution, yet its political economy rested upon economic regeneration and an
emphasis on the problem of underconsumption, which, if acted upon, would lead
to more redistribution of surplus value than was safe to be granted.
Hence the situation became compromised; right Labourists had a workable
political economy, but no political hegemonic ideology, through which it could
placate left Labourism (who had to sell the political economy to the working
class). Fascism, on the other hand, could provide a potential political hegemonic
ideology. However one problem was that Fascism was irrevocably tied to a
political economy of large scale long term reinvestment, linked to a radical
redistribution of surplus value. A series of links finance capital was very
reluctant to consider. There was another more fundamental reason why finance
capital had to reject Fascist ideology: the British labour movement was still
strong enough not to submit to it, while the middle class, possibly due to this
fact, was too weakly organised to foster Fascism's growth. Therefore, while the
rights political economy could be grudgingly accepted by the ruling class of
Britain, its flirtation with Fascism could not. Under the banner of Fascism a
political economy of planning capitalism set left Labourism against the system
and possibly lead to the reinvigoration of the working class. Finance capital in
its rejection of Fascism gave the clearest of indications that Fascism would not
contain the working class movement in Britain, but would prove highly restrictive
to the movement of capital. Fascism, then, was no solution, it was simply a
double bind. The reality of the period was that if finance capital was to be
contained of necessity to ensure long term survival, then Labourism must
guarantee control of the working class. Fascism could never achieve this in
Britain and so finance capital remained aloof from it during the 1930s.
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This is the one important reason why Mosley and his co-partners attracted only
the fringes of the finance capitalist class and had to be content with a ground
swell of lower middle class and lumpen proletarian support. As Benewick
declared, the British Union of Fascist (BUF) I presence was marginal to the
mainstream of British politics,285.
Fascism was virtually ignored by the organised labour movement and received
only very weak endorsement amongst its more traditional supporters in the ranks
of the middle class. Most of the little support it was able to muster, came from
the lower middle class, clerical workers, shop keepers, small traders..etc.286
Membership peaked at around 50,000 in 1934 and plummeted to 5,000 a year
later, before making a slight recovery in 1936-7 to around 16,000. Electorally it
was a complete failure (ibid, p234). The BUF received no financial support from
the ruling class. It had to be content with internal subscriptions such as they
were, and donations from William Morris the industrialist and Mussolini.287
The fact that the Mosleyites had latched on to Hobson's theory of
underconsumptionism sealed Fascisms fate on British soil, so far as an alliance
with finance capital was concerned. As mentioned, from underconsumptionism
spring the politics of redistributing ruling class profits to workers and the
nationalisation of 'sacred' financial institutions. Fascism also meant the
movement away from British Parliamentary democracy, the very capitalist
institution which had, for more than two centuries, served to enshrine the
Treasury-Bank of England-City nexus of financial capital control ever more
deeply into the social fabric. For paramount reasons such as these, Fascists
proved incapable of securing the faith of finance capital.
285 R. Benewick, Direct Action And Democratic Politics, in Benewick & Smith (edt) (1972), pSI. Also
A. Thorpe (1992), Britain in the 1930s, p50-58.
286J. Stevenson & C. Cook (1994, 2nd edt), Britain in the Depression, p236-7, Longman.
287J. Stevenson & C Cook, ibid, p217-240; also see Skide1sky, (1975), op-cit.
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The national Governments success in holding together for a decade, is testimony,
amongst other things, to the centrist position fiancne capital had been forced to
adopt as it manoeuvered from one faction of Labourism to another. This fact
also has some bearing as to why Fascism did not gain ground in Britain. The
National Government, for its survival, had to act as a constraining conservative
force on the polarisation and eventual splintering of the main political Party's
during this era of transition. The main effect of such a conservative force was to
reinforce traditional voting patterns and alliances amongst workers and the
middle class. The result was that 'The National Government provided a bulwark
for (the middle class) against communism and in doing so condemned the BUF
to a relatively minor role' (Stevenson & Cook, op-cit, p238-239).
Right wing Labourists who had flirted with Fascism had to move fast in
distancing themselves from it. Macmillan's credentials as the personification of
right wing Labourism are further enhanced when one notes how rapid his
response was in distancing himself and Tory/Liberal reformers from the Moseley
faction. The Mosley phenomenon had alienated both fmance capital and left
elements of Labourism whom the right were attempting to co-opt. Macmillan's
movement away from Fascist influence, was very much guided by the need to
offer something for both fmance capital and left Labourism. In this respect
Macmillan's 1935 document - The Middle Way - was a significant breakthrough
in the goal to unite both Labourist factions and fmance capitalists in pursuit of a
long term solution to capitalist decline.
In the Middle Way MacMillan stresses a recommitment to Parliament as a
sovereign dictator of any future advance towards Labourism. Such a
commitment was a positive move so far as the interests of fmance capital were
concerned. Parliament was a crucial linchpin in securing finance capitalist
hegemony. Through it, fmance capital enhanced its control over fiscal and
308
monetary policy. It also acted as the forum through which the overall direction
and scope of a Labourist system could be developed and controlled. The
reconversion to the sovereignty of Parliament made MacMillan's subsequent
volte face on the subject of the economic problem -conversion from over
production to underconsumption - easier for finance capital to accept. The
acceptability of the underconsumption argument was further enhanced, when
right wing Labourism rejected Hobson's version of underconsumptionist
problems and accepted Keynes's version of the underconsumption doctrine. It
was a version characteristically weak on physical planning and strong on fiscal
planning solutions. The emphasis on fiscal planning was, to recap, more
favourable because it could provide finance capital with the tools to control the
economy and weaken any resolve to over embelish any controls on the flow of
capital.
The ground for compromise, then, appeared to be solidifying. Simultaneously
the acceptance of underconsumptionism, and therefore the need for capital
investment, was effective in building a bridge with left Labourism; particularly
the group revolving around Atlee, Durbin and Gaitskill. Nevertheless, despite
the progress made towards creating a political economy around which finance
capital and left Labourites could unite, the essential problem - the lack of a
political ideology to cement it - still remained. So long as this problem
remained, it would block any re-accumulation strategy from developing.
Devoid of the necessary political ideology, fmance capital could see only the
advance of the working class and the degeneration of the law of value. A
degeneration it may, or may not, have been able to control using Keynesianism.
Therefore, despite its potential for allowing some form of control of use value
and needs, through money forms of control, right wing Labourism's middle way,
failed to gain full acceptance. Any middle way under the given conditions was
treated with much suspicion, by those within the inner circle of fmance
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capitalists, who held court within the Bank of England, the Treasury and the City
(Booth & Pack, 1985). Something was missing for finance capital and that
'something' was a guarantee that the working class would remain depoliticised
under the rubric of 'planning'. Left Labourism provided such a guarantee via its
insidious relationship with Stalinism.
6.8 The Role ofLeft Labourism
While the battle from the right wing of Labourism was slowly gaining ground,
left wing Labourism was pushing its own brand of 'planning': one which had
more than an echo of ;state socialism from above'. For inspiration it drew
heavily upon Stalinism in the Soviet Union. Of course left wing Labourism,
represented organisationally by the Labour Party and TUC, were never slow to
castigate the USSR for its blatant repression. For example, the TUC under the
leadership of Walter Citrine and Ernest Bevin were particularly vitriolic in their
denunciations of the Stalinist systems excesses during the purges (Jones 1984).
The Labour Party for its part, adamantly refused affiliation rights to the CPGB
(Evan Durbin, 1985; Mark Jenkins, 1979). Nevertheless, as many have
indicated,288 one cannot equate the Labour Party's and the TUC's denunciation
of communists operating in Britain and specific practices of Stalinism in the
Soviet Union with rejection carte blanche of all things Stalinist. Nothing in
point of fact could be further from the truth. Stalinismwas an inspiration to left
Labourites throughout the 1930s. In fact if one thing united a disparate official
Labour movement in the 1930s it was an adherence and commitment to defend
what Earnest Bevin called, despite his earlier reservations, 'that superhuman
288 For example, B. Jones (1977).
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effort to rebuild a state on socialist lines,289 which Stalinism supposedly
represented.
By any criteria of measurement, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB)
remained on the periphery of political power, in fact the organisation was almost
as isolated as the Fascist Party. In what way, then, can it be argued that Stalinist
influence was the vital factor in Labourism's rise to political power after 1940?
Putting the question another way; on what basis does the influence of Stalinism
rest? The argument below suggests that the resting point was so deeply
embedded that even the Stalin-Hitler Pact could do little fundamental to disturb
it. Stalinism's often implicit, but, nevertheless, all pervading influence, originates
from two sources, which the left of Labourism (and eventually the right) found
irresistible. Firstly, Stalinism had rejected (reluctantly) the law of value (and so
markets) as controller of labour and regulator of production. Secondly, Stalinism
was living proof of the ability to maintain control over labour, whilst projecting
an image of socialist progress through notions of a common 'plan'.
It is this promise of Stalinism that gave hope to the belief that a realignment of
use and exchange value in the context of a declining capitalism, could be
successfully implemented. Labourism, particularly its left wing, with their
traditional gloss of democratic socialism from 'above', was intimately related
with Stalinist ideology and practice. Despite denunciations of Stalin, the Soviet
Union and the CPGB, which on occasion mayor may not have been principled,
the rational core of Stalinism became a natural ally to left Labourism. It was an
ally in the Labourist quest to rule the labour movement on the basis of the
bureaucratic regulation of use value and need in the public sector; and,
simultaneously, an ally in bolstering the rule of capital in the ailing value creating
sector, via state subsidies and regulation.
289 A. Bullock, ( ), The Life and Times ofErnest Bevin, p507.
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Most of the denunciation directed at Stalinism was centred on the systematically
overt use of repression. The repression was absolutely necessary to the Soviet
system, aiding and abetting its political economy of atomisation of the working
class in an attempt to control the surplus product in the interests of the continued
rule of an elite. As Ticktin reveals, atomisation exudes from the core of the
Soviet system. The elimination of the law of value with the dissolution of the
NEP, without at the same time evolving democratic institutions, meant the
system lacked any organic social link between individuals: it had no effective
mode of production. However, this omission becomes the essence of its rule
over labour, due to the fact that all units in this bureaucratised 'community' -
individuals, enterprises, regional planning agencies - become isolated by the
requirements of their own self preservation. The negative disruptive effect on
the division of labour and production, however, also enforced a direct
dependency on individuals. This contradiction between essential atomisation,
but the need for community which can only be given expression through direct
dependency, becomes the basis on which the laws of motion of the soviet system
evolve. The ruling elite who live off the surplus, attemped to control the
contradiction set in motion by the above and thus maintain their privileges. The
KGB enforced and consolidated the rule of the elite through terror and
repression. The political atomisation which followed prevented challenges to the
system. It also added to the contradictions of the system, in the sense that the
more atomisation occured, the deeper the fragmentation of the division of labour,
production and distribution became. Although able to control political revolts, in
effect the system did not control the economy and labour power, so much as rest
upon its fault lines. The end result was a system out of control with a growing
divide between actual use values produced and consumed and potential use
values (Ticktin, ibid, p130_164).290
290 See H. Ticktin (1992), Origins ofthe Crisis in the USSR, particularlyp130-164, Sharpe.
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Labourism did not require anywhere near the level of repression meted out in the
USSR to control the working class of Britain - which, crucially, is one reason
why left Labourism could be quite free with its condemnation of the USSR on
this issue. Repression of the Soviet order was not required because, although
weak, the commodity fetishism of the market place was still adequate enough, to
control labour, if supplemented by bueaucratic atomisation. Labourism, then, is
not entranced by Stalinism in total, but only certain essential elements of its
'rational core'. Of primarily interest surrounds the legitimacy the Soviet political
economy granted, by its very existence, to the project of bureaucratically
controlling use values and need and selling this to the working class as 'socialism
in one country'. Left Labourism was so much under the sway of Stalinism over
this issue, that those who would critique the waste and destruction wrought by
the sham of 'planning' in the USSR, and bemoan 'too much' the misery of the
oppressive conditions, were almost completely ignored by the left in Britain.291
Political requirements compelled the left to accept the official figures of 'growth
and efficiency' at face value, as 'proof of the success of 'socialist planning in one
country'.292
Despite the overall explicit and implicit attraction towards the USSR, left
Labourism was, it is important to stress, unevenly balanced in the depth of its
commitment to promoting a hybrid of Stalinism on British capital's soil.
Theisunevenness originated fromformal differences between factions within left
Labourism over the lessons to be drawn and direction to be taken concerning the
291 For example, Rakovsky, as early as the first year of the first five year plan, produced a devastating
enditment of so called 'planning'. The undemocratic administarion from above had produced chaos not order
in the economy. Quantitative figures of growth, he argued, were an illusion behind which the qualitative
waste and destruction of human productive potential masceraded. I refer the reader to his artical produced in
full in Critique 13.
292 Political expediency meant they were more likely to take at face value the heroic reports of 'planning
successes' meted out by the likes of Voznesensky (leading economist within the bureaucracy), who in 1941
could inform the world that 'The Soviet Union had increased the output of 'socialist' industry by 430%',
between 1929-40 (cited in A. Rothstein (1943), The USSR Speaks For Itself, p22.
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relationship between 'planning' and the market. The left can be divided very
broadly along two (ultimately parallel) political tracks. Along the first track ran
a belief that planning and the market should compliment each other. Leftists
taking this track included some influential members of the Parliamentary Labour
Party and TUC. For example, Gaitskall and Durbin from the Labour ranks,
endorsed such a belief; as did Bevin and Citrine in the TUC. Most of the
contemporary and latter day discussion of this project has been hamstrung by
methodology. It is hard to make sense of the class nature of the thought of
individual left Labourists, as, for the most part, when they do formulate their
thoughts, they reify society, reducing it and the classes within it, to an abstract
unity called the 'National interest'. They also, invariably, employ an empiricist
based rational choice paradigm, which restricts analysis of the issues to formal
logic. Thus for Durbin, 'there is no formal or logical contradiction between
planning and pricing', therefore, on this basis, we are lead to believe, it should be
applied.293 The message for public consumption is that it is all a matter of
rational action and correct application of technique. Given a liberal portion of
rationality and technique, the economy is deemed susceptible to the central
planning of investment and the willing distribution of capital and labour. State
control of the surplus and wage rates, is another rational choice decision which
will, apparently, go uncontested by labour and capital. Not only this, but the
supply and demand for consumer commodities will be unaffected. Thus
capitalist 'ethics' of 'consumer sovereignty' can still reign, uninhibited by 'socialist
planning,.294
When one drops the assumption of an abstract national interest of course, the
irrelevance of the latter to the practical realities of the class conflict become
clear. The methodological approach adopted here, allows one to view the debate
293 E.F.M. Durbin (1949), Problems ofEconomic Planning, p48.
294 Examples of this deep and unabiding fetishism within the Labour Party can be garnered liberally from
Durbin, op-cit; D. Jay (1947), The Socialist Case; B. Wooton (1934), Plan or No Plan.
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about 'planning' and 'markets', as the battle between two antagonistic social
relations; the laws of motion of which become compromised and complicated in
the context of a declining capitalism. The problem is that in the contemporaneous
debate (and indeed debates today), the dialectical methodology is largely
unrecognised.
One can understand why social democrats should ignore the social relations
pervading 'plan' and 'market': forcing the square peg of planning into the round
hole of markets, after all, provides their political and economic life line. They
therefore have a vested interest in obfuscation. It is harder (but by no means
impossible) to understand why many Marxist have been seduced into uncritical
acceptance of the infallibility of the 'law of value' and an uncritical acceptance of
the apparent progressiveness of anything labelled 'planning'. On this basis they
then misunderstand the implications of combining 'plan' and 'market'. Possibly it
indicates the fact that many Marxists have been compromised either theoretically
and/or practically by left LabourismlStalinism? Central aspects of the latter
issue were discussed in the first chapter, the point to be made here is that
because of the methodological restrictions placed on the debates of the era, there
can be little gained from a regurgitation of the contemporary literature on the
issue. The real underlying issue was far more direct and straightforward: who
should control the surplus produced by labour? As far as the faction of Left
Labourites were concerned, it should not devolve to worker control. Nor should
capital accrue it all. The state, and its Labourist agents were to have their share,
through an enlarged state function and in the form of secure and well paid
salaries. These were the real practical ramifications of attempting to 'balance
markets and plan'. One can also see the practical ramiftcations for the TUC. For
them, balancing 'plan' and 'market' translates in reality as the desire for a strong
centralised state to guarantee the coordination of long term fixed capital
formation on the one hand; and the continuation of voluntary 'free market'
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collective bargaining on the other. Such a 'balance' provided the ruc
bureaucrats in particular, the best of all their possible worlds: control over
labour and control over capital.
On the other 'track' ran the belief that the 'plan' must suppress the 'market',
without of course devolving any real power to workers. Thus the State must
coordinate and allocate the majority of socioeconomic resources, with the help of
decentralised institutions representing management, labour and community
groups. This track is represented by Aneurin Bevan, G.D. Cole, Stafford
Cripps..etc, although their views change considerably over time and in relation to
each other. This option is bolder than the first track. Its adherents wished to
make more use of the potential given to Labourism out of the loss of capital's
substantive basis. For Cole the source of the contradiction between plan and
market is ethical; the existence of one denying the ethics of the other. As
'socialist planning' has superior ethics, then, for Cole, the choice is clear: the
market must go. 'Socialist planning' and the market mechanism arrive at
decisions concerning 'efficiency' and 'distribution' in very different ways: the one
concerned with need, the other with profit. Cole's conclusion, unfortunately, is
not to call for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and substantiation of
freely associated production, but rather to celebrate regression back to the kind
of control over use value expressed by the feudal guild system. As a project
within the modem era it has more in common with Corporatist trends to control
labour through direct dependency and rather less to do with the communist
objective of attaining the free association of individuals. Hence Cole is drawn,
inevitably, down the path of the Labourist compromise.
If one can claim this against Cole, it is even more applicable to most of the other
left Labourists. Of course Cole sits uneasily amongst the more overtly Statist
members of left Labourism. Fundamentally, however, there is little to distinguish
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either of the two opinions mentioned above. They both lead to the containment
of the working class. This is why many of the persona located on each track can
jump from one to the other without loss of real credibility. Their ability to do so
is, ultimately, vital, as it enables them to weave a tight knit community of
interests. For example, two very important 'think tanks'; the Society for Socialist
Inquiry and Propaganda (SSIP) and New Fabian Research Bureau (NFRB),
became the institutions through which Bevin, Gaitskill, Durbin, Dobbs, the
Cole's, Morrison, Dalton, Atlee, Cripps, Foot..etc, could air their grievances and,
more importantly, forge a hegemonic commitment to the 'rational kernel' within
stalinism: the goal of 'socialismin one country'.
Their is evidence of the gradual acceptance of this hegemonic project amongst
wider sections of the middle class and bourgeoise, for example, the so called
XYZ Club. Founded by Labour sympathisers in the City, the club established
institutional links between left Labourism and finance capital representatives.
These representatives were mainly interested in fostering belief within the
Labour Party as to the importance of markets and of sound fmance. Club
members included, James Lawrie (Lloyds Bank), Douglas Jay (The Economist),
Francis Williams (City editor Daily Herald). According to one prominent
member the XYZ Club could lay claim.. 'to have exercised in a quiet sort of way
more influence on future government policy than any other group of the time and
to have done so in the most private manner without attracting publicity to
itself .295 There seems little doubt that high on the agenda would be issues
regarding the extent of capital controls that Labourism would require; the
possible extent of surplus value redistribution it would take for Labourism to
operate; and the prior assignment of 'appropriate' volunteers from the City, for
manning the corporate heads of future nationalised industries.
295 Francis Williams, cited in, E, Durbin, (1985), p83, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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Another, deeper, more vociferous and lasting influence eminating from left
Labourism, has been that of Fabianism. This creed within the Labour movement
was undoubtably the most influential in assisting the rise of Stalinist influence.
There can be little contention from any quarter as to the profound influence of
Fabianism on Left Labourism. Fabianism has been at the heart of Labour Party
philosophy since its inception (E. Durbin, 1985; L. Radice, 1984). For example,
Pimlott credits Fabians of the 1940s and 50s with bringing Keynesianism into the
mainstream of the Labour Party and trade union policy. There cannot be much
doubt as to the immense influence Fabianism exerted on the philosophy and
practice of left Labourism.
The Webb's, in every sense the guiding mentors of Fabianism before 1940,
epitomise best, perhaps, the pernicious links between the left of Labourism and
Stalinism. Any irony is only apparent in the fact that, in the 1920s, when Soviet
democracy could still be described as latent, the Webb's were anti-Bolshevik,
while in the 1930s, amidst open acts of terror, repression and the show trials,
they proselytised about the virtues of Soviet democracy. For the Webbs, freely
associated production and the wave of revolutionary movements commencing in
1917 which sought to bring this to fruition, spelt anarchy, chaos and lack of
moral discipline. According to the Webbs (and in this they personified
Fabianism) the masses could not rule, they had to be ruled (in their own ultimate
interests of course). This need for a benevolent authority, a 'socialism from
above', was the essence of the 'socialism' which had always been a part of left
Labourism. Thus one can understand why the Webbs gazed longingly at the
Stalinist system, either ignoring completely or else making light of the acts of
atrocity the system piled up, one on top of the other.
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So far as Beatrice Webb was concerned, Stalinism had, 'revolutionised..the
purpose of government, which was to 'transform the motives of men,296 from
that of the market to that of adaptation to centralised command. The lessons of
Stalinism were those of order and control. Not only would production and
consumption be harmonised, but so too (apparently) would human faculty and
desire.297 The Webbs spearheaded the movement which carried the theoretical
arguments and practical justifications for support of and advocacy for Stalinism
within the ranks of the Labour establishment. As Jones has commented, 'These
voices helped generate the crescendo of Labour Party administration and support
for the Soviet Union in the early part of the 1930s,.298 The penetration of
Stalinist ideology into the ranks of the Labour establishment, was, of course,
given ultimate impetus by the stagnation of capitalism in Britain; its failing ability
to control labour; and its lack of any credible future programme of reform to
establish order. The Stalinist promise of full employment was enough to blind
those to the gross inhuman excesses of the Soviet system.
Left Labourism was also supported by the wider British intelligentsia, who were
infatuated with Stalinism for much the same reasons. To quote Jones,
The early 1930s witnessed an eruption of radical
feeling in British Universities ...the alignment
with a force (Stalinism) which claimed to be inexorably on the
side of 'good' was a haven of refuge to many bemused
Liberal faced with the reality of fascism abroad and
poverty at home.299
296 L. Radice (1984), The Purpose ofGovemment, p300, MacMillan.
297 L. Radice (1984), op-cit, p300.
298 B. Jones (1977), op-cit, pl0.
299 B. Jones (1977), ibid, p13. (the word in brackets is myadition).
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George Orwell was a little more forthcoming about the depth of sycophancy he
observed amongst his peers concerning Stalinism. Orwell (The Lion and the
Unicorn) reveals in no uncertain terms the extent of the infatuation and
intellectual bankruptcy of a whole generation of intellectuals. Faced with
Fascism abroad and decadent capitalism at home, the intelligentsia, placed their
faith in Stalinist forms of control over workers, rather than in genuine socialism.
Orwell expressed contempt and dismay at the depth of unthinking loyalty to
Stalinist 'socialism' given by a generation of 'left' intellectuals. For Orwell they
were little more than 'publicity agents posing as international Socialists', the
followers of 'unquestioned dogma,.300
The Labour left, then, had absorbed the negative programmatic consequences of
Stalinsim. One major problem which the left Labourist had to contend with (a
problem which would produce serious resistance from finance capital if it was
not dealt with) was that, along with Stalinism came the verbiage of Marxism.
Although the language of Marxism had often had its uses, particularly when
faced with labour militancy, it was, nevertheless an obstacle, as far as winning
the confidence of finance capital and Right wing Labourism was concerned.
Leftists such as Bevan and those who later rallied round the banner of Bevanism,
may have been Labourists to the core, however, their radical posture offered a
potential rallying point for the re-politicisation of labour. It was dangerous
enough for finance capital to be endorsing the advance of use value and need,
without leaving the link between need and Marxism in some sort of close
approximation politically. Stalinised 'Marxism', even though ideologically
incoherent on most occasions, had to be separated from the link with revolution.
Accident in this case advanced the forces of necessity. During the 1930s, the
Popular Front movement and its eventual rupture by the Hitler Stalin Pact,
300 Cited from a forthcoming article by John. Newsinger, Destroying the Myth: George Orwell and Soviet
Communism, in Critique Journal of Socialist theory, issue No 27, 1995.
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became of vital importance in breaking the link. It succeeded in separating the
influence of Stalinisms 'rational core' from any further notions of 'revolution'.
From this moment on revolution was ruled out - the way forward was to be the
evolutionary progression towards 'socialism from above'.
The influence of Stalinism and the popular front on the left of the Labour Party
was considerable. Tribune the major think tank of the Left, became, in fact, a
non independent 'tribune' given over to chronicling the 'wonders' of Stalinism.
Jones captures the sycophantic mood well in the following quote;
It published an article by Harry Politt on the need for
working class unity, it offered Palme Dutt review space to
eulogise the published letters of Lenin, and it commissioned the
communist Pat Sloan to demolish Trotsky's The Revolution
Betrayed. ..J.R. Cambell's apology for the Moscow Trials Soviet
Politics and its Critiques was favourably reviewed, Trotsky
was incessantly denounced, and Stalin's unscrupulous
redrafting of recent history The History ofthe CPSU was
praised in lavish terms. Both in Tribune and elsewhere the
British fellow travellers campaigned vigorously for a popular
front and for Communist Party membership to the Labour Party.301
The Popular front against Fascism, established by the Comintem in the mid
1930s across Europe, proved to be one of the high points of CPGB popularity.
Under the guise of anti-fascism, it became a vehicle for subordinating the
working class to social democracy in Britain and Europe, in the overall interests
of securing the Moscow line of appeasement and 'peaceful coexistence' with
capitalism. In other words, the Stalinist system wished to preserve itself by
301 B. Jones (1977), The Russian Complex, op-cit, p36.
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sacrificing the international working class to capitalism. In Britain, the CPGB,
as the quotion above indicates, had strongly infiltrated the Labour left. For many
Marxists (mainly Trotskyists) the CPGB were pushing at an open door. The
Tribune and Bevanite left had succumbed easily to Stalinist propaganda, but they
were not alone on the left. The New Statesman & Nation too were solidly behind
Stalinism; defending Stalinist atrocities and anti-working class politics in Spain
concretely by refusing to print anything which placed Stalinism in a negative
light. Orwell was refused space in its pages to provide his account of the events
in Spain. In fact, Homage To Catalonia was rejected by The Left Book
Club.302
Clearly the integration of the Labour left with Stalinism was a deep and long
lasting one. An intergration cemented, further still, by the popular front
campaign orchestrated by the CPGB. Of course, this sycophantic loyalty to
Stalinism weakened considerably after the volte face of the Stalin-Hitler Pact.
For example, Stalinist show trials suddenly became important news again.
However one must be careful to separate this vilification of the USSR and Stalin,
from the still strong commitment to its 'rational core'. At no time did the left,
despite the betrayals, denunciations and repressions, reject Stalinist 'planning'.
This rational core' proved irresistible. As Jones explains;
The latter years of the decade saw influential intellectuals
reassessing their attitude to Russia ...The initial idealism of the
revolution had been choked by the extension of authoritarian
control and the elevation of its chief manipulator, Stalin.
Trotsky's claim that Stalin had betrayed the revolution began
to receive consideration in the West. .Max Eastman..pronounced
the end of socialism in Russia.
302See J. Newsinger (1995), Critique 27.
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However;
Despite its recent tarnished domestic image the Soviet Union
was, after all, the pioneer of a planned social economy, the
historic friend of the Labour Party, and the recipient of its
benign partisan protection.303
The Daily Herald in its publication of December 1st 1939 may well have
'suddenly' discovered that 'the USSR was dead' and that 'Stalin's new imperialist
Russia' had taken its place. However, this did not shake the belief that, warts
and all, the USSR system of planning was the way forward.
The objective here is not to look deeply into the intricacies of the Popular Front
movement and its demise at the behest of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, but to consider
the effects this had upon Left Labourism. Indeed the effects were profound. The
Left wing groupings around the Labour Party had constituted a block to
Labourist advance in general, in the sense that they weakened the political
impact of the Right wing factions within the Labour Party and TUC. Stated
simply, finance capital would not be drawn into the web of Labourism as long as
sections of the Left Labourist movement could not be disciplined. In a word,
while they continually spoke the radical language of 'revolution' and Marxism
was still spoken, systemic Labourism would remain an idea who's time may
never come. Stalin's sudden pact with Fascism changed all this. The Tribunite
left and their fellow travellers were cowed into submission by the Labour Party
and TUC right wing over the issue. As Jenkins explains;
The Tribune left...found that, in separating themselves from
303 B. Jones, op-cit, p29.
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the Kremlin turn, they had, ironically, smoothed the path of
Morrison and Attlee..304
In effect the right in the Labour Party were able to use the stick of Stalinisms
Fascist links, not to undermine the link with Stalinism, but to undermine the link
between the left and any notions of revolution. They were able to claim that
Marxism, leads to Stalin, leads to political dictatorship; a dictatorship with very
little difference substantially from Hitler's. Right wing forces were able to
dominate the ideology of the Labour Party and TUC more decisively from this
point and, therefore, were able to ensure that gradualism and reformism and the
mixed economy became the key watch words of Left Labourism. The rational
core of Stalinism was still accepted, of course. What had changed was that now
it could be linked to gradual reforms and separated from any notion of revolution
which the left of the Labour Party may have had illusions in. Thus, Left
Labourism, after the Stalin-Hitler Pact, finally became 'fit to govern' and so able
to take up their position alongside the Right. The rational core of Stalinism had
been separated and neutralised to the benefit of a declining capitalism in Britain.
Socialism 'from above' and 'in one country' could now be envisaged. As one
commentator notes,
It was no coincidence.. that the left wing monopoly of
progressive socialist thinking should now be broken,
books by such right wingers as Hugh Dalton and Evan Durbin
began to attract attention, helping to form the basis of the
programme which Labour would enact after 1945.305
304 Mark Jenkins, (1984), Bevanism, p36.
305 B. Jones, op-cit, p54.
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The extent of the collapse of the Labourist Left can be gauged by the sudden
conversion to Keynesianism, by those previously committed to physical
planning. John Strachey is an example of such a conversion. The immense
ideological barrage from the Right had converted him to the belief that the fiscal
controls of Keynesianism could provide a 'third approach to socialism,306, when,
for most of his intelectuallife, he had worked for the supression of the market.
Once the Right of the Labour Party had gained ascendancy, and Stalin had parted
company with Hitler's Fascism, the way was clear for a reorientation of relations
with the USSR. The pact with Hitler could now be seen, for convenience, as
simply an isolated mistaken policy. Cole exemplified the apologetic nature of
Labour's 'new approach', when stating that 'a country does not cease to be
socialist because it follows for a time a radically mistaken policy'. One
implication of such a pronouncement is that Stalinst 'planning' (socialist) can be
separated from policy (the inadequacies of the USSR and Stalin). Once
separated, they can be united with more rational policies, based on Labourism of
course. Thus, the basis of the hegemonic pact between Left Labourism, right
Labourism and finance capital was eventually forged in 1940. The war effort
merely focused this pact, it did not create it, as orthodox theory suggests.
The manner in which the 'rational core' of Stalinismcould 'create social order'
was not lost on Right wing Labourists. Macmillan, for example, had come back
from a visit to the Soviet Union in the early 1930s admiring its disciplinary
effects if not its efficiencies. Whilst Beveridge had to agree with his Fabian
friends the Webbs that this type of planning may hold a rational kernel for British
capitalism (Booth & Pack, 1986). The rational kernel, as explained, lay in
Stalinisms ability to appear ideologically favourable to workers while, in
306 B. Jones, op-cit, p54.
325
practice, subjecting workers to the oppressions of bureaucratic physical
planning to add insult to their exploitation. Thus, the Right and Left wing of
Labourism had fostered enough common ground to convince finance capital they
could secure a new accumulation strategy and maintain controls over the labour
movement. What they united around was the ideology of Social economic
planning, overseen by Keynesian fiscal controls, within the framework of
Parliamentary democracy. Keynesian fiscal 'planning' secured the dominance of
the instrument of money, which was crucial in winning the acquiescence of
finance capital to the project of Labourism after 1940. Stalinism provided the
context wherein the physical planning of capital would lead, not to the re-
politicisation of labour, but its further depoliticisation. More specifically,
Keynesian tools of fiscal/monetary planning, provided Labourist forces the
ground upon which to build a material compromise between the classes and
provided finance capital with the means to dilute and control the pace of the
developing dominance of use value over exchange value. With the political
hegemony of Labourism secure the Labourist tendencies - management of
national money, social welfare state, welfare management/national industrial
relations strategy - developed together as a system of working class containment.
Left and Right Labourists had secured a material basis of rule for themselves
alongside finance capital. In the next chapter analysis turns to an understanding
of the deeply undemocratic nature of Labourism and its inherent irresolvable
contradictions, contradictions which would eventually lead to its dissolution, and
which, consequently, gave rise to 'Thatcherism'.
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CH 7 LABOURISM: ITS CONTRADICTION & COLLAPSE.
The task of this fmal chapter will be to explain the contradictions of systemic
Labourism once this phenomena had come into being. As the Nationalisation
programme, set in motion after the second world war, epitomises the Labourist
compromise, the chapter opens with an explanation of how fmance capital use
this as a vehicle to control labour and continue its accumulation. Another task of
the chapter is to emphasise the highly unstable nature of systemic Labourism, to
make clear why Labourism had inevitably to collapse and uncoil due to internal
contradictions. Finally, it is argued that the collapse of Labourism becomes the
foundation for explaining the rise of so called 'Thatcherism'. It, therefore, lays
the basis of an understanding of the present epoch. The chapter opens by
situating Labourism within the wider international crisis of the early post war
period, thus setting out the contextual basis for understanding the inner
contradictions of Labourism. Labourism was very much predicated on certain
international conditions too, conditions which presented a 'window of
opportunity' for the balance of class forces in Britain to be cast in favour of the
Labourist compromise. Following this an examination of the undemocratic
nature of Labourism, specifically within the Nationalised industries, is
undertaken. Finally, on this basis, the discussion moves to an identification and
understanding of the inner contradications within Labourism responsible for its
demise.
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7.1 Labourism and the International Crisis
International pressures were increasing the urgency of the ruling class to
actualise the Labourist settlement. Exports by 1945 had fallen to 30% of their
19391evel. Carr summarieses British capital's weak international position;
It had been estimated that the war cost a quarter of Britain's
wealth, £7, 300 million. Debt to other countries had grown
from £476 million to £3, 555 million in 1945. Much of the
debt was to sterling area countries. Britain faced major
difficulties in resolving this situation because of the physical
damage to its productive capacity and merchant marine.
Obsolete plant, lack of investment, manpower shortages and the
dislocation caused by war, all contained exports. Invisible
earnings had been cut by war time sales of foreign assets
valued at £4, 200 million. Imports of food and foreign raw
materials were vital but foreign earnings scarcely paid half
the costs.
Of course this parlous state was not solely or even primarily to do with the costs
ofwar, but more to do with the failure in the decades before the war to develop a
new accumulation strategy on the basis of class compromise. The cost of war
added significantly to this grave situation. The deliberation as to primary cause
notwithstanding, the blunt uncontentious fact was that British capital's
international position, was in a chronic state at the very time it was most needed
to cement the Labourist compromise. A positive balance of payment is
necessary because Labourism, based on a re-alignment of use and exchange
value, had to be paid for out of present and future surplus value, a surplus value
in large part, 'earned' internationally.
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A related issue of concern to the new Labourist system, was that prolonged
deficits on the balalnce of payments would bring forward the day when holders
of sterling would clamour for converability and speculate out of sterling. Again,
this would pose serious repercussions for the Labourist compromise internally.
The immediate post war international situation was indeed dire. The shortage of
sterling had reached the most critical levels, at the very same time that American
lend leasing to Britain had been cut. As Savage notes, sterling balances, mainly
with India and Egypt, were in the red and Treasury forecasts pointed to a current
account deficit for some years to come.307 The British ruling classes
commitment to a finance and resource absorbing imperialist foreign policy,
exacerbated the balance of payments problem. As a result the need to control
consumption, at a time when it should have formed one of the foundations of
Labourism, became a necessity. In the immediate post war period the ruling class
was committed to putting down revolts within Indo-China and Greece and to a
general longer term policy of controlling and administering its influence within
and around the sterling area (Savage, 1993; Callaghan, 1993). The massive
deficits on both capital and current accounts appeared to be in inverse relation to
commitments to expansionist imperial policy centred around the sterling area.
The drastic domestic deflationary pressures implied by the above, at a time when
the labour movement expected the realisation of the Labourist promise
concerning full employment and rising living standards, generated a surge of
militancy in the working class. This gave greater impetus towards establishing
and consolidationg Labourism ideologically, at a time when its material basis
was deteriorating.
307 J. Savage, in his Introduction to J. Fyrth (edt) Labours High Noon (1993), p xxiv.
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The balance of payments problem, caused by the war debt, continuing
commitment to the sterling area and domestic commitment to Labourism, could
of course be relieved in the short term by more American aid, as it was with the
Marshall Aid Plan. It could also be relieved by securing the parameters of the
sterling area against American imperialism and reversing the dollar losses of the
sterling area. The problem with the latter option was that American capital at the
close of the war, would only provide aid, on the level of the Marshall Aid Plan, if
British capital relinquished its grip on the sterling area and allow American
capital into the lucrative markets. As British capital was not about to relinquish
their hold on the sterling area, such an aid package, at that particular time, was
ruled out. British capital looked to other solutions. The solution would require,
as a prerequisite of its adoption, enough control over the working class to shift
investments to exports and away from satisfying working class demand for
consumption goods. Such a shift necessarily required the policing role of the
trade union bureaucracy to restrain national incomes - a task which could only
be successfully policed by a TUe officially endorsed by the state as national
representatives of labour, holding positions of power within the state. And then
only within an overall social environment where workers had been compromised
with promises of full employment and a social welfare system. Thus the
Labourist settlement is given impetus and its defining characteristics are amde
clearer, by the problems of balancing international payments and ongoing
imperialist commitments. It was the need to acquire massive aid while
maintaining the sterling area, and the need to meet the financial burden imposed
by Labourism, which determined the post war Labour Governments slide into
cold war foreign policy. It is worth explaining under what circumstances these
needs were eventually met, because it brings into relief, amongst other things, the
precarious foundations upon which Labourism was erected.
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7.2 Labourism and the USSR connection in International Context
In 1945 the newly established Labour Government viewed the USSR as an ally
that had suffered greatly during the war against Fascism. However this position,
while of value in creating socialist unity within the Labour ranks in the build up
to election victory, was in ultimate conflict to Labourism's success. Success
depended on the compliant mobilisation of the Labour Party and TUC towards
the goal of the political containment of the working class domestically to the
needs of a declining capitalism. This containment, as argued, necessitated all the
strands of Labourism to become actualised in order to realign use and exchange
value. For this to occur a new export led foreign trading policy was crucial. The
latter in turn required that some form of international trading compromise with
the USA be struck. Hence by 1946 a more hostile Soviet line and increasingly
pro American line was adopted by the Labour administration in the Foreign
Office, which was, at the time, headed by the 'socialist' and ex leader of the
TUC, Bevin. The newly emerging international policy line was to find its
logical conclusion in the Cold War split.
There were two reasons why the about turn on the USSR could help fulfil the
Labourist pretensions of the Labour government. Firstly, hostility to the USSR
on the basis of the perceived threat of expansionism, served to discipline the left
of the Labour Party and trade union movement and so inculcate further the social
democratic brand of 'socialism from above'. Despite the emergence of a Keep
Left movement lead by Bevanite factions (Jenkins, 1979; Carr, 1993), which
attempted to resist the pull to the right, the anti-USSR stance eventually
succeeded in uniting the bulk of Labourists to the task of implementing
Labourism not some variant of Stalinism. Their isolation and disorientation was
complete. The lefts call for a 'third way' between Moscow and Washington for
331
British socialism, for example, amounted to little more than what Labourism was
to provide anyway, that is, physical planning (Sate downwards), overseen by
Keynesian fiscal controls. Thus the left of left Labourism had no distinct
political programme. The anti-USSR stance proved a success in uniting the left
to the project of Labourism, as indicated by acquiescence of Tribune, Socialist
Commentary and The Fabian Colonial Bureau to the Labour rights hard nosed
imperialist adventures, under the ruhbric of a more 'progressive colonial policy'
(Carr, 1993; see also Callaghan, 1993).
The second reason for the Labour Governments hostile stance to the USSR again
had more to do with pragmatism than principle. Opposition to the USSR
general, and playing up the threat of Soviet invasions in particular, had become
an effective bargaining chip with American capital, over the realignment of
imperialist rule and the balance of costs and benefits to be meeted out to
international capital as a result. For example, it was on the basis of the
perceived Soviet threat, that British capital was able to win a very favourable
deal with American capital; one which reduced its sterling area dollar debt.
Callaghan illustrates the potential lucrative results. Malaya's tin and rubber
trades(owned by British capital) accounted for a substantial amount of the
sterling areas dollar earning exports. The double threat of communist
insurrection in Malaya (June 1948) and an American economic recession (1948-
49), jeopardised the profits and ultimate ownership rights of British capital.
Enter the new cold war stance taken by the Labour Government, which proved
very successful in reversing this crisis.
Fortunately for the Governments policy, the cold war was well
under way when the communist uprising began, and so it was
possible for British policy makers to alert the American Govt
to the nature of their Malayan problem and elicit a sympathetic
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response. With France at war with the Vietnamese Communists
and China on the brink of a communist revolution, it was all
the easier for British policy to be seen in a favourable light
in Washington. The USA was thus prepared to increase its
stockpiles of Malayan rubber and tin, and to accept strict
limits on its dollar imports, in order to help the British economy.
(Callaghan, p127, 1993)
Just over a year later Malaya had a trade surplus with America of $185.7 million,
the largest within the sterling area; while the total sterling area dollar deficit had
been reduced from a third quarter 1949 figure of $539 million to a fourth quarter
figure of $31 million ( ibid, p127-8).
The anti-USSR stance taken by the Labour government post 1945 was
instrumental, not just in securing more favourable sterling balances and boosting
the current accounts in the short term, but also in securing the medium term
future of the sterling area itself. American capital had initially attached
imposing strings to the provision of dollar aid worth $3, 750 million; calling for
British capital to relinquish the sterling area, interest to be paid on the loan and
the convertibility of sterling within the year. However, the new 'cold war'
conditions and Britain's crucial anti-communist credentials, became instrumental
factors in a new deal. American capital, in order to allow British capitalism to be
the bulwark against communism abroad and communism at home, would allow
Britain to receive Marshall Aid and keep the lucrative sterling area. Even the
failed reconvertibility of sterling for a short period in 1949 and the eventual
devaluation of sterling and move back to unconvertibility, was allowed to go
largely unredressed by American capital. Of course British capital could no
longer secure their ideal of completely closing the sterling area to world
penetration, nevertheless important tariffs remained and, more importantly, so
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did the arrangements concerning the use of sterling and trade links imposed on
the colonies of British Imperialism. In effect the arrangements concerning
sterling and trade links between British capital and its colonial powers, was the
basis upon which a fusion of interests between large industrial capital and
fmance capital was grounded. The super profits generated also provided one of
the vital pillars upholding the Labourist system.
7.3 The Sterling Area and Bretton Woods
The sterling area was, then, of vital importance. The sterling area and the
provision of Marshall Aid, became vital international lifelines which went some
way to securing sufficiently healthy balalnce of payment to consolidate the new
Labourist system domestically. The Bretton Woods agreement was the fmal
consolidating factor, internationally, to the underwriting of Labourism
domestically. The agreement allowed western capitalist currencies to be pegged
to the dollar at a fixed parity which allowed vital adjustments to national money.
Essentially the adjustments, and Bretton Woods exchange rate regime in general,
were recognitions of the fact that each western capitalist nation had to make its
own compromises with its working class. Thus the ability to devalue sterling, if
and when required by the changing balance of class struggle, provided the
necessary international vacuum within which the management of national money
could work, via the adaptation of Keynesianism. As Bonefeld (p70, 1993) put it,
'The Keynesian mode of integration of labour was underpinned by international
agreement of currency exchange relations, based on the Bretton Woods
agreement of 1944 and the reconstruction of capitalism in Europe through the
Marshall Plan,.308
308 What Bonefeld does not reflect on is the criucial role Stalinism played in this, or , rather, the way in
which Stalinism was used by capitalist rulers to weld the labour left and the working class to the containment
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The Bretton Woods agreement was a hybrid relation completely befitting the
transitional nature of the epoch. On the one hand, its sought to constrain the
floating national currencies of the 1930s, itself a reflection that circulation capital
had set adrift from productive capital to escape the 'problem of labour'. On the
other hand, it sought to offer a realignment of circulation capital with fixed
capital on a more flexible basis. The ability to change the value of national
currencies offered considerable scope for any necessary adjustments to the
underlying conflict of interests between finance and industrial capital, in the
overall interest of continuance of the exploitation of labour. One important
manifestation of this was the so called 'stop-go' deflationary/reflationary policies
forced on Britain capital. At one and the same time it weakened Labourism and
extended its unstable life. Once the sterling area began to weaken under the
weight of sterling convertibility in 1958 and the declining competitiveness of
industrial capital, the buffer effect of 'stop-go' accumulation on the basis of
control of national money, became of crucial importance in the containment of
labour, but also in its resolve to become more militant.. By the same token, once
the Bretton Wood agreement had been tom up in 1972, the 'stop-go' phenomenon
became more pronounced, and less effective in controlling labour. The
immediate, initial, effect of the Bretton Woods agreement, Marshall Aid and the
sterling area accumulation regime, was to institutionalise the management of a
debased money capital, towards the goal of reuniting (however shakily)
circulating capital and fixed capital. Empirically it allowed the state to filter
credit from the private sector and/or print its own money, in order to achieve two
goals; enhance the use value creating sector tied to the welfare state, and to prop
up large productive capital's with lucrative sales to the state and/or state
subsidisation.
strategy implied by the success of Bretton Woods. Bonefe1d is not alone, see for example, Pilling (1986);
Burnham (1990); Armstrong et al (1984).
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The sterling area, supplemented by Marshall Aid and Bretton Woods, effected a
compromise between large industrial capital and finance capital in a number of
specific ways. It allowed a fusion of interests: finance capital supplying
industrial capital with investment capital re-routed from the commonwealth,
whilst at the same time earning interests on the re-routed capital. The investment
capital was then used by industrial capitalists to expand its sales into the captive
imperial markets of the commonwealth. These markets were secured by finance
capital's grip on foreign exchanges, which stemmed from the 'agreement' imposed
on colonies that all colonial profits should be held in sterling. As sterling was
unconvertible until 1958, this meant colonial countries either had to leave their
sterling deposits idle, in which case finance capital would make parasitic use of
them, or use them to purchase commodities denominated in sterling (ie, British
commodities), in which case the deal underwrote industrial capitalists profits.
Such a captured market allowed the large industrial capital's in Britain to comply
with the surplus value restricting confines of the new Labourist environment -
personnel management/national industrial relations system (which
bureaucratically atomised workers and restricted relative surplus value
extraction); government intervention on wage floors and health and safety; the
greater taxation implied by demand management; the greater economic strength
of workers due to full employment. The sterling area was vital to maintaining all
these commitments, while still maintaining profit rates. It is also on the above
basis that circulation capital continued to dominate fixed capital, in the sense that
super profits from the captive imperial markets did not require new technique
and new investments. In effect the sterling area allowed socially unnecessary
labour and inferior standard commodities to go 'unpunished' by the world market.
Thus, short termism and the financial dominance within and without the firm of
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fmance capital (by this time orchestrated by institutional investors) (Coakley &
Harris, 1983), could still be maintained under the rule of Labourism. The point
about the dominance of circulation capital over fixed capital is crucial to an
understanding of the later contradictions met by Labourism and will be given
more detailed consideration here after discussing the way in which finance
capital and industrial capital forged a parasitic relationship with the nationalised
industries. Basically this involved a resolution that policy surrounding
nationalised industry should keep capital as fluid and unfixed as possible, in the
contex of the Labourist compromise.
7.4 Labourism and the Promise ofNationalisation.
Full employment; a massive nse m employment in the public sector; the
implementation of wage councils; and legislation protecting workers from hire
and fire motives, all went a long way in substantiating the de-commodification of
labour power. These actions and the general shortage of labour power and the
anti-profit pro 'socialist planning' atmosphere, generated a rise in strikes.
Between 1944 to 45, for example, the incidence of strikes rose by 65% (from
1491 to 2293). Most of the disputes occurred in mining (60%) and transport,
engineering and shipbuilding (25%). Although only of short duration the
disputes signalled a potential disaster for the Labourist project of controlling the
level of income and consumption in the interests of mobilising capital for the
export drive. Fundamentally, then, to the Labourist project was the incorporation
of trade union structures within the Labourist state. Given the de-
commodification of labour power, strikes against the strict adherence to market
forces would be inevitable. To combat this and to force compliance with
restrictions on provision of needs emanating from the social welfare system, it
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was important that the working class were effectively atomised. Whilst the
Stalinisation of the left ensured workers would remain politically atomised or
depoliticised, economically they had enormous potential collective strength at the
point of valorisation, which, if allowed to advance unheeded, would sooner or
later threaten the system. Hence the reason for successive post war Labour and
Tory governments commitment to incorporate the structures of the trade union
movement into the state. To this end the National Joint Advisory Committee
established in 1939 and the Joint Production Committees and Essential Works
Order Acts (1941), were further consolidated by the Production Efficiency Board
and other government non elected boards designed to institutionalise the
compromise between the representatives of capital and labour. This
institutionalisation of trade unionism, was of course the logical development of
the trade union bureaucracies break from labour - its original source of power.
Under the Labourist system of containment, the trade union bureaucracy had a
crucial role to play. That role was to bureaucratically police the working class
and so prevent their potential to act as a class for themselves. To this end the
new institutions of so called 'tripartitism', had to regulate national collective
bargaining; channel and dissipate any wider class grievances into reforms the
system could live with; and, in combination with the growing personnel
management function, atomise workers at the point of valorisation, via strict
adherence to numerous job classifications, demarcation lines and acceptance of
hierarchical management control..etc. The costs this imposed on capital in terms
of restricted relative surplus value extraction, was, apparantly, to be outweighed
by the benefits of increasing control over the working class. The costs were not
an immediate problem when an adequate return of profits could be had via the
sterling area and a world market, which exerted little competitive pressures on
British capital in the first decade after the war. The reward for the trade union
bureaucracy was their recognition as an essential national institution and the
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corresponding political influence at governmental level over the future direction
of the economy, that went with it. As Hyman explains;
Their representation on tripartite consultative and
administrative bodies, already highly developed during war
should be sustained and extended; direct consultation with Tue
leaders should precede government initiatives; intervention in
industrial relations without TUe agreement was taboo. These
demands were accepted by the Government in principle, even
ifnot always satisfied in practice.
The Government, of course, could not be ruled by principle because
substantively the TUC's role was to contain and police the working class. For
example, the TUe were committed by member trade unions under pressure from
the rank and file, to adopt collective bargaining in the market place. It was felt
by workers that in a time of labour power shortage, their interests would best be
served by using national collective bargaining power to wrest higher wages and
better conditions from capital. The TUe acquiesced on the matter mindful of
the real task - to control consumption growth in the interests of investment lead
exports; absolutely vital in underwriting Labourism. Hence when a national
incomes policy, subordinating the rank and files economic strength, was
introduced between the years 1947-8, 'the TUe made all the concessions, a
reflection of its almost complete uncritical acceptance of the Government's main
policy'.309
Between 1945-51 the number of strikes was at a record high, although disputes
were often minor and relatively short lived. Any major disputes that did occur
309 R Hyman in J. Fyrth (edt) (1993), pI8? Hyman is part quoting from J. Tomlinson, The Labour
Government and the Trade Unions: 1945-51, in N. Tiratsoo (edt) (1991).
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took place in the mines prior to nationalisation. This strike wave suggests that
the promise to decommodify labour, inherent in full employment and social
welfarism, had increased workers confidence and economic muscle. However,
while Labourism provided the basis of this new found confidence (later a
powerful shop stewards movement would develop on this basis), it also provided
the basis of the working classes de-politicisation. The national state socialist
movement, given ideological and practical impetus by Stalinism, dominated the
political head of the working class. The hegemony of left Labourism, which held
that 'socialism' was to be an evolutionary process, dictated by Parliament and
handed down from above, had in thralled most of the leading elements of the
working class. Therefore, labour's 'economic body' might prove resistant,
recalcitrant and militant as the decades lapsed after the post war settlement, but
its collective 'political head' would prove a decisive factor in the channelling of
discontent into reformism. The bait being that reformist compromise was
identified as a kind of down payments on the goal of state socialism.
This de-politicisation of workers was not unique to the British working class, of
course. Alongside the rest of the international working class, British workers
had to suffer the massive political retrenchments caused by the defeated
revolution of 1917, the subsequent rise of Stalinsm and the subtifuges of the cold
war. The de-politicisation was, hence, profound and epochal. 310 Given the
extent of this de-politicisation, it is little surprise that the working class offered
no resistance to the Labour Party and TUC's manoeuvres to reject any notion of
worker representations in the 'socialist' industries after nationalisation (Savage,
1993; Saville, 1993). The same holds for the newly created institutions of the
social welfare state.
31
0 For a deeper understanding of the epochal significance of Stalinist influence on the working class, the
reader is refered to the Journal Critique, which has devoted much of its 22 year existence to its explanation.
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The nationalised industries in many ways epitomise the way Labourism works to
contain labour, while allowing the vested interests of capital to reign. Workers
were given no say in the control of nationalised industries at their conception.
The sale of nationalised industries to the state was not the outcome of worker
appropraition, but a fmancial bonanza for capital, who were busy running them
down anyway. The nationalised industries were run and controlled by fmanciers
and prominent industrialists who payed themselves vast salaries. They were run
with the interest of subsidising the market sector with under priced supplies of
commodities. Emanuel Shinwell ( Minister for the Coal Industry) vetoed the
idea of workers control. Instead an ex Director of the Bank of England and a
number of senior military figures staffed the Board of the National Coal Board.
As one source explains, the 'myriad trade and advisory committees which
surrounded the nationalised industries, and the industries themselves were
controlled and run by fmancier, industrialists and civil servants'.311 Likewise,
the Ministry for Food was effectively run and controlled by ninety of Unilevers
management staff. The Capital Issues Committee, which coordinated capital
investment decisions for the network of nationalised industries, were controlled
by 'seven bankers, stockbrokers and industrialists'.312 A combination of senior
military, bankers, stockbrokers, industrialist and civil servants, manned the
Boards of other nationalised industries too; including Electricity, Gas, Cable &
Wireless, BOAC andBEA.313
The transference of ownership and control may have been largely illusory, but
the magnitude of the transference of capital, as compensation for the sale of
nationalised industries and payment for fmancial 'consultation and underwriting',
most certainly was not. 'The Government excelled itself in compensation paid to
311J. Saville, cited in J. Fyrth (1993), op-cit, p45.
312J. Saville (1993), op-cit, p46.
313 For a more extensive description of the controllers and their background, see A.A. Rogow (1955), The
Labour Government and British Industry 1945-51, Oxford.
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the railways, the London Passenger Transport Board, and inland waterways',314
as well as Coal, Electricity and Gas. The valuation of these industries did not
take account of the dilapidated extent of the fixed capital assets and placed a
value in accordance with their present share value, which had remained high,
needless to say, due to fmance capital's expectations of the favourable terms of
sale. For example, even though the Ministry of Fuel had warned that old stock
and assets in the Coal industry would have to be replaced to the tune of $200
million 'under fierce lobby from mineowners' the Government ignored this and
valued the stock as if there had been little depreciation relative to socially
average technological advances in the market sector.315 Finance capital, having
blocked any move to place workers on the Boards; having earned windfall gains
from nationalisation; and having taken control of the running of the Boards (with
the high salary rewards that go with it), then proceeded to ensure that the
nationalised industries ran in the interests of sustaining the law of value.
The dominant view, forced through against some resistance from rationalisers,
was that the industries should operate on the basis of ensuring that average costs
equalled average prices. This had the benefit of keeping prices artificially low
thus keeping wasteful labour consuming sectors open, in the overall interests of
ensuring that the market sector had a sure source of low cost supplies of energy
to produce their commodities. The result of this was that nationalised industries
did not have enough retained surplus to re-invest in fixed capital and research
and development and were dependent upon state funding. Rather than enhance
use and needs, the nationalised industries became the giant low cost suppliers of
private capitalist industry.
314J. Saville (1993), op-cit, p48-9.
315J. Saville 1993), op-cit, p48-9.
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In subsidising industrial capital, fmance capital could continue with its political
economy of maintaining the dominance of circulation capital in and against fixed
capital formation. The subsidation joined forces with the guaranteed colonial
markets, to ensure enough space for industrial capital to keep up its profit rate
without unnecessarily raising the organic composition of capital. Thus,
Labourism had provided, in the form of nationalisation, the basis for the
continued rule of finance capital and continued accumulation of capital in
general.
The problem it still faced, however, was keeping labour at arms length politically
and hence ensuring that their innate economic strength did not translate to
challenges to the compromise and!or to too much pressure to expand use value
and need provision. As will be explained later, this problem did come back to
haunt capital. The essence of the policy, then, surrounding the nationalisation
programme, was to maintain the circulation capital bias. The policy, as indicated
earlier, derived from and bolstered the same bias characterising the surplus value
creating sectors of British capitalism. An issue taken up in more detail below.
7.5 Labourism and Circulation Capital
The policies generated by Labourism of full employment; the direct provision of
substantial needs via the social welfare state; national commitment to collective
bargaining and demand management, went allong way towards de-commidifying
labour power. The economic strength which accrued to the working class, due
to these policies, represented a significant capitalist concession. Of course the
de-politicisation of workers reduced the danger to capital that such concessions
which valued use value and need, rather than strictly the maximisation of
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profitability, would form the basis of a political programme against capital.
However, given the precarious nature of Labourism, to further neutralise this
danger, capital retained its circulatory capital bias within the economy and
especially within the enterprise. The emphasis on circulation, by implication,
meant a down playing of commitments to long term fixed capital formation and
lack of commitment to reorganising the use of labour power along Taylorist
lines. This is why the personnel management function and a new commitment to
national collective bargaining becomes so vital to the Labourist system. Their
task is to bureaucratically atomise the underlying social integration of labour
power (see chapter six).
If successful the bureaucratic atomisation blocks the advancement of labour
acting as a class. It also allows the further (pragmatic) development of the
abstraction of labour power in production. The tendency towards abstraction
had been held back by capital during the depression years, specifically to counter
working class collectivity and impose atomisation through unemployment (the
basis of the slow down in accumulation suffered at that time). Under the new
Labourist containment, finance capital will only commit itself to valorising labour
power if it can maintain its circulatory bias across the large productive capital's.
The potential loss of relative surplus value extraction that the rejection of
Taylorism and long term fixed capital formation implies, could be largely
overcome only if Britain remained within the sterling area, which allow positive
rates of profit to be maintained and bolstered. Another key factor to this
compromise was the continued expansion of world market share of traded
commodities, or at least sustaining the percentage share acquired during the
1950s. These are the pillars of Labourism so far as capital is concerned. Added
to these are the less essential subsidies from the state and the implicit
subsidisationthe nationalised industries provide the private sector.
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The slow crumbling of the sterling area and loss of world markets from the mid
1950s onward, undermined these pillars placing immense pressure on the
circulation capital bias within the economy. The latter was essential to fmance
capital's continued endorsement of Labourism, hence as the sterling area
crumbled so to did the class compromise at the heart of Labourism. The rate of
profit went on a decline and fmance capital, struggled to manoeuvre itself out of
Labourism in an effort to continue its commitment to circulation capital. The
subsequent drives for 'modernisation' (Wilson's 'white hot technical revolution'),
was evidence of left Labourism's commitment to Labourism, especially in the
face of a growing tide of working class unrest. Their miserable failure at every
turn to impose 'modernisation' is testimony to the deep hostility fmance capital
began to express against Labourism.
As previously explained (chapter five), an emphasis on circulation capital has
become 'second nature' to finance capital as the means to its survival. One
example, of the extent of finance capital's circulatory capital bias is provided by
the fact that in Britain, unlike America, the 'H'-form (holding company form) of
capitalist organisation predominated right up until the mid 1970s.316 In essence
under the 'H'-form, productive capital becomes a loose ensemble of plants and
enterprises (fixed capital), all with independent management structures and
commodity lines. Sometimes the commodity is the same (horizontal integration),
sometimes a sub part of others within the holding capital (vertical integration)
and some times they are different (diversified integration). The main point is
this: the holding company places a premium on money capital and so remains
largely unconcerned about how the fixed capital it sublates do what they do, so
long as short term profit rates remain relatively satisfactory. If profits decline,
then the loose arrangement makes it that much easier to sell off unprofitable
316 See T. Nichols (1986), for a concise outline of the deficiencies of the Britsh industrial organisational
structure, due to the predominance of the 'H'-form, For a more detailed account see D.F. Channon (1973), The
Strategy and Structure ofBritish Enterprise, MacMillan.
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enterprises and to buy others that are more willing to achieve the goals set by
circulation capital's needs. When this becomes the driving force of an entire
economy, then the productive capital's, which constitute most of the dominant
industrial capital's, usually remains small and under capitalised. As a result
economies of scale are limited and the ability, or will, for long term investment
becomes systematically reduced. The latter represents the result of fmance
capital's quest to impart a circulationary bias, to create maximum flexibility in its
manoeuvrings to contain labour, while maintaining a distance from labour.
It is no accident, therefore, that, as Nichols points out, British capitalism has at
one and the same time the most centralised forms of capital scattered around
some of the smallest enterprises, as measured by number of employees (Nichols,
1986). The centralisation of capital and atomisation of labour is thus combined
in the 'H'-form. American enterprises had long ago (by the 1920s) adopted the
'M'-form (multi-divisional form) and rejected the 'H'-form. The 'M'-form
describes rigid corporate hierarchical controls at the centre of productive capital,
over clearly defined functional and/or regional units. It is premised on long term
investment strategies and Taylorist hierarchies of management control. It also
implies the intense abstraction of labour via the commitment to maximising
relative surplus value extraction (see chapter six for an extended explanation).
The 'M'-form, given the peculiar nature of the class compromise at the heart of
Labourism, contradicts the Labourist containment strategy. As a result it fmds it
hard to flourish in Britain. Thus the 'H'-form becomes a necessity for capital in
Britain, and not, as many have claimed, an eccentric vice.
The influence of this style of accumulation strategy on the entire British economy
is all embracing. For example, between 1949-70, the 100 largest industrial firms
portion of manufacturing output grew from 23% to 41%; the figures for
employment roughly shadow this. If we take into account also the large frrms
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overwhelming dominance of small to medium firms, many of which are
suppliers to large capital, then one begins to grasp the true extent of influence
enjoyed by the largest 100 units of productive capital. Thus the fact that virtually
all of the top 100 applied the 'H'-form structure (the likes of ICI being the
exception that proves the rule), is no small confrrmation that finance capital's
circulatory capital bias has manifested its influence on accumulation throughout
the economy during the period of sytemic Labourism. One has only to note, by
way of example, the ad-hoc finance driven mergers which created British
Leyland Motor Company (BLMC) and latterly Rover, and created GEC from
English Electric.
Another related factor of the circulatory capital bias, is the particular
preeminence of personnel management and collective bargaining framework to
British capitalism, mentioned in the previous chapter. The personnel function
liaises with a formal bureaucratic network of class containment - the national
collective bargaining organ of the trade union movement. However, due to,
firstly, the circulation bias of finance capital and, secondly, the economic
strength imparted to labour by full employment status, an informal collective
bargaining arrangement develops. The personnel management / formal
bureaucratic collective bargaining procedures are designed to contain and
atomise workers within productive capital and throughout the rest of the
economy. However, the informal collective bargaining between rank and file
workers/shop stewards and individual productive capital gains strength from
capital's necessary short termist outlook. That is to say, the more formal
arrangements which attempt to atomise workers via bureaucratic rules
procedures and regulation, imply a longer time horizon of investment by capital
to sustain it. Because this is not forthcoming, then the working class escape the
full implications of bureaucratic atomisation. As a result, their economic
resistance to capital is provided with a renewed impetus (one which the Donovan
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Commission would pick up on in the 1960s). The resistence means that labour
was much more prone to breaking out of the orbit of control of Labourism and its
realignment of use and exchange value. For labour, as the 1960s and 1970s
bears witness to, use value and need came to be the sole criteria of demands
placed on capital.
Burawoy picked up on this informal resistence and its devastating effects on both
the ability for the formal bureaucracy to contain labour and relative surplus value
extraction. Describing the results of a sociological study conducted in the early
1950s on a small engineering subsidiary of Vickers, he points out how the
bureaucratic containment of labour is significantly weaker compared to an
American counterpart of the same size and industry. He goes on to show how
the informal bargaining of the workplace overrides much of the formal
atomisation imposed on workers. As a result, workers are able to significantly
resist time and motion study and work speed ups. In fact, through a process
described as 'gold bricking', Burawoy reveals the extent of restrictions on relative
surplus value extraction. That this was allowed to continue within Vickers as a
natural product of daily working life is testimony to the systematic nature of the
informal resistence. Evidence that this was systematic to the economy as a
whole, is revealed by the late 1960s findings of the 'Commission on Industrial
Relations' (Fox, 1985). For it to have been allowed to continue for so many
decades is further testament to its centrality in the structure of accumulation
imposed by fmance capital after the war, as a pivotal part of the Labourist
containment package (later I analyse how this informal and formal tension
develops and how the circulatory bias of fmance capital is eventually
challenged).
Labour, given strength and renewed militancy by full employment conditions,
begins to encroach upon the state and demand the further suppression of
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valorisation to use and need. This issue became a critical one when fmance
capital lost one of the central pillars of its accumulation strategy as the sterling
area crumbled. Labour pushed for use and needs to be met, but due to its own
crisis, fmance capital had to begin to rest itself free from commitments to
industrial capital and to the Labourist project orchestrated at state level. The
state, pulled first one way and then another by labour and capital over the
contradictory motives of use and exchange value, attempts first to intervene
(moves towards greater state intervention in the 1960s); or attempts to halt
Labourism in its tracks (Heath government 1971-74); or reverts once more to
Labourism (Labour government of 1974-76); before fmally ending the Labourist
compromise (Labour and Tory governments from 1976 to the present). Such is
the essence of the post war era of systemic Labourism. The details need to be
unearthed, however, of how, why and under what specific conditions the brief
ascendency and slow decline of Labourism manifested. One needs to consider,
in other words, the manner in which central pillars of Labourism were destroyed
by class struggle.
7.6 The Destruction ofthe Central Pillars ofLabourism
The fact that the incomes policy of 1948-51 were a success in controlling wage
settlements and so inflation, is testimony to the initial strength of the Labourist
system in compromising workers to the Labourist project and containing them to
the needs of a declining capitalism.
So long as the system could maintain steady growth in living standards which
were not subsequently retrenched by inflation, then the project of labour
containmentwould be relatively successful. Because labour containmentwas the
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substantive ground upon which finance capital's containment to the project of
systemic Labourism rested, the same conditions of success also held for them
too. Yet, as argued earlier, the foundations of this dual containment were
necessarily short term - the sterling area and a growing share of world trade
outwith the sterling area. These international pillars of Labourism were
eventually to be detonated around the late 1950s. Firstly, Germany, France,
Japan..etc, had quickly caught up and overtook British capital in the export
market. Secondly, sterling became convertible in 1958.
Due to the specific social relations established between capital and labour within
the labour process in Britain, namely the overarching desire to control workers
and maintain the dominance of circulating capital, the efficient valorisation of
labour power in the export led sector of productive capital had been
sacrificed.317 This led to the persistent poor productivity growth which
plagued the economy throughout the 1950s. A fact that many commentators
have noted, but provide little essential understanding of.318 Because the
dominance of circulation capital was inscribed in the Labourist compromise itself
- the escape route for capital, given the imposition of use value and need - little
could be done to arrest and reverse the poor productivity, investment and output
growth rates The shrinking of export markets was thus both inevitable and rapid
during the 1950s and became sustained throughout the 60s and 70s. The
shrinking share of exports presented itself as a permanent underlying crisis in the
balance of payments. The potential repercussions for Labourism were immense:
aggregate demand management, which had become the main vehicle through
317 An example of the circulation capital bias over fixed capital is provided by the fact that fixed capital
investment in the Steel industry amounted to only one third of the average invested in european steel, see D.L.
Burn (1961) The Steel Industry: 1939-59, CUP. AJ;, Oberbeek (1990, p123) points out, the steel industry was
no anomaly, but representative of the general trend in British industrial capitals.
318 I refer the reader back to my initial critique of de-industrialisation theory in chapter one for a full
acount of this.
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which the push for needs over profits had become manifest, would have to be
more stringentlypoliced than ever before.
Under the cover of full employment and a burgeoning shop stewards
organisation, this attack on the re-alignment of use and exchange value, would
have to be mounted with capital in a weakened position. The TUC's ability to
control the working class was by no means guaranteed and at any rate the TUC
had vested interests in maintaining Labourism. In these circumstances the
immense pressure from finance capital for the re-introduction of sterling
convertibility, proved overwhelming. The development of the Buro-dollar
market was also a related avenue of escape for finance capital. In 1958 sterling
again became an international currency. However, the contradictions merely
heightened. British finance capital became home to the euro-dollar market and
home to sterling balances which could be lost in a moment of sustained
speculation. In a word the City of London had again become the focus of
international capital exchanges. As such, it became hyper-sensitive to domestic
class conditions, which had more and more to fit in with international exchange
requirements and not Labourism (Ingham, 1984).
The inherent weakness of the British economy had been shielded by the sterling
area and, more precisely, by the fact that the trade imbalance would not translate
into the movement out of sterling by lender nations. Convertibility changed all
this. From that moment, to offset a run on sterling, the value of sterling had to be
maintained in order for it to remain attractive to holders. This gave capital two
choices. Firstly, it could commit itself to maintain the value of sterling, no matter
the domestic requirements of labour, or, indeed, industrial capital. Secondly, it
could commit itself to resisting any further lowering of interest rates and hiking
them up when required. Both of these conditions necessarily damage fixed
capital investment and the ability to export. In this respect the choices were of
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the poison chalice kind. The high value of sterling strategy to save the sterling
area, meant worsening balance of payment crises and hence the inevitable run on
sterling, which again could lead to higher interest rates to keep sterlings value
from falling further. The sterling area was lucrative while it lasted, but ultimately
a lost cause ofr finance capital and became effectively useless, as a pillar for
Labourism, from the late 1960s onward.
This was not the end of the problem facing Labourism. As the sterling area
weakened so the importance of facing the far superior competitive forces of the
EEC nations strengthened. When one combined this with the already chronic
valorisation problem, the defining limits of Labourism become clear. by the late
1950s a clear choice offered itself to finance capital: either the working class be
more stringently contained, or massive deflation and so de-industrialisation must
inevitably set in. In the ensuing two decades the opposing natures of use and
exchange value creation were never in greater contradiction as the objective
struggle of capital and labour to realise the dominance of either one or the other
over the economy as a whole gained pace within the context of all the conditions
and contradictions so far defined.
Labourism and the Modernisation Movement
The first initiative in response to the contradictions mentioned, adopted by
successive Governments, was to resecure the foundations of Labourism. Hence
the Conservative Government's moves to establish the National Economic
Development Council (NEDC) in 1962. The NEDC was to be the central hub in
a network of institutional arrangements between the TUC, government and, what
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was later established as, the CBI. Initially the idea was that the NEDC would
create the missing institutional links required by Labourists to generate the
necessary administrative mechanisms throughout the economy and State, which
would help secure capital and labour's commitment to Labourism. Agreements
would be struck on the rate and scope of investment; rate of wage increases
nationally and also the rate of growth of the social wage embodied in the welfare
state. There was nothing revolutionary about the NEDC, no side was compelled
to comply, initially. It was in fact a basic necessity of any Labourist, or
Labourist type, system. Nevertheless, the stronger institutional role was soon
abandoned and its real function as a method of containing wage inflation, by
adopting incomes policies, quickly emerged. Through the Treasury and Bank of
England, the influence of the City of London and finance capital was being
clearly expressed. Finance capital need only threaten a run on sterling, in order
to bring to heel any notions of a further supression of value relations (Leys,
1986; Gamble, 1980; Longstreth, 1979; Ingham, 1984; Overbeek, 1990).
The second strategy was to intensify the containment of the working class via a
series of national incomes policies. The 1960s were witness to five different
incomes policies, ranging from the initial 'voluntary' agreement to the 'statutory'
enforcement and on to the more direct 'freeze' on wages. The deepening
restrictive nature of each were indicative, once again, of the Governments pro
finance capital stance. As has been recorded, each incomes policy ultimately
failed to contain working class demand. In fact they simply lead to the
beginnings of a re-politicisation of the working class. The large public sector
workforce were the only ones who suffered as a result of incomes policies. A
large proportion of public sector workers sold their labour power outside of the
law of value. A process which meant that any control over wages was invariably
perceived as a political act. By the same token the public sector workforce feel
the pressure from finance capital's fetishistic requirements to establish stringent
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money controls, not as a natural law of the markets, but as a political act by the
Labour Government of the day (Hyman, 1975) to reduce the standard of living
and renege on the their commitment to extending the social wage. Thus the
political struggle over wages soon becomes a wider class struggle over the social
wage. The knock on effect to the market sector, proved to be a major issue of
concern, during the 1960s and 1970s. Leapfrogging wage rises and the offensive
too them taken by capital and the Govrnment, merely fueled the latent militancy
and extended the politicisation of workers. The underlying process was to make
the choice between needs and profits that much starker and uncompromising.
The sterling crisis of 1966, exaserbated the polar opposition emerging between
use and exchange value. The inability to control the economic militancy of
labour, eventually forced the Labour Government to expand the public sector and
go for growth, by tackling finance capital head on with an enforced devaluation
of sterling in the teeth of strong oppositional forces in the Treasury. Commodity
fetishism was weakening even more and labour was moving from a class in itself
some way towards a class in itself. Thus, although still policed by the Stalinised
left and the TUC bureaucrats, a chain reaction of sit-ins, work to rules and
takeovers by workers was set off by the late 1960s. As Spencer points out, from
the abortive worker takeover of GEC factories on Merseyside, to the successful
occupation of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, developed a succession of
strategies struggling to break free from the control of the TUC and Labour Party.
'Work-ens, work-ins, sit-ins, occupations, etc,' all became methods of industrial
action which, 'strikes at the heart of the ownership question',319 and, one should
add, the question of who should control the surplus.
That the incomes policies had backfired in such a drastic way for Labourism, can
be of little surprise, in view of the fact that the policies had driven a wider wedge
into the commodity form of production. Labourism, as, perhaps, finance capital
319 B. Spenser (1989), Remaking the Working Class: Shop Stewards Experience, p22, Russel Press ltd.
354
had always feared it would, was being gradually transformed from the
containment of the working class into the working classes bridge head to the
State. They may not have physically entered the 'corridors of power', but the
immanent power of their class power were beginning to dictate the terms and
conditions of Labourism. Primarily this transpired as the dictation of use value
and need over exchange value and profit. The problem for capital was diagnosed
by The Donovan Commission, a Royal Commission of academics, industrialists,
finance capitalists and trade union bureaucrats, established to discuss the
'problem of labour'. Despite the usual reification of the central issue, they struck
at the heart of the problem for capital. The Labourist system, the report
concluded, had brought into being an industrial relations system, which exhibited
two opposing tendencies; a formal collective bargaining arena and an informal
one. The conflict between the two had caused (so the Donovan Commission
argued) the poor productivity, poor investment rates and the creeping inflation
which had retarded British capitalist accumulation since the war. The essence of
their argument can be summarised as follows: on the one hand, the formal
mechanisms, controlled by the TUC and trade union bureaucracy in general,
policed the setting of national wages and re-routed class conflict into harmless
reform. On the other hand, there had developed an informal collective
determination over the sale of labour power; one controlled by the rank and file
and their shop stewards committees. The latter persistently broke through most
national agreements and used the full employment conditions to exact wages
without apparant regard to profitability. What is more, they resisted a significant
number of attempts, at the point of valorisation, to restructure the labour process
in an effort to increase relative surplus value extraction. The policing role of the
trade unions and management had failed to curb this by impose even more
rigorous formal bargaining procedures. As a result capitalists were forced to
raise prices to cover the wage demands and the 'restrictions' imposed by workers
on the rate of exploitation. This conflict, in turn, lead to further balance of
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payments problems and inevitable economic decline. If this persisted,
Labourism would come to an end. The Donovan Commission was a bulwark for
Labourism and suggested the only remedy open to it: more bureaucratic policing
of the working class. To this end, successive Governments were encouraged to
set new agenda for industrial relations. Specifically, no strike 'cooling off
periods and the formalisation of rank and file shop stewards and their
committees. It was thought that by tightening up control within the labour
process, increased authority to determine the sale and use of labour power would
shift to national and economy level, and so shift further into the sphere of
influence of the Labourists. In effect the tighter bureacratisation of labour was to
be the basis upon which the polar oppositonal trends of use and exchange value
were to be anchored. If the anchor held, then class compromise could be
effected. ANy weakness or fault lines and the polar opposition would produce
ever more militant responses from capital and labour. Particualrly so as the
inflationary spiral implied by the opposition, would weaken even further the hold
of the value relation. If labourism failed, in other words, finance capital would
put immense pressure on the system to eradicate all restrictions on capital
movement and the inflationary excesses of the State; while labour would push for
further devaluations of money capital, greater rises in living standards and
workers democracy to ensure these claims were carried through.
Initially, the balance of class forces went against fmance capital, as the
subsequent devaluations of 1967 and 1972 testify. The 1967 devaluation,
coupled with the Wilson Government drive for modernisation, made it appear
that a regroupment of capitalist forces within industry, in reaction against fmance
capital, was to be significant. The rationalising mergers of the 60s320 and the
rapid move towards more 'efficient' organisational structures (the 'M'-Fonn)
320 An indicator of merger rationalisation is suggested by the fact that by 1970 the top 100 manufacturing
Companies accounted for 41% of manufacturing output, double the share enjoyed by the top 100 Companies in
1949, see Prais (1976) The Evolution ofGiant Firms, 1909-1970, CUP.
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(Nichols, 1986, p148-9); combined with the anti-labour policies of the Labour
Party embodied in their document In Place Of Strife (1970) and Tory Party
Industrial Relations Act (1971), was evidence of a concerted effort by Labourist
forces to bring both labour and finance capital to heel.
The Labour Party and Tory Party commitment to taming the economic strength
of the working class cannot be doubted. Neither can their commitment to
bolstering the ailing bureaucratic atomisation imposed on the working class by
the twin forces of trade union bureaucracy and personnel management. It is
estimated that between 1963 and 1979 the personnel management function grew
steadily from a figure of between 10, 000-15, 000 to 50, 000. As Pimblott
suggests, 'it appears likely that representatives of personnel managers and
industrial relations specialists on the governing bodies of organisations is
strongly associated with the centralisation of pay bargaining' (1990, p294). In
Place ofStrife (1969) the Labour Party response to the findings of the Donovan
Report, aimed at cutting the basis of working class resistance to the new
rationalisation measures in industry. It proposed to give government direct
powers to settle inter-union disputes; to impose a compulsory 28 day 'cooling off
period in the case of 'unconstitutional' strikes; to set up an Industrial Board to
oversee the imposition of fines; to restructure informal bargaining, by
incorporating the shop steward movement into the bureaucracy of their trade
unions. Finally, in exchange for a greater effort by the trade union bureaucracy,
to quell revolt from below, the government would enforce closed shop
agreements, and provide greater protection over issues such as 'unfair dismissal'.
This left Labourist strategy was stillborn, due to the failure of the Labour Party to
get re-elected in 1970.321 Taken as a whole - rationalisation through mergers;
321 Blackburn argues that Labour would have failed anyway due to its 'sentimental attachment both to
bourgeois society...an to the osolete Atlantic formula'. I think it more fundementally correct to argue, as I have
done above, that the Labour Party would have failed because the poor productivity..etc, and circulation
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reorganisation of the large scale Company structures along 'M'-form lines; the
development towards personnel management and centralised collective
bargaining - the period was the peak of a trend in British capitalist society
towards what has been referred to as 'Corporatism,322 A project quite different
than Labourism which, as argued is the outcome of the containment of class
conflict within a declining capitalism which imparted, not a productivist or fixed
capital bias, but the maintenance of circulation capital bias alongside
bureaucratic atomisation of the working class. The election of a Tory
Government in 1970, marked a definite movement away from anything like the
ideal model of 'corporatism' and especially the haunting reality of the Labourist
compromise. The move away was eventually to find its logical outcome in the
election of the Thatcher Government in 1979. A mixture of right Labourist and
finance capitalist motives are evident in the political strategy adopted by the
Tory Government of 1970-74 to contain the threat of the working class.
7.7 The beginning ofthe Endfor Labourism
The main representatives of industrial capital, the CBI, favoured state regulation
of industrial relations implied by the Labour document, but were most certainly
against any notion of its other aspects such as state control of industry and
'worker representation on the board'. They were, therefore, resistant to any
capital/short termism mentality, was structural to the 'success' (not in some abstract 'efficiency' sense) in
controlling and containing the threat of the working class.
322 Technically, 'Corporatism' is defined as a system of interest mediation..on a non-voluntaristic basis.
The full implications of the social process are that markets are heavily circumscribed in a society where the
state cordinates the actions of major institutional groups (labour and capital), through a rigid hierarchy of
bueaucratic controls. It mplies the possibility ofthe termination of class struggle (hence 'corporatism' remains
an unrealisab1e goal). However, protagonists of the theory suggest societies are capable of drawing near to the
ideal, for example, Fascist Germany. Proponents of the theory in practice, for example, Labourists in Britain,
claim the Corporatist body can be interlocked with social democratic politics. The reality, however, as the
1960s and 1970s have revealed, is rather different - class conflict cannot be institutionalised out of existence!.
358
further movement to corporatism, despite the oft cited claims to the contrary
made by large paternal capitalists such as Weinstock. If nothing else the
dominance within the large industrial capital's of the institutional shareholders,
through their ability to exact changes to the value of shares, not to mention their
ability to exert minority control (see earlier chapter on finance capital), blocked
any paternalistic desires to consolidate corporatist relations with labour.
In this respect the Tory Industrial Relations Act (IRA) (1971) appears to have
gotten things just about right for large industrial capital and the interests of
fmance capital. Firstly, it advocated legal sanctions against trade unions and the
working class, while rejecting any notion of an incomes policy. The lesson had
been learned: incomes policies politicise the working class and are instrumental
in weakening the bureaucratic containment imposed by Labourism. Secondly,
the Tory Government adopted two (ultimately interrelated) strategies. A Neo-
Liberal strategy for the wider economy and an industrial relations strategy
specific to the re-commodification of labour power. The Neo-Liberal economic
strategies aim was to rehabilitate and extend the sphere of influence of
commodity relations. the regulatory powers of the NEDC were to be reversed
and a market lead revival of the economy was to be introduced. Subsidies to so
called 'ailing duck' industries would end, while stringent control of the money
supply would again become the orthodoxy (the end of Keynesianism). The
hoped for result would be deflation, an easing of the balance of payments
problem, increased competition between firms, unemployment and a reduction in
the collective power of labour. The Industrial Relations Act was designed to
work in tangent with the above. As the discipline of the commodity form of
production took affect, labour's own commodity status was to be re-invigorated
and collective power weakened. The closed shop facility was to be weakened;
the rights of individuals within trade unions were to be strengthened in such a
way as to legally undermine collective decisions; a 60 day 'cooling off period
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before industrial action was to be introduced, as well as individual ballots before
strike action.
These strategies of the 1970-74 Heath Government were not simply an attempt
to deal with the ailing exports industry, spiralling inflation and the chronic
balance of payments problem, crucial as these were. Nor was it simply the
outcome of a sudden realisation of the Government that British capital's
international accumulation strategy had to be re-orientated from an 'Atlantic' to a
European one (Blackburn, 1971; Overbeek, 1990). Although this too has some
truth. In a more profound sense, the Heath Governments strategies were an
attempt to break with the Labourist containment of the working class.323 The
balance of payments and inflation problem had been driven to crisis proportions
by the prospect of the break up of imperial preference and the pressure of having
to adjust British average socially necessary labour output to EEC standards. Yet
the adjustment was an impossible one, given that one of the main pillars of
Labourism, the site of valorisation (in particular the large industrial capital's
which dominated the economy such as GEC, ICI, British Leyland, British Steel
etc), had been structurated in such a way as to give finance capital maximum
flexibility through the dominance of circulating capital. As explained earlier,
informal pragmatic collective bargaining, overlain with the formal structures of
worker atomisation provided by personnel management and trade union
bureaucracies, on the one hand and short term circulation capital bias within the
large productive capital on the other hand, were a crucial manifestation of
Labourism. As were its empirical results: poor productivity, low rates of growth
and investment. Thus the problem was not so much one of an international re-
323 Much has been written about the cohesions and breakdowns of 'international capital' vis-a-vis nations
in the age of imperialism. While helpful in setting some crucial aspects of the context of the class conflict
between capital and labour and some of the courses of action open or closed to capitals; it should not be used
as a substitute for such an analysis, yet this has been by and large the case within Marxist 1itrature (eg, see R.
Blackburn, 1971; Oberbeek, 1990). One must insist that the underlying contradiction betwen capital and
labour, not capital and capital, via some abstract 'imperialism', is the real ground upon which an
understanding of the aims, concessions and contradictory policies capitalist governments are forced into.
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orientation, or peicemeal reform, but one of the beginning of the end of an epoch
of the Labourist containment of labour. Commodity fetishism had failed, now
Labourism was failing. A fact inherited by the Thatcher administration.
In as much as this was the real underlying issue to be resolved by capital, then
the two strategies unfolded by the Tory Party in 1971 were indicative of the fact
that, far from driving harder to maintain Labourism, most sectors of capital
wished an end to Labourism. None more so than either the smaller capital's or
the financial institutions of the City. Small capital's because they had been
emasculated by economy wide incomes policies, the collective strength of labour
and taxation claims which bore little relation to their rate of accumulation or
specific market conditions. Institutional share holders and financiers wished an
end to Labourism because they had been hemmed into a declining domestic
economy where valorisation was proving ever more difficult, due to the
politicisation of the working class, which had increased each passing year of
Labourism. Trapped within the British economy, buying and selling shares in a
vane effort to boost short term dividend profitability, against a backdrop of
escalating worker discontent, could only ever be a short term response. One
fraught with increasing danger, as the economy slowed and the working class
breached the barriers of their bureaucratic atomisation, to defend what they
perceived to be a social contract between themselves and left Labourists to
provide needs regardless of profit. The CBI may have voiced reservations about
the IRA (Leys, 1986; Coates, 1989), but, caught in a vice between the TUC's
inability to control the working class adequately and embroiled in
disenchantment amongst capitalist with Labourism, the CBI could bring no
strategy of its own to the bargaining table.
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7.8 The Final Collapse.
The historic defeat of the Tory Government has been well documented, both in
its ability to enforce deflationary policies and to control the collective power of
the labour movement.324 By 1972 the IRA had been shelved, laid to ruin by
the working class.325 In the same year a complete reversal of economic policy
had occurred. The infamous 'Barber Boom', set in motion a massive reflation of
the economy. The Tory government had backed down and recommitted itself to
Keynesian demand management. The Tory Government made some noises in the
direction of corporatism, but the commitment was only half hearted as the TUC
terms were too demanding.326 Finance capital were being made to pay for the
Governments failed attempt to remove Labourism and now had to bide its time
before making its next move to attempt to dissolve the Labourist compromise.
The majority of commentators, quite correctly, point to the political ineptitude of
the Heath Government over its handling of the two strategies, as well as its
misfortune in carrying through the attack on the labour movement just when the
world economic crisis and OPEC oil embargo hit Britain. While it is quite right
to say that the Government were inept in using civil law (a tactic which made
'martyrs' of the working class, around which they could collectivise their threat to
capital); and correct to point out that they attempted too much industrial relations
reform too soon (a fact which gelled further still the collective response of
324 For example C. Crouch (1979); A. Barnett (1986), Class Struggle and the Heath Government, NLR,
No 77. D. Coates (1989).
325 The TUC had also felt the pinch of government policy to bring an end to Labourism. This had the
effect of weakening the TUC's desire to control worker militancy; in fact the opposite was the case. The TUC
eventually backed the call for a General Strike to bring down the IRA. The gaoling of the 'Pentinville Five'
(Dock workers gaoled for breaching the IRA), brought the whole process to a head, leaving the Government
no option, but to either take on the working class at a time when the TUC were unwilling/unable to stop them,
or backdown; the latter was of course prefered at this particular moment in the balance of class forces.
326 The Government brought the TUC and CBl together for talks about the formulation of economic
policy based on the NEDC. However, according to Fox (1985, p402), 'The union proposals which ncluded
repeal of the IRA and the Housing Finance Act, were deemed to be too high a political price and the
government backed off.
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labour). However, such diagnosis continue to miss the main point of why the
response from the working class was so explosive, so immediate and so damning
for capital. To explain this one must refer to what the elimination of Labourism
meant in terms of the commodityform of production relations.
It has been argued in this thesis that, commodity fetishism, as the capitalist
labour control mechanism has gone into decline. The source of that decline lay
in capital's incessant need to abstract labour in production and exchange in order
to increase the efficiency of relative and absolute surplus value extraction. Yet
the abstraction of labour transforms itself into working class socialisation in
production. The subsequent collective organisation of its leading sections
against capitalism limit capital's ability or desire to further the abstraction of
labour. Due to this limit, fixed capital investment declines, as does the capitalist
mode of production. The decline issued forth capital's primary response: the
development of finance capital and its dominance over the economy and labour.
Finance capital initially used parasitism, de-industrialisation, slump and the
resulting high, sustained levels of unemployment, in their attempt to regain
control over labour. Although surplus value extraction suffered, finance capital's
profits did not necessarily do so, due to monopoly pricing and more importantly
the export of capital.
However, this was only ever a short term strategy of labour containment and, as
explained, a new strategy had to be institutionalised; one which supported ailing
commodity fetishism and allowed the continued development of the abstraction
of labour in production and exchange. Thus the Labourist system came into
being in order to re-establish control over labour. The essential task was to
allow the further abstraction of labour in production to continue, while resisting
the negative effects it has on increasing the social integration of labour power
and the effects this subsequently has in developing class wide action and
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consciousness against the system. For this, Labourism has to penetrate the
whole of society - the state, the economy and the site of valorisation itself. As
argued, The Labourism which slowly emerged to actuality after WW11,
attempted to gain this level of penetration. The sum total of social welfarism, full
employment, Keynesian management of money, national collective bargaining
system, and the combination of personnel management and trade union control at
the workplace, sought to penetrate every pore of society and in so doing contain
the working class in a bureaucratic straitjacket. The purpose was to politically
atomise collective labour and chanel labour inot abstract collectives, limited to
reforming the fundemental condition of alienation.
The inherent contradiction between capital and labour in the face of a declining
capitalist system, proved to be far too strong a force for labourism to resolve.
Labourism brought control, but at the price of poor productivity, poor investment
in fixed capital and output growth rates vis-a-vis competitors. Nevertheless,
Labourism, for a period, resting upon the pillar of Stalinism (see earlier
explanation), did contain the potent force of socially intergrated labour. The
containment strategy was weakened considerably, however, when the institutions
of the sterling area, as a central material support pillar of Labourism, eventually
crumbled. The 1960s bore witness to the fact that, as Labourism grew weaker,
its institutions became accessories to the re-politicisation of the working class.
The class had gained entry to the State and Government policy. It began to use,
as a kind of 'battering ram', the very institutions (collective bargaining, full
employment, social welfare commitment to the meeting of needs) which before
had served to emasculated labour. Thus, when the Tory Government decided to
dissolve their commitment to Labourism, they were effectively dissolving the
control mechanism over labour at the very same time as labour had become
politicised into defending them. The outcome served only to strengthen the
inherent socialisation of labour and intensify its political will to resist capital.
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As history reveals, the TUC were way behind the working class and finding it
increasingly difficult to head off their political confrontations with the state. The
mineworkers victory in 1972 and more infamous one of 1974, which had ushered
in the three day weeks and blackouts, were merely the head of steam generated
out of the wider social unrest, guiding, focusing and radicalising it. As Kessler
puts it the three day week and the blackouts thrust 'industrial relations into
peoples homes - their lights went out - and that raised the significance of
industrial action in pursuit of wage claims to a new political level' (p23, 1992).
The effects of the Stalinist influence over labour, however, were reinforced. The
doctrinaire belief in and uncritical acceptance of a national state socialist project,
was always to be the reef upon which the working classes militancy would
flounder. It is around such a project that the Labour Party and trade union left
(then called the Bennites) could fulfil their historic role for capitalism; welding
the working class to Labourism once more. The fact that the revolutionary left
was either seduced by the Labour Party and/or were wedded to the view that
something inherently progressive and socialist was at work in the USSR, left the
working class with little direction to channel its discontent, accept into electing a
Labour Government once more. The left of the Labour Party, in winning the
political head of the working class to Labourism once again, had won the right to
at least call the manifesto shots of the incoming Labour Government of 1974.
The result was that Labourism was provided with the all too necessary radical
twist in order to dispel the militancy of workers and draw them back into
reformism. The new twist was that use value would be given even higher
prominence as a telos for social relations than Labourism had endorsed hitherto.
Exchange value and its criteria was to be a poor second. Empirically, this
revealed itself in the Labour Party manifesto as a massive expansion of social
welfare; firmer commitment to full employment; stronger emphasis on demand
management; and the extension of the nationalisation programme into industry
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and the financial institutions of the City. As Hawkins points out, 'The idea
behind the contract..was that workers might be induced to moderate their claims
for higher money wages if their 'social wage' was improved. In return the TUC
undertook to persuade affiliated unions not to push for increases in the real
incomes of their members' (Hawkins, 1978, p72-3).
Against the backdrop of world recession and the OPEC oil embargo, the further
re-alignment in the commodity form of production relations, which the
commitment to a 'social wage' on the scale envisaged in 1974 implied, only
intensified the antagonism between capital and labour. The result in 1974-75
was an effective strike in fixed capital formation leading to a 'three fold increase
in unemployment,327 to 1.5 million and 25% inflation. Known empirically as
'stagflation', its historically specific significance lay in its revelation that the unity
of exchange and use value, which held commodity relations together, was
beginning to stand in outright opposition, tearing apart commodity production
relations. One estimate has it that profits as a percentage of GDP fell between
1972-76 from 14% to 9%.328 As measured by the effective sterling exchange
rate, the value of sterling had fallen by 29% between 1971-5.
Keith Joseph, one of the leaders of the new Neo-Liberal faction within the Tory
Party, was adamant that British capitalism was heading towards destruction and
eventual 'socialism'; propelled by the institutions of the Labour Party and trade
unions, who had little control over the workers they 'represented' (see Coates,
1989). His worries for the negative destruction of capitalism were well placed,
which is more than one can say for his views that the Labour Party were leading
workers to socialism. The social contract entered into by workers and the
Government, which was suppose to enhance needs over exchange value (the
327 P. Ormerod (1992), Government Policy and Profitability, cited in J. Mitchie (edt), The Economic
LegaG,fg p294, Academic Press.
3 P. Ormerod (1992), ibid, p294. This calculation excludes oil and is net of stock appreciation.
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'social wage'), in return for observance of an incomes policy, was more than a
little one sided. Faced by world recession, runs and threatened runs on sterling
and inflation (which appeared to be getting out of control), the Labour
Government implemented its incomes policy, but refused to carry out most of its
promises to labour. A case of a 'contract' on the basis of all exchange value no
use value. As Glyn & Harrison observed, 'Neither Benn nor the Tribunites
fought effectively against this line'. Any talk of an 'alternative economic
strategy', was confmed very much to the corridors of Parliament and viewed as
the usual 'Top down' socialism, through legislative slight of hand (1980, p110-
11). With little political organisation to back up it economic muscle, the working
class would remain entangled in the machinations of Stalinst influenced left
politics. The TUC were brought into central frame to face down pressure from
the rank and file and impose the incomes restraint on member unions.
In the context of this there was a run engineered on sterling which forced the
Labour Government into acceptance of another IMP loan. The loan came with
conditions not surprisingly beneficial to finance capital. The Public Sector
Borrowing Requirement had to be cut by £3 billion and control of the money
supply was to be the focus of policy, not commitment to full employment. The
Labour Government faced down wage rises in the public sector with renewed
vigour, while the TUC done likewise in the private sector. The government then
proceed to uncoil its commitment to Labourism at the behest of the City and
IMP. One after the other, it ended its commitment to Keynesianism, to any
notion of physical planning and ushered in monetarism. As a result, alongside
wage restraint, the working class were now asked to accept a total re-alignment
in commodity relations. Cutbacks in social welfare commitments, the
deflationary control of money supply in the overall interests of value
accumulation and the introduction of a viable reserve army of labour. The
Labour left remained silent.
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Once the promise of 'socialism from above' had collapsed, the working class
mobilised to smash Labourism, the so called 'winter of discontent' being the
empirical manifestation of this. However, with no political guidance, except the
negativeness of 'state socialism', the smashing of Labourism proved to be a
wholly negative affair. The Labour movement collectivised in a negative show
of strength to smash Labourism, then disbanded to leave 'Thatcherism' to emerge
out of the ashes. The 'Alternative Economic Strategy' of the left appearing
ludicrous in a situation where capital was running away from, not embracing,
further mutatations of Labourism.
With full recognition of the the failures of the 1971 IRA, the new Thatcher
faction sought to squeeze out the last vestiges of Labourism which had enmeshed
capital and labour. The trade unions, useless in their ability to control labour had
to be by-passed. A series of 'Employment Acts' throughout the 1980s and 90s
were deployed. They were designed, not so much to control 'union power', (the
real problem was that unions lacked any real power), but to de-collectivise the
working class, as a preemptive strike before attempting to recommodify labour
power. While this route was taken, and in an effort to speed up
recommodification of labour power, fmance capital was set free to ravage the
domestic and world economy in its parasitic craving for profit over and above
surplus value extraction. The results of the past 15 years of political atomation,
structrual unemployment and slump economics, in an economy in rapture to
parasitism from the City of London, in the form of deregulation, privatisation and
recommodification, is evidence of the fact that Labourism, as a strategy of labour
containment and the containment of capitalist decline, has been well and truly
abandoned by the British ruling class. The slump and structural unemployment,
may have succeded in atomising labour, but is, more essentially, evidence that
368
capital has distanced itself further still away from labour, and is ultimately,
therefore, the harbinger of a steepening of the slope of capitalisms decline.
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